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EDMUND HUSSERL

PHANTASY, IMAGE CONSCIOUSNESS, AND MEMORY (1898–1925)

TRANSLATED BY

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What follows is a translation of *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung* (1898–1925), Volume XXIII in the Husserliana series, the critical edition of the works of Edmund Husserl. Husserliana XXIII brings together a broad range of posthumous texts on perception, phantasy, image consciousness, memory, time, and a variety of related topics. They were written during a period of enormous productivity and pivotal development in Husserl’s philosophical life, reaching from the years immediately preceding the publication of the *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901) almost to the time of his retirement in 1928.

As Eduard Marbach, the editor of Husserliana XXIII points out, Husserl formulated grand plans early in the last century for the systematic development and presentation of his thought, particularly of the phenomenology of reason. Part of this project would consist of a “‘very comprehensive work on perception, phantasy, and time.’” Husserl never in fact realized his idea of exploring these topics collectively in a single work, but he did offer courses and write sketches touching on all of them. A selection of these materials, mainly from the first decade of the last century and devoted to time consciousness, was published in 1928 in Husserl’s *Jahrbuch* with a brief foreword.

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3 A critical edition of Husserl’s texts on time consciousness from 1893 to 1917, including those published in the *Jahrbuch* supplemented by a wealth of previously
by Martin Heidegger, who was also listed as the publication’s editor, although it was Edith Stein who had actually assembled the texts when she was Husserl’s assistant in 1917. A significant portion of Stein’s selection consisted of material from the fourth part (“On the Phenomenology of Time”) of a lecture course Husserl gave at Göttingen in the winter semester of 1904/05 on the “Principal Parts of the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge.” The third part of the course was devoted to “Phantasy and Image Consciousness,” and appears in this volume as text No. 1 (1–115). Although the four parts of the 1904/05 course do not represent the fulfillment of Husserl’s dream of a systematic presentation of perception, phantasy, and time consciousness, they do constitute a rich trove of phenomenological analysis and offer fertile soil for the refinements and developments that appear in Husserl’s sketches written over the next two decades, many of which appear in this volume.

Husserliana XXIII includes investigations of Gegenwärtigung, or “presentation,” which characterizes perception, but it focuses particularly on the array of phenomena that fall under the heading of Vergegenwärtigung, or “re-presentation.” The latter embraces memory, expectation, phantasy or imagination, and image consciousness, which is the kind of experience one has in looking at paintings, sculptures, photographs, films, and theatrical productions. The texts assembled here do not exhaust what Husserl had to say about these topics. Eduard Marbach notes, for example, that the distinction between presentation and re-presentation is a fundamental issue in the phenomenology of time consciousness; one therefore finds extensive discussions of perception, memory, expectation, and even phantasy


4 For an account of the status of the texts included in this volume, see Eduard Marbach’s “Einleitung des Herausgebers” to Husserliana XXIII (xxv-lxxii) and his editorial supplement (“Textkritischer Anhang,” 595–723). Marbach’s introduction, notes, and appendix provide an exhaustive critical apparatus for the texts with respect to their dates of origin, condition, subsequent revision, and so on.

5 “Einleitung des Herausgebers,” Husserliana XXIII, xxviii-xxix.
The themes also appear, at least in passing, in the *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I*. The texts in this volume, however, do not simply repeat what can be found in other parts of the Husserlian corpus. Indeed, they offer a significant broadening and deepening of Husserl’s reflection on re-presentation and its forms. And although their primary focus is not on perception or time consciousness, they throw new light on these phenomena as well, adding the kind of nuances that make Husserl’s observations so philosophically fruitful, and clarifying the difficult and often perplexing positions he takes elsewhere in his work. The texts also suggest rich lines of analysis one might take in pursuing such topics as imaging, art, and aesthetic experience.

Despite the ubiquity and obvious importance of presentation and re-presentation in our conscious lives—we are always perceiving in our waking moments, and very often remembering, phantasying, and looking at images—the connections and differences among these experiences are elusive and obscure. They initially confront the philosopher as a tangled skein of phenomena, and Husserliana XXIII may be read as a chronicle of Husserl’s attempts to tease them apart. He returned to this task again and again, his views evolving over the years and in some cases undergoing dramatic change. What he achieved by the end of his life was a comprehensive, if not exhaustive, account of the forms of re-presentation and their relations to one another and to other phenomena. His process of untangling involves making distinctions and showing connections, a common enough phenomenological procedure, but nowhere more in evidence or more effective than here. Husserl’s sketches and lecture notes present the philosopher at work, not talking about phenomenology, but actually doing it. Since, on the whole, he did not write the texts with an eye to publication, he is less constrained than in his published work. He experiments—raising, exploring, and discarding possibilities—and concedes that the phenomena often defy his efforts to understand them and to capture them in an appropriate terminological net. He sometimes changes his mind and freely admits that something he has written is not correct. All

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of this seems to lie in the nature of the phenomenological enterprise itself. As he writes in his 1904/05 lectures, phenomenological analysis has the “peculiarity” that “every step forward yields new points of view from which what we have already discovered appears in a new light, so that often enough what we were originally able to take as simple and undivided presents itself as complex and full of distinctions” (19). His remarks about his struggles with the material can also be poignant and even humorous, leavening the aura of rigorous science surrounding his work. In 1912, for example, after an extended discussion of position taking, he writes: “...I had essentially discovered all of these things long ago, and it is quite remarkable, almost incredible, that I have tortured myself over them for an entire month now and that I had completely forgotten about them” (552).

The freshness and sense of discovery that mark the sketches and lecture notes in Husserliana XXIII represent one of their greatest strengths, but their often unfinished and unsystematic state also poses special difficulties for the reader, who is left with the task of weaving them together into some semblance of a coherent whole. What follows is intended to help in that respect, although the texts are so rich and various that a brief introduction can touch on only a few of their many themes.

I. Presentation and Re-presentation

This first part of the introduction draws attention to some of the key features, relations, and distinctions Husserl uncovers in his investigations of presentation and the various forms of re-presentation, focusing particularly on how their respective objects appear. The second part considers Husserl’s evolving understanding of how acts of re-presentation are “constituted,” that is, how, thanks to their structure, they are able to “intend” or be conscious of their objects.

A. Perception, Memory, and Expectation

Perception. Although Husserl is chiefly concerned with intuitive re-presentation in this volume, perception is never far from the center of discussion. This is not surprising, given that Husserl describes perception as “presentation,” and memory, phantasy, and their kindred
phenomena precisely as types of “re-presentation.” Husserl seeks to understand the latter by playing them off against the former. In fact, one could say that simple and uninhibited perception is the default phenomenon from which all the others proceed: perceptual appearance and perceptual belief “are always already there as the foundation of everything else” (342). A brief look at this foundation will fill in part of the background Husserl assumes in his discussion of re-presentation.

Perception displays certain essential features. As presentation, it is conscious of its object as present (109). It is also conscious of its object as “factually existing” (214), and, if the perception is uncontested, as something in which the perceiver believes (88). Perceptual belief in the existence of the object does not come about by appending something new—a feeling of certainty, for example—to an originally nondoxic presentation; on the contrary, belief “is perception in its primitive mode” (478). Of course, perception can be challenged and its belief modified into doubt or even cancelled, but such doxic modification assumes that an uncontested perception with its belief in the actual and present existence of its object was there originally (88).

One might assume that these features, which are certainly essential to perception, are also unique to it, but this is not Husserl’s considered view. Thus he argues that perception is not the only kind of consciousness that apprehends what presently exists. In addition to the re-presentational consciousness of past and future, there is also a re-presentational consciousness of something that now exists but is not present to me (367). This occurs, for example, when I think of a familiar restaurant as presently existing, even though at the moment I am nowhere near it and it does not in the least enter into my perceptual field. This is a kind of “memory” of the present (636) in which I am conscious of something now existing as merely re-presented (280). Belief is another feature that is essential, but not unique, to perception. “That belief is obviously not the distinguishing characteristic of perception, I scarcely need to say. . . . Memories <are> also distinguished by belief” (88). In memory, I believe that what I remember actually existed in the past, although it is certainly true that my memorial belief derives from a past perception in which what is remembered was originally given in the mode of belief (345). Expectation also includes belief; specifically, the belief that what is expected will exist (172).
If intending an object as present and if believing that it actually exists are, one might say, necessary but not sufficient conditions of perception, what does distinguish perception from acts of re-presentation that share some or all of these same characteristics? Husserl’s answer is that perception not only gives the object as present and existing, but gives it *in person* [*leibhaftig*] (601), as actually there confronting the perceiver. Presence in person involves both temporal presence—the object is perceived as now existing—and presence in the sense that the object is there, standing over against the perceiver and not re-presented as something presently existing but absent from the perceptual field of regard. This original giving of an object as actually existing and intuitively present is the fundamental gift of perception to conscious life, which no form of re-presentation can provide and that all forms of re-presentation presume.

**Memory and Expectation.** If perception is the consciousness of what now exists as present in person, memory is the consciousness of what is past and expectation is the consciousness of what is future. They join perception in positing something in the realm of actuality, but only in perception is the object there in person, which is precisely why memory and expectation are types of re-presentation and not presentation. Despite the absence of their objects, however, memory and expectation still displace us into the past and future of the same world that we are presently perceiving. By contrast, phantasy, as we shall see, transports us into its own world in which what is phantasied is not believed to be actual at all (172).

Husserl describes memory as “actual” consciousness because the past toward which it aims carries the sense of something that has actually been now (603). This implies that memory is rooted in perception, since it is precisely perception that originally gives what is actually present. It follows that memory is not simply the consciousness of a past object, but consciousness of it as having been perceived by me in my past here and now. When I remember a sunset, for example, I remember it as something I once perceived (345).

In his developed view of memory, in place by 1909 or so, Husserl draws out the chief implication of this claim: namely, that the memory of an object is at the same time the memory of the earlier act of perceiving the object (236). This position, as we shall see in the second part of the introduction, has important consequences for the
understanding of the constitution of re-presentational acts. Suffice it to say for the moment that the memory of the past object and the memory of its perception are two aspects of a single act, not two separate acts, and that it is by re-presenting the perception in which the object originally appeared that “‘I am displaced into the past’” (244) and see the object before me again (345). In a similar way, I am transported into the future in expectation by re-presenting a future act of perceiving in which an object will actually stand before me in person.

That memory is the recollection of something I once perceived explains why the remembered or expected object appears as it does. Perception always presents its object in some definite way, from one side or another, in the brightness of daylight or the darkness of night. By recalling the perception, memory also recalls the way in which the object appeared when it was originally presented. Similarly, expectation, looking to the future, anticipates its object as it will appear in a perception yet to come. This does not mean, of course, that memory or expectation give their objects with the force and vivacity of something perceived. The remembered object, Husserl observes, appears as if through a veil or fog. When I recall my living room with its green rug, brown sofa, and so on, “I ‘see’ these varied things in differing ‘freshness’ and ‘vividness,’ in differing ‘fullness and ‘fragmentariness,’ much as if I were seeing through a sort of thick fog” (241). Even if the fog were to lift a little, as Husserl suggests that it can (345), it would not disperse to the point that I would confuse my memory with perception. Memories and expectations can also be “vague” or “explicit.” If, for example, I settle into my seat before a recital with only a sketchy notion of what I am going to hear, I will have a vague expectation. On the other hand, if I expect to hear a song with which I am fully familiar and if I “present it precisely, in advance” (356), displacing it into the future and letting it run its course beforehand, my expectation will be explicit. A month later I might remember that I heard the song, but recall little else about the experience. I could, however, replace this vague memory with an explicit one in which what is past “‘runs its course once again’” (356) in a reliving of the original experience in its successive phases.

While the object of memory appears as past and as something perceived in an earlier now, Husserl observes that its appearance as
past comes about in relation to the actual now. The act of memory itself is not past; it exists in the now and occurs simultaneously with my actual perceiving and with any other acts I may presently be carrying out (244; 307). This existence in the now situates the memory so that it can be conscious of the past by playing it off against the present. More generally, the simultaneity of the acts of perception, memory, and expectation, together with their intentions launched on different temporal trajectories, makes possible the consciousness of now, past, and future as referring to one another (what is past or future is past or future in relation to the now) and as excluding one another (past is not now and now is not future) (Hua X, 318).

B. Phantasy

Phantasy or imagination pervades our quotidian existence. It also plays a key role in phenomenology itself, for it is through free imaginative variation that the phenomenologist achieves insight into the essential structures of experience. Husserl says relatively little in these texts about phantasy’s role in the phenomenological method, but he devotes a great deal of space and effort—probably more than to any other topic—to uncovering the essence of phantasy as a fundamental form of re-presentation. This proved to be a vexing issue. As late as 1923, after decades of investigation, Husserl still cautioned that “we need to reflect carefully here. Determining the essence of phantasy is a great problem” (671). In tackling (and retackling) the problem, Husserl shaped a many-faceted analysis, several aspects of which I shall examine in this section.

Phantasy and the As-if. In perception, memory, and expectation, I am conscious of things and events as, respectively, now existing, having existed in the past, and coming to exist in the future. Phantasy, on the other hand, “is set in opposition to perceiving and to the intuitive positing of past and future as true; in short, to all acts that posit something individual and concrete as existing” (4). Phantasy is an inventive rather than a positing act, and the characteristic of actual existence, which first marks something as concrete and individual, is not something that I can invent (665). When I shift from perception, memory, or expectation into phantasy, I am aware that I have entered a null world in which what I imagine is not taken as presently existing,
as having existed in the past, or as coming into existence in the future (360). I am not under the illusion that the centaur I am now imagining is actually there in person or that I have ever perceived it in the past (345). How, then, does the phantasy object appear to me?

Husserl regularly employs three qualifying phrases to capture phantasy’s unique character: “as it were” (gleichsam), “as if” (als ob, more common in later texts), and “quasi-.” Thus he describes phantasy as “perception ‘as it were’” (345) and claims that I am conscious of what is phantasied “as if it were being actually experienced” (659). Everything that can occur in perception—and much that cannot occur there—can make an appearance in phantasy, always with the index of the as-if. “In lively intuition we ‘behold’ centaurs, water nymphs, etc.; they stand before us, depart, present themselves from this side and that, sing and dance, and so on. All, however, in the mode of the ‘as-if’ . . .” (606). Memory, in its own fashion, is also the consciousness of something as-if, but it remains in touch with an actual past and therefore with actual being. Phantasy’s as-if, on the other hand, is unique in that it is directed precisely against actual existence (673). “There are no phantasy objects—understood as existing objects. There are no existing phantasy worlds” (671). The consciousness of being that characterizes actual existence “has, so to speak, been emasculated” in phantasy (606). Hence there is phantasy consciousness of something as existing, but only as existing in the as-if (673); of something as there itself, but only as there itself as it were (323); and of something as present, but only as present as it were (323). Finally, phantasy transforms the actual belief of perception and memory into belief as if, a modification that Husserl is at pains to distinguish from the modifications perceptions undergo in becoming doubtful, probable, and the like (672).

Among phantasy’s other characteristics, Husserl draws special attention to its “protean character” (65). The phantasied object, in contrast to the relatively stable object of perception, continuously fluctuates in form, color, fullness of detail, and forcefulness. The friend I am perceiving, on the other hand, does not at first appear in color-saturated vivacity and then fade into an empty gray, which is precisely the sort of thing that regularly happens in phantasy. The phantasied object also appears as more or less vague, and, like the remembered object, is seen as if through a veil or fog. It is “so very different in
its content and total character from the normal perceptual appearance that it could not occur in its circle” (76).

The perceived object in its stability and unveiled presence, Husserl maintains, is actually given; the veiled and unstable phantasied object, on the other hand, is inactually given, which, Husserl indicates, means “given as hovering before us” (405). Actually to be there in person and merely “to hover before” are evidently phenomenally distinct ways of appearing. The phantasied object’s inactual givenness, however, does not necessarily entail an explicit awareness of conflict with the realm of perception. When we are absorbed in phantasying, we are not focused on the null character of the phantasy object, but as soon as we relate the phantasy object to present reality, we become aware that it is null, that “it is nowhere at all, not in any space, not in any time, and so on” (309).

If the explicit consciousness of nullity is not part of the original experience of phantasy, one might reasonably ask why phantasy is not illusion or hallucination. The answer seems to lie in the notion of the as-if, which, as far as the object is concerned, is a kind of aura that phenomenally distinguishes the phantasied object from the perceived object. The object of hallucination, on the other hand, masquerades as a perceived object, appearing as bodily present. Hallucination strays into the circle of perception precisely because its object lacks the character of the as-if.

**Phantasy and Neutrality Consciousness.** Since phantasy does not posit its object as actually existing or as having existed, or as doubtful, probable, and so on, Husserl describes it as a realm of “disinterestedness” (694), “purposelessness,” and “play” (695). These terms suggest that phantasy is a type of re-presentation that neutralizes the belief found in perception and memory (672). This, in fact, seems to have been Husserl’s view until the mid-twenties. Phantasying acts, he wrote in 1912, are, “with respect to the ‘posing of actuality,’ neutralized acts” (605). About ten years later, in describing what happens when I view a film, he claimed that my absorption in the events on the screen as if they were actually happening “is neutrality consciousness (phantasying)” (692). In the same text, however, Husserl begins to express reservations about whether phantasy really is a neutralized act. Neutrality consciousness, he argues, presumes a prior positional act that is subsequently inhibited or neutralized (698, note 15). In phantasy,
however, “it is not the case that an actual position exists beforehand and then ‘abstention’ produces the change into the ‘as-if’ ” (699). Phantasy is not a two-step process involving first positing and then neutralizing, which would leave the original positing act, now neutralized, at its core. Phantasy is a nonpositional act from the beginning. One can, of course, deliberately disconnect or not participate in the positing belonging to an act of perceiving, remembering, or judging, in order to contemplate or just think about its object, but that neutralizing decision does not produce a phantasy. For that reason, Husserl concludes that “the expression ‘neutrality modification’ is suitable for the change in thematizing interest but not for phantasy” (709).

Connections and Mixtures. Husserl takes experience as we live it to be a constant mix of perceptions, memories, expectations, phantasies, judgments, and so on. Phantasy, particularly, is so commonly bound up with other experiences that Husserl questions whether there is ever in fact a completely pure phantasy (610). What “contaminates” phantasy is its regular involvement with nonphantasying acts. The phantasies that we ordinarily experience, Husserl claims, are not pure phantasies but acts in which we phantasy “a figment into a portion of intuitively experienced reality” (610). Thus I phantasy something as inserted into my perceptual field, past or present, or I imagine an object I am now perceiving or once perceived as different in color or shape. That phantasy is so often bound up with perception does not mean, however, that what I phantasy and what I perceive truly blend (83). If I phantasy a sculpture, say, into my perceptual surroundings, the phantasied object will never appear as genuinely a part of my visual field, as an actual sculpture would. The object, superimposed on my perceptual field, might hover before me in the manner in which phantasy objects appear, but it would still form “a realm by itself” and not mix with what is actual (180). The same situation would prevail in the other direction: an actual perception could never blend with a phantasy into a single uniform experience. The phantasied and the perceived, like oil and water, refuse to mix. Furthermore, if I focus on the object of perception, my phantasy object disappears or at least fades into the background: “I cannot become absorbed in both simultaneously and cannot include both in the same intention.” (179, note 3).

Husserl points to other ways in which phantasying and nonphantasying acts connect. For example, I often make judgments about what
I am phantasying. These are actual judgments made on the basis of phantasy, not phantasied judgments. Their actuality is tempered, however, by the fact that they relate to something imagined rather than to something actual, as judgments normally do. Husserl therefore describes them as “modified” judgments (447, note 109). Similarly, I often perform affective acts on the basis of phantasy. I find myself experiencing fear, astonishment, compassion, or delight in the face of what I am imagining (or of what I am seeing in a picture). These are not phantasied or depicted feelings, nor are they the “existential” feelings I might have in the presence of an actual object or event (462). They are quasi-feelings that I undergo in looking at the phantasy object, a “series of modified yet actual feelings that <the> phantasy excites as parallels of feelings that <the> perception, the impression, excites . . .” (465).7

Phantasy and Freedom. Husserl takes the object of perception to be a physical thing embedded in the law-governed world of nature. There is only one such world, “a single and fixed realm” (624), prescribing rules for the things it encompasses (542) and leaving room for only “a small sphere of freedom” (641). I can, for example, freely choose to turn my head or move my entire body in order to get a better look at a table I am perceiving, but beyond such elementary choices the course of my experience is basically determined by the nature of the table, its location in space, my own position, and various other factors embedded in the perceptual situation. Memory, as the recollective consciousness of an earlier perception that is now finished and closed, permits even less freedom. It is true that I am free to embark on the memory or not, but if I choose to do so, the path that will lead me to the past is set out in advance (559). Memory’s world is the elapsed portion of my perceptual world, forever fixed and placed beyond the possibility of change.

In contrast to the one fixed world of perception and memory, “the worlds of phantasy are absolutely free worlds . . .” (642), invented and shaped by individual subjects and infinite in number (624). Phantasy, accordingly, is marked by “its optional character” and, “speaking ideally, its unconditional arbitrariness” (642). Despite this arbitrary

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7 Cases such as these are interesting for aesthetics, particularly in connection with Aristotle’s discussion of pity and fear in the Poetics.
character, however, phantasy can have its own kind of harmony. To take as my basis a *quasi*-actuality such as a centaur, for example, means to create a harmonious world for the centaur (642). Of course, the closer determination of this world in phantasy is not rigidly prescribed; as long as it conforms to the horizon of a centaur’s world, the determining can proceed at my pleasure (643). This means that if I ask what the centaur will have for breakfast in the morning, I can specify anything I wish, subject to the minimal eidetic restrictions imposed by the sort of thing the centaur is imagined to be. Thus I can exercise the option that he will eat oats and apples (but not that he will have two fried pronouns and a salty verb). Whatever answers I arbitrarily offer, however, will be “neither true nor false” (625). Indeed, the “*quasi*-explicating” that opens up the horizon of phantasy’s *quasi*-world “is a new and free phantasying-in” (642), unlike the progressive explication of the perceptual horizon through actual experience, the course of which is determined and whose “answers” will necessarily be true or false.

When Husserl wrote that Phantasy’s freedom is characterized by unconditioned arbitrariness, he added that this is the case “speaking ideally.” In practice, phantasy’s freedom, radical though it may be, is subject to certain constraints coming from outside phantasy itself. The same natural laws and eidetic necessities that bind perception also exercise an influence on phantasy. If I imagine that I throw a stone the size of my fist at a house and that the house collapses as a result, I will have a conflict because the nature of a fist-sized stone does not include the capacity to topple a house (542). “We are . . . always already constituted as human beings in our experiential world,” Husserl writes, “beyond which phantasy may indeed soar, though perhaps necessarily in such a way that it somewhere clashes with the reality of experience” (610). Husserl does not mean that it is impossible for me to imagine a small stone destroying a house. He only means that if I do imagine it, I will be conscious that it is not something that could happen in reality. In that sense, the “constraints” on phantasy’s freedom serve as a reminder of the sharp boundary between the rigid world of perception, the same for all of us, and the playful domains of phantasy, in each of which an individual subject reigns supreme.

*Phantasy, Identity, and Possibility.* Identity is a recurrent theme in Husserliana XXIII. The perceptual object belonging to the single,
law-governed, spatio-temporal world of nature enjoys genuine identity (628–629; 663). I can return to it again and again as identically the same in a series of perceptual acts; and should it cease to exist, I can preserve it in its identity through different acts of memory (664). But what about identity in the case of the phantasy object? Can identically the same thing be given in multiple phantasies? Or is it rather the case that each new phantasy, thanks to its “unconditioned arbitrariness,” constitutes a new object?

There is abundant textual evidence that Husserl held at one point that the object of phantasy possesses identity and can be the target of multiple acts. He writes, for example, that I can “say in phantasy that this phantasy individual and that phantasy individual are the same. The identity is a quasi-identity, and yet not a falsely attributed one . . .” (632). Furthermore, during most of the period covered by this volume, Husserl equated the object of phantasy with a possible object8 that can be given as identical in multiple acts. A possibility, Husserl claims, “can be grasped repeatedly and with evidence as the same . . . with the same sense in repeated quasi-experiencing. For example, I can repeatedly phantasy a centaur as the same centaur, as exactly the same individually . . .” (661). To be a phantasy object here means to be a possibility, and to be the same phantasy object means to be the same possibility. Presumably Husserl conflated phantasy and possibility at this time because he thought that the object of phantasy, as a quasi-object rather than something actual, could be nothing other than a possibility.

Husserl eventually comes to refine this position, however, distancing himself from the view that we can repeatedly phantasy the same thing and revising his understanding of the relationship between possibility and phantasy. Principal among the reasons for his new stance is his realization that the phantasy object or possibility, as the ongoing invention of an individual subject (662), would necessarily be subjective. If that is the case, I cannot be confident that what I am now phantasying is precisely the same object or possibility that I phantasied earlier, rather than “merely one that is like it” (662). I could, of course, stipulate that it is the same, but that would simply be a

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8 “Phantasy objects are possible objects; phantasy worlds are possible worlds” (671; cf. 681).
matter of arbitrary willing on my part (662). The situation is similar if several subjects claim to be aware of the same phantasy object. Perceptual objects are intersubjectively available precisely because they are parts of the physical world and not subject to the individual perceiver’s freedom. In contrast, Husserl argues, “it makes no sense to say that an ‘individual’ centaur that one subject invents and that another subject invents is the same” (684), given that each subject creates his or her own phantasy world (686). Even if several phantasying subjects agree to phantasy the same centaur as intersubjectively identical (685), what is phantasied remains, in each case, bound to the imagination of an individual subject and is not something existing in itself (686, note 4). My centaur is mine; the other’s centaur is his. Even if they are perfectly alike, they are not individually the same (685).

In concluding that phantasy objects are not intersubjectively available, Husserl suggests that it is the possibility rather than the actually phantasied object (*this* centaur) that could be intersubjective and enjoy an identity, thus implying a rejection of his original view that phantasy objects are possibilities. In fact, in 1923 he writes that we must distinguish the phantasied object from any possibility that might be drawn from it (687), and adds that “one could run into confusion if one took phantasies, without further ado, to be possibilities” (684, note 2).

Husserl came to distinguish between phantasy and possibility at least in part because the objects of phantasy are not taken to be existent or “geared” toward a decision about their existence; indeed, the whole issue of possible existence does not arise in pure phantasy. Possibility, on the other hand, involves existence in its very concept: “What is possible is possibly existent. It can exist, I can ‘imagine’ (make the supposition) that it exists. I can shift at any time from mere phantasying into an act of supposing” (687). It is when I suppose that what I am phantasying exists that I have a possibility. Furthermore, several subjects could make the same supposition and thus have the same possibility, although not the same phantasy (688).

It seems, then, that just as Husserl abandoned his identification of phantasy and neutrality consciousness, he came to view the consciousness of possibility as a higher-order act distinct from phantasy itself: “…The carrying out of a consciousness of possibility is not
a phantasying or even an assuming... . . . It is an intentionality of a higher level” (700–701). The correlate of an act of phantasy is a phantasy object, not a possibility, and it does not enjoy identity. The correlate of the consciousness of possibility is precisely a possibility, not a phantasy object, and it can be identical across multiple acts and perceivers. At the root of these differences is the subjectivity of phantasy: “what is phantasied is absolutely subjective and not something in itself; possibilities, however, do exist in themselves. Suppositions are not phantasies...” (687).

C. Image Consciousness

There are two fundamental forms of re-presentation:
1) reproductive re-presentation;
2) perceptual re-presentation, that is, re-presentation in image, in pictorial exhibiting (565).

Memory, expectation, and phantasy comprise the first of these forms. The second consists of what Husserl usually calls image consciousness, the sort of awareness that comes into play when we look at a photograph, contemplate a sculpture, or view a program on television. Image consciousness plays a particularly important role in this volume, and some of Husserl’s most fascinating and cogent analyses are devoted to it. His discussion of the topic makes its appearance as early as 1898, and with only slight variations remains remarkably consistent through the 1920s. Its prominent place in Husserl’s reflections follows from its significance in our experience, exemplified in the rich array of phenomena Husserl discusses, ranging from drawing, painting, and etching, to sculpture, photography, and theater. He even refers to moving pictures in texts written when the medium was still in its infancy. A second reason why image consciousness plays a key role in this volume is that for a time it became, as we shall see shortly, Husserl’s model for the explanation of the constitution of reproductive acts such as phantasy and memory.

Image consciousness is the form of re-presentation most closely akin to perception. In fact, Husserl takes it to include a genuinely perceptual dimension. Even the names Husserl chooses for it signal that it has a foot in both the perceptual and imaginative worlds:
“perceptual re-presentation” (565), “perceptual phantasy” (605), and “physical imagination” (22). Image consciousness, however, differs profoundly from ordinary, straightforward perception, which, with its single intention directed toward a single object, Husserl describes as the simplest of all experiences (477). Image consciousness, on the other hand, is complex, involving as many as three objects: “1) the physical image, the physical thing made from canvas, marble, and so on; 2) the representing or depicting object; and 3) the represented or depicted object” (21). In the case of a portrait of Bismarck, for example, the depicting object or painted image of the chancellor is what directly appears to me; it is what I see. Husserl calls this the “image object,” also referring to it on occasion as a “figment” [Fiktum] or “semblance” [Schein]. Its physical support—canvas and pigment—is the “physical image,” while what is depicted—Bismarck—is the “image subject” (21).

The “physical image” serving as the support for the appearing image is a physical thing made of real materials. It actually exists in the physical world (23), a perceptual object present in real space (20) and real time (646); one can rightly say of it that it “hangs askew, is torn, and so forth” (118). The physical image, however, is more than just another object in the world of things. It is intentionally made to be the bearer of an image object; its whole reason for being is to function as a “substrate” (587) and to “awaken” (30) or “instigate” (135) our awareness of an image. In its absence, there would be no image consciousness at all. But it is also because it is grounded in the physical world that a painted or printed image can deteriorate or even cease to exist. On the other hand, the fact that the image is anchored in a physical substrate accounts for its identity, stability, and public character, which match those of any actual thing in the world (76). The image in an engraving does not constantly change its form and appear now in one color and then in another, as phantasy objects do (71). Phantasies, lacking an “appropriate instigator” (587) in the public world of physical things, are, as we have just seen, private. The image object, on the other hand, founded in a publicly available physical thing, can be experienced as identically the same by many different subjects at one time or at different times (578; cf. 658).

The physical image, although certainly essential to image consciousness in its role as substrate, is nevertheless not the appearing...
image. When I look at a portrait of Bismarck, I do not see canvas and pigment, but an image of a human being. Of course, it is equally true that when I see the image of Bismarck I do not see Bismarck in person either. The image object is clearly a peculiar thing, something irreducible either to its indispensable physical support or to what it depicts. To bring out its unique character, Husserl stresses that the image object alone genuinely appears in image consciousness. Neither its physical support nor not its subject actually appears when I look at the portrait of Bismarck. I may be conscious of the subject in the image, but it remains absent. The image of Bismarck, on the other hand, with its image colors and image size, is present. Husserl captures this situation by saying that the image object “directly and genuinely appears” (48), while the subject does not appear but is meant (20, 22). In simple perception, by contrast, what appears—the perceived object—is what is meant; there is no distinction between the two.

Fundamental to image consciousness is what Husserl calls the phenomenon of “seeing-in.” On one level, Husserl suggests, the image arises when I see something in the physical support. For example, in the case of a plaster bust, “I see in the physical thing before me an image head” (582); that is, I see the head in the shaped plaster. But he also claims that seeing-in occurs in the case of the image object. In a reproduction of a painting of the Madonna by Raphael, for example, I do not simply see “an achromatic little figure of a woman, about a foot and a half high, tinted only in black and white,” but rather “the form of a sublime woman of superhuman size” (48). The Madonna is the subject of Raphael’s painting, and I see the Madonna in the image object that appears to me in the reproduction of the painting (48). It is this element of seeing the subject in the image that distinguishes image consciousness from signifying or symbolizing consciousness, the sort of consciousness at work when I understand a highway sign or a symbol in an airport indicating the location of the baggage carousel. The sign or symbol appears perceptually and in its own right, and then points externally to something that does not appear. Signs, at least when they are functioning as signs, are not pictures of things, not images in which one sees things. “The symbolizing function represents something externally; the imaging function exhibits its subject internally, seeing it in the image” (89).
Image consciousness is a unique form of re-presentation in that it is also, in part, presentation. It involves a “suppressed” perception of the image’s material support and an explicit perceptual presentation of the image object itself. This means that the image appears as present and actually there itself, just as the object in ordinary perception does (297). I truly see the image when I look at the picture, just as I see the wall on which it hangs: it appears to me “with the full force and intensity of perception” (62, 64). On the other hand, image consciousness “is not perceptual consciousness simply” (560) and not “normal and full perception,” inasmuch as the image person in a portrait appears as present but not as actual (43). Husserl attempts to capture this unique status of the image as present but not actual by calling it a “perceptual semblance” [perzeptiver Schein] or “perceptual figment” [perzeptives Fiktum] (698, 612). The perception in image consciousness is therefore perception “carried out in an inactual way” (360). In order to indicate the sort of “inactual” perception at work here, after about 1912 Husserl often uses the term Perzeption rather than Wahrnehmung, which is, literally, the “taking of something as true,” that is, the straightforward perceiving in which something is believably posited as there and as actually existing (556, 584). Image consciousness as Perzeption, on the other hand, offers a mere “show” rather than the real thing.

Of the three objects involved in image consciousness, it is only the image object that I must take as inactual. The physical image—plaster or canvas—really exists in the nexus of nature. The image subject, for its part, can be purely fictional, but it can also be something or someone who actually did exist or who now exists, again in the real world. Even the act of image consciousness really [reell] exists, not in the real world, of course, but in consciousness. The image object, however, although genuinely perceived, “truly does not exist,” either inside or outside my consciousness; “it has no existence at all” (23). It is “a nothing” (50), “a nullity” (51).

Image consciousness thus involves “inactual” perception that presents the image as present, as there itself “in person,” but not as actual, not as existing. Image consciousness is therefore “consciousness of inactuality.” It is also “consciousness of conflict,” Husserl writes (180), indeed, of multiple conflicts; and it is precisely through these conflicts—the conflict of the image with its physical support and
surroundings and the conflict with its subject, if it has one—that the consciousness of the image as a present “nothing” arises. Husserl gives as an example of the first kind of conflict a sculptural image of a runner conflicting with the bronze from which the sculpture is made. The figure of the runner appears as there in the image, but only the bronze is truly present in reality (180). The image continues to appear as present, but is “annulled” by the bronze that underlies it; and it is for that reason that I take the runner I see to be an image runner, not a real runner. In fact, one may surmise that it is the “nothingness” of the image, arising in conflict, that lets it be something different from the bronze with which it mixes and mingles. A simple perceptual object is not really about anything, not even itself. It simply is what it is—a tree, a bronze doorknob. The sculpture made of bronze, however, is more than what it is physically: it may be made of bronze, but it represents a runner.

The image object, since it is not a real object, is, Husserl claims, “ideal” (649). This points to a second dimension of conflict. The image presents an ideal world, and “this ideal world is a world by itself” (50) with its own space and time (646). When I contemplate the image world represented in a picture, this world “properly has no unity with the things outside [the picture’s] frame” (486). It conflicts with its perceived surroundings, which appear as actual, while what appears in the image does not: The image, to be sure, is in its surroundings thanks to its physical substratum, but it is not of them, even though, like its surroundings, it appears with the vivacity of perception. Thanks to this conflict with its environment, I experience the image as an image, not as an actual thing.

The third kind of conflict involves the subject of the imaging and is empirical in nature. There will be conflicts between a subject as it appears in an image and the subject as it would or does appear in an actual perception. The child in a snapshot, for example, will appear smaller than in actual life, and the image-child’s appearing colors will be much different from what they would be if one were actually perceiving the child herself. “There are no human beings in photographic colors,” Husserl writes (175).

The multiple conflicts that make image consciousness possible should not be confused with the conflict of competing perceptions. I may not be sure, for example, whether I am perceiving a hound or a fox
(336), but that is not the sort of conflict that awakens the consciousness of an image. Or, to take a favorite Husserlian example, I may think that I am perceiving a real person when I visit a wax museum, but then begin to wonder whether I am looking at a wax mannequin (336, 570). Two perceptions, and two beliefs, do battle in such cases, and the point of the conflict is to settle the issue in favor of one or the other. The two perceptions cannot coexist; one must surrender (576). There is no such resolution of the several conflicts inherent in image consciousness, however: indeed, it is precisely a condition of image consciousness that the tension between the physical image and the image object, between the image object and its surroundings, and between the image object and its subject not be relaxed. If it were, I would lapse into ordinary perception and image consciousness would cease, or I would vacillate between seeing a real thing and seeing an image. But that is not what happens in image consciousness. Thanks to the perpetual and irresolvable conflicts supporting it, I am secure in the knowledge that it is an image I am experiencing, not a real thing or person.

*Image Consciousness, Art, and Aesthetic Consciousness.* Husserl intersperses his general account of imaging with a number of interesting comments on aesthetic consciousness and specifically artistic images, which suggest possible elements for a Husserlian philosophy of art.

When I contemplate an object aesthetically, Husserl claims, I leave the existence of the object out of play and take delight exclusively in its appearance (168, note 6). I take no position with respect to its being or nonbeing, “except perhaps the aesthetic position taking that belongs to feeling” (521). I am concerned exclusively with what appears as it appears (521). This means that aesthetic consciousness is not restricted to works of art. It can also occur in the contemplation of an object in nature, such as a mountain (648) or a landscape (615). In can even occur in the case of something I phantasy (649). The essential point about aesthetic consciousness is that the object that gives me aesthetic delight, whatever that object may be, does so because of the way in which it appears (462, 522).

Although Husserl does not take the domain of what is aesthetically pleasing to be restricted to art, he does claim that “all art is ‘aesthetic’ ” (654). To qualify as a work of art, something must be capable of
being the object of aesthetic delight. A further question is whether something must also be an image in order to be a work of art. Husserl’s reply is that although not all images are works of art, all works of art are images: “Without an image, there is no fine art” (44). And within fine art, it is precisely the manner in which the image appears that accounts for the possibility of experiencing the work aesthetically (44).

A different question is whether works of art, given that they are images, must also be depictive. Husserl’s early discussions of image consciousness leave the impression that all images do indeed depict a subject in the fashion of portraits or religious paintings. Later he rejects this position. “Earlier I believed that it belonged to the essence of fine art to present in an image,” he writes in 1918, “and I understood this presenting to be depicting. Looked at more closely, however, this is not correct” (616). Husserl points out that some dramatic works—Shakespeare’s Richard III, for example—involves depiction, that is, they are about definite persons or events. But he also observes that not all plays—or, presumably, not all novels, paintings, and sculptures—depict subjects in that sense. “... When a play is presented, no consciousness of depiction whatsoever needs to be excited, and what then appears is a pure perceptual figment” (617). In such nondepictive works, an image brings to life a world within itself, but this is a world of illusion, a semblance world (617) that does not have to depict or refer beyond itself to any particular subject. Indeed, the implication of Husserl’s discussion of theater and literature is that even works that do depict someone or something particular are, as far as their status as artistic images is concerned, still fictions. Furthermore, Husserl’s account of imaging suggests that there is a broader sense in which works of art may be said to have a subject. Husserl mentions domestic dramas, comedies, and fairy tales as instances of nondepictive art (616), but he clearly implies that they are about something, that they have a content or subject matter. In a tragedy, for example, the actors produce the image of some tragic course of action and of the characters who participate in it. “But here ‘image of’ does not signify depiction of” (616). The point is that the subject of the play is altogether internal to the play and lives only in the play’s image object, the self-contained as-if world created on the stage. The play is about something, but what it is about is to be found only within itself.
Differences in what works are about, Husserl suggests, offer interesting possibilities for distinguishing different kinds of art. There can be “realistic art,” for example, which might have as its horizon a particular city at a particular time. Within that horizon, the artist creates an as-if world of situations and destinies making us feel as if we were witnessing a specific social world at a definite moment (652). That the setting is real, however, does not mean that the work is any less a semblance. It simply means that the realistic artist intends to capture in his images the characteristic flavor of a time and place. Such inventions of “artistic empiricism or positivism” are still targets of aesthetic appreciation, though they are not necessarily “beautiful” (653).

Art can also be “idealistic.” The writer of idealistic fiction, for example, focuses on the normative. He embodies values and the conflict of good and evil in the characters and situations he creates, with the intent of kindling “the love of the good in our souls: without moralizing or preaching. He transfigures the love in the medium of beauty” (654). Husserl alludes to other possibilities for art as well, such as the philosophical and metaphysical (654), suggesting how remarkably hospitable the artistic image in its nullity can be.

II. Constitutional Issues

To this point we have focused chiefly on what the various forms of re-presentation accomplish and how their objects appear. Husserl is also concerned with the constitutional dimension of re-presentational acts, that is, with the elements and structures of such acts that enable them to “constitute” or be conscious of their objects. During the period covered by Husserliana XXIII, Husserl appears to have embraced and then rejected two ways of explaining the constitution of re-presentational consciousness. One of these was the “image theory” (Bildtheorie). The other was what Husserl described on occasion as

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the “theory of representation” (*Repräsentationstheorie*, 244, note 3). We will examine each in turn.

A. *The Image Theory*

What Husserl called the image theory takes presentation and re-presentation to be forms of image consciousness, which means that presenting or re-presenting entails “making an image of something.” The image will then have a subject, as it often does in ordinary image consciousness, but it is the image and not the subject that is the direct and immediate object of the presenting or re-presenting act. The typical version of the theory takes the appearing image to be immanent to consciousness and the imaged object to be either transcendent and real (such as an actual house) or nonexistent (such as a unicorn).

Although Husserl warned in 1904 that “the popular aura” of the image theory “could seduce us” (Husserliana XXII, 304), he himself never succumbed to the theory’s allure as far as the constitution of perception was concerned. He cited “an unbridgeable essential difference” between perception and image consciousness in *Ideen I* (Husserliana III, 80; tr. 93), and in the *Logical Investigations* described the application of the theory to perception as a “fundamental and almost ineradicable error” (Husserliana XIX/1, 436). The difference, plain to phenomenological description in Husserl’s view, is that perception presents its object directly and as present in person. The image theory, by imposing a mediating image between the perceptual act and its object, “does entirely unnecessary violence” (Husserliana XXII, 304) to perceptual experience as we live it and as we disclose it in phenomenological description.

When it came to the question of the constitution of memory and phantasy, however, Husserl showed considerably less resolve in resisting the “temptation” (94, 613) posed by the image theory. After all, neither memory nor phantasy present their objects as actually there in person, and the image theory seems to be an ideal way of accounting

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for their capacity to re-present what is absent. In fact, Husserl gave in to the temptation for a time, albeit with some reservations. Thus he wrote in 1898 that “phantasy presentations . . . re-present their object in the phantasy image, just as ordinary image presentations do their re-presenting in the physical image” (117). In texts from the 1905 lectures, he drew a strict parallel between the two kinds of consciousness and claimed to find a community of essence between them (22, 70).

The most prominent characteristic they share, he thought, was the possession of two objects: the image, which actually appears, and the subject of the image, which does not actually appear. (69). It therefore not the phantasied object itself that we experience in phantasy. “In phantasying, we mean another object, for which the object that appears and that differs perceptibly from the phantasied object serves as an image representant” (31). Phantasy and memory, on this account, are species of indirect or mediated consciousness, like picturing. In phantasy there is “a certain mediacy in the act of presenting that is absent from perceptual presentation. Perception presents its object directly: An object appears, and it is this object that is meant and taken as real” (25). Phantasy, according to the image theory, represents its object indirectly by making another object appear and by taking it as the representative or, better, “the ‘image’—‘image’ is surely the only word to use here—for the object genuinely meant” (26). One can surmise that what motivates the image theorist, and Husserl himself at this point, to insert an image as a third thing between act and object is what one might call the “prejudice of presence”: the conviction that one can be aware of what is absent only through something present. Because a past object is past and no longer available, one can have access to it only through a present image, a kind of medium that summons the object out of its absence, but, of course, only “as if” (34). The prejudice of presence and the need for an intermediary go hand in hand.

Image theorists, Husserl suggests, typically take the image to be something in the mind. When Husserl embraced the theory, however, he argued that the image no more has a mental existence than a physical existence. Like the image object in a painting or sculpture, “the phantasy image does not truly exist at all” and therefore “does not have a psychological existence” (23). By refusing to give the image a mental existence, Husserl avoided what he described as the “naïve
interpretation” of the phantasy image, which conceives of the image as a sort of little picture stashed in the drawer of the mind. The naïve view leaves unanswered the question of how the mind, with only the internal image at its disposal, could re-present the alleged subject of the image at all. “If I put a picture in a drawer,” Husserl asks, “does the drawer represent something?” (23). The problem with the naïve interpretation is that “it conceives of the image as there in the mind just as a physical thing is there in reality. Phenomenologically, however, there is no image thing in the mind or, better, in consciousness” (23).

Criticism of the Image Theory. In a note appended to the 1904/1905 lectures, Husserl announced that he would try to interpret phantasy as image representation, but cautioned that there are “objections to this attempt, objections that subsequently turn out to be justified” (18, note 2). He also asked in 1905 whether one can actually distinguish in phantasy between an image object and a subject, expressing serious doubts about whether one can (59, 76). If Husserl does not decisively abandon the theory at this point, he certainly begins to criticize it seriously; and by 1909 he appears to be firmly settled in the conviction that “an essential distinction must be drawn between phantasy apprehension and image apprehension proper” (335).

Husserl’s movement away from the image theory may be seen as a step in his liberation from the prejudice of presence. (His criticism of the theory of representation, as we will see in the next section, was another step in the same direction.) The consciousness of what is absent, Husserl comes to conclude, does not depend on the actual presence of some content or image in consciousness. “In phantasy,” he writes, “we do not have anything ‘present,’ and in this sense we do not have an image object” (86). If we imagine angels and devils, or displace ourselves into the past through memory, the objectivities appearing to us “are not taken as image objects, as mere representatives, analogues, images of other objectivities” (92). Something does appear to us in memory or phantasy, of course, and even appears immediately, but it is not something present (93) serving as the representative of something else that is absent.

With the collapse of the distinction between image and subject in re-presentation (though not in genuine image consciousness, of course), Husserl is able to claim that a re-presentational act such as
Phantasy “relates to its object just as straightforwardly as perception does” (92). Phantasy thus joins perception in aiming directly at its object itself, even if what is phantasied is not there in person (192). In memory, too, the remembered object “stands before our eyes itself; it is not perchance something else there in person (as in the case of depicting) and of which we are conscious as the representant of something resembling it” (604).

In escaping the prejudice of presence, Husserl sees that the direct, unmediated consciousness of an object need not coincide with that object’s actual presence. This insight stands as a bulwark against the reduction of phantasy, memory, and expectation to image consciousness, and establishes them as “ultimate and altogether original” modifications (468).

Modification and Mediation. Husserl will use the term “image” occasionally (and casually) in connection with phantasy and memory in texts written after 1909, but he never seems to have lapsed back into the image theory. His mature view takes phantasy and memory to be species of reproduction, which, given his abandonment of the image theory, obviously cannot mean the sort of reproduction found in portraiture and other kinds of imaging. Rather, Husserl understands reproduction to be a matter of “modification” (672): phantasy and memory are distinct forms of “modified consciousness” (659). Simple perception would be unmodified consciousness directed straightforwardly toward its object as actually there in person. The phantasy of a perception would be a unique modification of the perceptual act and would be directly aware of its object, but not of its object as there itself and as actually existing. Instead, it would be the consciousness of its object as if it were being actually experienced. Everything involved occurs with the index of the “as-if” (659). The phantasy is as-if perceiving and its object appears as if it were existing and actually there itself. Similarly, the phantasy of a memory is the consciousness of something as if it had been actually experienced and as if it were being actually remembered, whereas in truth the only actual thing taking place is the act of phantasying itself.

“Modified,” as applied to phantasy, then, means not actual or not related to what is actual. I do not posit as actual what I phantasy. This is not a hidden characteristic; I am aware of it when I phantasy, and so I do not hallucinate or fall victim to illusion.
We observed that when Husserl abandoned the image theory, he embraced the view that phantasy and memory are direct, unmediated experiences of their objects, that is, re-presentational experiences that intend absent objects themselves without the mediation of an image. The rejection of the image theory, however, does not mean that memory and phantasy are not mediated experiences in another sense. In fact, their constitution as forms of modified consciousness goes hand in hand with this new sense of mediation. We noted in our earlier discussion of memory that by the end of the first decade of the century, Husserl had reached the conclusion that memory has the “remarkable peculiarity” that it is not only memory of what I earlier perceived but also memory of my earlier act of perceiving it: “I remember lunch. ‘Implicit’ in this memory . . . is also memory of the perception of lunch . . .” (367). It is by reproducing the past act—in effect, by going through the medium of the act—that I am able to recall its object. Husserl refers to this as memory’s “double intentionality” (Husserliana X, 53). I recall the past object or event by remembering the past act that originally intended it. I do not, of course, remember the two in the same way. If I did, my memory of the earlier act would be the memory of the perception of the earlier act (236), and I would be trapped in an infinite regress. Husserl escapes this threat by claiming that the explicit object of memory is the object of the past perceiving, while the past perceiving itself is re-presented only implicite (237). Similarly, phantasy accomplishes its consciousness of the phantasied object by reproducing an act that intends the object. In this case, however, everything happens in the mode of the as-if. The phantasied act is not an act that I actually experienced in the past, as the act reproduced in memory is. Both it and its object are experienced in the manner peculiar to phantasy. If I have an intuitive phantasy of a house, the house appears to me from a particular side, in more or less definite lighting conditions, from a certain distance, and so on—that is to say, precisely as if I were perceiving it, for it is perception that originally presents an object from one side or another and in a certain light (531). Since perception gives the object itself, directly, one can say that by reproducing a perception, even in the nonpositing mode of the as-if, one also has that quasi-perception’s quasi-object. To reproduce the perception is to re-present the object—not the image of the object, but the object itself.
This mediation is fundamentally different from the mediation that occurs in image consciousness. There is no question of an image intervening between the act of memory or phantasy and what it represents. The only indirect or mediated aspect of such re-presentational acts is that they directly present their objects by reproducing the acts that intend those objects: in memory’s case, the act that once actually intended its object; in phantasy’s case, the act intending it “as if.” Hence one can say that in phantasy one has “an original quasi-perceptual as-if giving of the object itself” (696), and in memory the modified giving of a past object itself that I once actually perceived.

B. The Representation Theory of Constitution

The representation theory as a way of explaining constitution will be familiar to readers of Husserl’s Logical Investigations. It might equally well be called the “schematic theory,” since it interprets the constitution of acts of consciousness in terms of the “schema ‘content of apprehension and apprehension’ ” (323). By “content of apprehension,” Husserl means an immanent sensory content—a color or tone datum, for example—which is a real [reelle] component of consciousness but not itself an act and not by itself the consciousness of anything. Bereft of objective reference when considered alone, the content wins its intentional relation to something objective only through an interpreting apprehension (24). An immanent color datum, for example, becomes the “representant” for the color of an object by being apprehended (323). The act or appearance is therefore a combination of two components—a nonintentional content and an intentional apprehension. Contents without apprehensions are blind; apprehensions without contents are empty.

Early in the last century, Husserl employed the schema to explain the constitution of a broad range of phenomena. Indeed, its presence or absence became a principal criterion for Husserl’s assessments of the theories of his contemporaries. In the lectures from the winter semester of 1904/1905, for example, he praises Franz Brentano’s analysis of phantasy and memory, but faults him for not giving an adequate account of the role of apprehension in their constitution. Although Brentano recognizes a distinction between perceptual and phantasy apprehension, Husserl charges that he fails to put the distinction to use
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(100), effectively rendering it moot. Instead, Brentano makes everything a matter of changes in content, a position that entangles him in “the greatest difficulties” (9): It is simply beyond the capacity of a bare sensory content, Husserl thinks, to account for the differences among such diverse acts as perception, phantasy, symbolic consciousness, and categorial presentation. Husserl, however, was convinced that he could avoid Brentano’s confusions and achieve an exhaustive phenomenology of the act by bringing both elements of the schema fully into play: “This is everything that can be brought to light here descriptively,” Husserl wrote in 1904, “everything that can be found by means of analysis” (24).

In his developed account of the schema, Husserl argued that each of its components displayed differences corresponding to the type of consciousness in question. The content, for example, changes in kind when perception yields to phantasy or memory. In perception’s case, the content is sensation, an actual sensory datum experienced within consciousness; in the cases of phantasy and memory, the content is a phantasm: “Sensations serve as the basis for perceptions; sensuous phantasms serve as the basis for phantasies” (11). External perception as consciousness of what is actually present requires sensation as its content, for sensation is “the mark of reality; all reality is measured over against it; it is a primary, actual present” (87). When I see a red rug, for example, a “red” sensory content, actually there in consciousness, undergoes interpretation by a perceptual “rug apprehension,” thereby constituting the perceptual appearance of the existing red rug. Memory and phantasy, on the other hand, are not original presentations of something actually present; they can be intuitive, however, and, to that extent, possess a sensory component. In memory, for example, I have the intuitive re-presentation of the red rug I once perceived. The sensory component of the intuitive memory, however, cannot be original in the sense of a sensation; if it were, I would actually perceive the rug. It is therefore a modified content, fit to serve as the bearer of an appropriate ray of memorial apprehension. It is this that Husserl calls the phantasm. “To every sensuous sensation-content, to the sensed red, for example, there corresponds a sensuous phantasm: the red actually hovering before me in the intuitive re-presentation of a red” (11). Phantasms are genuinely sensory contents, although they are phenomenologically distinct from sensations,
which alone enjoy authentic reality. Phantasms, by comparison, are “taken to be nothing by themselves, but ... looked upon as actors for something else, which, again, precisely sensation would give” (84).

The distinction between sensations and phantasms is matched by distinctions on the side of the apprehensions. Perceptual apprehension animates sensations, constituting the perceptual appearance of an external object with its sensory qualities. A subsequent memory of the same object with the same qualities comes about through the animation of phantasms by a memorial apprehension. A phantasy apprehension (261), also animating phantasms, yields a phantasy experience, whose object hovers before me neither as actually present nor as having been present, but “as something merely re-presented” (110). Finally, image consciousness involves not one, but as many as three apprehensions. In the case of a portrait drawing, for example, a normal perceptual apprehension, animating sensations, constitutes the consciousness of the drawing’s physical support (49). A second and distinct moment—the image apprehension—constitutes the awareness of the image object, the appearing face of the person depicted. (Ordinarily, Husserl claims, the image apprehension “uses up” the available sensations in its constitution of the appearing image, leaving only an empty consciousness of the paper and ink supporting it (49).) And lastly, since the drawing is a portrait, the image object acquires its function of portraying a definite person through a third mode of apprehension that constitutes the relation to the image subject (29). These three distinct but inseparable apprehensions mutually achieve the constitution of the three entwined objects of the unitary depictive act.

Criticism of the Theory. Husserl seems to have been generally satisfied with the schematic interpretation of perception and representation until about 1909. But just as he began to express reservations about the image theory of re-presentation as early as 1905, so he began to have doubts about the efficacy of the schema at around the same time. He notes, for example, that it is difficult to describe the distinction between sensations and phantasms (136), and that a direct comparison between the two is “disappointing,” failing to lead to any firm results (100). On a deeper level, he becomes increasingly sensitive to a tension between presence and absence in the case of the phantasm. He writes in 1905, for example, that the phantasm “gives
itself as not present” and that “only indirect reflection bestows on it an acquired present” (87), but only a few pages later he claims that “the present [emphasis mine] phantasms and apprehensions serve as representants for what is genuinely intended but not present . . .” (94).

Husserl faces a dilemma here. The phantasm is supposed to have the characteristic of the not present, of the not there itself (204). On the schematic interpretation, however, it is a real component, along with the apprehension, of the act of phantasy or memory. But if the act is present, and if the phantasm is a real part of the act, then the phantasm too must be present. Reflection confirms this: the phantasm is seen to have “the characteristic of ‘the internal present,’ ‘of the internal being now and being there itself,’ just like perceptions and presentations and memories . . .” (204). Indeed, if it were not present, how could it be apprehended?

The dilemma poses serious problems for the schematic view, which Husserl gradually came to see. As he asks in a note added later to the text cited above: “How can an apperception confer on something experienced the characteristic of the not there itself?” (204, note 12). This question goes to the heart of Husserl’s objection to the schema. If I experience the phantasm as an immanent content present and there itself, how could an apprehension render it not present and not there itself? It is simply not tenable that a present phantasm could undergo a “discrediting modification” (113, note 10) into something that is not present (201, note 2).

Against this background of accumulating doubts and difficulties, Husserl asked in 1909 why attempts at explaining the relationship between perception and phantasy had so consistently failed (323). His answer is no longer that the failure can be traced to the neglect of the schematic interpretation. Rather, it is precisely the schematic interpretation itself that is the culprit:

I think the answer is the following! I have not seen (and generally it has not been seen) that in the phantasy of a color, for example, it is not the case that something present is given, that color as a really immanent occurrence is given, which then serves as the representant for the actual color. On this view, sensed color and phantasm-color in themselves would be one and the same, only charged with different functions. I had the schema “content of apprehension and apprehension,”
and certainly this schema makes good sense. However, in the case of perception understood as a concrete experience, we do not first of all have a color as content of apprehension and then the characteristic of apprehension that produces the appearance. And likewise in the case of phantasy we do not again have a color as content of apprehension and then a changed apprehension, the apprehension that produces the phantasy appearance (323).

One would like to think that this strong declaration signals Husserl’s wholesale abandoning of the schema as an account of constitution. It seems much more likely, however, that the abandonment is only partial. For one thing, the schema persists, particularly as an explanation of the constitution of perception, in Ideen I (1913) under the language of sensuous υλε and intentional μορφη (Husserliana III, §85), and it is also unapologetically present in Experience and Judgment,11 a still later work. On the other hand, Husserl certainly does seem to have rejected it as an account of time consciousness by about 1909;12 and the text cited above, probably from 1909 as well, together with later analyses, suggests that he also surrendered it as an adequate account of phantasy and memory. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that his terminology changed during the same period to reflect a profound and revolutionary shift in his understanding of sensations and phantasms.

C. Internal Consciousness and Internal Reproduction.

Husserl’s new view of sensation and phantasm is closely tied to his conception of internal time consciousness, or, more simply, “internal consciousness,” which underwent profound development from 1909 through 1911. Internal consciousness signifies the nonobjectivating or nonthetic awareness we have of our acts and contents as unities belonging to the immanent time of consciousness. Each act, for example, begins, lasts for a while, and comes to an end, running off in the temporal modes of now, past, and future. Husserl usually refers to such immanent unities as “experiences” [Erlebnisse], and frequently calls the internal consciousness we have of them “experiencing” [Erleben] (397).

11 Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil (Hamburg, 1964), §64, p. 303.  
12 See the “Translator’s Introduction” to Husserliana X.
Before 1909 or so, Husserl focused on the acts and their contents as *already constituted* immanent unities, offering no account of the experiencing or internal consciousness through which their constitution occurs (371). That changes after 1909, however, when he opens up a new and ultimate dimension of consciousness and begins to investigate the experiencing of the acts and their components. In a text dating from 1911 in Husserliana X, Husserl termed this new dimension the “absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness” (Husserliana X, §34, p. 73), distinguishing it from both the experiences it constitutes and the transcendent objects of those experiences. This view of three levels in consciousness also appears in the present volume. In a text from 1911 or 1912, Husserl refers to the “absolute consciousness and its moments of experiencing” (392), and goes on to distinguish between:

1) The internal consciousness, the experiencing,
2) The experience,
3) The intentional object of the experience (397).

While the absolute consciousness (level 1 above) and the experiences it constitutes (level 2) are inseparable moments of a single conscious life, Husserl insists that they are distinct. Internal consciousness, he writes, “is the experiencing of experiences, but not itself an experience” (395).

The discovery of an “absolute” dimension of consciousness distinct from the level of experiences it constitutes brought with it a radically new understanding of sensation. As long as Husserl’s focus was on the level of constituted immanent unities, sensations were taken to be contents or “objects” in internal time (324), just like the acts of perception to which they belong. With the new conception of internal consciousness, sensation is taken to be the *consciousness* of experiences, whether the experiences are acts or sensory contents. “What is sensation? A purely immanent consciousness of a sensuous content. . . . Sensation is nothing else but the original consciousness of immanent time” (307). Husserl also uses the term “impression” (which, it must be said, he employs in a dizzying variety of ways) as a synonym for sensing or sensation: “Impression can be . . . the name for the experiencing, for the internal consciousness in which the experience as an individual becomes constituted” (403).

“Sensing,” and particularly “impression,” carry broader and narrower meanings (381). Broadly, impression refers to the original
consciousness of acts and contents as temporally extended in immanent time. Within that original consciousness, however, impression can also refer to the immediate consciousness of the “now”-phase of an experience, distinguishing it from “retention,” the consciousness of its just past phases, and from “protention,” the consciousness of the immediately impending phases. Retention and protention, thus understood, are also impressional: both are dependent moments of the actual phase of the absolute flow, making up one’s immediate and original consciousness of the past and future phases of the constituted experience. Impression, retention, and protention jointly function as a triumvirate of interdependent constitutional moments.

Husserl’s new conception of internal consciousness and sensing also allows him to suggest a new conception of the phantasm. He now takes it to be a modification of sensation, with sensation understood in the sense described above. Hence the phantasm is no longer taken to be a datum in immanent time, a surrogate for a sensory content awaiting animation by a memorial or phantasy apprehension. “On the contrary,” Husserl writes, “‘Consciousness’ consists of consciousness through and through, and the sensation as well as the phantasm is already ‘consciousness.’” (323). The phantasm dissolves into pure intentionality. “If I analyze phantasy consciousness (a phantasm), I do not find color or anything else of that kind; on the contrary, I again find phantasy consciousness” (326). A red-phantasm is not a red content in the sense of something that would actually be red; as consciousness, it simply “‘presents’ red” (334). The presenting that occurs in phantasy, of course, is not actual presenting, but the modification or phantasm of presenting (334). This new conception of the phantasm signals a fresh understanding of re-presentation, in which modification is understood to be purely a matter of consciousness, not something cobbled together out of inert and nonintentional contents animated by an assortment of reproductive apprehensions.

If it is reasonably clear that Husserl embarked on a new, non-schematic interpretation of the constitution of re-presentation after 1909, the precise shape of the interpretation is considerably less so. Still, one can discern at least some of its features, which I attempt to sketch in what follows.

All actual experiences are originally constituted impressionally in internal consciousness, but all experiences can also be reproduced (369), which is precisely what occurs in re-presentation. An actual
re-presentation is an experience itself, of course, and is therefore originally constituted in internal consciousness (407). In the constituted re-presentation, another experience “is ‘re-presented’ reproductively” (391). Acts of re-presentation, we noted earlier, are characterized by a double intentionality. They re-present not only an object—something remembered or phantasied—but also an act, and it is by re-presenting the act that they re-present their objects. “Internally reproducing experiences have an intentional relation to the corresponding nonreproducing experiences. If the latter are themselves intentional experiences, the reproductions have a double objective reference: not only to the original experience, but also to their objects” (394). As we have seen, memory recalls a past object by recalling the act that originally perceived it, and phantasy is directed toward its phantasied object by re-presenting in the mode of the as-if a “perceptual act of meaning” (331).

To capture re-presentation’s dual intentional function, Husserl sometimes appeals to a terminological distinction between reproduction and re-presentation. The act is said to be reproduced, its object to be re-presented (372). Although he stresses the difference between the two intentional directions, he does not take re-presentation to be a lamination of two separate acts, one reproducing an experience (the “reproduction”) and the other independently re-presenting the object of the experience (the “re-presentation”). Reproduction in the narrow sense is simply a moment of the complex re-presentational act and is itself re-presentational: “reproduction can then be the name for the modification belonging to the re-presentation of the experience” (403). On this reading, Husserl’s occasional terminological distinction between re-presentation and reproduction is a way of emphasizing the dual constitutional structure of the re-presentational act: by reproducing an act, the object is re-presented.

Reproductions, then, are reproductions of experiences (406, note 11). This still leaves the question of how reproductions accomplish their constitutive work. Husserl’s reply is that “the essence of reproduction consists in being the reproduction of impression: of internal impression . . .” (410). Reproduction reproduces an act by reproducing the internal consciousness of the act (372). Husserl cautions that this reproduction does not mean that in memory, for example, the past internal consciousness is restored in the manner of a fading echo, which would imply the original impression’s lingering presence (372).
Reproduction is not presentation, even of something in a weakened form; it is re-presentation, an altogether different kind of consciousness.

The reasoning behind Husserl’s claim that reproduction reproduces the impression or internal consciousness of an act derives from his understanding of both experiencing and re-presentation. When I carry out an act of any kind, including one of re-presentation, I am conscious of the act as an experience that I am now actually living through. In the case of a re-presentational act, I am conscious not only of the re-presenting act as my present experience but also of a reproduced or re-presented act. The consciousness of the reproduced act is also internal consciousness, but of a new kind. It is not the original internal consciousness through which I am aware of an act as present and actually taking place. It is modified internal consciousness through which I reproduce an act that is not actually taking place, that is not there itself. To the internal consciousness in which an act is originally constituted, there corresponds a reproductive modification or “internal memory.” “Every internal reproduction (no matter what act is in question) is a reproduction ‘of’ the corresponding internal perception, precisely its modification” (370). This “internal reproduction” (410) is the “counterpart” (683) of impressional internal consciousness and explains how it is that in re-presentation we are conscious, not just of an object, but of the act that is conscious of the object.

It is in this connection that Husserl’s new conception of the phantasm comes into its own. Sensation or impression is the original consciousness of an act. The phantasm, as the modification of sensation, is the reproductive consciousness of an act of which I am not now impressionally aware. “Phantasm [is] the act’s phantasy modification: hence phantasy of it” (332). The phantasm is the reproductive moment of the act of phantasy or memory that constitutes the consciousness of a past act or a phantasied act. It is not a blind “content” waiting for the miracle of apprehension to give it sight, but the internal reproductive consciousness of a quasi- or nonactual act. It plays the same role as sensing plays with respect to the original act, only doing so within the context of a re-presentational experience (370). It is the parallel or correlate of sensing, constituting an act, not as present and actual, but as absent and inactual.
There are two further aspects of internal reproduction that deserve comment. The first is that the claim that internal reproduction corresponds to the original impressional consciousness of an act does not necessarily mean that it is the reproduction of an act that I have actually experienced. In memory, of course, I do reproduce an act that I once actually lived through in an earlier present. In phantasy’s case, however, the notion of “corresponding” has a different meaning, since I can phantasy an act—that is, have a phantasm of it—that I have never impressationally experienced. If I phantasy a purple centaur playing the pipes, I cannot claim that I am now or ever have perceived anything of the sort. Nonetheless, I do internally reproduce an act in this case, but an act completely saturated with the characteristic of the as-if. Here the internal reproduction is inventive, generating a quasi-act out of whole cloth, so to speak. That I am capable of such phantasmagoria shows not only that consciousness is spontaneous—my capacity to embark on a memory or to make a judgment confirms that—but also that it is remarkably creative. The act of phantasy that I actually experience generates the reproductive consciousness of an act that I have never actually experienced, and with that act creates a new world of phantasy.

Finally, the parallel between phantasm and sensation extends only so far. Sensation in the sense of impressional internal consciousness falls on the ultimate level of consciousness; indeed, it is at one with the absolute flow that constitutes experiences as unities in immanent time. Internal reproductions, on the other hand, are just such constituted experiences and therefore fall on the level of what the absolute flow constitutes: “The reproduction itself is certainly also an ‘experience,’ a now, something of which I am impressionally conscious . . .” (407). The phantasm as internal reproduction can indeed stand in for impressional consciousness in memory and phantasy, but it can assume that role only because it is something already constituted.

With his account of internal reproduction, Husserl closes the circle of his investigation of re-presentation and integrates it into his phenomenology as a whole. He finds in impressional consciousness and its reproductive modification the roots from which the many branches of experience—presentational and re-presentational—spring. His efforts to understand this bedrock level of constitution illustrate, perhaps more vividly than anything else in Husserliana XXIII,
depth of Husserl’s thought and the remarkable honesty and analytic acumen that mark his entire phenomenology of phantasy, image consciousness, and memory.

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All translation is a kind of illusion, more or less perfect according to circumstances, and varying also with the skill of the translator.13

I noted at the start of this introduction that Husserliana XXIII is a compilation of lecture notes and sketches never published during Husserl’s lifetime, and in most cases never intended for publication in the form in which Husserl left them. They are often brief and fragmentary, and laced with unfinished sentences and abrupt beginnings, endings, and changes in focus. In most cases I have left these features intact in order to produce as faithful an illusion as possible of the letter and spirit of the original texts. On the whole, then, the translation is quite literal, which strikes me as appropriate, given the material’s technical and often difficult character.

Observations about the translation of particular terms are included in footnotes. Notes carrying the designation “Editor’s note” are by Eduard Marbach, the editor of Husserliana XXIII, and those marked “Translator’s note” are, obviously, by the translator. Material in diamond brackets was added to the text by Eduard Marbach; material in square brackets was added by the translator.

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PHANTASY AND IMAGE CONSCIOUSNESS
(Third Principal Part of the Lectures from the Winter Semester 1904/05 on “Principal Parts of the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge”)

< Chapter 1.

THE QUESTION OF PHANTASY PRESENTATION IN CONTRAST TO PERCEPTUAL PRESENTATION

We have been occupying ourselves up to this point with the phenomenology of perception. We cannot attempt to carry out a phenomenology of perception in a fully adequate way and complete it on its own account without taking into consideration the phenomena closely related to perception. By taking these phenomena into consideration in the analyses to which we now turn, what we have learned thus far will be freshly illuminated, supplemented, and enriched. Our immediate aim is the phenomenology of phantasy.

§ 1. Ambiguity of the concept of phantasy in ordinary language — phantasy experience as the foundation of phenomenological eidetic analysis and concept formation

All of us bring along from ordinary life a certain concept of phantasy, phantasy appearance, phantasy presentation; and like almost all

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1 The German text reads: “... Phantasievorstellung gegenüber der Wahrnehmungsvorstellung.” “Vorstellung” will usually be translated as “presentation,” though occasionally as “representation” or “phantasy,” when the sense demands it. “Präsentation” will always serve as the translation for “Gegenwärtigung” and “Präsentation” (which characterize perception). Where the sense of the text requires it, the appropriate German term will be included in brackets in the text. “Vergegenwärtigung” (which characterizes ordinary memory, expectation, phantasy, and so on) will be translated by “re-presentation”; “Repräsentation” will be translated by “re-presentation” or “representation,” depending on the context, and “Darstellung” by “presentation,” “exhibition,” “exhibiting,” “representation.” — Translator’s note.

2 10.1.1905.

3 “Phantasieerlebnis.” “Erlebnis” will usually be translated by “experience.” “Erlebnis” refers to occurrences “immanent” to consciousness, such as acts of perceiving, remembering, phantasying, and so on, as well as to sensory contents. Translating it by “experience” is both economical and clear in the context of this work. The
concepts of classes of psychic phenomena coming from common life, it is vague and ambiguous. Thus it is plain that one understands under the title “phantasy” now a certain mental disposition or ability and now again certain actual experiences, activities, or results of activities, which arise from the disposition or testify to the ability. Indeed, one sometimes even expressly contrasts phantasy, the activity of phantasy, and the work of phantasy — differentiating their significations — just as one distinguishes understanding, the activities of understanding, and the works of understanding. Phantasy then means a certain mental disposition, an ability, as when we speak of a man of strong or weak phantasy or, exaggeratedly, of someone with no phantasy at all. On the other hand, we also speak of the phantasies of an artist, and in doing so have in view certain psychic experiences that he produces in himself or that he awakens in us by means of his works. As far as the meaning of these “works” is concerned, we will not, in general, call the externally visible works phantasies, though we will indeed call the formations brought to appearance by means of them phantasies: the human beings or fabulous creatures, the actions, passions, situations, and so on, that the poet invents for us. These formations are also designated as works of phantasy (of phantasy in the first sense), and one even prefers to call works in this sense phantasies.

Phantasy understood as ability lies outside the frame of our interests, as does phantasy activity considered as a causal process taking place in psychic objectivity, as an activity in the genuine sense, as a psychic action; and naturally the same is true of the result of the action, of the work of phantasy considered as the result of a causal process. What interests us are phenomenological data understood as the foundations of an eidetic analysis that we are going to undertake. What specifically interests us here, therefore, are intentional, or better, objectivating experiences — so-called “phantasy presentations,” often simply termed “presentations,” which we are also in the habit of apprehending under the ambiguous title of “phantasy activity”; for example, the experiences in which the artist sees his phantasy formations, or more precisely, that peculiar internal seeing itself or

verb “erleben” will be translated by “(to) experience” and “erlebt” by “experienced.” “Erfahrung” will be translated by “actual experience” or “empirical experience,” and occasionally by “experience” when there is no danger of confusing it with “Erlebnis.” — Translator’s note.

*Inserted later: “real and.” — Editor’s note.*
bringing to intuition of centaurs, heroic characters, landscapes, and so on, which we contrast to external seeing, to the external seeing that belongs to perception. The re-presenting of something to oneself internally, the “hovering of something before one in phantasy,” here stands opposed to the external appearing of something as present. The disposition, the ability, this complex of dispositions, whether original or acquired, is, of course, nothing phenomenological. The phenomenological sphere is the sphere of what is truly given, of what is to be met with adequately, and the sphere of the real components of what is truly given. Disposition, however, looked at objectively, is a concept that transcends the genuinely immanent sphere. It is an important methodological concept in psychology, but it does not concern us. On the other hand, the phantasy experience, the so-called phantasy presentation, is a phenomenological datum. It obviously belongs in the sphere of objectivating experiences; objectivities are brought to appearance in phantasying and are perhaps meant and believed. These objectivities themselves, the appearing centaurs, for example, are nothing phenomenological, just as the appearing objects of the perception of physical things are not phenomenological. Nevertheless, in a certain way they do indeed come into consideration for us, inasmuch as the objectivating experience, here the phantasy experience, shows the immanent peculiarity of bringing to appearance precisely this object appearing in such and such a way, and <of bringing it to appearance> as this object. This is an immanent determination of the phantasy presentation, an essential peculiarity that can be found through evidential analysis as a purely internal moment of such experiences. And thus, along with the experience itself, there also belongs to the phenomenological analysis of the experience the circumstance that the experience relates to something objective, that it relates to this objective something in this manner and form and to it as what it presents itself as being.

The popular concept of phantasy, however, does not refer just to the sphere of artistic phantasy from which our examples were taken. At least, a narrower and, to be sure, very common concept of phantasy, which psychology has taken up under the title of productive phantasy, stands in close relation to this sphere. Productive phantasy is phantasy that gives form voluntarily; it is precisely phantasy in this sense that the artist particularly has to use. However, one must distinguish two further concepts here, one wider and one narrower, depending on
whether or not one understands the voluntariness of the forming in the sense of free imagining (inventing). Certainly the historian also uses productive phantasy, phantasy that gives form voluntarily. But he does not invent. By means of form-giving phantasy on the basis of secured data, he seeks to outline a coherent view of personalities, destinies, eras — a view of realities, not of things imagined.

Ordinary language also employs the concept of phantasy beyond the sphere of productive phantasy. Thus hallucinations, illusions, dream appearances are often designated as phantasies. On the other hand, presentations belonging to memory and expectation, in which nonpresent objects are determined in the mode of realities as having existed earlier or as expected with certainty, are not designated as phantasies. It is said of hope that it flies on the wings of phantasy, but what is here taken to be phantasy is not a matter of determinate expectations, but of things merely imagined.

In the ordinary sense of the word “phantasy,” one moment surely plays the leading role: Phantasying is set in opposition to perceiving and to the intuitive positing of past and future as true; in short, to all acts that posit something individual and concrete as existing. Perception makes a present reality appear to us as present and as a reality; memory places an absent reality before our eyes, not indeed as present itself, but certainly as reality. Phantasy, on the other hand, lacks the consciousness of reality in relation to what is phantasied. There is still more, of course. Usually the term, particularly the parallel term “imagination,” expresses unreality, pretence; what is phantasied is merely something imagined — that is, merely semblance. Of course, we also note that not every semblance, not even every semblance intuited sensuously, is taken to be something imagined, to be a phantasy semblance. The source of the semblance must lie in the subject; the semblance must be ascribed to the subject, to its activities, its functions, its dispositions. If it is attributed to a physical basis, if it is grounded in external nature, as the bent stick in

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5 The German term is “Schein,” which is difficult to translate in a way that will not be misleading. “Appearance” as a translation would risk confusion with “appearance” as the translation of Erscheinung. “Illusion” works in some contexts but not in others. “Show,” as in “show business,” comes closest to the sense of the term as Husserl usually employs it, but “show” as a translation would often appear awkward as well as unclear to the reader. “Semblance” seems to be the least misleading choice, though “illusion” will be used where the sense calls for it. — Translator’s note.
water, the wondrously rising moon, and so on, are, then one does not speak of phantasy appearance.

Now the latter are versions of the concept that may offer much of interest but are just not significant phenomenologically. Indeed, only what is immanent matters phenomenologically, only the internal characteristics of the experiences seen in pure adequacy, only what is essential to what is immanent; that is, only what gives rise to eidetic universalizations, consequently to concept formations that permit adequate realization through our being able to see directly the conceptual essence in evident generalization.

\[\S 2.\] The task of acquiring an essentially unitary concept of phantasy presentation as phantasy apprehension — characterization of perceptual apprehension

Whether an act of presenting in phantasy is artistic or not artistic, voluntary or not voluntary, inventive or not inventive, we always find a common element in addition to the varying empirical and psychological connections, which do not concern us at all, and even in addition to the varying consciousness-characteristics, which are given phenomenologically in themselves. And we find the same common element in the case of memories and expectations: We find precisely that which is designated there as presentation and which, in its closed specific character, stands out in contrast to perceptual presentation. We do not, however, find this common element in the case of hallucinations, illusions, and dream appearances. Here the appearances, or the apprehensions underlying them, are obviously perceptual apprehensions. And inasmuch as it becomes apparent that phantasy apprehension cannot be identified with perceptual apprehension, we must, in a manner contrary to the ordinary way of speaking, exclude the phenomena mentioned above.

If we abstract from the characteristic of quality and even from meaning in the case of perception (the word taken in the customary sense), we then acquire the perceptual apprehension. And if we restrict ourselves to what is essential, then this concept extends as far as the prominent phenomenon of appearing as present itself extends. This distinctive trait yields an essentially unitary and phenomenologically realized concept. Different intentional
characteristics — believing, doubting, desiring, and so on — can then be combined with this apprehension. Complex phenomena arise, which, however, are connected, owing to the fact that one and the same sort of presentation, “perceptual presentation” or “perceptual apprehension,” underlies them. We again find such presentations in so-called hallucinations and illusions, just as we find them in cases of physical and natural semblance.

The only thing at stake for us now, however, is to acquire an essentially unitary concept of phantasy presentation understood as phantasy apprehension. Here, too, we notice or can make evident to ourselves that under the popular title of phantasy, but also under other titles such as memory and expectation, there stand intentional experiences that exhibit, in addition to their varying consciousness-characteristics, an essentially common element as their foundation.

Of course, as we [have] already remarked, these are objectivating acts and, as objectivating, presuppose objectivating apprehension. And this apprehension in its specific essence is the same whether we have to do with freely arising phantasies or with productive phantasies, or again with intuitive presentations belonging to expectation or with intuitive re-presentations of an earlier past that we have experienced ourselves.

Our interest, therefore, is not directed toward the variety of complex experiences that the (sometimes narrower and [sometimes] wider) concept of phantasy includes, but toward this unitary — essentially unitary — kind of apprehension, which we intend to designate as phantasy presentation. Whether it in fact designates an essentially original kind of presentation and, in contrast to perception, a new kind of presentation must, of course, be investigated at the beginning.

§ 3. The failure of contemporary psychology’s inquiry into the question of the relationship between perceptual presentation and phantasy presentation. Absence of the concept of objectivating apprehension.>

The question of the relationship between perceptual presentation and phantasy presentation has been the object of many serious efforts. Only exceptionally, to be sure, has it been treated in the literature in
publications devoted specifically to it, and even then only in fairly superficial fashion. But important figures have touched on it in different connections and in a way that shows that they have not taken it to be just a trivial question. Lectures, however, occasionally offer something much deeper than the literature does, and here I am thinking of the extremely clear-sighted way in which Brentano specifically treated the question in some of his lectures. An excellent treatment by Stumpf in his lectures on psychology also towers far above what the literature has to offer.\(^6\)

What caused the problem to appear to be so exceedingly difficult and what made a serious solution of it impossible was, in my opinion, the circumstance that the concept of objectivating apprehension and the attendant distinctions between apprehension contents, apprehension sense, and apprehension form were missing. Even the most important investigators constantly confuse the sensuous contents of perception and the object of perception. Muddled by metaphysical prejudices, they posit a nonintuitable thing-in-itself as the object of perception, while the actually intuited object is overlooked in the theoretical point of view and identified with the sensation content.

Precisely the same thing happens in the case of phantasy presentations. One confuses the sensuous content that is experienced in the phantasy presentation and that functions as a representant in the phantasy apprehension with the object of phantasy; one identifies the two. Consequently, one actually completely overlooks the phantasy apprehension as mode of objectivation, just as one does in the case of perception. What is straightforwardly characteristic of perception, the apprehension of the present, is not recognized as a phenomenological characteristic. In this way, too, the dispute over the distinction between the act and the content of intuitive presentations is accounted for. A great many investigators say that when we present a color or sound, that when we perceive it or present it in phantasy, there is consciousness of the sound, but the consciousness is nothing unique that would belong just to this sound. All psychic experiences have an indefinable relation to the pure Ego, but this relation is not something that can be found in the sense in which a content can be found.

\(^6\) On the lectures of Brentano and Stumpf in question here, cf. the Editor’s Introduction to Husserliana XXIII, p. XXV. — Editor’s note.
In addition, many investigators erase the pure Ego and say simply: Content is all that can be found. The act of finding is not a new content that would join the contents. If we perceive, then precisely this color, that sound, is an experience. An act of perceiving, such as seeing, hearing, and the like, is not a new content that would be given with the tone content or color content, a second experience in addition to the color, to the sound. The so-called psychic acts are therefore fictions, if one understands by them (as Brentano, for example, does) experiences different from the so-called “physical phenomena,” from the color phenomenon, sound phenomenon, and so on.

§ 4. Brief presentation and criticism of Brentano’s theory of “presenting”

On the other side stand the School of Brentano and the thinkers who agree with his school in these matters. For Brentano, “presenting” is the title of the first fundamental class of “psychic phenomena”; that is, of intentional experiences. He distinguishes presentation and what is presented: presentation is the act, what is presented is the content. It is most remarkable that an investigator of such extraordinary acuteness has not distinguished the different concepts of content or of what is presented, has never carried out the pertinent descriptive analyses, and has not appreciated the fundamental significance of these distinctions. The content for him is ordinarily the sensation content belonging to perception. What we, guided purely by the sense of perception, call the perceptual object, that which supposedly stands over against us, that which supposedly is seen itself, is not clearly distinguished from this content, or is not actually distinguished from it at all. Brentano does occasionally speak of the “object” in distinction from a content, but for him this is the external object in the absolute, metaphysical sense. He confuses the object in this sense with the object meant in perception, obviously overlooking the fact that it is only in reflection, in natural scientific and metaphysical reflection, that we arrive at the point of setting another object or a complex of other objects that do not fall into the appearance — a complex of atoms, of ether waves, of energies and of whatever else one may assume there — in relation to
the phenomenal object understood as a merely appearing object. In any case, these entities are nothing falling within the boundaries of perceptual apprehension; on the contrary, they fall into the sphere of scientific theories, which are related to perception only indirectly and conceptually.7

Since, on the one hand, Brentano intends (partly on the basis of internal experience, partly for theoretical reasons) to portray presenting as an act, as intentional consciousness, and since, on the other hand, he does not grasp the essence of apprehension, of perceptual presentation in the genuine sense, as objectivating interpretation, there are no differentiations at all for him in the act-characteristic of the presenting itself. The “content” yields the sole differentiation; the act of presenting is as multifariously determined as there are contents toward which it is directed. That such a view is unsatisfactory, that to many this presenting appears to be a peculiar thing, a pointless form, is understandable; and it is also understandable that Brentano’s exposition only strengthens the convictions on the opposing side that presenting is a mere fiction, that there are only contents and, in addition to them, at most the emphasizing function of attention.

Naturally, owing to the incompleteness of his phenomenological analysis, Brentano gets entangled in the greatest difficulties. If presenting is supposed to be something without differentiation, it becomes differentiated only according to its contents. But then what happens with the differences between perceptual presentation, phantasy presentation, and symbolic presentation? Between intuitive and nonintuitive presentation, categorial and sensuous presentation, and so on? How are these supposed to be reduced to differences in bare content? Brentano has attempted to do this and has employed all of his admirable ingenuity to interpret away all essential differences in the modes of presenting. In the course of doing this, however, he now and then comes close to admitting that, in some fashion, modes of presenting must be assumed again after all: he senses that something is missing in his analyses. What is missing is nothing else than the distinction between meaning, quality, and apprehension-characteristic and

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7 In connection with this, [there is] Brentano’s confusing reference to intentional objects as intentional in contrast to real objects: The content belonging to the perception is the intentional object for him, the real object is the thing in itself. As if sensations appeared and were meant in perception instead of the physical object.
apprehension form. Certainly if by “presenting” one understands “mere presenting” taken as the mere hovering of something before one, as the looking at something without making any decision about it, then this is a unique characteristic that allows of no further differentiation — an infima species in the genus “act.”

But if one understands by presentation the apprehension that produces the appearing in intentional acts independently of believing or not believing, of doubting or wishing, hence that which is identical when intellectual indecision turns into decision, affirmation into denial, then, of course, there are many differences. The apprehension admits of very important analyses indeed. Inasmuch as these are absent — and they are absent in Brentano’s case, though they are equally absent in the case of the rest of the psychologists (if we disregard modest beginnings) — the possibility is also absent of apprehending in the methodically correct way the controversial question about the relationship between perceptual presentation and phantasy presentation and of distinguishing the component problems that obviously exist for us here.

§ 5. The question of the difference between perceptual presentation and phantasy presentation and the particular problem of the distinction between the corresponding apprehension contents: sensation and phantasm>

Perceptual appearance and phantasy appearance are so closely related to one another, so similar, that they immediately suggest ideas about the relationship of original and image. In both cases we have objectivating apprehensions; and in both cases the same object can come to appearance, and even come to appearance with precisely the same determinations from the same side falling into the appearance — in short, the appearances are indeed “the same” in both cases, except that in the one case it is precisely perception that we have and in the other case it is phantasy. What is responsible for the difference? Well, obviously two very different kinds of things: the contents serving the apprehensions and the apprehension-characteristics themselves. For one who does not recognize, say, differences in apprehension-characteristics as phenomenological differences, this basis of possible clarification is lost and embarrassment and confusion ensue.
To begin with, as far as the contents that function as apprehension contents are concerned, the question, naturally, is about what kind of contents they are, whether or not the same contents function as apprehension contents in perceptions and in phantasies.

Sensations serve as the basis for perceptions; sensuous phantasms serve as the basis for phantasies. But one can then ask: Are phantasms identical in genus with sensations — speaking descriptively, of course, not genetically — or are they different? This marks off a problem that can ordinarily be separated from the problem of the distinction between perceptual presentation and phantasy presentation. Whether or not sensations serve as apprehension contents of perception is immaterial to us now. The apprehension content by itself, of course, is not yet a perceptual interpretation, which is only something added to it. And exclusive of any apprehension, such as the phantasy of a centaur, a house, and so on, the phantasm, too, is a sensuous content that is something totally different from the phantasy.

To every sensuous sensation content, to the sensed red, for example, there corresponds a sensuous phantasm: the red actually hovering before me in the intuitive re-presentation of a red.

Now what is the relationship of the one red to the other? Both are red-experiences. Genus and species may be the same. Do any essential differences still exist in that case? Or is it a question of a difference in a new dimension, such that a red is possible as sensation and precisely the same red — the same in species — is possible as phantasm? And such that these designations, “sensation” and “phantasm,” do not point back at all to genetic differences (to whether they originate from peripheral stimuli or from central stimuli) [and] do not point back to the apprehension function either, to whether the same content founds two different apprehensions — that, on the contrary, it is a question of an internal difference, an essential difference?

We would have a peculiar problem here, then. Do the apprehendings belonging to perception and to phantasy have at their disposal two fundamentally different classes of apprehension contents, which, however, stand from the start in the strange relationship that both repeat the same genera and species? Or is that not the case? The other problem, which <poses the question> about the clarification of the perceptual apprehensions and phantasy apprehensions, is, of course, essentially different from the problem of the apprehension contents.
Is it a question of the same apprehensions on both sides, but grounded in an alleged essential difference in sensuous contents understood as sensations and phantasms, or is it a question of apprehensions essentially different in kind? And if the latter, in what does the specific character of the phantasy apprehension consist? What is its situation in relation to its apprehension contents? What modifications can it assume? What common elements are preserved in the change of apprehension contents, and how is the constitution of the phenomenon of a phantasy presentation taken as a whole to be understood in itself and in comparison with related phenomena?

Whoever (in company with a great many psychologists) sees only the contents and closes his eyes to the objectivation, to the difference between the content that is experienced and the object that appears, naturally gets into the most severe difficulties, whether or not he then decrees essential differences between sensation and phantasm. If there is an essential difference, as many assume (more in the hope of avoiding difficulties than from its actual appropriateness on the basis of phenomenological analysis), then one must not ask why, in perception, an object stands before one as present, while in mere phantasy it does not. Surely one cannot assert that present and nonpresent are merely verbal expressions for two genera of objects. And the object, after all, is supposed to be the same as the content. If the differences between sensation and phantasm are merely gradual, however, the question then is whether the difference between the present object of perception and the merely re-presented object of phantasy is a gradual difference, whether a gradual blending is not absurd in this case.

§ 6. Critical discussion of the differences between perception and phantasy put forward by the psychologists

Interest directed onesidedly toward genetic explanation, before one has even begun to carry out a description (a description not at all appreciated for its true importance and difficulty), hides all of the problems from many psychologists and from epistemologists who are psychologically inclined. They quickly finish their business simply by pointing to a difference in origin: perceptual presentations originate from peripheral stimuli, phantasy presentations do not. If
they do inquire into descriptive differences, they point to the greater vivacity of perceptual presentations (Aristotle was the first to do this). Hume is satisfied with this difference alone. Recently they have troubled themselves about new differences. Following the example of Alexander Bain, they mention the trait of fullness. In comparison with the corresponding perceptual presentations, phantasy presentations are fragmentary and poor in contrasts, determinations, and characteristics.

In addition, psychologists point to the trait of stability or, comparatively, volatility. A perception (sensation) endures in unchanging fullness and strength as long as the stimulus causing it endures. If the stimulus is fleeting, the sensation will be fleeting too. But generally that is not the case: generally the stimuli are sufficiently steady, and therefore the perceptions have an enduring, settled character.

Phantasms, however, hover before me fleetingly, now making their appearance, now disappearing; they are not steady. They also change in content; they do not constantly maintain their colors, forms, etc.

Additionally, the psychologists cite as a characteristic the voluntary variation that phantasies permit; specifically, variation that does not depend on voluntary intervention in the outside world. Perceptions disappear only when we close our eyes, depart, and so on. If we do not do these things, perceptions remain what they are and do not undergo any change through our mere free choice.

The psychologists sought to help themselves with such distinctions. For that purpose there then arose, in addition to the genetic differences, distinctions pertaining to their psychological effects, hence once again causal rather than phenomenological differences.

It is easy to see that one does not get to the heart of the matter with such distinctions! And it is easy to see that, in making them, the problems of the differentiation between sensation and phantasm and the problems of the analysis of the two kinds of apprehension become unintelligibly scrambled. The trait of intensity or vitality obviously belongs to the contents, not to the apprehensions. In the case of the latter, one does not speak of intensity. At most, the interest grounded on the apprehension may have its degrees. The objectivation, however, is not something that can be meaningfully characterized as strong or weak. On the other hand, the traits of fullness and instability do have an essential relation to apprehension. The same object is presented
at one time with great fullness of apprehension contents, at another time with little fullness; and in volatile change it is presented now with greater fullness, now with less. This cannot, of course, be the ground for any essential distinctions, since the distinctions within the phantasy presentations of the same object are at least as great as all of the distinctions that belong to the perceptual presentations. This whole point is obscure, since one must first make clear phenomenologically what the reference point of the changing fullness — namely, the same presented object — signifies phenomenologically. If one arrives at the apprehension, however, then one must ask what the presenting of the same object in perception and in phantasy signifies, and whether this sameness does not permit a differentiation in objectivation, a difference in the kind of objectivation, which makes up the true distinction between perception and phantasy — a sharp distinction and not merely a relative one such as the distinction between fullness and volatility, which, of course, has its application independently within each of the two genera of presentation.

Naturally, the last trait — that of voluntary variation — does not offer any help for a descriptive distinction either: What does voluntary intervention in the “outside world” mean? Subjectively, such intervention takes the form of perceptions. If we have perceptions, and if we have them without confusing them with phantasy presentations, then we can measure supposed perceptions against them. The question, however, is not about the distinction between illusion and reality, but about the different essences of perception and phantasy and whether any essential distinction at all exists between them.

If one takes the distinction to be a distinction that characterizes things psychologically, however, then it no longer belongs in the phenomenological sphere. De facto we have two different sorts of presentation, which we easily distinguish in practice. From the standpoint of psychology, it is interesting to see the different ways in which these presentations are related to our free choice, and so on. But these are surely genetic-causal problems; they are problems of psychology.

We cannot do much, therefore, with the customary presentations of the psychologists, no matter how much psychologically valuable material is brought together in them. Our analyses of perception,
however, have elucidated the essential problems for us and, from the very beginning, have allowed the rough differences in the constitution of phantasy presentation to emerge, so that we can become engrossed at once in the center of the subject, passing over or touching only cursorily many matter-of-course convictions about it.
< Chapter 2.

INTERPRETATION OF PHANTASY PRESENTATION AS IMAGE PRESENTATION (IMAGINATION) JUST LIKE PHYSICAL IMAGE PRESENTATION >

§ 7. Kindred distinctions within perceptual apprehension and phantasy apprehension>

Speaking in the sense of ideal possibility, we can characterize it as evident that to every possible perceptual presentation there belongs a possible phantasy presentation that refers to the same object and, in a certain sense, even refers to it in precisely the same way.\(^1\) If we re-present a landscape, the landscape belonging to perception corresponds to it; and the perceived room corresponds to the phantasied room. In view of this, it is clear that almost all of the distinctions we made in the case of perception also find application in the case of phantasy. Apart from the distinction between apprehension and the characteristics of meaning and of qualitative deciding based on apprehension (characteristics that obviously can be precisely the same on both sides), in both cases kindred distinctions mutually correspond within the apprehension. For example, we see right away that just as we must distinguish between apprehension contents and apprehension-characteristics in the case of perceptual apprehension, so we must distinguish between them in the case of phantasy apprehension; we see that we must not confuse object and content, that the objective appearance perhaps brings the object to appearance from only one side, and so forth. The object can even hover before us in phantasy in an appearance exactly like the appearance in which it was perceived: it appears from the same side, as “seen from the same standpoint,” in

\(^1\) Whence this evidence? A separate problem.
the same illumination, coloring, adumbration, and so on. In the one case, the object is perceived in all of these respects; in the other, it is phantasied.

§ 8. Phantasy presentation as pictorialization. Beginning the process of defining the essence of image presenting

We characterized perception as an act in which something objective appears to us in its own person, as it were, as present itself. In phantasy, to be sure, the object itself appears (insofar as it is precisely the object that appears there), but it does not appear as present. It is only re-presented; it is as though it were there, but only as though. It appears to us in image. The Latins say imaginatio. Phantasy presentation seems to presuppose or claim for itself a new characteristic of apprehension; it is pictorialization. We no longer need to show that the merely objective resemblance of the phantasy presentation to a corresponding perception does not suffice to establish what is really important here (it is a matter of indifference whether the resemblance concerns the sensuous foundation or something else about the phenomenon). Everyone knows what it means to re-present an object to oneself, to bring it forward in an internal image, to make it hover before one. Everyone uses the expression “to imagine”, and thus knows to some extent what is essential to the case. But only implicitly, I am sorry to say. For what matters here is to bring explicitly to consciousness that imaging has meaning only through a peculiar consciousness, that having a resembling content does not mean the same thing as apprehending an image. On the contrary, what resembles something turns into an image of it only through the unique and absolutely primitive image consciousness, a consciousness just as primitive and ultimate as the perceptual consciousness or consciousness of the present. Of course, this does not exclude in either case the possibilities and necessities that may be revealed by an

\[\text{2}\] We intend to try to pursue as far as possible the point of view of imagination and the notion that phantasy presentation can be interpreted as image presentation — although there is no dearth of objections to this attempt, objections that subsequently turn out to be justified.
analysis whose task it is to pick out the different aspects of these unique phenomena.

In proposing, then, to fix image presentation, image apprehension, as a separate genus of presentation, we must naturally consider this sphere to extend just as far as there is actually present an apprehension that re-presents its object in image. And thus it immediately becomes clear to us that we must count in our sphere of imagination not merely the internal image presentations that the expression “phantasy presentation” normally has in view, hence presentations by means of mental images, but also image presentations in the ordinary sense of the word, hence those remarkable presentations in which a perceived object is designed to present and is capable of presenting another object by means of resemblance; specifically, in the well-known way in which a physical image presents an original. How imaginings are differentiated through internal and external images is, of course, something that we will also have to investigate.

To begin with, we compare as far as possible the two sorts of imaginings and seek to make clear to ourselves the common element in image presentation. We want to begin gradually and with the greatest possible caution. For as easy as the analysis at first appears, the difficulties that subsequently come to light and gradually require many modifications in what we earlier accepted and many new distinctions in what we earlier took to be simple are just as great.

Indeed, this is universally the peculiarity of phenomenological analysis. Every step forward yields new points of view from which what we have already discovered appears in a new light, so that often enough what we were originally able to take as simple and undivided presents itself as complex and full of distinctions.

Hence we ask: What does re-presenting in image involve? Put simply, what does image presenting involve?

In every instance of such presenting we distinguish image and subject. The subject is the object meant by the presentation. And subsequently and by virtue of qualitative characteristics combined with it (intellectual or affective characteristics), this object is the object taken to be existing (e.g., the remembered or expected object); or the object taken to be unreal, as in the fiction known to be fiction; or the object doubted, wished for, inquired into, hoped for, feared, and so on. We now disregard these characteristics; we must retain only the
act of meaning. If the palace in Berlin hovers before us in the phantasy image, then the palace in Berlin is precisely the subject meant, the subject presented. From the palace in Berlin, however, we distinguish the image hovering before us, which naturally is not a real thing and is not in Berlin. The image presents the subject but is not the subject itself. We already note here that this image appears in a sense entirely different from the sense in which the subject appears, and that a serious equivocation presents itself if both are characterized as presented in phantasy.

§ 9. Physical imagination as a parallel case to phantasy presentation

Before we enter into more precise analyses, however, let us look at the parallel case of the physical image. Here the situation is somewhat more complicated. When we distinguish between subject and image in this case, we immediately note that the concept of the image is a double concept. That is to say, what stands over against the depicted subject is twofold: 1) The image as physical thing, as this painted and framed canvas, as this imprinted paper, and so on. In this sense we say that the image is warped, torn, or hangs on the wall, etc. 2) The image as the image object appearing in such and such a way through its determinate coloration and form. By the image object we do not mean the depicted object, the image subject, but the precise analogue of the phantasy image; namely, the appearing object that is the representant for the image subject. For example, there lies before us a photograph representing a child. How does it do this? Well, primarily by sketching an image that on the whole does indeed resemble the child but deviates from it markedly in appearing size, coloring, and so on. Of course, this miniature child appearing here in disagreeably grayish-violet coloring is not the child that is meant, not the represented child. It is not the child itself but its photographic image. If we speak of the image in this way, and if we say in criticism that the image fails, that it resembles the original only in this or that respect, or if we say that it resembles it perfectly, then naturally we do not mean the physical image, the thing that lies there on the table or hangs on the wall. The photograph
as physical thing is a real object and is taken as such in perception. The former image, however, is something appearing that has never existed and never will exist and, of course, is not taken by us for even a moment as something real. We therefore distinguish the representing image, the appearing object that possesses the depictive function and through which the image subject is depicted, from the physical image.

We have three objects: 1) the physical image, the physical thing made from canvas, marble, and so on; 2) the representing or depicting object; and 3) the represented or depicted object. For the latter, we prefer to say simply “image subject”; for the first object, we prefer “physical image”; for the second, “representing image” or “image object.” Now naturally the latter, the representing image, is obviously not a part or aspect of the physical image thing. To be sure, the colored pigments spread on the surface of the canvas and the lines of the drawing laid on the paper are parts of the physical image thing. But these colors, lines, and so on, are not the representing image, the true image of the imagination, the semblance thing, which makes its appearance to us on the basis of color sensations, form sensations, and so forth. A three-dimensional body, with colors spread over it, does indeed appear to us in the engraving — let us say, the Emperor Maximilian on his horse, a figure appearing three-dimensionally but built up visually from shades of grey and from enclosing boundaries. This figure, of course, is not identical with the gradations of grey tints that are really found on the physical image, on the sheet of paper, and are really assigned to it. The same color-sensations that we interpret at one time as the objective distribution of colors on the paper, on the canvas, we interpret at another time as the image rider, as the image child, and so on. These image objects, of course, must then be distinguished from the depicted objects as well. For example, the actual child has red cheeks, blond hair, and so forth. The child appearing photographically displays none of these colors at all; on the contrary, it displays photographic colors. What has photographic colors in the appearance presents something that is colored in an entirely different way. Not only do we know this from reflection, but it belongs to the essence of the imaginative apprehension from the beginning that, while this object colored violet grey appears to it, it does not mean this object but a different object that only resembles it.
From case to case, and depending above all on the kinds of depiction, the differences between representing image and image subject, between the object that genuinely appears and the object meant and presented by means of it, are quite diverse and vary a great deal. But such differences are always there. If the appearing image were absolutely identical phenomenally with the object meant, or, better, if the image appearance showed no difference whatsoever from the perceptual appearance of the object itself, a depictive consciousness could scarcely come about. This is certain: A consciousness of difference must be there, albeit the subject does not appear in the proper sense. The appearing object is not just taken by itself, but as the representant of another object like it or resembling it.

§ 10. The community of essence between physical imagination and ordinary phantasy presentation with respect to “mental images”>

Now the situation is certainly more complicated in the case of physical imagination than it is in the case of ordinary phantasy presentation, but we do find that both have something essential in common: In the case of physical imagination, a physical object that exercises the function of awakening a “mental image” is presupposed; in phantasy presentation in the ordinary sense, a mental image is there without being tied to such a physical excitant. In both cases, however, the mental image is precisely an image; it represents a subject.

In the simpler case of ordinary phantasy presentation, we had distinguished two objects under the titles “image” and “subject.” In order to make two objects present, however, two objectivations, two apprehensions, are needed; or we must be able to distinguish phenomenologically two directions or components of apprehension in the unity of the phantasy presentation. The naïve interpretation is much simpler, of course. The image lies hidden in the “mind,” and in addition an object possibly exists “outside.” If it is a question of a mere fiction, however, as when we phantasy a dragon, then precisely only the mental image is on hand and there is nothing further to explain. Naturally, we would reply: Nothing further than the trifling matter of how the mind, provided that something like an image exists in it, manages
to present the subject to itself, hence something different from the image. If I put a picture in a drawer, does the drawer represent something? But the naive view errs above all in that it conceives of the mental image as an object really inhabiting the mind. It conceives of the image as there in the mind just as a physical thing is there in reality. Phenomenologically, however, there is no image thing in the mind, or, better, in consciousness. The situation is exactly the same in the case of the physically depicting representation in which the painted lion does indeed appear but does not exist and at best makes objective an actual thing, a certain lion belonging to reality, which then for its part does exist but does not appear in the proper sense. In both cases, the images (understood as the appearing, analogically representing objects) are truly nothing. To speak of them as objects carries an obviously modified sense that refers to existences entirely different from those that the images give themselves out to be. The image object truly does not exist, which means not only that it has no existence outside my consciousness, but also that it has no existence inside my consciousness; it has no existence at all. What does actually exist there, apart from the “painting” as a physical thing, the piece of canvas with its determinate distribution of color pigments, is a certain complex of sensations that the spectator contemplating the painting experiences in himself, as well as the apprehension and meaning that he bases on this complex so that the consciousness of the image occurs for him. Likewise, the phantasy image does not truly exist at all; it does not, perchance, have a psychological existence. Rather, a certain complex of sensuous contents, the complex of phantasms, exists; and a certain apprehending consciousness, with which the image consciousness is first consummated, is based on this complex. Just as in the one case the color sensations and the other visual contents in their concrete complex are not yet the image itself — since, for example, they still contain nothing of the full three-dimensional corporeality that characterizes the appearing image — so too in the other case, that of phantasy, the phantasm, or the complex of phantasms, is not yet the phantasy image. In neither case, of course, can what is lacking consist in the mere supervention of new sensuous contents, as if an increase in sensuous contents could produce what we call the consciousness of an objectivated objectivity [objektiven
Gegenstandlichkeit. Sensations accumulated with sensations, sensuous contents accumulated with sensuous contents, just give ever new complexes of experienced sensuous contents; they do not yield an appearing object. What is added in both cases, of course, is the objectivating consciousness. What is added is the apprehension that interprets the content, conferring on it the relation to something objective, and that brings about from the content’s blind factual being the apprehending of the content as objectively this or that, the presenting of something with the content, the meaning, not of the content, but of something by means of the content. To experience this apprehending and to have the object in the presentation are one and the same. To produce an act of meaning on the basis of this apprehending and to be related in the meaning to the object are again one and the same. The apprehension content, the corresponding mode of apprehension and the meaning founded in it, possibly connected in addition with such and such higher intentional characteristics, intellectual or emotional, exist here phenomenologically (in the empirical case, really exist psychically). This is everything that can be brought to light here descriptively, everything that can be found by means of analysis.

Apart from this, whatever presents itself psychologically, the attendant dispositions [for example], are naturally not descriptive facts that one can come upon in phenomenology. Hence this is all that is left of the allegedly immanent existence of the representing image object.

<§ 11. The relation to the image subject, or the two apprehensions, one built on the other, in phantasy presentation — reference to a precise analogue: word appearance as carrier of a second apprehension as sign>

There is certainly the need here for more precise determination and delimitation. The apprehension of experienced sensuous contents — of sensations in the case of the contemplation of a physical image, of phantasms in the case of phantasy imaging — yields the appearing image, the appearing representing image object. With the constitution of this appearance, however, the relation to the image subject has not yet become constituted. With a simple apprehension, therefore, we would not yet have any image at all in the proper sense, but at most
the object that subsequently functions as an image. How does the object come to function in this way? How is it supposed to become intelligible that, although the image object appears to us, we are not satisfied with it but mean another object through it? The portrait is taken by us to be an image; that is, we do not mean the image object appearing chiefly in shades of grey or even a painting’s image object appearing in colors. We take the image object precisely as the image of such and such a person. However, a bare act of meaning cannot be of help in this case. A presenting in the sense of an apprehending, of an objectivating that constitutes the new object intentionally, surely must serve as a basis. The act of meaning presupposes something meant. When no representation, no objectivating apprehension is on hand, the act of meaning cannot aim at any object. (Of course, I also take the act of meaning here to be something different from the apprehending, since we had persuaded ourselves that the act of meaning is a pointing function that can pick out one object among a plurality of apprehended objects and mean it specifically.) Consequently, we see that phantasy presentation, and above all phantasy apprehension, must be a more complicated phenomenon than perceptual presentation. In the latter, we have one apprehended object, and this object is the object meant in the complete perception. In phantasy presentation, however, we have two apprehensions, one built on the other, constituting two objects; namely, the phantasy image that appears and the object presented pictorially, the image subject, which is presented precisely by means of the image. The meaning belongs to the complete phantasy presentation, however, and is directed toward the image subject. I present the palace in Berlin; that is, I make it present to myself in an image. The image hovers before me, but I do not mean the image. Rather, a second apprehension is founded in the image apprehension. This second apprehension imprints a new character on the image apprehension and gives it a new object relation. In the image, which is not itself the palace, I do nonetheless intuit the palace; the image re-presents, simulates the palace for me. And the act of meaning is then directed not simply toward the image object by itself but toward what is represented, toward what is analogized by means of it.

And, accordingly, we find in phantasy presentation a certain mediacy in the act of presenting that is absent from perceptual presentation.
Perception presents its object directly: An object appears, and it is this object that is meant and taken as real. In phantasy presentation an object also appears, but this object appearing in the primary and proper sense is not the presented object. Phantasy presents an object above all by making another object resembling it appear and by taking it as the representative or, better, the image — “image” is surely the only word to use here — for the object genuinely meant. It looks at the image, but in the image sees the subject or by means of the image grasps the subject. This, however, is a new apprehension; that is, a new consciousness-characteristic without which no new object could be meant. Later we will become acquainted with a precise analogue: It is just as in the reading of a word — “integral,” for example — the word is seen but not meant. In addition to the word-appearance, we have, built on it, a second apprehension (which is not an appearance): The word is taken as a sign; it signifies precisely “∫”. And in the normal usage of the word, we do not mean what we see there, what sensuously appears to us there, but what is symbolized by means of it. The word seems entirely different from some arbitrary sound, from a senseless acoustic or written formation. The latter is not the bearer of a new apprehension. It can be meant, therefore, but cannot be the bearer of an act of meaning referring beyond itself.

The situation is the same in the case of imaging. The appearing object appears but is not taken independently. It holds good for something else and thus is taken to be an analogical representant, an image.

<§ 12. The presupposition of the entire reflection up to this point: the double objectivity in phantasy presentation and in physical image apprehension>

The presupposition of this entire reflection, of course, is that in phantasy presentation a double objectivity actually and legitimately comes into question, specifically as an immanent double objectivity, as it were, and that what presents itself is obviously not a merely conceptual distinction, indirectly imported by a reflection that relates

3 Symbolizing.
the phantasy experience to reality. It is not a question of the sort of distinction that we hear more often in the case of perception between the appearing thing, the thing in the ordinary, empirical sense, and the thing-in-itself. In the latter case, these two very different things, the empirical thing and the thing-in-itself, do not belong to the experience itself, to its apprehension sense and its meaning; on the contrary, only one of these, the first one, belongs to the experience. The naive consciousness perceives and knows nothing of a thing-in-itself. The relation to the latter lies not in perception but in metaphysical reflection. The situation is entirely different in the case of the two objects of phantasy presentation. Anyone who phantasies has an image experience. Something objective appears to him. However, no one considers this appearance to be an appearance of the object itself. Certainly no one takes this faint, fluctuating appearance — now rising fleetingly to the surface, now disappearing, its content changing in so many ways as it does so — to be the appearance of the object, of the palace itself, for example; rather, one takes it to be the “representation” of the object, a re-presentation, a pictorialization. But mark my words, one does not thereby mean the appearance as it is actually given. One does not perchance look at it as it is and appears, and say to oneself: This is an image. Rather, one lives totally in the new apprehending that grounds itself on the appearance: in the image one sees the subject. The image consciousness has a tinction that confers on it a signification that points beyond its primary object: the characteristic of representation according to resemblance.

So it is too in the case of the physical image apprehension, and one immediately recognizes from the comparison that the mere circumstance that sensuous sensations serve as the basis in perceptual presentation while phantasms serve as the basis in phantasy presentation cannot exhaust the distinction between the two. In the imaginative presentation occurring in the contemplation of a painting, we certainly do have sensations as contents of apprehension. The result of the apprehension, however, is not a perception. The Madonna by Raphael that I contemplate in a photograph is obviously not the little image that appears photographically. Hence I do not bring about a mere perception; the perceptual appearance depicts a nonperceived object. And this is not a conceptual knowing either, nor does it imply...
that I undertake an act of distinguishing and relating, setting the appearing object in relation to an object thought of. On the contrary, the image is immediately felt to be an image. The apprehension based on sensuous sensation is not a mere perceptual apprehension; it has an altered characteristic, the characteristic of representation by means of resemblance, the characteristic of seeing in an image.

§13. The two apprehensions belonging essentially to the constitution of imaginative presentation

If we speak of two apprehensions belonging essentially to the constitution of imaginative presentation, then, of course, it is not a question — in the sense of what was said — of two separate apprehension experiences on the same level that would merely be held together by some bond or other. If the depicted object were independently constituted by one act and the image by a second and separate act, then we would have neither an image nor something depicted. We would have one object presented here, another object presented there. At best, we would have the consciousness of a relation between the objects established by comparison; that is, a consciousness that the one object is similar to the other. But that is not the situation here. We do not have two separate presentations, and above all we do not have two separate appearances. When we present a palace, for example, we do not have, as it were, two palace-appearances, as we do, say, when we place two pictures side by side or carry out two phantasy-presentations in succession. Rather, two apprehensions are interwoven in imaginative presentation. There is a primary apprehension; in it we have a palace appearance. With this apprehension, however, we pictorially present the palace in Berlin itself; we apprehend the palace as a resemblance-representant. Much as in perception the sensation is experienced but is the fundament of a perceiving interpretation that does not consist in making it into an

4 The new apprehension is not a new presentation: From where is it supposed to take its apprehension contents? All of the sensuous contents available have already been used up in the constitution of the image object.
independently existing content, so a whole apprehensional consciousness is now carried out, but its object is not taken to be an independent object. A resemblance representation, as a new mode of apprehension that produces the relation to the image subject, is grounded on it.

The one object therefore belongs to the act pertaining to the other object. The apprehension that constitutes the image object is at the same time the foundation for the presentation that, by means of the image object, constitutes the other object; and in normal phantasy presentation and image presentation, the act of meaning is aimed at the latter, directed toward it alone. This second object is intended in a quite singular way. No appearance corresponds to it. It does not stand before me separately, in an intuition of its own; it does not appear as a second thing in addition to the image. It appears in and with the image, precisely because the image representation arises. If we say that the image represents the subject, the subject is not for that reason intuited in a new presentation; rather, it is intuited only in the characteristic that makes the appearance of the object functioning as an image felt by our consciousness, by our perceiving, precisely as an image representation.

In any event, we would only have to consider whether we should not say that, owing to essential connections between them, two states of affairs belong together here; namely: An apprehension in which the image object appears along with the additional characteristic that it is the representant of something, in which case an act of meaning and of heeding aims at the image object and, in addition, at a represented object built upon it; and another type of apprehension, which takes place by means of a conversion that is always and essentially possible, in which case the image object is not objective at all but is instead a modified apprehending of the same contents, which would yield a new simple apprehension: re-presenting in image.

Yet it seems to me that here, essentially, only the diversely functioning act of meaning posits the difference and that a duality of apprehension always presents itself.  

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5 Reading “anderen” for “einen.” — Translator’s note.
6 This was worked out somewhat more precisely in the lecture.
7 Up to here, 1/12/1905.
<§ 14. Recapitulation and a new exposition: The intermingling of the two apprehensions that constitute imaging consciousness, and the coinciding in resemblance or, as the case may be, the divergence of the objects of these apprehensions. Givenness of the conscious relation to the image subject through the re-presentational consciousness of what does not appear in what does appear.>

In the last lecture, we attempted to understand phantasy presentations along with physical image presentations from the unitary point of view of the imagination and to bring to analytic clarity the peculiarities of all the presentations falling under this point of view, hence of imaging presentations of every sort as opposed to the perceptual presentations that we had considered up to now. The constitution of imaging presentations proved to be more complicated than the constitution of simple perceptual presentations. In the former case, several essentially different apprehensions showed themselves to be based on one another or in one another, corresponding to the number of objectivities that are produced and, depending on changes in attention, come to the fore for the privileging act of meaning. Three objectivities were interwoven in physical imaging; two were interwoven in phantasy. What both cases had in common was the fact that an appearing objectivity was always taken not for itself but for another, nonappearing objectivity represented in image. The physical image awakens the mental image and this in turn presents something else, the subject. The mental image is an appearing objectivity; for example, the person or landscape appearing in the colors of the photograph, the white form appearing through the sculpture, and so on. The subject, however, is the landscape itself, which is not meant in these diminutive dimensions, not meant as colored in grayish-violet as the landscape in the photograph is, but in its actual colors, size, and so forth. But this landscape does not appear as a second thing in addition to the image landscape. The available material of sensation, which could possibly function as contents for apprehension, is completely used up. No new appearance can become constituted: the appearance has no apprehension contents at its disposal. — We tried to assume that the situation is the same in the case of phantasy. We do not experience the thing itself, as it is, in the phantasy appearance. We have an appearance that often deviates considerably from reality; moreover, in most cases
it fluctuates and changes greatly in its internal determinations. What appears to us there is something objective, but it does not appear to us in the way in which it appears in reality; we take it as a phantasied object. In phantasying, we mean another object, for which the object that appears and that differs perceptibly from the phantasied object serves as an image representant. The subject, what is meant, is also not present here in a second appearance. We have only one appearance, the appearance belonging to the image object. But we have more than the one apprehension (or, if you wish, the one objectivation) in which this image object becomes constituted for us. If this were not the case, nothing else but the image object could be meant. In the image object we image the subject, which is more or less different from — even if resembling — the image object: A second objectivating characteristic is there, a new apprehension with a new apprehension sense that is founded in the apprehension belonging to the image object, and it is precisely this that brings about for consciousness what we express when we say: “With the appearing image we mean the subject.” The new apprehension, however, is not something attached to the image appearance in a merely external way, not something connected with it only from without. The new apprehension permeates the old and has absorbed it into itself. The appearing image thing does not awaken a new presentation that otherwise would have nothing to do with it. It does not, in the manner of a mere (even if analogous) symbol or of an arbitrary sign, refer beyond itself to something else that would not be intended as internally united with the sign itself or would have no internal relation to it at all. Rather, the image object makes intuitable what, indeed, is not identical to it but is more or less like it or similar to it in content. Something of the consciousness of the intended object lives in the kindred traits. We see the meant object in the image, or it is picked out for us from the image intuitively. Phenomenologically, however, it is inherent in this that the image object does not merely appear but bears a new apprehension-characteristic, which is permeated and fused in a certain way with the original [and] which, as it were, refers to the object properly meant not simply at a distance from the content of what appears, but in it, or refers to the object properly meant through this content. What functions representatively in the content of the image object is conspicuous in a specific way: it exhibits, it represents, pictorializes, makes intuitable. The subject looks at us, as it
were, through *these* traits. These traits come to the fore in the noticing of particular details, and in the noticing they are set apart from the other traits of the image object: from moments, parts, determinations that either have, as strongly marked, the opposite characteristic, the characteristic of conflict with the corresponding determinations of the subject meant, or to which neither the one characteristic nor the other pertains. Such characterless traits depict nothing, though it also remains indeterminate how the real object exhibits itself in them. In the way in which it is meant, it leaves open the determinations in question; the meaning or the attendant apprehension contains indeterminacies in this respect. On the other hand, as far as the consciousness of moments of the image that deviate from and do not fit the subject is concerned, it essentially presupposes the consciousness of moments that do fit and are intuitive. Only these moments produce an image consciousness. If the conscious relation to something depicted is not given with the image, then we certainly do not have an image. This conscious relation, however, is given through that specific consciousness belonging to the re-presentation of what does not appear in what does appear, according to which what does appear, by virtue of certain of its intuitive properties, gives itself as if it were the other. To be sure, in this process of being given, a conflict can become apparent in other moments, or a difference from the subject can become apparent in the disparity in the resemblance of all the moments. If two objectivating apprehensions were not interwoven with one another, it would be a miracle, or nonsense, how a consciousness of this kind is possible, since only the image and certainly not the subject falls into the appearance. The making intuitive in the image, which *in* the image-appearing possesses the consciousness of the image *subject*, is not an arbitrary characteristic that adheres to the image. Rather, the intuition of the image object awakens precisely a new consciousness, a presentation of a new object, which has an internal affinity with, a resemblance to, the image object as a whole and, as far as particular details are concerned, with respect to certain of its points. The new presentation, insofar as it refers to the new object with such and such determinations, naturally contains, through its apprehension sense, aspects and components that correspond to these manifold aspects of the object. However, it is not a new intuition that would contain all of these aspects in the manner of a direct and genuine appearance, hence
in the manner of an appearance of the aspects themselves. Yet this new presentation does not lie next to the presentation of the image object either; on the contrary, it coincides with it, permeates it, and in this permeation gives it the characteristic of the image object. The coinciding relates to the moments of resemblance. We look into the image object, we look at that by means of which it is an image object, at these moments of resemblance. And the subject presents itself to us in them: through them we look into the subject. The consciousness of the subject extends throughout the consciousness of the image object with respect to aspects of the analogizing moments. As far as the moments reach, a consciousness of identity is given, such that we in fact see the subject in them. Should there be perfect likeness in every respect, there would be coincidence in every respect. We would then have to have a consciousness that the depicted object is re-presented fully and completely. And it would have to feel to us as if the object itself — the full and complete object — were there in it. Of course, such an “as if” could not come about if there were not enough moments to make possible the doubling of consciousness as image consciousness and subject consciousness. Despite full internal coinciding, such moments must not be missing in any way. We are then, of course, pointed toward external moments. In the case of a perfect portrait that perfectly presents the person with respect to all of his moments (all that can possibly be distinctive traits), indeed, even in a portrait that does this in a most unsatisfactory way, it feels to us as if the person were there himself. The person himself, however, belongs to a nexus different from that of the image object. The actual person moves, speaks, and so on; the picture person is a motionless, mute figure. Add to this the conflict with the reality of the physical image, which characterizes the image object as sensuous semblance. The situation is the same in phantasy. A thoroughly vital phantasy, the emergence of a very clear memory, as sometimes falls to our lot when our faculties are alert and when dispositions are particularly favorable, barely gives rise to the consciousness: this is a mere image. We feel so close to the object that it is as if we were at one with it in reality, as if it were actually facing us. To be sure: It is truly represented, we see it “itself.” Living in the image consciousness, we

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8 More on this in a later lecture.
actually feel ourselves to be in a corresponding perception. Looked at more closely, however, this use of the phrase “we actually feel ourselves to be” is surely analogous or indicates a quite momentary deception. What is there is always only re-presentation and not being present. The phantasy image dissolves; it does not preserve its freshness for long. Other phantasy images suddenly push into its midst. Perhaps these are even clear phantasy images, but they interrupt the immediate consciousness of the object. They do not carry it on; they do not constitute the unity of an objective present in which the phantasy object would have a place. We will say more about these discontinuities later. Here it suffices to refer to the stable unity of the perceptual reality, to the stable interconnections of the objectivities belonging to perception’s field of regard, and, on the other hand, to the senseless confusion with which phantasies and even memories promiscuously go by and thus produce for us the consciousness of mere imaging. To be sure, in clear phantasy we see the subjects; it seems to us quite as if they were there themselves — but only “quite as if”: The appearance still has a characteristic that prevents us from taking it as the appearance of something itself in the strictest sense. At least, the different intentional contexts into which the subjects fit produce a conflict of consciousness. They prevent an unmodified, simple object-intention from becoming constituted. What becomes constituted instead is, at best, a coinciding duality: coinciding in the moments of perfect likeness sensed without difference, hence in the moments of exact depiction, at best in all internal moments, but separating in the interwoven intentional characteristics that award to what appears and is meant completion in different valid objectivities. Thus what appears turns into an image object of itself, as it were; that is, into an image object of the same object that appears there, except that it belongs elsewhere and consequently certainly cannot be the same in strict identity, but only something that is perfectly like it.

In other respects, as is well known, there are images that are perfect in very different degrees, and hence there are very different grades and levels of image consciousness. Only in the limit case does the coinciding between the direct objective apprehension, which corresponds to the image object, and the indirect apprehension, which

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appertains to the subject, extend so far that we see the image subject
in the image object perfectly, that we take all of its internal determi-
nations to be intrinsic parts of the subject. In general, however, the
two objects appear to be different, becoming identified with respect
5 to some moments — aspects of their plastic form, for example — but
becoming distinguished from one another as far as other determina-
tions are concerned — with regard, say, to color, size, and so on. The
latter determinations in the image object are not valid for the subject;
they are there in the image, but they have no depictive function.
Chapter 3.

IMAGING CONSCIOUSNESS IN ITS IMMANENT FUNCTION AND IN ITS SYMBOLIC FUNCTION — ON THE AESTHETIC CONTEMPLATION OF AN IMAGE — INQUIRY INTO THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE FOUNDING APPREHENSION IN PHANTASY CONSCIOUSNESS AND IN IMAGE CONSCIOUSNESS TO PERCEPTUAL APPREHENSION

§ 15. What imaging apprehension and symbolic apprehension have in common and how they differ

The observations just made render understandable to some degree the intermingling of the two apprehensions that constitute the apprehension consciousness belonging to imaging, and they let stand out distinctly not only its difference from perceptual apprehension but also its difference from symbolic apprehension. As far as the latter in particular is concerned, imaging apprehensions and symbolic apprehensions have in common the fact that they are not simple apprehensions. In a certain sense, both point beyond themselves. But the symbolic apprehension and, in addition, the signitive apprehension point beyond to an object foreign to what appears internally. In any case, they point outward. The imaging apprehension also points to another object, but always to a similarly formed object, to an analogous object presenting itself in the image; and above all, it points to the object through itself. In symbolic presentation, the meaning regard is pointed away from the symbol; in pictorial presentation, it is pointed toward the image. In order to present the object, we are supposed to immerse ourselves in the image; we are supposed to find the object displayed in what carries the imaging function in the image. And the more vitally we grasp it, the more alive the subject is to us.
In the course of this description, it immediately becomes clear to us that we must distinguish between two cases in connection with representation by means of analogy. An image can function as internally representative in the manner of immanent imaging. An image can function as externally representative in a manner that is essentially equivalent to the consciousness belonging to symbolic representation. A wood engraving of a Raphael Madonna, for example, can remind us of the original that we have seen in the Dresden gallery. Images can function as analogical memory-signs. Images do this in great numbers. The Stuttgart publishing house recently issued volumes containing complete series of works by Dürer, Raphael, and so on, in the most minute reproductions. The chief object of these volumes is not to awaken internal imaging and the aesthetic pleasure given with it; their point, instead, is to supply pictorial indices of the works of those great artists. The reproductions are repertoires of memory. They are illustrative captions, aids to memory, so to speak. They do still operate pictorially, of course, but they also function as memories: They are supposed to function associatively and to reproduce more complete image presentation in memory. Whoever immerses himself purely in an image, whoever lives in its imaging, has the re-presentation of the object in the image itself. Whoever makes use of the image as an aid to memory seeks and perhaps finds another re-presentation of the object, which may offer him a richer re-presentation of it.

We could, therefore, distinguish two classes in symbolic presenting. Symbolic presenting in the old, original sense of the word, the presenting of something externally by means of images, symbols,

1 Actually, this is questionable. Is it not a matter of a mixture of imaging and symbolic functions?
hieroglyphs. Speech and writing originally have, respectively, a symbolic or hieroglyphic character.² Signitive re-presenting by means of signs that are utterly without relation to the things they are signs of, that have nothing to do with them internally, arises first through a process of wearing away and later on by the formation of technical terms, algebraic symbols, and so on.

Most scientific images also belong to the former. Of course, something else comes into consideration in this connection as well: the steering of attention toward the symbolizing moments and their isolation for attention by picking out in the image exclusively those moments (precisely in the form of the image elements that only function symbolically).³

§ 17. Interest in the How of the image object’s depicting in the case of aesthetic contemplation of the image in contrast to the exclusive direction of interest toward the image subject in ordinary phantasy presentation and memory presentation>

We have to distinguish intuitive image consciousness, the consciousness that belongs to immanent imaging, from the images that function as symbols⁴ and from the image consciousness that comes about in the symbolic function of the image. Only the consciousness belonging to immanent imaging plays a role in the aesthetic contemplation of the image. In aesthetic contemplation, we immerse ourselves in the image; our interest belongs to it, we see the subject in it. The image obviously does not have the mere function of awakening a presentation of the object that would be external to the image, of awakening a new intuition of the object or even just a conceptual

² There is internal imaging here too, but in addition (in addition to the imaging already on hand) an intention, precisely a symbolic intention, aimed at a second something, at a new appearance, with genuine representation of what is meant. The immanent image function: to see the object in the image; the transeunt symbolic function: one already has the consciousness of the internal image and, in addition, a new intention aimed at a new appearance.

³ Characteristic profiles, etc. Schematic images.

⁴ Later: “or [as] externally recollective (without convention and custom).” — Editor’s note.
presentation of it. Naturally I do not wish to imply by this that the interest and meaning belonging to the aesthetic image is directed exclusively toward the subject, as if it were always only a matter of bringing the subject to intuitive presentation. When the image operates aesthetically, it may indeed be the case that a new presentation brings the subject or some of its components to a more complete intuition — say, to a more fitting coloration. Universally, the play of phantasy may be set in motion in such a way that we become immersed in the world of the subject, as when, on seeing the pictures of Paolo Veronese, we feel ourselves transplanted into the magnificent, opulent life and activity of the grand Venetians of the sixteenth century; or as when we see in Dürer’s agreeable woodcuts the transfiguration of the German landscape and the German people of his time. But how essentially the image object participates in this interest becomes apparent by the fact that phantasy does not pursue these new presentations; on the contrary, interest always returns to the image object and attaches to it internally, finding satisfaction in the manner of its depicting.

Essentially different from this position taken toward the image is the comportment in ordinary phantasy presentation and memory presentation, whose interest and meaning is directed exclusively toward the image subject. In phantasy, at least in fully awakened phantasy, in the actual phantasy intuition, the image consciousness is also a purely internal consciousness. The image object does not refer to anything; that is, to anything in the way in which a symbol does. It does not point away from itself, does not point outward, even if toward something similar that would present itself as different from what already appears in the image: as if the intention pertaining to the image and the intention pertaining to what is depicted were placed side by side and a reference of one to the other were to ensue, but internally within themselves. On exceptional occasions, one can also enjoy one’s phantasies aesthetically and contemplate them in an aesthetic manner. Then we do not merely look at the subject in the image consciousness; rather, what interests us is how the subject presents itself there, what manner of appearing in image it displays, and perhaps how aesthetically pleasing the manner of appearing is. Thus the artist will listen to and lie in wait for his own phantasies in order to see in them the most
aesthetically beautiful poses. Or he directly experiments in fantasy. He phantasies a subject in various ways and seeks out among its ways of appearing in fantasy (among its ways of being presented by an image object that has been formed and appears in such and such a way) those that are the most beautiful aesthetically. This, of course, is not the normal case. When we phantasy, we live in the phantasied events; the How of the internal image presentation falls outside the scope of our natural interests.

§ 18. Possibility of change in the direction of the meaning-intention and of a corresponding change of object.

Description of the mode of appearance of the image object in the context of a psychological interest, for example>

We see that different acts of presentation can be constructed on the same apprehensival basis. To mean the image object, to mean the image subject, and again to mean the image object as the image of the subject are different objectivating states. Since in speaking of the object of our presentation we normally denote that object to which our objectivating act of meaning refers, change in the direction of the meaning-intention also signifies a change of object. If we live in

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5 This is incorrect. Confusion between image-object appearance and appearance of the subject. In this case, it is a question, not of the image in the sense at issue here, but of the “appearance” of the phantasy subject, concerning which “side” gives the best effect aesthetically. Surely I can ask myself in the case of the perceptual object: From which side does the object work best aesthetically? Thus in phantasy I present the object to myself from different sides and, living in the consciousness of the subject, ask myself: In what way does it have the greatest effect aesthetically? In the case of the physical image as well, the side from which the object comes to presentation is essential. Add to this the How with respect to what does not belong materially to the object itself, e.g., marble, brush work, the way in which the colors operate. Only the psychologist, not the artist, turns his attention to the appearance just as it exists in phantasy.

6 In aiming at the object, the intention necessarily aims at the object in some “appearance” (aspect) or other. Hence we have to distinguish: 1) the phenomenon of the primary appearance (image-object appearance); 2) the consciousness that is directed toward the subject, specifically in one of the subject’s appearances taken from the synthesis. It will be absolutely necessary to differentiate the concepts of appearance and to introduce different names.
free phantasies or in memories, the act of meaning, the objectivating intention, aims at the image subject. But we can also focus our attention on the image object and, in turn, on the manner of its appearance, on the constitutive components of the appearance, on the sensuous phantasms, and so on. We can describe the image object belonging to phantasy, as when we say, for example: I am now remembering the botanical garden as it was in summertime — trees rustling noisily, flowers blooming, slopes shaded. The colors, however, may not come to me. It is more the plastic forms that I find, more a restlessly changing grey than the colors, and so on. Here we focus our attention on the appearance itself and compare its content with the intended subject. Hence the phenomenon of normal phantasy presentation and the phenomenon of presentation directed toward phantasy objects, toward image objects of whatever sort, are obviously different. To take another example, in reading a travel book the situation is clearly different depending on whether we live in the phantasy consciousness as a consciousness that intuitively re-presents foreign lands or, perhaps diverted by a psychological-descriptive interest, turn our interest and act of meaning toward the phantasy images themselves. The apprehensional basis can be precisely the same in both cases. The same image objects appear, and these are the basis for the same relation to the distant lands. In the one case, however, it is the image objects that are meant and are the focus of interest; in the other case, it is the distant lands.

§ 19. The self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency of the two interpenetrating apprehensions and, in the case of imagining mediated by physical images, the problem of the relationship of the founding apprehension to perceptual apprehension. The suppression of imaging consciousness in the case of deceptions à la the waxworks, the panorama, and so on, and aesthetic semblance>

Of the two interpenetrating apprehensions in the consciousness belonging to phantasy imaging and in the consciousness belonging to immanent imaging generally, one is obviously non-self-sufficient, the other self-sufficient. The appearance that places the image object before my eyes could be experienced precisely as it presents itself in
the imaging consciousness even without such an imaginative function. On the other hand, as far as the modifying apprehension through which the image first becomes an image is concerned, it is evidently bound to an appearance that founds it. Where there is no appearance, there is also nothing there that could serve as an image to re-present something else; an object must lie within our view so that we can present another object in it.

Now what relationship does this founding apprehension have to perceptual apprehension? We can study the situation in cases in which image consciousness that had become constituted on the basis of a primary appearance ceases.

Such cases occur above all in physical image apprehension. Let us presuppose that the physical image is given in perception. Here, in the being on hand of the image apprehension, from which we can easily abstract, it is already clear that the founding image-object appearance taken in and for itself has the character of a perceptual appearance, of an ordinary presentation. It is not, of course, a normal and full perception, inasmuch as what appears — for example, this image person in an oil painting — is not taken to be actually present. It appears as present, but it is not taken to be actual. A belief consciousness may be there, but it does not refer to the object of the perceptual apprehension but to the object that is seen in the image, to the person who is not present but who comes to be presented in the present in an image, to the person who is precisely only re-presented. The frequently mentioned deceptions à la the waxworks, the panorama, and so on, show that the transformation of an image phenomenon through the ceasing of the imaginative function allows an ordinary perceptual apprehension to come forth, perhaps even a full perception furnished with normal belief. It may be that at first we see the mannequins as human beings. We then have a normal perception, even if it subsequently proves to be mistaken. If we suddenly become conscious of the deception, image consciousness makes its appearance. But image consciousness does not succeed in lasting in such cases. With its real clothes, hair, and so on, indeed, even with movements artificially mimicked by means of mechanical devices, the wax figure so closely resembles the natural human being that the perceptual consciousness momentarily prevails again and again. The imaginative apprehension is suppressed. We indeed “know” that it is a semblance, but we cannot
help ourselves — we see a human being. The accompanying conceptual judgment that what is at stake is a mere image becomes ineffective against the perceptual semblance, and the inclination to take it as real is so great that we might even believe for a moment that it is real. The conflict in which we then find ourselves is, of course, a crude and altogether unaesthetic effect. Wax figures, imitating reality as closely as possible — covered with real clothes, fitted out with genuine hair, and so on — present perceptual appearances of human beings that coincide so perfectly with the human beings depicted that the moments of difference cannot produce a clean-cut and clear consciousness of difference; that is to say, a secure image consciousness. Image consciousness, however, is the essential foundation for the possibility of aesthetic feeling in fine art. Without an image, there is no fine art. And the image must be clearly set apart from reality; that is, set apart in a purely intuitive way, without any assistance from indirect thoughts. We are supposed to be taken out of empirical reality and lifted up into the equally intuitive world of imagery. Aesthetic semblance [Schein] is not sensory illusion [Sinnentrug]. The delight in blunt disappointment or in the crude conflict between reality and semblance, in which now semblance passes itself off as reality, now reality as semblance — reality and semblance playing hide-and-seek with each other, as it were — is the most extreme antithesis to aesthetic pleasure, which is grounded on the peaceful and clear consciousness of imaging. Aesthetic effects are not the effects of annual fairs.

§ 20. Whether the founding apprehension in memory and in phantasy in the ordinary sense has the character of a perceptual apprehension. Suppression of image consciousness in hallucinations and in visions. Daydreaming and the consciousness of semblance in the formations of phantasy.

Now what about imagining that is not mediated through physical images? What about phantasy in the ordinary sense, including the phenomena of memory? Should we also say here that the founding apprehension has the character of a perceptual apprehension? At least in cases in which there is present an intuition of the phantasied objectivities that is clear and rich in content? Are all genuine acts of appearing one and the same?
character, the character of presentation? It also happens here that image consciousness ceases; and when that occurs, we will, of course, have to assume that what is left has only the character of perception. Here I call attention to transitions from a phantasy into a vision. The phantasy formations no longer hover before the inner eye as images. Empirical perception, the reality in which the visionary as a bodily organism lives, is suspended; and simultaneously with the suspension the opposition between this reality and the phantasy imagery, the imaging function of the phantasy images, escapes. The visionary is then in a trance state; the world of phantasy is then his real world. He himself takes it to be real; that is to say, his intuitions are perceptions, even endowed with the characteristic of belief.

We will assume the same thing in the case of dreams, and not only in the dreaming that occurs in sleep but also in daydreaming. Sometimes we give ourselves up to the attractions of phantasy to such an extent that we begin to react to the phantasy appearances in actions just as if perceptions were at stake: our fist clenches, we hold audible dialogues with the imagined persons, and so on. Of course, precisely at that point the dream is in the habit of ending; actual perception chases off imagining. The more frequent case, however, is probably that in which the real world before our eyes is almost swallowed up while we pursue the phantasies, although that world makes us aware, in however minimal a way, of its factual existence, so that a faint consciousness that they are semblances constantly colors our phantasy formations.

Such experiences do indeed speak in favor of the claim that the appearances of phantasy, taken apart from image consciousness, are not essentially different from the appearances of perception. Yet the question is whether this proves true only for limit cases, whether in such cases the phantasy appearance does not veer precisely into hallucination, into a perceptual appearance, while in themselves the image apprehension in the phantasy appearance and [the apprehension] in the perceptual appearance are essentially different. In particular, the question will be whether, if we are forced to assume that there are no differences between the mode of apprehension that constitutes an image object and the mode that constitutes a perceptual object, we will also have to concede that there are no essential differences in the apprehension contents.

7 Nietzsche.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ORDINARY IMAGE-PRESENTATION AND PHANTASY PRESENTATION

§ 21. The apprehensions underlying physical image presentation. The question of the identity or difference in apprehension contents

Before we discuss these questions, particularly the question of the relationship between sensation and phantasm, we want to finish some interesting and important analyses. Up to now, we have for the most part discussed what is common to imaginings based on perception and to imaginings belonging to phantasy. Now we want to study their differences and, in doing so, attempt at the same time to penetrate somewhat more deeply into their analytic essences.

To begin with, an important difference seems to occur with respect to the underlying apprehension. The apprehension is more complicated, so it seems, in the case of physical image presentation than in the case of phantasy presentation. In phantasy presentation, the whole complex of sensuous contents belonging to the unity of the experience finds its place in a single appearance; namely, in the appearance belonging to the phantasy image. The situation is different in physical image presentation. Here two objects come into play phenomenally: the physical image appears, and once again the mental image, the exhibiting image object, appears. I can focus on either of these two objects; I can mean either one of them objectivatively. And each is there in the form of a direct appearance and not in the form of a mere symbolization or of a founded consciousness aimed at an image subject. Each object appears in precisely the full and proper sense. For example, if I contemplate the picture of Raphael’s theological subject

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1 The study of the differences between phantasy and perceptual imagining.
hanging above my desk, the picture appears to me as a physical thing, as a thing hanging on the wall; I focus my attention on that. Then I change the direction of my contemplation and focus my attention on the image object: there then appears to me an achromatic little figure of a woman, about a foot and a half high, tinted only in black and white and surrounded by two little cherubs, considerably smaller and tinted in the same way, and so on. In normal contemplation of the picture, I live in the image consciousness. In that case, I focus my attention on something entirely different: I see the form of a sublime woman, of superhuman size, two powerful and large young angels, and so on. I also say of these that they “appear,” but obviously this does not occur in the proper sense. I see the subject in the image object; the latter is what directly and genuinely appears. The image object’s appearing plastic form and its appearing gradations of light picture the subject for me with respect to its plastic form and its true coloration, which does not come to further expression in the image.

Now what about this appearance? What about the direct objectivation that is at the basis of the image apprehension? Is it founded in the appearance of the physical image object? Does the image consciousness therefore come about because, below everything else, the sensuous sensations undergo a perceptual apprehension by means of which the physical image becomes constituted? And because, in a second step, a new perceptual apprehension is grounded on this first apprehension [and] the image object would then appear in it, and then the representing consciousness, the image consciousness, would finally be founded in this? This seems to be the case. Nevertheless, while we imagine the subject, the picture as a spatially present physical thing and the picture as a figment, as the bearer of imagining, in fact lie within our view. And yet one becomes uncertain as soon as the question about the apprehension contents of these two appearances is raised. The image object and the physical image surely do not have separate and different apprehension contents; on the contrary, their contents are identically the same. The same visual sensations are interpreted as points and lines on paper and as appearing plastic form. The same sensations are interpreted as a physical thing made from plaster and as a white human form. And in spite of the identity of their sensory foundation, the two apprehensions certainly cannot exist at
once: they cannot make two appearances stand out simultaneously. By turns, indeed, and therefore separately, but certainly not at once.

§ 22. The appearance belonging to the image object and its character of unreality, of conflict with perception’s field of regard constituting the present

Let us study the situation somewhat more closely. The engraving shows us a design. Submitting to the intentions of the engraver and the painter, we do not apprehend the design as a system of lines and shadings on the surface of a piece of paper. Rather, precisely as far as the design as a whole extends, we see, not paper, but plastic shapes, and a relation to the subject is brought about in these shapes or through them. The engraving has a white paper margin: There we see paper. The picture has a frame, and the frame together with its paper stands out from the wall on which it hangs. The wall belongs to the room, a considerable part of which extends into our field of vision. All of this is not without significance. While we are living in the imagining of the subject, the visual field of our perception does not disappear. On the contrary, we have the perception of our surroundings, even if not in the form of a primary act of meaning; and they are the surroundings of the picture, indeed, in a certain way, even of the subject. First, as for the picture, that part of it to which the design does not extend also belongs in the unity of the perceptual apprehension. On the other hand, normal perceptual apprehension is absent as far as the design is concerned. At least, we cannot say here without further ado: We see paper. To the extent that the apprehension contents coincide, the image apprehension displaces the paper apprehension. Or better still: the image object appears and is the bearer of the consciousness of the subject. The apprehension contents are used up for this appearance. A second apprehension — the paper apprehension — is also there in a certain way, connected with the continuously united apprehension pertaining to our field of regard; it is excited by it. However, while the rest of the field of regard enters into appearance, the paper apprehension itself is not an appearance, since it has been deprived of apprehension contents. Its apprehension contents now function as the
apprehension contents of the image object. And yet it belongs to these apprehension contents: in short, there is conflict. But in a peculiar way. The image object does triumph, insofar as it comes to appearance. The apprehension contents are permeated by the image-object apprehension; they fuse into the unity of the appearance. But the other apprehension is still there; it has its normal, stable connection with the appearance of the surroundings. Perception gives the characteristic of present reality. The surroundings are real surroundings; the paper, too, is something actually present. The image appears, but it conflicts with what is actually present. It is therefore merely an “image”; however much it appears, it is a nothing [ein Nichts].

What we must particularly notice about this reflection is that it expresses in paraphrase, in discourse that conceives indirectly, what quite obviously belongs to the character of physical image consciousness. Pay attention above all to the circumstance that in fact one is conscious of the surroundings of the image, that in fact the image object — and together with it, as it were, the subject indicated in it — appears in the manner of a perceptual object. And so we have nothing but perceptual apprehensions, which, in conformity with our experience, enter into unity. Corresponding to the continuity of sense contents in the field of visual sensation, the whole appearing objectivity, the image objectivity and the objectivity of the surroundings of the image, takes its place visually in a single objective nexus. One objective nexus, which, however, divides into two nexuses according to the value of the reality involved. Let us start from the picture with its exhibiting and exhibited figures, landscapes, and so on. This ideal world is a world by itself. But why? By what means is it characterized phenomenologically as a world by itself? Well, our visual field certainly extends further than the field of the image, and what occurs in the former also has its relation to the image. The frame is in the visual field. It frames the landscape, the mythological scene, and so on. We look through the frame, as if through a window, into the space of the image, into the image’s reality. Obviously these words express something about the phenomenon. The objects seen and the objects quasi-seen, the image objects, enter into relationship. But why do they not in fact produce a coherent whole of objects, and, more precisely, a perceptual coherent whole? A single cohesive present? Now the surroundings up to the border of the image, up to precisely
the point at which the design and the image apprehension begin, are, of course, perceived; here there is perceptual apprehension without any image consciousness. The image object, however, is given in a perceptual apprehension modified by the characteristic of imagination. But that still does not suffice. The appearance belonging to the image object is distinguished in one point from the normal perceptual appearance. This is an essential point that makes it impossible for us to view the appearance belonging to the image object as a normal perception: It bears within itself the characteristic of unreality, of conflict with the actual present. The perception of the surroundings, the perception in which the actual present becomes constituted for us, continues on through the frame and then signifies “printed paper” or “painted canvas.” We do not see the printed paper or painted canvas in the proper sense. The sensation material, which the image-object apprehension has claimed for its appearance, cannot in the proper sense become the core of appearance a second time. That is evidently impossible. Yet in a nongenuine way, in the mode of “nongenuine presentation,” the paper perception is an appendix of the perception of the surroundings. And so we have a unity of perception that fills out the whole visual field, the whole perceptual field of regard. This is the perception that constitutes the “present,” actually present reality. And there coincides with it, with regard to a part, a second perception, or rather only a perceptual apprehension. It erases the genuineness of a corresponding part of the now-perception; it coincides, therefore, with a part of that perception that offers only nongenuine appearance. So we have appearance here, sensuous intuition and objectification, but in conflict with an experienced present. We have the appearance of a not now in the now. “In the now,” insofar as the image object appears in the midst of perceptual reality and claims, as it were, to have objective reality in its midst. “In the now” also insofar as the image-apprehending is something temporally now. Yet, on the other hand, a not now insofar as the conflict makes the image object into a nullity that does indeed appear but is nothing, and that may serve only to exhibit something existing. But it is evident that this exhibited something can never exhibit the now with which it conflicts; hence it can only exhibit something else, something not present. The latter could at most lie within one’s field of regard, only outside the image field.
§ 23. The relationship between what is actually present and a mere figment in the conflict of two perceptual apprehensions in cases of sensory illusion

Whenever a perceptual apprehension comes into conflict with a second apprehension — which presupposes that in whole or in part they have the same substratum of sensation — the apprehension that determines what is actually present is the one that joins together with the unity of the total actual perception to form a comprehensive total perception and that participates in the force of the mutually founding belief intentions. As for the other apprehension, to the extent that it takes possession of the sensuous content, of some section cut out from one or more sensory fields, and produces an appearance, it constitutes a mere figment, an illusory object, a mere "image" — however one is accustomed to putting it — even when no image representation occurs.

This is the case, therefore, with every "sensory illusion." The bent stick in water is a fiction, an illusion: for in deceptive perception the visual apprehension is supplemented by certain tactile apprehensions. Actual investigation by touching and grasping yields a "straight" stick, which, for its part, normally requires a different visual appearance.

— Or let us take our example of the mannequin: If I see a human being in the mannequin, I have a perceptual appearance. As soon as I become aware of the deception, I may still have the same appearance, I may continue to make the sensuous contents appear to me as a human being, but I then have a conflict with reality: what is actually present is determined here by the surroundings and by the figure seen (though seen as a wax mannequin), which shares objective unity with the surroundings. If I interpret it otherwise, then I feel precisely the "otherwise." I feel the conflict; I have the appearance of a nothing. This human being is a nothing. If, however, the figure presents a well-known person by virtue of its resemblance to him, the situation changes again. The person in the now, in the present in which the person finds a place fictitiously — that is, on the one hand, as appearing, and, on the other hand, as in conflict — is nothing. But the person in the present does represent a resembling existing person, though not someone existing here, not someone existing presently.

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2 Reflection in water.
<§ 24. Preliminary look at the situation in the case of phantasy: the complete separation of the field of phantasy from the field of perception>

As we soon see, the situation in the case of phantasy (including memory) is entirely different. The apprehension contents of phantasy are obviously not simultaneously bearers of genuine and nongenuine perceptual apprehensions. The phantasy image does not appear in the objective nexus of present reality, of reality that becomes constituted in actual perception, in my actual field of vision. The centaur that now hovers before me in phantasy does not seemingly cover over a part of my visual field, as does the centaur in a picture by Böcklin that I actually see. The real space of perception does not have a portion that is framed off in such and such a way and that leaves room in its midst for a fictive space for my phantasies. The field of phantasy is completely separate from the field of perception. But if this is the case, why do we distinguish the two under the titles of perception and phantasy? Is it perhaps because of the image apprehension? But could it not be the case that phantasy apprehensions might function without any imaging? And would they not then be perceptions? Could we then perhaps have two perceptual fields, except that the two would be separate and therefore multiple visual fields, multiple tactile fields, and so on? And could not the phantasy field at some future time change into a perceptual field, and the perceptual field into a phantasy field? [50]

<§ 25. Recapitulation. The twin ways of representing by means of resemblance: 1) internal imaging as genuinely imagining consciousness; the moments in the image-object appearance that, as bearers of the consciousness of internal representation, illustrate something intuitively, and the other moments in the image-object appearance; the double character of conflict belonging to the image-object appearance; 2) external imaging as a mode of symbolic consciousness³>

In our most recent lectures, we were concerned with studying the imagination in its different formations. At first we attempted to treat

³ January 21, 1905.
the phenomena of physical imaging and the phenomena of phantasy (including the phenomena of memory) from the same point of view. We encountered a series of highly remarkable differences. Within physical imaging, the distinction between immanent image consciousness and transcendent image consciousness emerged as very important. We subsumed the latter under a broader concept of symbolic representation. An image representation can therefore occur in two essentially different ways. It can 1) have the characteristic of internal representation. We see the subject in the image itself; we see the former in the latter. The image (expressed more precisely: the image object) brings the subject to intuitive presentation in itself, and it does this to a greater or lesser extent depending on whether the number of pictorializing moments is greater or smaller. Namely, a remarkable difference becomes apparent with respect to the various moments from which the appearance of the image is constructed. Some of the moments, that is, are genuine bearers of the consciousness of internal representation; others do not have this function. In the former, the image object exhibits the subject to us. Looking at them, emphasizing them in consciousness, so to speak — but by no means abstracting them — we see the subject; it is re-presented in them in the proper sense. By virtue of this distinctive character, they have a special status, precisely the status of moments that illustrate intuitively. In the case of a steel engraving or of a plaster bust, for example, the plastic form of the image object has this status, but not the shades of black and white. The latter moments, hence the supplementary group of moments constituting the appearance belonging to the image, are deprived of the mentioned distinctive character or status. They are there in the image, but they are not operative. We do not intuit the subject in them. They do not even have a symbolic function; they do not point as signs to corresponding, though differently determined, subject moments. They have no relation to the latter at all. However, by virtue of association, the moments that illustrate intuitively surely

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4 The last sentence was later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
5 Husserl later changed the period to a comma and inserted the following text: “<can have> the character of internal and external, of immanent and transcendent imaging. Let us work this out more precisely in our recapitulation.” — Editor’s note.
6 Nota bene.
7 Inserted later: “intentional.” — Editor’s note.
do have their intentional connection with these subject-moments. As soon as our interest is directed specifically toward these moments, the consciousness of conflict emerges, the consciousness of the meant object’s “being otherwise.” Even without this interest, however, the attendant image moments are afflicted with the characteristic of conflict. This is not, as it were, the logically unfolding and synthetic consciousness of conflict, but a phenomenological characteristic, a characteristic, so to speak, of discord, nullity, and so on. And for the sake of its unity, the whole image object, as soon as we take and consider it as a whole, has this characteristic of conflict. The image object as image object must be the bearer of conflict in a double sense. In one sense (a), it is in conflict with the actual perceptual present. This is the conflict between the image as image-object appearance and the image as physical image thing; (b) in the other sense, there is the conflict between the image-object appearance and the presentation of the \textit{subject} entwined with it or, rather, partially coinciding with it. The greater the extent of the agreement between image object and image subject — that is to say, obviously, the greater the extent of the conscious agreement manifesting itself in the immanent image consciousness — the more perfectly the subject is made intuitable in the image and the more we feel the object to be re-presented when we see into the image, and the less discord there is between the remaining moments, functioning as stopgaps, and the meaning of the subject. Nevertheless, even in the case of considerable difference, the intention transcending the image object or directed toward completion, toward richer intuition, can become unimportant. This happens in the case of aesthetic contemplation when, with the same apprehensional basis, the meaning does not aim exclusively at the subject. Rather, an interest, specifically, an interest in the form of aesthetic feeling, fastens on to the \textit{image object}, and fastens on to it even with regard to its nonanalogizing moments. Since I did not talk about it earlier, I call attention to the aesthetic function of the means and materials of reproduction, for example, the bold brushwork of many masters, the aesthetic effect of marble, and so on. The consciousness of the image subject is present there too and is in no way inessential, for without it there is no aesthetic image; but the mode of meaning, the distribution of the meaning intentions as well as the feeling intentions is entirely different from what it is, say, in the case of the photograph that we do
not look at aesthetically, but as the picture of a friend, of a great man, and the like. Here we can see the person only through the image as medium.

So much for internal imaging, in which we observe the genuinely imagining consciousness. In the second place, however, we distinguish this internal imaging from an external, transeunt imaging, a different mode of representation by means of resemblance, which belongs in a series with representation by means of signs, or at least mediates imaginative consciousness with signitive consciousness. A photograph, when it is particularly good, re-presents a person to us. We immerse ourselves visually in the photograph. A photograph, however, can also bring to mind a person in a manner similar to that in which a sign brings to mind something signified. If it does that, the image is characterized, phenomenologically, as that which brings something to mind. The person himself, however, who exists for us intentionally in a second and separate, though related, presentation — for example, in a phantasy presentation (but perhaps also in a merely empty intention) — the person, I say, then appears as what the image brings to mind. But images can also function just like symbols insofar as they receive, conventionally or on the basis of one’s own arbitrary stipulation, the determination to function in this way as “engines of memory.” In this case, the images, just like symbols, bear a phenomenological characteristic of their own. They are charged with a responsibility. They not only carry with themselves the presentation of the signified object, they also refer to it as <to> that which is supposed to be meant. They divert interest from themselves and seek to turn it away, as it were. An illustrated table of contents for a collection of art works (which are, properly speaking, what is meant and indicated), a hieroglyph, and so on, offer examples.

The viewing of the image naturally carries with it a certain primary imagining, an internal image consciousness. But the latter consciousness, which is usually imperfect, is only the basis for a symbol consciousness connected to it and directed outward. What resembles points to something else, which is not to be seen in it internally but

8 The physical image points to the physical <image>, the figment is the image indicator of another figment, the image apprehension points to another image apprehension.
9 Added later: “Sketches as memory images.”
is instead something to be made present in a new presentation. The *depicting image* is not an intuitional illustration, or not that alone, but is essentially or is\(^{10}\) *at the same time a sign*, a symbol, of the prototype. “At the same time” naturally does not signify “at the same time” in a temporal sense. For the two functions are built on one another *in succession*, while in coexistence they check one another. Whoever sees-in does not see beyond; whoever seeks and sees the subject *in the image* cannot, while doing this, at the same time see and seek it outwardly.\(^{11}\) But whoever in the act of seeing-in is not satisfied can certainly look around for a better image or a different intuitive presentation. And again, while fleetingly glimpsing the internal presentation of the subject, one can turn away from the image and, in an externally connected symbolic intention, turn toward what is symbolized and perhaps intuitively re-presented.

We have already become acquainted with all of this in its principal features. I have gladly repeated it, since with the exposition I have just given I was perhaps able to set forth the situation even more clearly and precisely than I was able to do earlier. In any event, one must make it entirely one’s own if one is to be able to go on building confidently.

\(^{10}\)“essentially or is” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.

\(^{11}\) This, however, is only a matter of attention.
At the conclusion of the last lecture, we were intent on distinguishing between phantasy presentation and ordinary image presentation. Image presentation became perfectly clear to us. Phantasy presentation continued to present serious difficulties and obscurities. Its consideration under the universal title “imagination” seemed to require that it too be regarded as image presentation; specifically, as immanent image presentation. On the other hand, a certain feeling of dissatisfaction did not leave us. We felt that the situation in phantasy presentation is certainly not the same as it is in physical image presentation.

One thing is indeed clear from the beginning: The “image” in the case of physical imaging — that is, the image object — is a figment, a perceptual object but also a semblance object. It appears in the way in which an actual physical thing appears, but in conflict with the actual present that conflict-free perception brings about. Now this figment, or rather this fiction consciousness, is permeated with representational consciousness. Hence imaginative consciousness arises here. And it arises in the new conflict between the figment and what is imagined.

On the other hand, if we look at phantasy, the figment is absent. In this sense, the “phantasy image” is not an image that establishes itself in the midst of the actual reality of the present. It does not appear in the form of a perceptual apprehension; it does not become constituted as something quasi-real among the phenomenal realities belonging to my field of regard; and it does not show itself as a figment through its...
conflict with the reality of the present, which in itself is uncontested. How does it appear, then? Does it actually appear in the manner of an image? Does an image object through which an image subject is intuited actually become constituted in phantasy? I must confess that again and again I was seized by serious doubts here. A part of these difficulties was removed after the differences between external and internal imaging were sorted out. Certainly phantasy appearance normally does not function in the manner$^1$ of external imaging; it does not represent externally. Or rather, it does not have to function in that way, although it can do so: as when we create for ourselves an image of a country according to a travel book — with the full consciousness, of course, that what is in question is only a more or less remote analogue; or when we present a musical work to ourselves by means of themes, [that is,] by means of a small part of the melody in which what is presented, in addition to its internal imaging, is also loaded with intentions pointing outward, and so on. But even then internal imaging is primary in every instance, and the pointing outward toward something else coming to intuition in other presentations is something appended. If, therefore, we leave the external intentions aside, since in any case they presuppose internal intentions to which they must first be appended, then the question is precisely about these internal intentions, how they are to be understood, and even whether they are really to be understood as image intentions. If they are, then in any event the image consciousness becomes constituted on a different foundation. The earlier conflict of the actual present with what sets itself in its midst as a figment is absent. But must not another conflict be assumed in its place? If nothing were to contest the appearance, would it not have to be taken as perception? Is not simple, direct apprehension that which makes up appearance in such a way that appearance in the primary and genuine sense everywhere signifies the same mode of apprehension? What characterizes one appearance as

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$^1$ Inserted later: “of an image in the sense.” — Editor’s note.

$^2$ From “and whether” to “are” later changed to “and whether their apprehension as image intentions can actually be carried through to the end.” — Editor’s note.

$^3$ The last sentence was later changed to: “Is not the simple direct apprehension that makes up the appearance everywhere the same? In such a way that appearance in the primary and genuine sense everywhere signifies the same mode of being presented?” — Editor’s note.
the appearance of something present and another as the appearance of something not present? We understand that in the figment something nonpresent can appear and consequently be presented in image. The figment is indeed characterized differently from any other appearance belonging to the present. It bears on itself the brand of nullity; it is the presentation of an objectivity, but the conflict marks the objectivity as nonpresent. If the conflict were absent, how could the appearance present anything but something present?

§ 27. Phantasy appearance: The degrees and levels of adequacy of the presentation to its object in physical imaging and in phantasy>

Let us consider the phantasy appearance more closely, then. First of all, we must distinguish the different degrees and levels of adequacy of the presentation to its object. In the sphere of physical images, we also find different levels of adequacy in the presentation of the image subject by the image object. To begin with, with respect to extensity — the range of the depictive moments — now more, now fewer moments of the image appearance can be involved in the imaging. The range is greater in the case of an oil painting or oleograph than in the case of an engraving or ink drawing. But there can be greater or less adequacy in another way too; namely, with respect to the intensity, so to speak, of the depictiveness, that is, with respect to the degree of the primitive resemblances that come into question. A drawing that suggests only outlines can give them in perfect resemblance, and thus with respect to this one moment furnish a perfect consciousness of internal imaging. A plaster cast can be good or bad; that is, not objectively good or bad, but good or bad phenomenologically speaking. Namely, the plastic form can furnish us with a perfect image of the object; without the least consciousness of conflict or disparity, we see the plastic form of the presented object, of the Moses of Michelangelo, for example, in the plaster. And the converse can be the case. We sense the disparity. A color print can reproduce the form perfectly, the color imperfectly: The coloring in such a case is taken to be the bearer of depiction, but

4 Inserted later: “the same object can be presented in phantasy in infinitely various ways.” — Editor’s note.
the analogizing is imperfect for our consciousness: The presentation is perceptibly inadequate.

These differences in degree in the case of physical imaging, however, change nothing about the fact that the figment appears to us with the full force and intensity of perception. However bad the color print, the engraving, the drawing may be, it makes an image object appear to us with the same sensuous force and intensity that we find only when a genuine perception makes its object appear. If we abstract from the accompanying act-characteristics in which validity and invalidity, adequacy and inadequacy, representational significance, and so forth, are experienced by us, then there is essentially no longer any difference between a painted thing and an actual thing. Or better: between the thing appearance in the case of the painting and the thing appearance in the case of the actual thing.

Now what about phantasy in these respects? Surely in phantasy we have appearances in the same sense in which we have them in perception or in physical imaging, or at least in an extraordinarily closely related sense. Objects face us in phantasy, often the same objects that face us in perception and depiction; and we can claim it to be evident a priori that any object that can appear in any way in one of these forms can appear in all of them, with all of the same differences of genuine and nongenuine presentation, of appearing sides and nonappearing sides, and so on. On the other hand, it is certain that there are, in general, great differences, and above all with respect to the last point discussed. In general, the appearing phantasy object does not appear in such a way that we could say (as we could say in the case of physical image objects) that, apart from the different act-characteristics, there is essentially no difference in comparison with perceptual appearance. It is not only that the phantasy thing does not appear in perception’s field of regard but instead appears, so to speak, in an entirely different world, which is completely separated from the world of the actual present. Normally there is also a difference in the phantasy thing itself: the phantasy thing appears as something formed, colored, and so on, and yet we cannot expect to find anything precisely resembling it among the objects of perception. If we conceive of

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\footnote{Apparently Husserl means the point discussed in the last paragraph. – Translator’s note.}
the characteristics of nullity and imaging as cancelled in the case of the image object belonging to physical depiction, then we have a perceptual object as good as any other. But if we do this with the phantasy thing, we have no such object. The phantasy thing, taken precisely as it appears in phantasy, is not found in any perception.

§ 28. The protean character of phantasy appearance: fluctuation in its fullness, force, and vivacity, and the connected fluctuation in the adequacy of its representation

However, I said a short time ago — with some care — that that is the case in general. What kind of restriction does this generality imply? We all distinguish between phantasies that are vivid, clear, and stable, and phantasies that are faint, obscure, continuously shifting, unsteady, and ghostly.

Occasionally — in the case of most people, only quite exceptionally — phantasy appearances present themselves in a manner that approximates that of perceptual appearance, indeed, that seems to approach phenomenological equality with it. Whether it actually is and can be its equal is difficult to decide. It is enough that one can be very uncertain about whether any difference at all exists for certain classes of persons and cases. In such limit cases, however, it is also uncertain whether hallucination or a physical image apprehension based on hallucination does not replace genuine phantasy apprehension. Naturally, we must exclude those cases in which hallucinations force themselves into the perceptual field and hold their own there as genuine perceptual appearances. In such cases, one no longer speaks of phantasy at all.

Consciousness of what is not present belongs to the essence of phantasy. We live in a present; we have a perceptual field of regard. In addition, however, we have appearances that present something not present lying entirely outside this field of regard.

Whatever the case may be with respect to the approximation [of phantasy appearance] to the limit of essential homogeneity with perceptual appearance (we do not wish to discuss the matter more closely here), there are often cases in which phantasy appearances present themselves as vigorous formations, cases in which they bring
to intuition objects that are sharply drawn, plastic, and color saturated. However, in countless cases — indeed, in most cases — the situation is otherwise. The phantasy objects appear as empty phantoms, transparently pale, with colors wholly unsaturated, with imperfect plastic form, often with only vague and unsteady contours filled out with je ne sais quoi or, properly speaking, with nothing, with nothing that one would assign as a defined surface, colored in such and such a way, to what appears. The appearance changes in protean fashion; something flashes there as color and plastic form and is immediately gone again. And the color, even when it flashes, is peculiarly empty, unsaturated, without force; and similarly, the form is something so vague, so ghostly, that it could not occur to us to posit it in the sphere of actual perception and imaging. These are distinctions that we do indeed describe with expressions taken from the domain of perception and yet do not find in that domain; they are new distinctions. In perception, unsaturated colors are colors that approach grey. But a grey can be as clear, firm, and real as any other color. The red that emerges in phantasy, however, does not simply approach grey, although it may readily do that; for when it does approach grey, the grey that belongs to phantasy itself manifests an unutterable emptiness that stands in contrast to the fullness of the perceived grey. Analogues in the perceptual domain are not entirely absent: I draw attention to appearances we have at dawn, particularly in the fog, or at twilight, and to the differences in fullness that appearances possess depending on variations in the intensity of light. And yet these perceptual analogues still appear in a different manner.

While in the case of physical imaging, therefore, the primary appearances, those belonging to the image objects, absolutely possess the fullness and force of perception, here in the case of phantasy images, of primary phantasy appearances, there presents itself a sphere of differences and graduated levels that concern precisely the fullness, the vivacity of the appearance, and obviously concern them on the basis of corresponding differences in the apprehension contents,

6 Considered more precisely, there are two distinctions. First of all 1) the distinction between forcefulness and the lack of forcefulness, between vivacity, fullness, and emptiness and lifelessness <>. This first difference is related to the primitive moments of presentation: the same moments can <be> more forceful, less forceful, etc.
the phantasms. Plainly, fluctuation in the adequacy of the presentation in phantasy is also connected with this fluctuation in fullness and vivacity. To speak generally, it is quite certain that phantasy presentations have in common with image presentations the distinction between perfect and imperfect presenting. In phantasy presentation, however, a gradual change in adequacy, which is absent in physical imaging, discloses itself. And at the same time we become attentive to the fact that in physical imaging, the image in question is usually a stable image, which therefore possesses its level of adequacy once and for all. But here in phantasy presentation the image is something fluctuating, unsteady, changing, now growing in fullness and force, now diminishing, hence something continually changing immanently in the scale of perfection. This, however, already pertains to a second point.

§ 29. Continuity and discontinuity in perceptual appearance, physical image appearance, and phantasy appearance

Namely, a second distinction, absent in the case of ordinary images, is inherent in the discontinuity in the succession of appearances grounded on the same identically preserved objectivating intention. (The discontinuity does not concern only the moment of vivacity.) This discontinuity contrasts with the continuity in the case of physical image appearances, which comport themselves in their continuity precisely as [appearances do] in perception.

In a word: the protean character of phantasy.

In the unity of a perception, the only alterations in the basis of the appearance are those that change the homogeneous into the homogeneous. The synthetic unity of the perceptual nexus, or of the nexus in the apprehensional basis, is firmly ordered. Every single member of this order belongs in the order with its own definite connection.

The same is true of the unity of the representational image in physical image presentation. All the variations that arise when our eye

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7 At this position in the lecture manuscript of 1904/05, Husserl inserted a sheet dated “2.X.1898.” The text beginning on p. 61, line 1 and ending on p. 63, line 5 reproduces it; cf. the critical notes to the text. — Editor’s note.
glides over the image belong together; the relevant “side” of the object becomes constituted in them. Even if the image is one that moves, as in the stroboscope, say, or in the motion picture, the unity of the presenting and, correspondingly, of the representational nexus (to which the unity of the object\textsuperscript{8} unfolding in it corresponds) is preserved.

It is in this that the continuity and constancy of the appearance consists. However much the appearance may change — even when the apprehensional basis is in flux — the change moves within the boundaries that the synthetic unity of the presenting nexus prescribes for it. In every variation, one and the same image object appears; and through it, one and the same depicted object comes to be presented. Here, therefore, we have an identical representational relationship. Every representational moment keeps its representational function in all of the changes; that is, the moment belongs to the identical unity of the image object, which, in the changing appearance, unfolds only in this direction or that.

Standing in contrast to this is the protean character of the phantasy appearance: inherent in this character is that the unity of the representational image does not remain preserved in the unity of the phantasy presentation. The object appearing as an image does not remain unaltered but constantly changes in the unity of the imaging presentation, in the identical unity of the intention directed toward the same unchanged object. And the wealth and poverty of representational moments changes with it. Now the image is a faithful representant of the object, now a less faithful one. An object has just now come to appearance that may have developed out of the previous object but is no longer precisely the same object; on the contrary, it is a different object, with representational moments that are less rich. Ordinarily the situation is such that the representational image given at first alters, but it is often also the case that within a phantasy presentation different representational objects emerge, which, in relation to one another, cannot be taken as alterations. Thus, for example, I present Bismarck to myself; specifically, through one of the famous images depicting him in a cuirassier’s uniform. Then suddenly another image of him, in civilian clothes, emerges, and so on. Nevertheless, the unity of the presenting consciousness can persist in such a way

\textsuperscript{8} “Object” later changed to “image object and image subject.” — Editor’s note.
that we can speak of one phantasy presentation with discontinuous representation.

If we disregard these discontinuities, others certainly come into consideration: namely, the intermittency of the image. Its fleetingness, its disappearing and returning. Moreover, concerning the variability of the single image (which, as long as it does not disappear, does not remain unchanged either), we must observe that the alteration in the image, which normally can be confirmed during a phantasy presentation that does not last for too short a time, absolutely must not be confused with changes in the appearance that moves within the synthesis of the nexus of appearances. In the latter case, the depicting object is unchanged; in the former case, the depicting object is changed. If a dear friend at first appears to me in color-saturated vivacity and then the colors dissolve into an empty grey while his shape is preserved, or if the whole appearance blends in a way that is similar to and yet entirely different from the way in which the appearances of external perception blend at the onset of twilight and darkness, then these are changes that annul the identity of the depicting object. If, on the other hand, the phantasy is preserved with particular vividness (we will even assume that it is preserved in a vivacity so full as to be in no way inferior to perception), and if my friend appears in the presentation as speaking, as moving about in various ways, and so on, then these are changes that belong to the identical unity of the representational objectivity. Now both kinds of changes are combined in phantasy presentation. And the unity of the representational consciousness is posited, not only throughout the changes in appearance that pertain to the identity of the depicting object, but also throughout the other changes in appearance in which the appearing object fluctuates in protean fashion.
EXPOSITION RECAPITULATING THE VIEW THAT PHANTASY PRESENTATION CAN BE INTERPRETED AS IMAGING PRESENTATION >¹

§ 30. Parallel between ordinary imagination and phantasy imagination

We can formulate the questions we began to treat in the last lecture as follows:

How is phantasy related to the ordinary imagining function? Is phantasy also actually imagination? And if it is, how is its essence to be made understandable in comparison with the essence of the common imagination we have clarified?

In physical imagination we have to distinguish the primary appearance, which is the bearer of depiction, from the depiction itself. In the former, the image object appears; in the latter, we are related to the image subject. Moreover, the exhibiting of the subject through the image has many degrees of possible adequacy, both with regard to its scope and with regard to the internal enhancement of depiction in individual moments. The parallel in the case of phantasy is the distinction between the primary, direct appearance and the conscious relation to the phantasied object. Here, too, we have a distinction between appearance and subject matter. And, as in the case of ordinary imagination, we have a distinction that must not be confused with the distinction between appearance and subject in perception: the latter distinction is related to the presenting of the subject through its different aspects; the former distinction, however, already pertains to a single aspect.

¹ This lecture was not given.
Furthermore, the phantasied object, too, presents itself through the medium of the primary appearance in different grades of perfection, both with regard to its scope and with regard to the degree of resemblance in the primitive moments. To that extent, then, a parallelism exists between ordinary imagination and the phantasy imagination that we are to study; and obviously this parallelism must exist if we are to speak of imagination in the case of phantasy.

§ 31. Strong and fluid distinctions between ordinary imagination and phantasy

We have discovered the following distinctions between the two cases:

1) The phantasy appearance does not appear within perception’s field of regard and hence is not a perceptual figment.

2) In general, the phantasy appearance (I speak always of the primary phantasy appearance) certainly cannot be transplanted into perception’s field of regard, cannot be admitted into it, for it has a conspicuously different character from any perceptual appearance (and consequently from any ordinary image-object appearance).

Generally, the following come to the fore:

a) Internal distinctions with respect to the presenting contents, and, parallel to these, distinctions with respect to the moments of the primarily appearing object that fall into the appearance. These are differences in force, vivacity, fullness.

b) On the side of phantasy, the absence of stability, the fleetingness and constant variation of the presenting contents, not only with respect to their fullness, but also with respect to their quality, their specific character as a whole.²

c) Along with this protean mutability of the presenting contents, the objective appearances change eo ipso and in parallel. And as a rule they are not only mutable but also change abruptly. More especially, we had to emphasize that this mutability and this change do not lead

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² In addition, the absence of the fullness of presenting moments, of fullness in Bain’s sense.
appearances over into one another in such a way that they continuously belong together within the ideal unitary synthesis belonging to one object. To be sure, a synthesis belonging to a possible intuitive nexus in phantasy and memory corresponds to the synthesis belonging to the nexus of perceptions in which the perceptual being of the object unfolds completely and in all of its aspects. Ordinarily, however, the appearances in phantasy do not succeed one another in this order. The object presents itself at one moment from the front, then suddenly from the rear; on one occasion it presents itself as it appeared at some definite time and then as it appeared at an entirely different time, in which case the two times are widely separated. But looked at precisely, this is true with respect to the exhibiting of the phantasied object through the primary appearances. The intention does indeed aim at the same object, but not according to the measure established by the order of the intentional interconnections belonging to the ordered synthesis. Add to this again the mutability of the presenting materials and of the primary appearances themselves and, finally, of the objects that appear in them primarily. Taken at bottom, it is not at all the case that in this protean change a single primary object is continuously constituted in the sense in which we had a single stable image object in physical imaging. The image object in the steel engraving does not sometimes appear grey over its whole extension, sometimes red in particular parts of its surface, then green, and so on. It does not constantly change its form; it does not sometimes appear as a whole and sometimes in part.

But that is the way it is in phantasy: even when the objective intention is preserved, the primarily appearing object changes. Hence we have two changes: within our directedness toward the same empirical object, we have abruptly changing intentions, the absence of connectedness within the synthesis. And to the extent that this abrupt change does not take place piecemeal, we have change in the primary appearance, hence change and disconnectedness in the primary object (the image object).

Obviously, these are strong distinctions between, on the one side, the manner in which the image-object appearances become constituted and proceed in phantasy and, by means of them, <the> relation to the phantasied object comes about, and, on the other side, the manner in which the parallel occurs in ordinary imagination. —
On the other hand, these distinctions are fluid. There are also clear and stable phantasies, and in particular clear and stable memories. These maintain the empirical continuity of the appearance and of what appears for great stretches, and, as far as the presenting contents are concerned, approximate to perception through their forcefulness, their sensuous freshness or fullness, doing so to such a degree that one can at least doubt, and has doubted, whether any distinctions still exist at all. One will also automatically think of cases here in which the appearances, in fact, are such that one hesitates between perceptual apprehension and phantasy apprehension, and asks, on the basis of the same appearance: Am I actually seeing this, actually hearing it, or am I merely phantasying it? Now these would be isolated cases that would require special discussion. In general, however, such doubt does not exist, even in cases of the liveliest phantasies. Why not? Why, we must ask, do we not take the primary appearances in all cases of clear and stable memories or imaginings to be perceptions? They do not carry with themselves the consciousness of being and, more precisely, the consciousness of being present. On the contrary, given the way in which they stand before us, we take them to be nonexisting. Can we assign a reason for this?

§ 32. The conflictual relationship between the phantasy field (or the memorial field) and the perceptual field, and the figment belonging to phantasy in cases of clear phantasy>

If a memorial appearance, clear and stable in the indicated way, were placed in the middle of the perceptual field of regard, and if it were to conflict with the field’s empirical demands, this would explain the consciousness of nullity. For then we would have a figment of the same sort that we find in the case of any common image. Here, however, the clear and stable phantasy image is not placed in perception’s field of regard; it has its own field, one completely separate from the field of perception. Suppose we placed ourselves at the standpoint from which the presenting contents in these cases could be identified with the presenting contents of perception — hence at the standpoint from which no essential difference would exist between clear phantasms and normal sensations — would anything at all remain that would
separate phantasy appearance (primary phantasy appearance) from perceptual appearance? Only in following one another, only in the form of succession, can what is perceived and what is phantasied become unified in appearance.\footnote{But if I phantasy something on white paper? Then I certainly have, even if fleetingly, an image “on” the paper.} And in general, the shift from one to the other gives rise to discontinuity. If we exclude the case of fresh memory, the case in which perception continuously changes into memory and in which a continuity leads from the perceptual field to a series of memorial fields, then the transition from a phantasy presentation just now being carried out to a perceptual presentation is a break, an enormous difference. The phantasy appearance shows itself to be a mere fiction in contrast to the perception, and in a kind of conflict with it. There is another conflictual relationship here as well, but it is of an entirely different sort from the one involving [the phantasy image placed in the middle of the perceptual] field of regard. In this case, the whole phantasy field conflicts with the whole perceptual field and there is no permeation. If we are wholly immersed in phantasy, then we certainly do not heed perceptual objects, though they do continually appear; they are there and show their discord with the corresponding phantasy field. The discord exists between the corresponding sense fields of perception and phantasy and between corresponding parts of these fields. Thus, if I am seeing things correctly, even here a kind of conflict defines the \textit{figment} belonging to phantasy. The phantasy image becomes constituted as an appearance that holds its own for a time over against perception’s field of regard but in this contrast receives the phenomenological characteristic that emerges as soon as we return to perception, and then return again from perception to the image. Perception without conflict, contested neither from within nor from without (by intentions belonging to empirical experience), constitutes the appearance of the actual present. What conflicts with it is not present. The phantasy object is impossible as a unity coexisting with what is present — not only objectively impossible, but also, as characterized phenomenologically, incompatible with it. What appears in the manner peculiar to phantasy is therefore not present. Precisely speaking: the primary object of phantasy is a \textit{figment}. And consequently nothing stands in the way of taking the mode of
representation through which the *phantasied* object comes to consciousness by means of the primary object as normal imagination.

Now the figment, just like ordinary imaging by means of pictorialization, can represent something that resembles it. Of course, one would also have to consider the possibility that it represents nothing further at all but is taken simply as it is, presenting nothing beyond itself. If one supposes that the sensuous contents and the apprehension are the same in both cases, then no internal difference remains. However, external differences, determined by the phenomenological nexus, could certainly still be there. These would make the annexation of different intentional characterizations possible and necessary — just as, considered *per se*, no difference exists between a physical image appearance and a perceptual appearance, and yet, through conflict with the given field of regard, a difference in characterization emerges: the image object turns into a figment.

Is such a difference to be found, then? According to our position, by virtue of the separation of the perceptual and phantasy fields, the difference cannot be the same as it is in the case of the common image object. However, is there not a distinction of a different sort that nevertheless functions in a similar way?

I certainly think so. Let us consider the relationship of phantasy fields to perceptual fields. Perception’s field of regard is an associative combination of several separate sense fields. The visual field is separate from the tactile field, and so on. On the other hand, in coexisting they are obviously not incompatible with one another; indeed, they are continuously interwoven in the form of perceptual objectivities appearing as unities. If we focus our attention exclusively on moments of the visual field, we become inattentive to the tactile field, but it does not disappear. And we can focus our attention on both at once, as when we simultaneously look at our hand and focus on the pressure it exerts on what lies beneath it. Likewise, we simultaneously see and hear, and can connect both kinds of sensation contents in one apperception, in which both then yield a coexisting unity. The separation into different fields here corresponds

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4 That is, in both ordinary or physical imagination and phantasy. — Translator’s note.

5 It is presupposed here that the field of regard already has, and maintains, its distinction as the field of the present.
to the divisions of the essential genera of content. What is related
generically and specifically fuses into a unity. The unity of the ob-
jective apperception then overlaps these unities of content and their
divisions. It takes contents from the different fields (without remov-
ing them from the fields) and forms unities of coexistence out of
them.

But can the apperception also do this with perceptual fields and
phantasy fields?

It is clear that a phantasy field is not related to the perceptual
field as, say, the visual field is related to the auditory field, or as one
part of the already objectified field of regard is related to another
part. One says that phantasy often supplements perception, but it can
never do so in the sense that comes into question here. One can never
simultaneously direct one’s regard toward the perceptual field and
the phantasy field. As soon as we focus our attention on perceptual
objects, the phantasy field is gone. Obviously one cannot expand the
field of the actual present by a new concrete part that adds itself to it
in the way in which, say, the tactile field of a hand adds itself to the
rest of the tactile field. What belongs to the unity of perception’s field
of regard is there simultaneously, is present, and everything in it is
simultaneous. What belongs to the unity of a memorial field, and to
the unity of a phantasy field of any sort, is also simultaneous; but the
word simultaneity finds no application to the perceptual field and the
phantasy field taken together, if — nota bene — this simultaneity is
also supposed to be given intuitively.

<§ 33. Cases of obscure phantasy and the question of whether
image object and image subject can be distinguished at all in
such cases. Reference to analogous appearances in the
perceptual sphere: double images and the conflict of
visual fields in the case of strabismus>

Up to now we have had to do with clear phantasies. Let us con-
sider cases of obscurity. What prevents a perceptual consciousness
from arising in these cases? What is the conflict in these cases with
the actual present that characterizes the object of the immediate ap-
pearance as something that does not exist independently, and thereby
makes possible its use as an image of something else? It already fol-
low from our descriptions of ordinary phantasy appearances that,
even if there were essentially no difference from normal perception
<with respect to> apprehension material and apprehension character,
differences from normal perceptual appearances would nevertheless
remain, and consequently also differences from normal fictions in the
circle of perception. Indeed, I have already mentioned that the fig-
ment within the actual present is as stable and clearly defined as an
actual thing. In phantasy, however, the figment is something vague,
fluctuating, so very different in its content and total character from
the normal perceptual appearance that it could not occur in its cir-
cle. But here a doubt arises: Can we distinguish image object and
image subject at all? In these thoroughly vague appearances, does an
object at first appear and do we then become conscious of a subject
by means of this object? Surely reference to analogous appearances
in the sphere of our field of regard will help us here. I call attention
to double images and the conflict of visual fields in the case of stra-
bismus. Transparent appearances. Vague, fluctuating. They are then
taken as semblances, and at the same time as analogous and symbolic
references to certain perceptions. The image object here is different
from a normal image object. It appears as a shadowy semblance with
a certain intimation of being. A stable object with a reality that one
could seize, so to speak, does not appear here. And yet objectivation
is not absent either, and the objectivation serves as the basis for a
pictorializing and symbolizing.

The situation is similar in the case of vague phantasies. Here, too,
one will at first doubt whether one should accept these empty schema
as objects, hence whether one can speak of image objects here. How-
ever, if we examine the situation closely, something always appears —
say, an outline of the object or at least a part of it, apperceived in a
way similar to the way in which a drawing is apperceived, or better,
to the way in which the vague and broken contours of a double image
in perception, which does not completely triumph in the conflict, is
apperceived. The interpretation goes beyond what is sensed and in-
tuited. A certain objectivation, even if an imperfect one, takes place,
and the apprehension of the subject is first built on it: the relation to
what is phantasied, which, to be sure, is made intuitable here in a very
poor way.
With precise observation, therefore, we will find double objects here as well, and then also functions of essentially the same sort as those found in ordinary imaging.

The nullity of the image here arises from diverse grounds. Partly from that conflict with the perceptual field, then from the conflict with empirical experience (analogous to the case of physical image objects, which I must still work out more completely).\(^6\)

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\(^6\) Up to here the lecture was not delivered.
ATTEMPT AT ESTABLISHING AN ESSENTIAL
DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHANTASY PRESENTATION
AND IMAGING PRESENTATION.

§ 34. The configuration of the field of regard belonging to
perceptual consciousness and its foundation in the
configurations of sensations in the fields of sensation.

Perception can pass over into fiction and into physical imaging without
the underlying perceptual apprehension having to change essen-
tially; on the other side, perception can often pass over into phantasy
imagining in a clear way. Here the natural starting point is the remark
we recently made that there is no figment at the basis of phantasy
apprehension, or, stated more correctly, that no primary, nonexisting
image object becomes constituted in phantasy apprehension in the
sense in which it does in physical image apprehension; namely, no
image object that would appear in the nexus of the perceptual field of
regard.

This remark points to necessary analyses. What we are speaking
about is the configuration of the field of regard. Let us restrict our-
selves to the field of regard belonging to one temporal moment; that
is to say (apprehending it phenomenologically), to the field of regard
in which objectivities do not appear successively but all at once. The
manifold perceptions of these objectivities, or the perceptual appear-
ances, correspond to the field of regard. These, too, are simultaneous
and not successive. Now the field of regard embraces, according to its
concept, all appearances coexisting in the form of simultaneity; and
all of these constitute a single configuration: that is, a configuration of
objects appears in them. This coexistence belongs to a cross section of
the perceptual consciousness. In truth, the configuration continuously goes on in succession: The perceived objectivity extends throughout time; that is to say, it extends continuously throughout the order of succession, in the course of which it already forms a unitary configuration in each cross section of simultaneity, of coexistence. It can form a unitary configuration in succession only by forming it in each point of coexistence.

This configuration, which holds sway among the perceptions and, as the unity belonging to one apperception, makes a unitary objectivity appear, has its foundation in the essential configurations of apprehension contents, of sensations in the fields of sensation. In the visual field, sensations are not isolated but, continuously cohering together as a unity, fuse with one another. Likewise the tactile contents in the field of touch. And the situation is surely the same in the remaining fields of sense, although in those fields the form of spatiality is not the connecting form. Of course, it is only the apperceptive configuration that presents unity among the fields of sense. In the sensuously appearing object, which is simultaneously seen and touched, visual and tactile contents have sensible unity, the unity of belonging together objectively, of the intentional coinciding of factors pointing to one another.

The intuitive-unitary configuration of phenomenal objectivity, the unity of the intuitive, actual present, extends as far as the simultaneous perception extends. (In this connection, the use of the word “present,” as we will yet be hearing, follows the stricter or looser use of the concept of simultaneity.)

Sensuous semblance also belongs in this sphere. Whatever is apprehended as an object, specifically through the apprehension of a section of the field of sensation, also has its place in the configuration. Even the nonthing [Un-Ding] appears, only it conflicts with certain objective demands of the rest of the perception. This changes nothing about the fact that it appears among them [the objects of sense] perceptually. As a perceptually appearing object, it has its spatial position among those objects of sense: The spatial nexus is again the intuitive form of these configurations. Everything that appears perceptually appears in space. But naturally the space must not be thought of as infinite space: as perceptual space, it extends as far as perceptual objectivity extends.
Now what about phantasms and phantasy appearances? How are they related to these configurations? Why are phantasms set apart from sensations? Why are phantasy appearances set apart from perceptual appearances, and, among the latter, from perceptual fictions as well? Phantasms, too, are sense contents, and sense contents of the same genus and species as those to be found in sensation. As far as content is concerned, tone sensation and tone phantasm, color sensation and color phantasm are by all means grasped as things of the same sort and not merely as things indirectly connected, like arbitrary signs and what they signify. Furthermore, there is no doubt that we can experience sensations and phantasms at the same time, as when, for example, we read notes and accompany our reading with tone phantasms, or when we phantasy a melody while attending to our visual perceptions, and so on. Now how is the one sort of sensuous content related to the other? Does the perceptual apperception seize and pick out certain contents from among the simultaneous sensuous contents, while in the latter there is no distinction at all given beforehand? We said of the sensations that they have a sensuous unity, a phenomenological unity, in the sense fields. Does this unity perhaps reach further, embracing without exception all sensuous contents of the same genus? Do we experience, say, all visual contents as a unity, and does perception then make a cut in this unity? Do all of these contents form a single visual field, one part of which is apprehended in perception, the other in phantasy? The answer, of course, is negative. The phantasms belonging to the so-called sense of sight do also appear in a visual field, though, to speak universally, they have no unity with the visual field of perception. And this is certainly to say: Essential unity is missing; the one visual field is not — and essentially is never — set into the other. Just now the Roons\(^1\) occurs to me; I have a phantasy appearance of the Roons as it had shown itself in perception from my window. A united spread of visual contents, a phantasy sense-field, belongs to this phantasy appearance. Phenomenologically, however, these sensuous contents and this field lack any connection with my present perceptual

\(^1\) The Roons is a hillock with a restaurant in Göttingen. — Editor’s note.
sense-field. And then it is also in accord with this that the connection of appearances and of phenomenal objects that are based on the foundation of sensations and phantasms is not a unitary connection. The objectivity appearing in phantasy is one objectivity and the objectivity appearing in perception is another. Both may be connected by intentional bonds, but they are not connected by the bonds of that mutually intentional interrelatedness that constitutes a unity of intuition, an objectivity intuited as a unity: in the way in which phantasy by itself and perception by itself each separately constitutes such a unity.

\[\frac{\text{§ } 36}{\text{75}}\]

Now what about these two fields? Are they coexistences as compatible as, say, different perceptual fields are — for example, the visual field and the tactile field? Do we therefore simultaneously possess several visual fields, essentially of the same sort inasmuch as they contain sense contents of the same genus and place-sensations of the same species, perhaps distinguished from one another only because a so-called perceptual apprehension is based on the one and a differently shaded so-called phantasy apprehension is based on the other? Why then should it not be possible that at one time imaginative apprehension bases itself on both or perceptual apprehension bases itself on both?

We note further differences here. The visual field of perception and the tactile field or auditory field of perception coexist. The sensation groups are separated, but they can be seen together; and they also fuse together into intuitive apperceptive unities. Objects appear that may include sensations pertaining to these fields, only interpreted, united. The situation is different if we take perception’s visual field and phantasy’s visual field. These absolutely cannot be viewed together. If we look at one of them, the other is suppressed, so to speak. The situation

\[2\] The sense fields of sensation and phantasy. While the sense fields of sensation are continuously filled in the course of conscious life and change conformably to law, this is not true of the sense fields of phantasy. They arise and disappear, and the different fields of phantasy belonging to the same sense do not form a continuous unity in the flow of time.
is similar to what it is in the competition of visual fields, and for similar reasons. If we look at the visual field of perception, if we focus on its sensation contents or on the objects of perception, then we have no intuition of the Roons. If, however, this intuition breaks through like lightning — specifically, as actual intuition — and if we do not merely have an empty intention, then for the moment the visual field of perception is uncultivated; precisely as in the case of the breakthrough of a part of the right visual field in the stereoscopic competition of visual fields, the corresponding part of the left visual field has disappeared, and vice versa. Of course, there is also an unmistakable difference between the two cases. In the last-mentioned competition, a united perceptual visual field always arises, perhaps one in which the parts of the two opposing fields are mixed. But that is not the case here, although it sometimes seems as if the image belonging to phantasy were set into the visual field of perception. The image set into the field, however, never presents itself as a perceptual appearance, as a part of the perceptual field. I am thinking about the appearance apart, say, from further apprehensions. This conflict also exists with respect to the tactile fields in phantasy and perception, and it touches corresponding parts of the fields on both sides. On the other hand, the phantasy field of the sense of hearing and the perceptual field of the sense of touch are not interrupted at all, and so it is without exception in relation to different regions of sense. The conflict also does not seem to exist within the sense of hearing. It obviously concerns only the locality, which is the foundation of the objective-phenomenal spatial order. The visual field of perception and the visual field of imagination have the same values of order, the same phenomenological place-arrangements. But two intuitions cannot be brought simultaneously into the unity of one intuition in which the local values repeat themselves.

Naturally, there is no phantasying “into” perception in the true sense, as if a mixture could truly arise there. If I phantasy the white chalk as red chalk, then for a moment I have a triumphant phantasy “red chalk,” though immediately alternating with the perception “white chalk”: both brought into a synthesis of conflict. The synthesis brings the corresponding parts of the fields into synthetic unity, into the unity of agreement or into conflict; but this unity in the shifting intellectual consciousness is not the unity of an appearance, the unity of a perceptual intuition or the unity of an imaginative intuition.
§ 37. Whether perception would not have to have an original primacy, since sensations alone are the originators of the reality of the present. Difficulty with respect to the irreal phantasms as present sensuous contents. Attempt at an answer: imaginational apprehension of phantasms immediately constituting a re-presentational consciousness; possibility of subsequently inserting the phantasy appearance and its founding phantasms into the present> 

But now a further question arises. The corresponding spatial fields of perception and phantasy alternate; they exclude the possibility of being unified in one appearance. Now I have the visual field: this cottage; now I have the visual field: Hainberg and Roons. But why is one the perception of the cottage, the other the phantasy presentation of the Roons? On what are the different apprehensions supposed to be based? Why does the apprehension not alternate too, or why is not the Roons now taken as actually present and then the cottage taken as actually present? Can we get by with merely secondary characteristics? Assume that we have already marked out a perception. Then a phantasy breaks through it. We experience a discontinuity in objects in the shift from the perception to the phantasy. But why must it be continuity rather than discontinuity that carries weight? Why is what breaks through taken to be phantasy? Why is it taken to be nonpresent and to be something that could be connected with actual perception only through a possible nexus of perceptions?

And in any case, must not perception have an original primacy that makes it possible to relate all objectivity back to it? In fact, a phenomenological distinction already seems to occur in the sensuous contents on both sides. The sensations alone have genuine reality — specifically, the reality of the present — and are the founders of genuine reality in intentional interconnections. In relation to sensations, phantasms are like nullities. They are irreal. They are taken to be nothing by themselves but are looked upon only as actors for something else, which, again, precisely sensation would give.

But a great difficulty arises here. The evidence of the cogitatio certainly teaches me that phantasies, and, accordingly, phantasms as well, are actual lived experiences. Indeed, phantasms are truly present, present sensuous contents, and as parts of realities are real themselves.
One could reply as follows: The perceptual apprehension essentially belongs to sensations. First of all, sensations are apprehended as present themselves, and the amplifying empirical apprehensions or the modifying apprehensions, which constitute what is transcendentally perceived, base themselves on them. Imaginational apprehensions, however, belong to phantasms. These imaginational apprehensions are not founded in direct apprehensions of a perceptual sort that first posit the sensuous content as something present and then take it as the image of something else. On the contrary, by virtue of their more or less remote resemblance they immediately found an immanent re-presentational consciousness, a modified consciousness of seeing what is meant in what is experienced, without, however, first taking what is sensuously experienced as something existing independently, more precisely, as something present. Later, however, we can abstract from this characteristic of imagination. We can posit the concrete phantasy appearance as now by grasping it as simultaneous with a datum of perception. For example, we can grasp a visual appearance as now, as simultaneous with a shout that we are hearing; and then, in the complex of the phantasy appearance, by analysis we can separate the phantasm, which as part of the whole is then itself something present. Only this mediated process produces an insertion into the present, which is already a present objectivated by means of mediations, not a present that is immediately sensed.

If we stick to what is immediate, however, then every phantasm would *eo ipso* undergo imaginational apprehension and, in further development, a transcendent imaginational apprehension.

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§ 38. Characterization of the distinction between phantasy apprehension and the apprehension belonging to perceptual imagination by the absence of the consciousness of something present that would have to function first of all as the bearer of an image consciousness.

We would also understand the distinction between phantasy apprehension and the apprehension belonging to perceptual imagination in this way. In the latter case — I mean in the case of ordinary image apprehension — something appearing in the mode of perception,
hence something phenomenally present (even if it is characterized as a semblance object), serves as the representant of something else. To be sure, participating in the consciousness belonging to immanent imagination, we see what is not present in what appears; but the latter is something that appears in the mode of what is present. It is something appearing perceptually.

In phantasy, we do not have anything “present,” and in this sense we do not have an image object. In clear phantasy, we experience phantasms and objectifying apprehensions, which do not constitute something standing before us as present that would have to function first of all as the bearer of an image consciousness. Relation to the present is totally absent in the appearance itself. A seeing of what is meant takes place immediately in what appears. Subsequently we can carry out the apprehension: This appears to me now, I now have this appearance of the town hall, etc., and through it I am related to the town hall “itself.” But in simple phantasy experience no apprehending of a “present town hall appearance,” of an image object presently presenting itself, is carried out.

As far as obscure phantasies are concerned, they seem to require a certain mediation. For we can say that the fluctuating, obscure appearance points to a possible clear appearance, which would bestow on the obscure appearance a heightening of the consciousness of its object, a sort of fulfillment. It is the corresponding perception, however, that would yield genuine fulfillment. Nevertheless, in the experience itself taken simply and without the objectifications that reflection subsequently produces, the imagining intention is carried out on the ground of phantasms in such a way that it is conscious of what resembles in what resembles; and whatever has no resemblance is, so to speak, an empty part of the intention. Even here the possibility is given of taking the phenomenon, just as it presents itself, as the making phenomenal of a presently appearing image object that is very different from the subject. But the consciousness of anything present, and consequently mediation as well, is totally absent. The pictorializing moments support the imagination. The remaining moments are not determinate moments and are not accepted as determinate; instead, they are “indeterminacies.” And they do not always conflict with the intention, and consequently do not yield a contrasting image-object consciousness. Or else a consciousness of an image object is
actually produced, only the image object does not appear as present, though it certainly does appear as an image. An imaginational image object functions here in precisely the way in which a perceptual image object functions in perception.

5  <§ 39. Consequence of the attempted interpretation [that there is] no direct imagining consciousness within the sphere of perception, and of the establishment of an original phenomenological distinction between sensations and phantasms. Reference to the belief-characteristic and the division of phantasy presentations into mere presentations and memories>

It would follow as a consequence of the interpretation we attempted above that within the sphere of perception there would be no direct imagining consciousness of the sort that we have just described in the case of phantasy. When an imagining consciousness is brought about on the basis of sensations of whatever sort, this happens under the mediation of perceptual apprehensions that constitute a present, an image object standing before me as present. If we were to ask on what this depends, the answer would be: The sensation defends itself, so to speak, against the demand that it be taken as the mere image of something. It is itself the mark of reality; all reality is measured against it; it is a primary, actual present. But while it makes a present appear, it can at the same time direct consciousness to something analogous, and simultaneously permit us to see in what is present something else, something not present. On the other hand, the phantasm, the sensuous content of phantasy, gives itself as not present. It defends itself against the demand that it be taken as present; from the beginning it carries with it the characteristic of irreality. Primarily it has the function of being taken as something else. Only indirect reflection bestows on it an acquired present.

We would thus come to the establishment of an original phenomenological distinction between sensation and phantasm (impression and idea), and the distinction between perception and phantasy presentation would originally rest on this distinction. Perception would belong essentially to sensation, and all formation of transcendent perceptions would preserve the common element that it
presupposes the core of sensation as that which makes perception possible. Perception thereby gives the actual present — the primary, intuited present. The intuited present in the strictest sense is related to adequate perception. The uncontested perception is belief; specifically, originally intuitive belief that phenomenally constitutes what is actually present as present. The contested present — that is, the conflict of an appearance belonging to the present with an uncontested appearance — yields the intuitive semblance, the nonthing [Unding] supposedly appearing to us as present.

That belief is obviously not the distinguishing characteristic of perception, I scarcely need to say. Phantasy presentations break down into mere presentations and memories. Memories are also distinguished by belief.

In memory, an objectivity appears intuitively, but nothing of the objectivity is given in the primary sense. The objectivity appears from one side, just as the same objectivity would appear from only one side in perception. But while in perception the appearing side is what is actually present of the thing, in memory it is only what is actually remembered, what is remembered in the primary sense. The rest of the object, in both cases, is apprehended supplementally.
§ 40. Determination of the essential distinction between imagination in the proper sense (perceptual imagination), and imagination understood as phantasy

We can recapitulate the result of our latest investigations as follows: An essential distinction exists between imagination in the proper sense (e.g., physical imaging) and imagination in the sense of simple phantasy.

1) Imagination in the proper sense, presentation by means of an image, consists in the fact that an appearing object is taken to be a depictive image for another object perfectly like it or resembling it. In the case of a physical image, the appearing object becomes constituted in a perception. Hence an object appearing as present functions as the image-representant for an object that is not present — to be precise, for another object that does not present itself in this act. Here a number of apprehensions are accomplished. This is quite similar to what occurs in the case of the signifying or symbolizing function: The symbol appears by itself, but is the bearer of a relation to something else that is indicated in it. So also in the case of the genuine image function the “image” is constituted in an objective apprehension of its own and is the bearer of a relation to what is depicted. Of course, important differences became apparent here between the symbolizing function and the function that presents something in an image. The symbolizing function represents something externally; the imaging function exhibits its subject internally, seeing it in the image. — In

1 7.II. 1905. Summary.
every image presentation we distinguish the bearers of the consciousness of pictorialization from the moments that remain external to this consciousness. Under all circumstances, *plastic* form, though not qualitative determinations, must belong to the bearers of the pictorializing of a *physical thing*. In pure pictorializing consciousness, the *subject* is seen in the image with regard to this *core*, which bears the consciousness of pictorialization and is identified purely with it. The consciousness of coincidence, however, can also be impure; that is, the disparity between the subject intention and the image-object appearance becomes sensible, indeed, even with respect to the pictorializing moments. — The latter are the phenomena of transition to the image consciousness that functions *symbolically*. The image then refers *outside itself*; it refers to something else that distinguishes itself from the image, which the image brings to mind by virtue of its resemblance and which, as resemblance-representant, it depicts. This externally depictive function also inheres in the “faithful” image as soon as attention is directed toward those moments of the image object that display a deficit with regard to the exhibiting: namely, toward the moments that do not exhibit at all. There are always such moments: The image is not itself the original. That is enough about imagination in the proper sense, above all in the form of physical imagination.

2) *Imagination as phantasy*. Because it lacks an *image* object that becomes constituted in its own right, imagination understood as phantasy is sharply set apart from the genuine image function, regardless of whether immanent or transcendent image consciousness prevails in it. And then [it entirely lacks] an image object appearing as present. Hence the subject here is not seen in an image object appearing as present, as it is in physical imaging; it is not seen in an object that deports itself as a member of the objectivity of one’s field of regard. Nor is the subject in this case depicted externally through such an image object, or even symbolized by remote resemblance. We do indeed have an appearance of an object in phantasy presentation, but not an appearance of something present by means of which the appearance of something not present would come about. We shall presently hear that simple phantasy presentations lack an image object in any other sense as well.
§ 41. Distinction between simple phantasy presentation and phantasy presentation mediated by an image; simple phantasy presentation as the presupposition of the genuine imagining function in phantasy.

For the sake of clarity, however, we must now distinguish two cases: 1) simple phantasy presentation; 2) phantasy presentation mediated by an image. In the second case, the presentation relates to the object mediately — that is, by means of an image presentation — so that an image consciousness becomes constituted, as it does analogously in the case of the physical image function. This is not the case in simple phantasy presentation. In phantasy presentation by means of an image, two presentational functions are built one on top of the other and are related to one another by means of an imaging relation: the founding presentational function is a phantasy presentation. It constitutes an object in the manner peculiar to phantasy, which then, for its part, is furnished with an imagining function. As when, for example, a geologist fabricates for himself an intuitive presentation of a prehistoric species on the basis of a few distinctive traits suggested by fossils.

And so it is without exception when a phantasy image serves precisely as a mere image of something that is not itself taken to be intuited in the image. Even here, depending on the circumstances, either seeing-in or symbolizing and analogizing can predominate. The difference between this genuine and proper image function in phantasy and the same function in the case of the imaging belonging to perception is clear: In the latter, the image object is an object appearing as present; in the case of phantasy, it is an object appearing in the manner peculiar to phantasy, hence not appearing as present. On the other hand, the consciousness of genuine imaging emerges as a common element. Furthermore, it is clear that the genuine imagining function in phantasy presupposes a phantasy presentation that is not itself imagining, at least not in the same sense. We are therefore

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2 Here a belief, a deeming likely, is involved. Hence the presentation is not a “mere” presentation.
3 Known and unknown.
referred to simple phantasy presentations; just as perceptual imaging is founded in perception, so phantasy imaging is founded in phantasy that is not already imaging itself.

§ 42. Delimitation of the concept of simple phantasy presentation as an accomplishment of pure re-presentational consciousness; immanent image consciousness as phantasy consciousness. Fixing terminology for the oppositions: perception — phantasy, or presentation — re-presentation

Now how are we to understand simple phantasy presentations? If our phantasy playfully occupies itself with angels and devils, dwarfs and water nymphs, or if our memory displaces us into a past that passes before our mind in intuitive formations, then the appearing objectivities are not taken as image objects, as mere representatives, analogues, images of other objectivities: While in the case of genuine images, a looking beyond, a being pointed toward something else, is possible and takes place, this makes no sense at all in this case, if we consider it precisely. The word “imagination,” the talk of phantasy images, and so forth, ought not mislead us here any more than the talk of “perceptual images” does in the case of perception. These ways of speaking originate from a reflection that contrasts the appearances belonging to phantasy with the possible perceptions of the same objectivity, and then contrasts the perceptions with the “things in themselves,” which cannot be given perceptually.

The phantasy appearance, the simple phantasy appearance unencumbered by any imaging built on it, relates to its object just as straightforwardly as perception does. Yet here again we must distinguish clear, perfectly adequate phantasies and obscure phantasies, and finally even completely clouded phantasies. Let us consider clear phantasies — clear memories, for example — and let us first carry out everything mentioned above without troubling ourselves about obscure phantasies. Now it is true of clear phantasies that a pure re-presentational consciousness is brought about in them on the

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4 The German text reads: “Gegenwärtigung (Präsentation) — Vergegenwärtigung (Repräsentation).” — Translator’s note.
basis of phantasms and the apprehension objectivating the phantasms. Objectivating the phantasms does not constitute, in advance, an image object that hovers before one and even appears as present; on the contrary, what immediately appears is something that is not present. The objective intention directed toward the phantasied object has its filling in the experienced phantasms, just as the objective intention in perception has its filling in sensations. This does not at all exclude the possibility that in a certain sense phantasy is essentially related to perception; namely, that it is confirmed and more richly and deeply fulfilled in the event of identification with a corresponding perception, and that the consciousness arises: What is phantasied is merely the re-presentation of what is actually given itself here in perception. In a sense, therefore, phantasy gives a mere image of the perceptual objectivity; that is, of the objectivity itself. In itself, however, the phantasy presentation does not contain a manifold intention; presentation [Vergegenwärtigung] is an ultimate mode of intuitive objectivation [Vorstellung], just like perceptual objectivation, just like presentation [Gegenwärtigung].

What troubled and misled us for a time was the evident internal kinship of the immanent, inwardly turned consciousness with phantasy consciousness. In fact, the consciousness is essentially the same in both cases. That is, for obvious reasons we will have to say: This immanent image consciousness is phantasy consciousness; that is to say, considered in itself, it does not differ at all from a corresponding phantasy consciousness. It is, however, permeated with a presentational consciousness. The same sensuous contents, the same sensations, are apprehended as the image object and at the same time serve, just like phantasms, as bearers of a phantasy consciousness, or as bearers of a phantasy consciousness at least with respect to a core. A phantasy consciousness is based on perception, but that is possible only by virtue of the conflicts we have discussed, which annul the presenting function of the sensations. If conflict is absent, then sensation is always objectivated and characterized as present, and this evidently excludes the “nonpresent” of phantasy. Although one speaks in a respectable sense of imaging in phantasy, and although, on the other side, phantasy makes up the most essential moment even in

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5 Confirmation only in cases of acts of believing, acts of deeming likely!
common imaging, as we have just discovered, it nevertheless seems most appropriate to speak of “imaging,” of “image apprehension,” only in cases in which an image, which for its part first functions as a representing object for something depicted, actually appears. Hence in the case of simple phantasy, in which this does not occur (however great the temptation to assume that the situation is the same), it is best to use a different term. One must surely investigate the facts here in great depth in order to recognize that, in a certain sense, it can obviously be said that something not present is re-presented in the present consciousness — the present phantasms and apprehensions serve as representants for what is genuinely intended but not present — and yet that these similar or identical expressions have an entirely different phenomenological significance in this case. If one is clear to oneself thus far, however, then one needs other terminology. Either we use the word “phantasy” itself, or we use the word “re-presentation.” Phantasy therefore stands opposed to perception, or re-presentation [Vergegenwärtigung, Repräsentation] stands opposed to presentation [Gegenwärtigung, Präsentation]. Where any confusion with image presentation [Vorstellung] and significational presentation is possible, one must speak with precision of genuine re-presentation, of simple re-presentation, in contrast to nongenuine re-presentation, to image re-presentation, symbolic re-presentation, significational re-presentation.

§ 43. The situation in the case of obscure phantasies: simple phantasy presentation presupposed in any case. Final survey of the modes of presentation emerging in our analyses>

Up to now we have spoken only of “clear phantasies.” Obscure phantasies, I must confess, have certainly caused me no little trouble. Here indeed the “image,” which is not only unsteady and fleeting but also very inadequate in content, deviates widely from the phantasied object. However, I have finally made up my mind that the construing of these phenomena as instances of genuine imaging would do no good. If obscure phantasies become constituted on the basis of an imaging, then the primary image object is already a phantasy object. And then the pure and simple phantasy object is presupposed in any
case. Consequently, our analysis can in principle reach nothing new. It is merely a question of fact. —

I might then believe, on the basis of abundant observation of the phenomena (which, to be sure are not very steadfast), that the presentation is normally not a mediate presentation (which would scarcely be understandable even on genetic grounds). If the phantasy is at least relatively and partially clear, the intention aimed at the object has a basis, a fullness, in the representing traits (corresponding to the pictorializing traits in the mediate image consciousness). The rest of the traits are of no value; they are empty. The difference between the object meant in the intention and the object that is given in the phantasy and undergoes objectivation does not lead to a consciousness of conflict and to the prominence of either object. In the case of the physical image object, sensation permeates everywhere. To the extent that sensation is there, a self-contained objectivation is also there, hence an image object constituted firmly and in such a way that one can seize it. In most cases, however, the image object does not become constituted in the present case, in spite of the difference. But then, of course, we also do not have a genuine intuition of the object. To be sure, we do not have a merely empty intention; on the other hand, we do not have a full intuition either. Rather, instead of intuition itself, we have a rudiment of intuition, a shadow of intuition. In the case of very obscure phantasies, the re-presentation is reduced to a wholly insufficient residue; and if this residue is suppressed entirely, as it is when the phantasms are interrupted, then the determinate but empty intention aimed at the object remains. With the sudden reappearance of the impoverished residues, the empty intention is confirmed and is filled with respect to these moments or those. However, it turns into actual intuition only when a sufficiently rich image is given. The gaps, the dissolving hues that disappear in the hollow light of phantasy’s field of vision, and so on, are objectivated only when we choose to objectivate them, only when we choose to interpret them on the analogy of real objectivity. Otherwise they simply remain without objective interpretation, and therefore they do not conflict and there is no double objectivity. But such an objectivity immediately occurs as soon as a clear and stable phantasy image, partially coinciding with the phantasy intention though clearly deviating from it in certain points, rises to the surface. If occasion should arise, memory may subsequently
operate modificationally on the intention and call forth the conflict. For example, a clear memory image bestows intuitiveness on an intention aimed at a friend, X. At first, however, the image quite clearly yields a black beard, and the intention, becoming modified precisely by the flow of memory, demands a brown beard. But in that case the image normally will not hold its own; it will become correspondingly modified in intuition.

The following have emerged in our analyses as primitive modes of presentation [Vorstellung]: 1) two simple modes of genuine presentation: perception and re-presentation; 2) one simple mode of nongenuine presentation: empty intentions; 3) the founded modes of presentation, based on the simple intuitive intentions or the simple empty intentions. The different primitive foundation-forms would have to be investigated further here. We have already distinguished the following: image presentations, presentations that symbolize by means of resemblance, and presentations that symbolize by means of mere signification (without an analogizing relation). Analyzed more precisely, we have image presentations in which perception and phantasy or phantasy and phantasy interpenetrate and found a depictive intention.

§ 44. Isolation of a new concept of appearance with respect to the consciousness-characteristic of presentation or re-presentation as that which distinguishes between perception and phantasy.
Indication of the shift within the analyses of time consciousness to the more precise discrimination of the differences between perceptual consciousness and phantasy consciousness>

We can, then, be pleased at our clear results so far. Now we need to go on, which will lead us very shortly into the sphere of the more precise discrimination of the various differences between perceptual consciousness and phantasy consciousness, and that means above all into the forms of time consciousness.

To begin with, we must agree on the following: When in phantasy we re-present to ourselves an object, an event — in short, anything objective at all — it presents itself in a determinate appearance that precisely corresponds to a determinate appearance belonging to a
possible perception. The synthesis of the nexus of possible perceptions precisely corresponds to the synthesis of the nexus of possible phantasies relating to the unity of the same object. The same object presents itself from the same side with the same phenomenal determinations, with the same colors, gradations of brightness, perspectival adumbrations, and so on — in short, with “the same appearance” — in presentational and re-presentational modes. Naturally, this same appearance indicates something identical in the experiences, just as something identical corresponds to the intentional consciousness, which in both cases is aimed at the same object. But here and there what is identical is not the same. The relation to the object is the work of the apprehensional sense. However, what was taken here to be identical under the title “appearance” does not concern the bare apprehensional sense. The apprehensional sense would be the same if it were not a question of the members of the objective synthesis precisely corresponding to one another on both sides. Appearance in the present sense, however, is also not quite the same as what, with respect to perception, we have designated in earlier lectures and also in the *Logical Investigations* as pure perceptual content; and again it is not the same as what we have designated in a different sense as appearance. Only in the identity that here comes to the fore between perceptual presentation and phantasy presentation does the new concept of appearance become isolated. Appearance is not perceptual presentation — that is, perception in abstraction from the moment of belief — nor is it the pure perceptual presentation that remains following abstraction from the symbolic components (and from theimaginational moments that may attach to them). For it is a question of something that occurs in both perceptual presentation and phantasy presentation, and in both cases is identical or can be identical. What one can and must abstract from is clear here: in one instance, from what in the apprehension characterizes the appearance exactly as presentation; in the other instance, from what characterizes it as re-presentation.

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*Cf. in Investigation VI: “§ 23. Relationships of weight between the intuitive and signitive constituents of one and the same act. Pure intuition and pure signification. Perceptual content and image content, pure perception and pure imagination. Gradations of fullness” (First edition, 1901). — Editor’s note.*
It seems, then, that we must think of the constitution of simple genuine presentation in the following way: The sensuous contents that undergo apprehension do so in an apprehensional sense that bestows on them a relation to the pertinent object. This happens, however, in such a way that manifold possibilities exist with respect to the same apprehensional sense. The apprehensional sense is an abstraction that becomes particularized in the form of an appearance. The object is intuited in the appearance not merely as the object determined in such and such a way. On the contrary, it is and can be determined in this way only because this side or that side of the object makes its appearance, or rather the object makes its appearance from this side or that side. Appearance here consists in the determinate particularization of the apprehensional sense in unity with the apprehension contents. Finally, the appearance carries, in addition, a certain consciousness-characteristic, which is what first of all distinguishes between perception and phantasy: The appearance is either presenting appearance or re-presenting appearance; that is, it receives one more characteristic that distinguishes it as one or the other.

We can also say: Things present themselves here such that an objectivation is carried out in simple intuitive acts that initially includes no characterization as present or not present (phantasied, past, future, and the like); on the contrary, this characterization only supervenes on what is already there. Of course, this first objectivation is not something that can exist by itself; for what appears is evidently either phenomenally present or not present.

To be sure, the relationship between presentation and representation and the question whether they are characteristics that stand on the same footing, whether, so to speak, they are merely two shades that are only specifically different, offers additional and quite striking difficulties, as we shall hear. But in any event, we have achieved with our distinctions a first approximation, giving an initial expression to the truth that we can accept provisionally. The solution of the difficulties, which are only indicated here, will have to form a principal part of the analysis of time consciousness.
§ 45. Connection to Brentano’s position: no essential differences between the apprehension contents: sensation and phantasm

Before I set about that task, however, I must add something that belongs more directly to the sphere of problems we have been dealing with up to now. A gap has remained in our presentations: we have not entered thoroughly into the question of the phenomenological distinction between sensation and phantasm. The investigations undertaken by various scholars into this question have treated it in such a way that it is always confounded with the question of the relationship between perception and phantasy. Yet no matter how intimately the two questions are connected, the inescapable condition for the successful treatment of these problems is their clear separation. In his lectures,1 Brentano has given a very detailed discussion of the former question, the most detailed of any that I am aware of. And the discussion concludes with the rejection of essential differences between sensations and phantasms. Both are essentially the same sensuous contents, not separated by any chasms, not divided by any fundamentally different generic moment. On the contrary, all of the differences occurring here are continuously mediated. In substance, they are differences in intensity: Compared with normal sensations, phantasms are sensuous contents of remarkably lower intensity.

1 On the lectures of Brentano, cf. the Editor’s Introduction [to Husserliana XXIII], p. xxv. — Editor’s note.
Besides intensity, still other relative differences come into consider-
5 ation, particularly fleetingness, arbitrary mutability, and so forth.
In their combination, in the way in which they are connected, these
differences provide adequate empirical grounds for the annexation of
the different apprehensions and prevent us from alternating at will be-
10 tween perceptual apprehension and phantasy apprehension. As for the
difference between these apprehensions themselves, it lies, accord-
ing to Brentano, in the fact that perceptions are genuine presentations
while phantasy presentations are not genuine presentations, and for
him that means indirect presentations, mediated by relations, by con-
cepts. Brentano, however, has never carried out a phenomenology that
penetrates more deeply into the apprehensions in these two cases, al-
though an important advance lies in the mere thought that the mode
of apperception is different in each case.\(^2\) (Brentano, strange to say,
denies any difference in the mode of presenting here.) Brentano finds
the principal reason for his position in the fact that the vivacity of the
phantasms intensifies until they change into sensations and convert to
perceptual illusions. And conversely, sensations can become so weak
that we fall into vacillating over whether we are still sensing or, on the
contrary, merely phantasying: when, for example, late in the evening
we await with anxious anticipation the stroke of the tower clock and,
misled by our expectation hastening on ahead, believe that we are
hearing it and yet again doubt that we are hearing it, and so on. The
ticking of the pocket watch.

In any case, from the standpoint of method one will be permitted
to assert this much here: as long as one manages to get by without
claiming an essential distinction between sensation and phantasm, one
must renounce such a claim. For the direct comparison between the
two, although it remains open to us in every moment, is disappointing.

In the presence of the fleetingness and mutability of the phantasms
and the difficulty of abstracting from the apperceptions that bestow
signification on them and on the sensations, one does not arrive at any
firm result. At least no one quite succeeds in doing so, and agreement
among the observers is especially lacking.

\(^2\) 9.II.1905.
§ 46. Situating the distinction between sensation and phantasm in the modes of apprehension. Discussion of something unsatisfactory about this theory in Brentano and in others: the interpretation of Humean vivacity as intensity

Now, of course, we do in fact have a means of differentiation in the different modes of apperception, in the phenomenological characteristics we have studied that base themselves on the sensuous contents. Accordingly, the true difference would lie in the modes of apprehension, not in the apprehension contents. Depending on the circumstances, therefore, the same content could be called sensation at one time and phantasm at another. Hence empirical psychological grounds would be responsible for the fact that a determinate mode of apprehension comes about at a particular time and that an opposed mode is impossible. At most it could be granted that, generally speaking, sensuous contents fall into two groups, with those in one group relatively very lively, very intense, and those in the other group separated in intensity by a vast distance from those in the first group, and with those in one group to a large extent not subject to the will, while those in the other group are subject to it, and so on. Of course, there is no shortage of contents that mediate with respect to intensity, fleetingness, etc., but then in most cases moments combined with them help to nail down a determinate mode of apprehension, so that in fact there remains only a very small sphere of cases that make possible doubt and fluctuation in apprehension.

I myself have preferred to make my mind up entirely in this direction, and even systematic investigations concerning the phenomenology of intuitions did not make me waver in this decision. Lately I have been wavering more often, but perhaps only because the specific way of executing this apprehension still offers difficulties; and in any case, the whole theory is not sufficiently thought out. The interpretation of Humean vivacity, vitality, as intensity by Brentano and other innovators does not please me. Certainly extraordinarily faint and weak sensations very often serve as surrogates for loud, intense sensations. A specific melody can be a loud melody in figurative presentation, while in fact it has very faint tones as its basis. That does not prevent the consciousness of identity, inasmuch as the unity of the melody,
the fabric of tonal relationships and relationships of intensity blended into one another, is in fact identical. It is questionable to me whether the phantasying of a melody can also be understood according to this schema, especially when we are dealing with phantasies that are at once clear and fully vital. I cannot place myself at Brentano’s standpoint with quite the assurance that I did earlier. In any event, I would not want to concede such a role to thinking that proceeds indirectly through surrogates, as Brentano is forced to do. And in many fields of sense — certainly in the field of color — we would have to establish our own theories of intensity. For what is intensity in the color field? Surely not brightness. Here we would just have to define the characteristically changing force and vivacity of the phantasms as intensity.

(And what is intensity in the field of taste? A burning taste is no doubt very intense as long as it is still burning. If I present the burning under circumstances that are not in the least intuitive, and if I present it precisely not as intense burning, is an analogue — widely distant from the intense burning, which is no longer burning at all — supposed to act as its substitute? Even in the fleeting moments in which a vivacious presentation prospers?)

And this is all the more true of the phantasy presentations of psychic phenomena. Just as at one time we perceive physical things and at another time present them in phantasy, so too at one moment we can internally perceive and actually experience psychic states, intentions, judgments, doubts and vacillations, questions, volitions, and so on, and at another moment merely phantasy them. What determines the distinction here? In this case, too, we must surely distinguish between apprehension contents and apprehension acts. And the same internal appearance must present itself at one moment as present, at another moment as not present, as imagined, past, and so on. Now it is obvious that the universal distinction is the same in both cases. A judgment actually made seems “more lively” than a judgment merely imagined, a pleasure actually sensed seems more intense than a pleasure merely phantasied, and so on. In the case of many of these phenomena, one certainly does not speak of intensity in the same sense in which one

3 That is, the case of the presentation of psychic phenomena and the case of the presentation of physical things. — Translator’s note.
speaks of it in connection with sensations. Judgment is a case in point. What is a more intense judgment? Surely not a more lively conviction? Of course, if it were, a phantasied judgment would then be a less lively conviction. But if I phantasy to myself a judgment to which I do not assent at all, am I nevertheless convinced about it in a lower degree? Degrees of conviction obviously have nothing to do with the difference between actual experience and mere phantasy. Brentano knows this just as well as I do, of course. On the other hand, I certainly cannot let myself rest with the view that what are merely inactualities [Uneigentlichkeiten] belonging to the act of phantasying are supposed to help: Surely we can fully phantasy a judgment in intuition and yet not thereby make a judgment itself, as we do, for example, when we take the judgment to be false. In the same way, we ask: Can we not phantasy an act of willing, even phantasy it intuitively, hence in the same sense in which we phantasy a red and blue intuitively, and yet not speak at all of an actual willing? Or can we not speak of the imagining of an act of doubting when we are not doubting at all, and so on? In the case of sensuous contents, no such fundamentally essential problems depend on our decision, as they do in the case of the acts, of the intentional contents here. In the case of sensuous contents, intensity, as it occurs in different fields of sense, probably does not suffice. Perhaps another difference, which is an analogue of intensity, comes into consideration, insofar as one will probably have to grant that phantasms continuously pass over into sensations. One can also call this difference intensity, but then in the case of every analogy there would certainly be different sorts or dimensions of intensity.

<§ 47. The difficulty in understanding how the distinction between the phantasy of a psychic act and the actual performance of this act is possible. The moment of belief and the inactuality of the act of phantasying>

If one is seeking and if one has sought over and over again to find absolute differences between sensation and phantasm, the search depends on a feeling that one must produce a decisive distinction between perception and phantasy, for which it is immediately advisable
that one produce a decisive distinction between the apprehension contents. And in this way one hopes somehow to escape the great difficulties connected with intentional phenomena. In fact, one does not at all escape these difficulties by decreeing some distinctions in the apprehension contents. It is a matter of indifference with respect to these difficulties whether one shades the apprehension contents off gradually or posits chasms between them.

But what kind of difficulties are these, you will ask. If I phantasy a color — we assume a clear phantasy — we find in the comparison of the color phantasm and the experienced color a specific likeness. On both sides, <there is> color. Whatever differences may be there in other respects, the similar is represented by means of the similar; more precisely, one thing is represented by another thing that is perfectly like it generically.

Now let us take psychic acts. I phantasy a judgment, a volition. If I am able to phantasy it intuitively, I have a judgment phantasm, a volition phantasm, which certainly corresponds to the judgment sensation, to the volition sensation (that is, to the actually executed judging and willing), as one thing corresponds to another that is perfectly like it generically. In the phantasm, in the imagining of a judgment, therefore, I meet with the qualitative dimension that characterizes judgment as judgment, as well as with the entire really experienced judgment content. Are we therefore actually judging when we phantasy a judgment? Are we actually willing when we merely imagine willing? For does not judging mean much the same as having in consciousness a psychic experience belonging to such and such a genus, built out of such and such determinations that precisely the concept of judgment embraces? And do we not have that experience? Is it not really there in the nexus of phantasy consciousness?

The great difficulty, accordingly, is to understand how the distinction between the phantasying of a judgment and the actual making of a judgment is possible, a distinction that is nevertheless so evident and palpable that no one could ever deny its existence.

The following evidence surely speaks to us with absolute clarity: To make a judgment, actually to will, actually to wish, actually to

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4 For example, intuitive memory of earlier volitions, judgments, etc., while we are not now judging, etc.
be in a rage, is something different from phantasying a rage, from phantasying a wish, a volition, a judging. And these latter experiences are not perchance complexes that include the former. To phantasy a judgment is not to judge and to do something besides. To phantasy a willing is not to will and to do something besides. But how again is this possible if the presentation is, as it were, an image that re-presents the entire content of the earlier state, consequently agreeing with it in all internal determinations, just as color in phantasy is color, too, after all.

That neither gradual nor absolute distinctions can be of any help here is clear. If we re-present in phantasy an error long since corrected, we do not now err, not even in the slightest degree. If one says that it is a question, not of the magnitude of the error, but of a number of different phenomenological levels that exhibit an analogue of intensity, a question of degrees of force or vivacity, then naturally we answer: Whether the judgment is vivacious or less vivacious, richer or poorer in the degree to which it is filled, if it is judgment at all, then we do believe; and consequently we actually would err as often as we presented an error to ourselves in phantasy. When we recall the earlier error, however, we truly err only if we do not merely remember but now still believe the state of affairs in question. Whereas if we have been set right in the meantime, we do indeed carry out the re-presentation and the memory, but no longer the belief. The distinction comes to the fore with particular clarity in the following example. If the memory of the earlier belief were to contain this belief itself, owing to the fact that it re-presents it intuitively, if the belief phantasm, as specifically like the belief sensation in content, were to be considered straightaway an actual belief, then the distinction that has come to the fore would make no sense: that is, the distinction between the memory of a belief together with actual belief and the memory of a belief without our participation in the belief.

The present difficulty, however, is also not laid aside if we assume an absolute distinction, so to speak, between the apprehension contents of perception and those of phantasy. This distinction could simply indicate that some moment of the experience on one side suddenly changes into a totally different moment on the other side, or that some moment is present on one side and absent on the other, while the kinship of contents, which furnishes the basis for speaking
of a phantasy image, must nevertheless persist. The judgment must surely recur with respect to all of its essential components, above all with respect to its belief moment and its relation to the state of affairs in question. Otherwise, the image is not an image of this judgment. In this case, there is only the distinction that here in the perceiving and phantasying of acts, the apprehension content and the apprehended object coincide, whereas in external perception and external phantasy they are different. Perceiving internally, I simply look at a judgment I have made; and in phantasy the judgment hovers before me, and there I also take it simply as re-presentation without any interpretation going beyond it. The sensation and the perceived object are one and the same here; it is the actual judgment. The phantasm and the phantasied object, on the other hand, are certainly different, though they agree in everything essential. If a judgment hovers before me in a clear re-presentation, is not the moment of belief there depicted by means of a moment of belief? By what other means should it be depicted? Only if one wanted to decree the inactuality of the act of phantasying [des Vorstellens] with respect to just this moment could one escape the difficulty. But then the re-presentation would not be a clear and actually intuitive re-presentation. We would then have to deny that a judgment could be re-presented fully and perfectly in the way in which a thing or the color of a thing, a tone, a melody can actually be re-presented according to all of its generic moments, apart — at most — from gradations, which, however, move within the genus.

Of course, it should not for that reason be denied that instances of inactual phantasy play a large role here. Indeed, they play a large role even in perception. I can perceive anger without in the least being angry — namely, the anger of someone else. I can see his anger in his countenance, in his speech and actions. Of course, this seeing of someone who is angry, just like the seeing of someone who is cheerful, sad, and so on, is, as such, not genuine seeing. It is seeing of the same sort that takes place universally with regard to other nonappearing determinations of the person in question. The moments of the physical appearance — the word “appearance” taken in the narrowest sense — are genuinely seen. All psychic moments, everything that belongs to

5 And likewise an act of desiring, an act of doubting, and so on.
the personality as personality, are indirectly attributed, in most cases by means of empty intentions fused into the unity of the perception. For all that, however, we will not say that acts could be re-presented only by means of empty intentions, that there could not be a genuine intuition of them in the form of a suitable re-presentation.

§ 48. Solution of the difficulty: Grounding the distinction between perceptual apprehension and phantasy apprehension through the addition by consciousness of the characterization of something as “present” or as “re-presented”

According to our analyses, in order to escape these difficulties one has only the following way out, which really is the sole one conceivable. The distinction between perceptual apprehension and phantasy apprehension is not and cannot be a mere distinction between two genera or classes of contents. For everything that is generic and that divides itself into ultimate differentia can present itself in the mode of perception and in the mode of phantasy. Perceptual apprehension and phantasy apprehension are distinctions of consciousness. The distinction, however, does not lie in the objectivation in which the “appearance” of the object is produced — indeed, this objectivation is common to both sides. Rather, it lies in the characterization that constitutes the difference between present and re-presented. Now two cases are conceivable: The distinction pertaining to the characterized apprehension has no essential relation to the contents per se, which means that precisely the same immanent content, speaking essentially, could undergo either the one apprehension or the other and that the de facto apprehension would be determined only on psychological grounds and not by any phenomenological traits. This would not assert the possibility of a free choice in the change of apprehension.

Or as the second possibility: In the phenomenological essence of an experience, its characterized apprehension is predelineated as the apprehension of something present or as the presentant of something present, or <on the other hand> as the apprehension of something not present or as the presentant of something not present.
If we presuppose the first case, we would have to say the following: The actual judgment that we perceive internally and the same judgment that we remember or merely imagine are distinguished by the characterization. In general, other distinctions will obtain as well.

Such distinctions, however, do not have to obtain and, in the limit case of an actually full and clear re-presentation, do not obtain, at least as relevant distinctions. Nevertheless, in the case of phantasy we do not say that we actually judged. The bare factual existence of an experience of such and such determinations that we attribute to the peculiar essence of judgment still does not fully make up what we call actual judging. If we are supposed to be speaking of something present, of something that is actually there, then the objectivity in question, and here the psychic content in question, must be experienced in the consciousness of the present and not be pictorialized, as it were, in phantasy consciousness. The one consciousness gives to the content the authority of an actually present content; the other consciousness deprives it of this authority and gives it the characteristic of a content that is not actually present, that is merely re-presented.

Since this is true of contents and appearances of every sort, we do not otherwise call special attention to it. We do not attribute these characteristics to the conceptual essence of an object. Accordingly, those characteristics do not belong to the conceptual essence of a judgment either, for under this conceptual essence we include everything that, universally, belongs exclusively to an objectivity of the sort “judgment.” The objectivity, however, becomes constituted in the appearance independently of the characterization. Perception and clear phantasy have this essential factor in common. But then it is important to observe that obviously not every experience that includes all of the moments of this essential factor is already judgment.

For judgment, speaking absolutely, means actual judgment, judgment made, present in the consciousness making it. Hence the modifying characteristic “not present” must not be there and, in conferring concreteness on those essential moments, discredit their actuality. This means, therefore: More than the conceptual essence belongs to the full concreteness of a consciousness that gives reality; the consciousness-characterization that produces the real being-present also belongs to it. Or the characterization that modifies something as not present must be there, and then what appears is irreal.
This is the way in which the matter seems to present itself at first. But then we get into a grave difficulty. Is the characterization of something as present not itself a moment of consciousness, and is the concretum produced by it not itself again something present? Would we therefore arrive at a characterization of the second degree and then, naturally, at an infinite regress?

Closely related to this is the following difficulty: We could certainly set actual judging and the phantasying of judgment in opposition. Likewise actual perceiving and the representing of perceiving in phantasy, and so on. Instead of that, however, we could consider the difference between a perception of the judgment and the phantasying of the judgment; in that case, it seems, we would be implicitly taking the actually present psychic acts as internally perceived. Indeed, we take perception to be the consciousness to which the “present” essentially belongs. But perceptions are themselves acts, and present acts. Are they perhaps present only on the basis of a perceiving of the second degree? And so in infinitum. Then we are in a serious fix.

The difficulties would disappear were we to decide to say: The present, as primarily and actually given present, becomes constituted intuitively in the act of perceiving. The perceptual apprehension’s ideal possibility, however, extends far beyond the actual perceptual apprehension; it extends as far as consciousness extends. Every concrete experience is eo ipso present; that is to say, as far as ideal possibility is concerned, it can be perceived. But as far as ideal possibility is concerned, every concrete experience can also undergo a modification in an apprehending that takes it as re-presentation. In

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^6 Can every experience? And do only empirical, psychological grounds exclude an experience or determine which one [can undergo a modification]? No. Full and actual experiences can never be apprehended as modified — the actual presentation, the actual judgment, etc., is not only not modified but cannot be modified, except in the mode of perceptual imaging. Hence an original distinction must obtain. Accordingly, I may say only: As far as ideal possibility is concerned, a modification corresponds to every concrete experience. The experience is “essentially” the same, but has the
this way, it becomes discredited, as it were. It is no longer accepted as present all by itself, but is instead taken as the re-presentation of another experience. The re-presentation itself is then again something present; the experience, in which a content receives the modifying characteristic of re-presentation, would, for its part, have to bear only a characteristic of modification related to itself, if it is to be taken as something merely represented.

If we judge, a judging consciousness relates to a state of affairs. We do not have an internal perception of this judging consciousness by virtue of an activity relating to it. We can, however, have such a perception, and this happens, exceptionally, in “reflection.” We are actually judging as long as nothing more than that simple belief consciousness takes place. We are still judging when we look at this consciousness perceptually: The act of perceiving does not modify; on the contrary, the actually present “factual existent” becomes constituted in it intuitively. But as soon as we begin to engage in phantasy, as soon as we take the judging consciousness to be the representative for a judging consciousness perfectly like it, as soon as we present with this judgment another judgment in the mode of simple phantasy consciousness rather than simply making the judgment or even simply looking at it, the judgment is the representant of a judgment and no longer “actual” judgment.

On the other hand, the phantasying of a judgment, the phantasying that we are now carrying out, is again something present; more precisely, it is something present that includes a judging consciousness as phantasm. This phantasm, as phantasm, as representant, is itself again something present, but something combined with the characteristic of discrediting. It is present together with this consciousness.

Of course, the same would hold true of all phantasies, and of all relationships of sensation and phantasm. What is the difference between a sensed red and a phantasied red? A sensed red is either a red that is simply experienced, or a red that is both experienced and...

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“characteristic” of re-presentation. We do not, however, have the “content” A and, in addition, the “characteristic of re-presentation” as a new experience; rather, we have the “re-presentation of A,” agreeing with the presentation of A in the “essence” A. The experience, re-presentation of A, itself has the characteristic of a presentation of the re-presentation of A.

But can this mean anything other than: in reflection the experience is apprehensible only as phantasy, as re-presentation of something?
perceived, or, finally, a red that occurs as a presenting content in an external perception, for example, in the perception of a red house. Then in all of these complexes the red is left in peace, so to speak. However, as soon as the red undergoes a phantasy characterization, as soon as the consciousness of a re-presented red becomes constituted with it, it is no longer taken as itself; it is now modified, discredited. But the re-presentational consciousness belonging to phantasy is presupposed here!\footnote{In that case, however, “something else” is presented in phantasy, unless I intend to make a subject present to myself in phantasy when the phantasy \textit{still} preserves precisely the intention aimed at this subject that is taken for granted or that is believably posited. In simple phantasy, what is seen presents nothing other than itself; but it presents itself as modified.} If a red were to present another red in genuine — that is, perceptual — imaging, it would not be discredited, since it would certainly belong simultaneously to a perceptual apprehension that would preserve its credit.

Such a discrediting is extraordinarily significant in its genetic aspect. A phantasy volition, a discredited volition, produces no deeds; a phantasy judgment produces no choices, and so on. Essential connections, which we cannot enter into here, belong in part to these distinctions.

<§ 50. \textit{Cases in which remembered and actually present psychic acts are related to the same presentational foundation}>

If one asks about cases in which we remember a past joy and at the same time actually rejoice about the same thing we rejoiced about in the past, remember a past judgment and still share its conviction now, remember a past volition and simultaneously will the same thing (appropriating the volitional decision), then one would perhaps have to say: It is a matter of two phenomena that coincide, yet certainly cannot be understood otherwise than as double. Let us take cases opposite to these: We remember our past joy at a party’s victory that we now rather regret; we remember a past conviction that we now no longer share, and so on. Then the actual consciousness of dismay is combined with the modified consciousness of joy, the actual disbelief with the modified consciousness of belief. Always related to the same presentational foundation. If it were purely a question of unmodified
experiences, then such combinations could not be produced (on the
ground of eidetic laws, no doubt). Joy at A and dismay at A, at the
same object in the same respect, exclude one another. The conviction
that A is and the conviction that A is not — both convictions held fast
in one and the same act — exclude one another.

On the other hand, the modification of an act together with the actual
performance of the unmodified opposite act involves no interference
at all. The two lie in different dimensions, so to speak.

Likewise, it is inconceivable that one and the same state of affairs
could be believed twice in the same act, could be willed twice, could
please twice, and so on. That is evidently impossible. Our attention is
drawn to the fact that in the field of regard each position can appear
only once. Hence the total coinciding of the visual fields of both eyes
with respect to their identical portions. The same unmodified expe-
riences are in accord with the corresponding positions of both visual
fields; accordingly, they form just one experience and not two. But
as soon as the modifying phantasy goes into action, it does indeed
create a new dimension. To be sure, the conceptually identical phe-
nomena do not present an intuitive mutual externality or juxtaposition
of entities; but because of the difference in apprehensions, they do
present a duality in their coinciding. The actual joy at the victory of
a good cause coincides, as far as its conceptual essence is concerned,
with the memory of the joy that was sensed earlier; and yet a duality
remains: We remember our joy at the victory, and we still rejoice at
it. And likewise in the case of judgment: We remember that we have
believed in an X, and we still believe the same thing.

<§ 51. On the clarification of the general view of perception as
opposed to phantasy: Either the interpretation of re-presentation
as modifying characteristic and of presentation as what is
correspondingly unmodified…>

Obviously, nothing would have changed with this in our general
interpretation of perception as opposed to phantasy. We provisionally

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8 This is something to consider.
9 The other part of this disjunction appears in the title to the next section, § 52. —
Translator’s note.
attributed a characteristic to each. The fundamental distinction, we said, is between presentation and re-presentation. However, the files were not closed on the nature of this distinction insofar as it depends on characterizations by consciousness. On the contrary, we have already indicated occasionally that problems remain here. In the case of the interpretation we are now testing, we can still say: There is an ultimate and marked difference between presentation and re-presentation. Now, however, we are elucidating it in such a way that we see in representation a modifying characteristic and in presentation what is correspondingly unmodified. Perception takes what appears <as> the being itself; that is, it precisely does not modify. Accordingly, it imagines nothing; it takes what appears just as itself. The same appearance can be at the basis of a re-presentational consciousness, which is a modification. However, this must not be understood as if what appears first given as unmodified and the modification enters on the scene only afterwards, imaginatively reinterpreting as something not given what is presently given. That would be out of the question, excluded by our analyses of phantasy. The phantasm is an experience, but not an experience first taken as present, as itself, and then taken as something else. If we take the phantasm to be something present, we do so only because it is a component of the phantasy presentation, which, for its part, is something present. Everything here that does not function in the role of a phantasm in a phantasy is said to be unmodified. The phantasm would then, in truth, be something present — the phantasm red a present red, the phantasm tone a present tone — although in immanent objectivation (phenomenologically). The phantasm wish, belief, and so on, would really be there, only provided with a new characteristic adhering to it called “discrediting modification.” But no matter what the latter might be called, the belief, the wish, would really be given.

All of this is obviously false.

<§ 52. . . or the account of two apprehensions of equal standing, presentation and re-presentation, and, correspondingly, of two apprehension contents, sensation and phantasm, differing in themselves>

The other way of accounting for the relationships here consists in affirming two apprehensions of equal standing or two characterizing
modes as presentation and re-presentation, and, corresponding to them, two ways in which generically equivalent contents can be realized in consciousness. Irrespective of the different modes of apprehension, sensation and the corresponding phantasm are already differently characterized in themselves, without prejudice to what they have in common as contents. It belongs to the essence of the phantasm, then, that it can only function re-presentatively.11

When we judge, the act of judging is not, in general, perceived. It is, however, sensed. When we imagine a judgment, the judgment experience is not a sensation, but a phantasm. Judgment sensation and judgment phantasm are distinguished from one another in the same essential moment that universally separates sensation and phantasm. Likewise, when we perceive we do not in turn perceive the act of perceiving. The act of perceiving, however, is an experience; specifically, a sensation experience. But if we present an act of perceiving to ourselves in phantasy, the present “image” of the act of perceiving is a phantasm of an act of perceiving, not a sensation experience of an act of perceiving.

Can one carry through on this opinion?

How do matters stand when we take a phantasy experience itself as present? The phantasy would have to be characterized as sensation, and consequently the act of phantasying would be the object of a possible perception. It would appear in the perception as present. But can the phantasm, which makes its appearance in the perception, not also be perceived and appear as present, even if in the nexus of this phantasy appearance?12

11 It belongs to the essence of sensation that, without fail, it must be immediately apprehended presentatively (and that it can be apprehended re-presentatively only mediately, in the mode of imaging). On the other hand, it belongs to the essence of the phantasm that it can be immediately apprehended only re-presentatively; that is, in a modified apprehension — for example, as re-presentation of red, as re-presentation of a red house, and so forth. However, the modified apprehension itself, which has the characteristic of a phantasm of an apprehension, has the characteristic of sensation.

12 But that would be at variance with the present theory, which would definitely exclude the possibility that a phantasm could ever serve as the presentant of a perception. Or should we say that it happens only mediately? That only the sensation can function immediately as a perception’s presentant, and that the phantasm can function immediately only as a phantasy’s presentant?
(In the sense of the other theory, however, everything is explained: The phantasm appears as modified when it appears as the bearer of a phantasy apprehension. If we abstract from the latter and if we consider the phantasm as a part of the whole complex belonging to the phantasy apprehension, then it is something present. It remains distinguished as a phantasm, however, because, while we do indeed abstract from the phantasy apprehension, we cannot just eliminate the phantasy apprehension at our pleasure. And this is especially true of the appearances that result from the transcendent interpretation of the sensation content. We cannot arbitrarily take as present that which appears; that is, we cannot freely choose to put a corresponding unmodified apprehension in place of the phantasy apprehension that is there at a given time.)
APPENDIX I

PHANTASY AND IMAGE PRESENTATION

<ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEPTUAL PRESENTATION AND PHANTASY PRESENTATION>

(September 3-4 to October 3, 1898)

<§ 1. Phantasy presentations as image presentations just like ordinary image presentations. What is inherent in the “act of re-presenting in image”?>

In order to determine the difference between <phantasy presentations> and perceptual presentations, we emphasize first of all what lies on the surface and is expressed by the designation “image presentation”: Perceptual presentations present their object as present to them itself; phantasy presentations, on the other hand, re-present their object in the phantasy image, just as ordinary image presentations do their re-presenting in the physical image.

What is inherent, then, in this “act of re-presenting in image,” or, simply, in image presenting?

In each such act of presenting, we distinguish image and subject. The subject is the object meant in the proper sense by the presentation in question. And if this presentation underlies an act that takes something to be existing (an act of remembering or expecting, for example), and in turn an act of doubting, inquiring, wishing, fearing, and so forth, then the subject, as the object meant by the presentation, is at the same time the object taken to be existing (more specifically, the remembered or expected object, say), and in turn the object doubted, inquired into, desired, feared. If the palace in Berlin “hovers before me in a phantasy image,” then the palace itself is the subject presented. From this presented subject, however, we distinguish as a second object the image hovering before me. The latter is also said, in
deceptive equivocation, to be presented in phantasy presentation. The situation in the case of physical images turns out to be somewhat more complicated. Here — and one can easily overlook this — the use of the word “image” is ambiguous. Something double stands over against the depicted subject: 1) The image as physical thing, as this painted and framed canvas, as this printed paper, and the like. We say that the image in this sense hangs askew, is torn, and so forth. 2) The image as image object appearing in such and such a way through the determinate colors and forms, hence not the depicted object, the image subject, but the analogue of the phantasy image. For the sake of distinctness, we can differentiate terminologically: the re-presenting or depicting image object and the re-presented or depicted image object. The physical image, in turn, is distinguished from both. However, the simple use of the term “image” is ambiguous to the extent that, in addition to the physical image, the re-presenting image object is also designated as an image. An example will make this clear. This photograph, for example, presents my child. First of all, it sketches an image that, on the whole, does indeed resemble the child but deviates from it markedly with regard to its appearing size, coloring, and so forth. When I present my child “in” this image, I do not mean this miniature child appearing here in disagreeably grayish-violet coloring. The miniature child is precisely not the child, but only the child’s image. And if I speak of the image in this way or even say that the image has failed or that it does resemble the original, I do not, of course, mean the physical image, the physical thing that hangs there on the wall. The latter is a real thing; the former, however, is something that merely appears, that has never existed and never will exist. Consequently, this image in the second sense, the re-presenting image object, is naturally not a part or side of the physical image — not, say, the color distributed on the paper in such and such a way. The semblance thing is a three-dimensional body with color spread over the body; it is not identical with the surface of the paper and its chromatic gradation of tints. The same color sensations that we interpret at one time as this objective distribution of colors on the paper, we interpret at another time as the image child but not as the real child; to the latter we ascribe entirely different colors, colors that do not appear to us in the image at all. In the case of every image, there are such differences, varying according to the images and the types of image; otherwise image presentation could not come about at all.
Now for the moment let us give preference to the simpler case of phantasy presentations. If, in their case, image and subject must be distinguished as two objects, then two objectivating acts or at least two directions or components of objectifying apprehension must be on hand as well. Naïve thinking, of course, conceives of the matter more simply. The image lies hidden in the “mind,” and the object possibly exists “outside.” And if the latter does not exist, as it does not when I phantasy a dragon, then only the mental image is on hand and there is nothing further to explain. Nothing further than the trifling matter of how the mind, with the image in the mind itself, begins to represent an object that is different from the image. If I put a picture in a drawer, does the drawer then represent the object? But the naïve view errs above all by making the image exist in the mind, or, to refine matters slightly, in consciousness, just as a physical thing exists in reality. If I “paint” a lion for myself in phantasy, then this image is related to the real lion in a manner analogous to that in which, say, a physically painted or a photographic lion is related to the real lion. In both cases, the image objects are truly nothing, and to speak of them [as objects] has a modified sense that refers to existences entirely different from the existences that they present themselves as being. The photographic image object (not the photographed object) truly does not exist. “Truly” — that does not signify: [not] existing outside my consciousness; on the contrary, it signifies not existing at all, not even in my consciousness. What does really exist is the determinate distribution of colors on the paper and likewise a corresponding complex of sensations that I experience in contemplating the photograph. In the same way, the phantasy image truly does not exist at all, but there does exist in the experience of phantasy presentation a complex of sensuous phantasy contents corresponding to the image. And just as in the case of the photographic image object the color sensations in their concrete complex are not themselves the image (one will surely not ascribe the objective and full three-dimensional corporeality to the complex of sensations, to mention only one thing), but first acquire the image-characteristic by means of an apprehending, interpreting act, the same is also true here in the case of the complex of phantasy contents. The apprehending act obviously does not append new sensuous contents, as if an increase in contents could produce

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1 Inserted later: “re-presenting.” — Editor’s note.
that without which the objectivity would be nothing at all for the one presenting. On the contrary, it adds the “mode of consciousness” that interprets the content; that attaches to the content a relation to something objective; that brings about, from the blind factual being of the content, the presenting of something with the content, the meaning, not of the content, but of something through the content. To experience this act of meaning and to present the object are one and the same. And nothing but the content really exists in consciousness; specifically, in this tinction by apprehension and meaning.

The dispositions that obtain in addition to what we have discussed and that play an important genetic-psychological role here are of no concern to us at present. Dispositions are not data of consciousness; they are not experiences that could be brought to light descriptively. In fact and properly speaking, therefore, neither the photographic image (which is distinct from the photographed object and from the photograph as physical thing) nor the phantasy image exists in the experience.

§ 2. Discovery of two directions of objectification in the phantasy presentation following the clue of ordinary image presentation>

The objectification that we have been considering to this point produces the depicting image, not the depicted subject: Looked at more precisely, it does not even produce the image, but only the object that is supposed to function as just an image. (I permit myself lazy, imprecise ways of speaking that treat the presented objects as existing in the presentation.) This will immediately come to the fore if we turn to the act of presenting that furnishes the presented subject to us. It

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2 Husserl later changed and supplemented the part of the sentence “…from the blind factual being” to the end of the sentence as follows: “that brings about, from the blind factual being of the content, the apprehending of the content as something; the presenting of something <with> the content; the having, not of the content, but of something objective through the content.” — Editor’s note.

3 “[act of] meaning” later changed to “apprehending.” — Editor’s note.

4 Inserted later above “to present”: “to have in appearance.” — Editor’s note.

5 “and meaning” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.

6 Inserted later: “re-presenting.” — Editor’s note.
must be different from the act of presenting in which the image object arises. Certainly the objects are different. In a sense, of course, the image in phantasy presentation is a presented object, but the object genuinely meant in phantasy presentation is another object, a subject different from it. The palace in Berlin is not my phantasy image of the palace in Berlin. To have the latter object does not yet signify to mean another object through it and an object depicted by it. It is very important to keep clearly in mind that a double objectivity comes into consideration here with respect to the phantasy presentation itself, as the kind of experience it is, and that it is certainly not a question of a merely conceptual distinction that only arises later in reflection on the relationship of this experience to reality. It is not a distinction of the sort that we make in the case of perception between the appearing thing (the thing in the customary empirical sense) and the thing in itself, where two things — the empirical thing and the thing existing in itself — certainly do not appear in the appearance, but only one thing, the first of the two things mentioned above. The objectifying apprehension of the phantasy contents, by means of which the external object (in our example, the palace in Berlin) comes to be represented, is not a bare presentation [Präsentation] of the kind that underlies perception or perceptual presentation. In presentation [Präsentation], the object “itself” appears to us. The phantasy image, however, appears as different from the object “itself.” It is precisely not the object, but as an image only represents the object. And this manner of speaking obviously expresses a distinction inherent in the experiences themselves. One should certainly not think that the circumstance that the perceptual presentation objectifies sensations while the phantasy presentation objectifies phantasms is fully sufficient to account for the distinction. It is precisely in this respect that the study of ordinary image presentations, sadly neglected up to now, proves to be extremely instructive. For the image here is the “objectification” of sense contents, and yet this objectification is not a perceptual presentation. It is not the re-presenting object, the “mental” image that is meant, but the

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7 Inserted later: “re-presenting.” — Editor’s note.
8 Husserl later put “the latter object” into brackets and inserted in its place: “The image, the re-presenting image object.” — Editor’s note.
9 Inserted later: “indeed as an.” — Editor’s note.
10 Inserted later: “here.” — Editor’s note.
depicted object, the image subject; not this tiny little figure appearing in the colors of the photograph, but the “real” child. And in the same way, when we re-present to ourselves an object in phantasy, we do not mean the fluctuating and fleeting phantasy image, now suddenly appearing and then disappearing, its content changing in various ways as it does so. We mean the image only when, as psychologists, we have it as our object. In perceptual presentation we have one apprehended object, and this is also the object meant. In phantasy presentation we have two apprehended objects; namely, the phantasy image and the image subject presented by it: only the latter, however, is meant, presented in the proper sense. Perceptual presentation presents its object directly, phantasy presentation indirectly: phantasy presentation presents its object in such a way that it first brings to appearance another object resembling the object, by means of which it apprehends and means the object in image.

Hence we were not rash when we spoke above of two acts or two directions of objectification. The apprehension that turns the experienced phantasy contents into the appearing image by objectifying them cannot be identical with the presentation that presents the depicted subject — and presents it as the sole thing meant in the unitary phantasy presentation. Naturally, it cannot be a question here of two concretely separated acts, which, say, would merely be simultaneous. If the depicted object were constituted independently by one act and if the image were constituted by a second act separated from it, then we would certainly have neither image nor depicted object. The one object becomes the image because it re-presents the other object by means of resemblance, and in this way too the latter first becomes the depicted object. This presupposes, however, that the one object would belong to the act pertaining to the other object, that the apprehension that constitutes the one object is the foundation for the presentation that, by means of that object, constitutes the other object. I have not differentiated the expressions here without reflection; I said “apprehension” in the first case, “presentation” in the second. In fact, two

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11 Inserted later: “specifically.” — Editor’s note.
12 Inserted later above “constitutes”: “presents” [vorstellig macht]. — Editor’s note.
13 “constituted” later crossed out with a wavy line. — Editor’s note.
14 Inserted somewhat later: “only in order not to have to use the same word.” — Editor’s note.
interwoven presentations cannot present themselves here, insofar as in both cases this word signifies (as it is frequently intended to do) an act aiming at the object, meaning it. The image object appears in the phantasy presentation, but it is by no means meant. On the contrary, the depicted object alone is meant. In any case, a strictly unitary concrete act presents itself here in which we distinguish two act moments, two directions of objectification, but only abstractly (although strictly descriptively).

§ 3. The act of presenting the image as the foundation for the consciousness of imaging re-presentation in phantasy presentation and in ordinary image presentation

We continue to stay with the preferential consideration of phantasy presentations in order to put some of the more important points in a clearer light. We distinguish two objects and, corresponding to them, two acts of apprehension. Let us consider the first act, which furnishes the image object for us, somewhat more precisely. If we abstract from its depictive function, the image is an appearing object as much as any object in perception is. And in that case, the act to which we owe the object, as far as its act-characteristic is concerned, is certainly nothing other than an act of presentation [Präsentation]. All of the distinctions we made earlier with respect to presentation we also find here: the distinctions between direct and indirect, primary and secondary, simple and complex presentation. Even the distinction between the single presentation and the synthetic series of presentations, in which one object or a coherent complex of objects shows itself sequentially from different sides and unfolds in its content, is not absent here. Of course, the presentation here stands in an entirely different experiential nexus. In the more comprehensive act-whole of phantasy presentation, it fills an essentially different function from the one it fills in perception (and in acts organized in a like way), so that its character appears to be considerably modified. We already stressed

15 “acts of” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
16 The last sentence was later changed as follows: “In fact, the apprehension to which we owe this appearing object is certainly not essentially different, as far as its essential character is concerned, from the apprehension in perception.” — Editor’s note.
that now it is no longer the “foundation” of a turning toward through which its object is meant and stands before me as the object intended in the total act. We also mentioned that such a turning toward based on the presentation is certainly possible, but only takes place when a specific interest is directed toward the image. In that way, however, a new experience arises, the experience of *contemplating the image*, which, to be sure, is different from normal phantasy presentation. The intending turning toward, which in the case of normal phantasy presentation completes the presentational character, is, of course, related most intimately to the image presentation but has an entirely different object: the image subject instead of the image. To that end, however, it is naturally required that this subject of presentation somehow be given; that is to say, that an apprehension that constitutes the subject for the presentation be at the basis of the presentation. As in the cases analyzed up to now, here too we must differentiate the apprehension that makes the object available and the intending turning toward that means the object of the apprehension. The new apprehension, however, is not a new presentation. From where is it to get its presentative contents? All of the phantasms (as we simply call the sensuous, experienced contents of phantasy) are fully consumed in the presentation of the image. Besides the phantasms, however, nothing other than the complex of act-characteristics is found in the experience of phantasy presentation. Thus the new apprehension, instead of objectivating new sensuous contents, can only make the first apprehension into the foundation of a new objectivation. Here an essentially different sort of apprehension presents itself, which we will designate, according to its universal character, as *re-presentation* and, according to its particular character, the character determining it here, as *imaging re-presentation*. Re-presentation necessarily presupposes presentation. A presented object is the presentant for the re-presented object. In the presentation, there is an experienced content that serves as the basis for the interpreting apprehension; specifically, a content that is indeed experienced as that which it is, but is not an object for us. Only if we “reflect” on it with, for example, a psychological interest, only if “internal perception” seizes it, does it become an object for us. But then the whole experience is also a different experience; the original presentation has made way for a new presentation. On the other hand, the representant (therefore that which in the re-presentation serves as a basis for the apprehension, for the interpretation) is always already an
object for us. The phantasy image “appears”; it stands before us as an object. The re-presenting object serves us as representant — but this can mean nothing else than that the presentation in which it appears is, in a unique way, the foundation for a new psychic act in which what is new belonging to the re-presenting function becomes constituted. The supervision of this new act-characteristic produces (for our experience) the difference between the simple apprehension of an A and the more complicated apprehension in which the A turns into the representant of a B. In this way, therefore, the presented object also receives, in the phantasy presentation, its image-characteristic through the “consciousness” belonging to imaging re-presentation. Of course, this image-characteristic must not be understood as a property appearing in the phantasy object, expanding the content of its determinations. No enrichment of content can make up that by which images, signs, objects of whatever sort that “re-present” something (that are taken as something, that exhibit it, re-present it, depict it, designate it, signify it, and so on) are distinguished from objects that do not re-present something. The exhibiting of something, the re-presenting of something, the being accepted as something, and the like, make no sense without an act that confers acceptance. On the other hand, of course, in reflection on the re-presenting function that an object is in the habit of bearing, nothing prevents us from attaching to it the image-characteristic or sign-characteristic in the manner of a determination. It is from this that the temptation first arises to confuse this external determination with an internal and enriching property, and accordingly to believe that an object could in itself be an image or a sign.

§ 4. Analogy and differences between the opposition of presentation and re-presentation within a concrete act of re-presentation and indirect presentation in perceptual presentation

The function of re-presentation has an obvious analogy to indirect presentation, which we have described above. The opposition between direct and indirect\(^\text{17}\) presentation lay in the fact that certain

\(^\text{17}\) of genuine and nongenuine [presentation].
determinations belonging to a presented object appeared in the strictest sense, but by means of an act-characteristic relating to the determinations assumed the further function of drawing the rest of the determinations, which in the strictest sense remained beyond appearance, into the domain of the total presenting apprehension. The situation is similar in the case of the opposition between presentation and re-presentation within a concrete act of re-presentation. The re-presenting object appears in the sense of presentation, hence in the normal sense in which we also say of the externally perceived object that it appears. If we adhere to this sense, then we may no longer designate the re-presented object as an appearing object. If I present the palace in Berlin to myself in phantasy, the phantasy image is a genuine appearance. But if, with this image before my eyes, I nevertheless do not mean the image in my act of presenting but the palace itself, then a second object is indeed given intentionally in the complex act, but not given in the form of a second appearance. Furthermore, just as in the above account the determinations that do not themselves fall into the appearance came to mediate apprehension by means of the determinations apprehended in that strictest mode of appearance, so in this case the object that is ultimately intended and that does not appear is indirectly apprehended; namely, by means of the object that is apprehended first and that does appear.

It admits of no doubt that the oppositions on both sides, insofar as we go back to the ultimate elementary acts belonging to the present act-complexes, rest on a specific likeness. But if we look more closely, the differences, of course, are also unmistakable. The image re-presents an original. If we re-present to ourselves any example of the fulfillment of an image re-presentation, it becomes evident that in this mode of re-presentation a relationship of (imaging) resemblance necessarily exists between representant and what is represented. The situation is entirely different in the case of the indirect presentation of determinations in the unity of a concrete act of presentation. We can, to be sure, quite legitimately take the relationship between directly and indirectly presented determinations as a relationship like that between representants and what is re-presented: but the re-presentation here is obviously not an imaging re-presentation.18

18 Nota bene.
Its performance in perceptual presentation does not consist in re-presenting the re-presented determinations in image; rather, it consists in bringing to the unity of apprehension the determinations that, together with the appearing determinations, belong to the unity of the object and constitute this unity along with the appearing determinations. The representant apprehends here what also belongs to it materially as representant; accordingly, it unites with what is thus re-presented in a consciousness that means its object. Both in their unity constitute the one meant object. The representant does not sacrifice itself in order to draw its counterpart into the luminous circle of the act of meaning; in procuring acceptance for the other, it intends to maintain its own acceptance. The concrete act of presentation that means an object — note that I have in mind the type of act that corresponds to external perception — is therefore a complex formation in which presentations, without becoming degraded into mere representants, nevertheless function re-presentatively; specifically, in the manner of apprehending enrichment and supplementation of the determinations directly given through them by means of determinations that co-belong to them materially. And the result of this fusion of partial acts is the seemingly simple consciousness belonging to perceptual presentation in which the object itself appears as if all at once, although, of course, even the briefest reflection informs us that “properly speaking” only one “side” of the object appears intuitively.

§ 5. Ambiguity of the terms “phantasy presentation” and “phantasy object.” Analogous differences in the case of physical image presentations>

Now we must consider more closely an important distinction that we came upon in our discussion in the last paragraph, along with some related distinctions. We mentioned the possibility of turning toward the phantasy image, which appears primarily, and contemplating

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19 This is true of symbolic re-presentation (contiguity in perception). Is it also true of analogical re-presentation?
20 Cf. § 3 in the present arrangement of the text. — Editor’s note.
it, rather than turning toward the depicted object, as happens in normal phantasy presentation. The one as well as the other is called, equivocally, the phantasied object; and again the presentation turned toward the one object as well as the presentation turned toward the other is called phantasy presentation. Indeed, to make the confusion complete, the latter term in addition comprehends three essentially different concepts: the presentative apprehension in which the phantasy object makes its appearance, specifically, before or apart from any intending turning toward; the re-presentative apprehension belonging to phantasy that gives the depicted object and must, in the same way, be distinguished from every turning toward; and finally, the phantasm, that is, the presenting sensuous content, the interpreting apprehension of which makes the image appear. If we consider more closely the two senses that we distinguished at the beginning in which it is a question of acts that at once mean and apprehend something, then a further sense will have to be added to them. By phantasy objects we understand objects appearing in phantasy and functioning ordinarily as images, and we distinguish:

1) Phantasy presentations as acts of apprehension that re-present something in image and that also mean something, in which a phantasy object functions as image representant. I mention immediately that, in the sense of the analyses we have carried out to this point, the lazy but convenient expression “apprehension that means something” [meinende Auffassung] everywhere designates a complex act in which an act that means something — the species of the act can be seen when one considers the coherent whole in question — relates to the object of the apprehension underlying the act.

2) Presentations of phantasy objects as acts of apprehension that present and mean phantasy objects.

3) Presentations of phantasy images as acts like those just described, only with the difference that we now designate the phantasy objects expressly as images, therefore conceive of them as charged with a re-presentative function.

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21 In the normal sense.
22 Phantasy presentations in the modified sense.
23 1) and 2) [cover] phantasy presentation in the wider sense.
The difference between the first sort of presentation and the two that follow is unmistakable, and, following what we earlier discussed, requires no new analysis. For instance, we obviously have a different experience depending on whether we re-present a foreign country to ourselves in phantasy images (while reading a travel book, for example) or whether we turn our interest toward the phantasy images themselves (for example, out of a psychological interest). In both cases, the apprehensional basis can be the same, but the presentation that means the object is directed in the one instance toward the depicted objects and hence not toward the images, and in the other instance toward the images and hence not toward the depicted objects.

However, the finer distinction between the last two presentations must also be emphasized, since obviously it is a question of different experiences, depending on whether the objects appearing in phantasy function as images or not. To be sure, it could appear doubtful whether or not all phantasy objects occur \textit{eo ipso} with the character of imaging, as when we focus our attention on the phantasy objects and not on the character of imaging, occupying ourselves exclusively with the objects that appear primarily. If we pass from the phantasy presentation of the foreign country to the presentation of the images re-presenting it, two cases are possible. On the one hand, their imaging can itself belong to the circle of our interest. This is the case, for example, if we want to consider, in a conceptual reflection that we would have to initiate, the relationship between image and what is depicted. Here a complicated experience of intuitive presentation, in which the image functions not merely as an image but is also apprehended and meant as the bearer of the image-characteristic, precedes the conceptual thinking and underlies it. (This presupposes a reflection on the re-presentative function.) On the other hand, the case is also possible in which the imaging lies entirely outside the boundaries within which our interest moves. The image interests us not as the image of something or other, but for itself, as the phantasy object appearing in such and such a way. This, however, does not prevent the image from continuing to be an image in the experience, from continuing to function as the bearer of a re-presentative apprehension, except that the advantage of specific attention does not fall to the share of either
it or its object. The presentation is now no longer characterized as re-
representative, since the re-presentative factor belonging to its broader
apprehensival basis does not play a specifically foundational role. The
characteristic of presentation can only be determined by the part
of the apprehensival unity whose object elevates the presentation into
a consciousness that means its object. The question then is whether
the situation is the same everywhere as it is in these cases. However,
it is surely conceivable that in other cases the re-presentative function
does not come into action at all. In fact, there are most certainly cases
that one can interpret in this sense. If we give ourselves up entirely
to the attraction of a phantasy that has been excited in a vivacious
manner, if we immerse ourselves in a phantasied world so completely
that the phantasies — by means of their interconnections of sense,
extraordinary vivacity, individualized fullness, continuity, and self-
sufficiency — barely fall short of normal perception, then we are
unable to observe anything of a re-presentative function belonging
to the appearances, anything of an image-characteristic belonging to
them. The image-characteristic makes its appearance only when the
surrounding reality turns our interest back toward it and we say to
ourselves: This is mere imagination.

Analogous distinctions, which do not have to be explained further
here, obtain in the case of the other group of image presentations,
those based on sensation. The physical image presentation aims at
the subject. The presentation of the image itself as the presentation
of the appearing image-representant is an entirely different experi-
ence. Here, too, it is possible that the consciousness of imaging can
slip away entirely, in which case an ordinary perceptual presentation
would result. Preventing this consciousness of imaging from arising
from the start in a purely intuitive manner is the effect produced by
images simulating the look of reality, images of the sort found in the
wax museum, and the like. Although in such cases we have a con-
ceptual knowledge of the fact that the appearances are merely image
appearances, in the intuitive experience itself the re-presentative mo-
ment, which is otherwise intimately mingled with the appearances, is
absent. But this moment is decisive for intuitive image presentation.
We have genuine perceptual presentations in those cases, accompa-
nied by the thought that their objects are mere images. The appearance
itself, however, presents itself as the appearance of a present object
and not as an image. Indeed, in naïvely contemplating it, the appearance forces us to make the intuitive perceptual judgment. In doing this, it deceives us. In truth, there is perhaps another (nonappearing) object, standing to the appearing object in the relation of original to image. We know all of this, and yet the illusion continues to exist, since the appearance possesses the characteristic of normal perceptual presentation so completely that it will not stand being degraded into a mere representant. The accompanying judgment that it is a mere image just does not impress the image-characteristic on the appearance itself.

§ 6. Difference in kind between presentations by means of phantasy images and presentations by means of physically mediated images: the apprehensonal basis is more complicated in the case of the latter; physical image, image object, image subject in the change in the direction of one’s regard; participation in the apprehensonal basis

Our specific interest up to now has concerned the peculiarities common to both sorts of image presentations. Even when here and there we favored the discussion of one of them, extending the results obtained to the other was to be carried out without further ado. Now it is time to investigate their mutual differences. Presentations by means of phantasy images and presentations by means of physically mediated images are manifestly different kinds of experiences, never to be confused. It must be possible to make the differences clear conceptually.

An important difference seems to occur first of all with respect to the underlying apprehension. The apprehension is more complicated, it seems, on the side of the physical image presentation than on the side of the phantasy presentation. In the latter case, the whole complex of sensuous contents belonging to its experiential unity finds its place in one presentation, by means of which the phantasy image becomes constituted. This is not the case with the physical image presentation. Here we have to distinguish, not two, but three objects, which, when one successively changes the direction of one’s regard, also come to the fore as separately meant: namely, the physical image,
the presented mental image (the appearing and re-presenting image object), and finally the image subject (the re-presented image object). For example, I am just now contemplating the engraving of Raphael’s little religious painting that hangs on the wall here. First I contemplate it as this physical thing. I then change my way of considering it; I focus my attention not on what hangs on the wall but on the subject of the picture: an exalted figure of a woman, enthroned on a cloud, with two robust and youthful angels fluttering around her, and so on. I again change my way of considering it and turn from the presented image object to the image that presents it, in the sense of the re-presenting image object. It is a rather small woman-doll with two considerably smaller angel-dolls, objectively colored in mere shades of grey.

The first two modes of consideration are the ones that dominate in ordinary life; the third is the particular interest of the artist and psychologist. In the shift from one to another, a change in the intending relation takes place, by means of which a different object always comes to the fore out of an apprehensive unity that, so it seems, is the same throughout. The second is the normal way of considering the image, which we designate here as the physical image presentation. All three objects contribute to its apprehensive basis. If we are absorbed in the contemplation of the image — that is to say, if we are turned toward the pictorial re-presentation of the subject — we have the depicting object in view. Only because the depicting object appears can it re-present the subject, which does not appear “itself.” On the other hand, the depicting object is not what is meant, not what is presented here in the proper sense; it turns into that only in a specific consideration of it, which was arrayed as the third mode of consideration above. The situation in the case of the physical image seems to be similar to what it is in the case of this re-presenting image, which above we made parallel with the phantasy image. On the one hand, it is not presented in the imaging presentation; much less, then, would it be perceived (in the genuine sense). When we bring about imaging presentation and are therefore turned toward the subject, we really do mean only the latter and absolutely not the physical image, the framed and printed paper. For that, a specific act of presentation or perception would be needed; that is, the sort of
consideration that we mentioned in the first position above. On the other hand, one will have to say that, even if the full perception does not lie at the basis of the present experience, the apprehension furnishing the perception’s object surely does. While we heed the subject and are absorbed in the imaging presentation of it, we nevertheless have before our eyes the physical image, the thing framed on the wall; it stands before us as this physical thing. — On closer inspection, this conception is not entirely correct. It is certain that the perception, and with it the apprehension of the physical image as physical image, also wins recognition in the frequent alteration of the direction of presentation, as empirical psychological experience attests. However, one can question whether in the case of the normal consideration of the image, which is directed toward the subject, the physical image actually does belong to the apprehensional basis. In fact, this is not the case. Only with regard to one part does the physical image enter into the apprehension. Namely, it must be noted that not only the colors and forms of the drawing, but also the framing and even the wider spatial surroundings become organically a part of the apprehension of the depicted object: the image, let us say, leaps from the frame; or we look through it, as if through a window, into the space of its objects, and so on. In a unitary apprehension, therefore, the depicted object is apprehended along with the surrounding objectivity in one objective complex. What is depicted is brought into prominence in the manner of what is particularly noticed; what frames it is put aside in the manner of “what is incidentally noticed.”

Stated more precisely, we are directed toward different things, depending on the circumstances. Frequently we do not heed the framing at all but exclusively the subject: the framing is then apprehended, but in the strict sense not perceived and not presented. In other cases, the sphere of intending turning toward extends beyond the whole apprehended complex, as when (in language of the sort referred to above, for example) we bring the presented subject into explicit relationship to its framing, hence also mean the subject in this relationship. As a rule, one will probably alternate with the other: While interest is concentrated on the subject, the framing, without seriously deflecting

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24 <Adolf von> Hildebrand.
that main direction of interest, forces itself through to momentary notice. In each case, the physical image certainly makes its contribution to the more comprehensive unity of the objective apprehension, from which one or the other presentation derives. We notice, however, that not the whole image but only certain of its components (the framing) are woven into the unitary surroundings of the depicted object and are brought to objective apprehension with it. If we apprehend the pictorially presented objects as emerging from the frame or if the frame appears to us as a window through which we see into their space (into the painted landscape, and the like), then, within this unitary connection between reality and pictoriality, there obviously is no place for the physical image thing, but only for its frame. What is missing from the image is that part whose presenting contents undergo an entirely different sort of apprehension from the sort the image thing requires; namely, the apprehension in which the re-presenting and re-presented objectivity are given.

In addition, it is worth noting here that however broadly or narrowly the consciousness that means its object may extend beyond the apprehended objectivity, the pictorial re-presentation nevertheless finds no support in that apprehension of the frame. The frame exercises no re-presentational function. If, as is most natural, we restrict the talk of pictorial presentation to the act that turns toward a re-presented object and means it, the just-described partial participation of the physical image thing in the pictorial presentation does not come into consideration at all. Only what functions re-presentatively, or is constitutive of what re-presents, belongs to it. If the relation that means the object is also extended to the perceived surroundings of the image, we have an experience composed of perception and image

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25 Inserted later: “immediately.” — Editor’s note.
26 In the case of acts that mean an object, we will have to distinguish universally between the apprehensional basis in the narrower sense, understood as the apprehension that constitutes its meant object exclusively, and the apprehensional basis in the wider sense, understood as the total apprehensional complex that has a far broader reach, in which a manifold objectivity becomes constituted, but only in smaller part enters into the consciousness that means the object. There certainly exists at any given time a whole field of regard for the attitude that means the object. Many objects are already apprehended; hence they stand at our disposal. However, we specifically regard only this or that object and make it into the object of an act that means it.
presentation. Such blends of experiences of different types occur very frequently.27

§ 7. Internal specific likeness of the act-characteristic belonging to pictorial re-presentation; external differences, however, in the case of both sorts of presentation. Desirability of a clarification of the internal differences between the sensuous contents: sensations and phantasms>

No important internal difference between phantasy presentation and physical image presentation showed itself in the direction that we have just investigated. The possibility of distinguishing in the latter case two further objects in addition to the depicted object certainly would not indicate that this double objectivity belongs to the re-presentative ground of the presentation (perhaps in an entirely unique way). Even in the case of physical image presentation, the re-presentative function was restricted to only one object, to the representing image. Nevertheless, a difference becomes apparent in that the representant in each case has emerged from a differently constructed apprehensional basis. The phantasy image exists outside all connection with “reality,” that is, with the field of regard of possible perception. On the other hand, the image presented physically is incorporated in a certain sense into the nexus of reality, although it is not itself taken to be something real in that nexus. Furthermore: In the case of the physical image presentation, a real object belonging to perception’s field of regard — namely, the physical image — functions as the instigator of the pictorial apprehension; its perception is the starting point and transit point for the development of the pictorial presentation. In the case of phantasy presentation, this unique connection to a determinate appearance in perception’s field of regard is missing; phantasy presentation has no instigator. Since the possibility always exists of shifting from the physical image presentation to the

27 For the rest, in phantasy, too, the range of the presentation (which can be considered by itself) that means its object is narrower than that of the underlying apprehension. The phantasied thing likewise has its phantasied background, its objective context, which is there but is not considered from every point of view — phantasy’s field of regard.
consideration of this instigator (to the consideration of the physical image as external physical thing), an external difference between the two kinds of presentations — vigorously coming to the fore — is already inherent here.\footnote{Husserl refers at this point with a lead pencil to “appendix M.” In question is a sheet, dated October 2, 1898, that Husserl later inserted into the lecture manuscript of 1904/05 (cf. above No. 1, §29, and the corresponding critical remarks to the text in Husserliana XXIII). — Editor’s note.}

However, an internal difference, relating not to the broader apprehensional connections and apprehensional possibilities but to the narrowest act of pictorial re-presentation, also presents itself. As far as the act-characteristics are concerned,\footnote{If we imagine that the object relation is identical on both sides — namely, if we imagine that the same object is presented in both cases, indeed, in both cases even presented from the same side, through the same appearing determinations — then only one difference remains: cf. p. 138, 1f.} the phantasy image and the physically presented image are internally of the same sort: There are certainly pictorial re-presentations in both cases. They differ, however, through their presenting sensuous contents. On one side, there are phantasms; on the other, sensations.

Here we encounter the difficult descriptive question about the distinction between sensations and phantasms. The answer to it, however, concerns not only the definitive knowledge of the distinctions last discussed; other differences, to be discussed in what follows, are essentially touched by it as well.\footnote{Moreover, in our case, beyond the differences explained, all the differences that are assumed between the appearances of phantasy and those of possible perception come into consideration too. For we will immediately recognize that the physically mediated appearances and the perceptual appearances are of entirely the same sort.}

§ 8. Perceptual presentation distinguished, as presentation in contrast to re-presentation, from phantasy presentation or physical image presentation directed toward the same object. — Question: How is the perceptual presentation of an object distinguished from the presentation of “the same” object as a phantasy object under the assumption that the phantasy object does not function re-presentatively?>

We have distinguished up to this point a multiplicity of apprehensional and presentational types: the presentations [Präsentationen]
belonging to perceptual presentations \([\text{Vorstellungen}]\), to phantasy presentations, to physical image presentations, in the last two cases connected to the characteristic of image re-presentation; then the respective presentations \([\text{Vorstellungen}]\) themselves; in addition, the presentations of phantasy objects and phantasy images; finally, the presentations of physically mediating images. We have studied the constitution of these different experiences, particularly what concerns the act-characteristics involved in them. In order finally to make the differences of the act-characteristics clear, however, something still remains to be done. They are so intimately connected that they do not all require a discussion as exhaustive as the one we have already devoted to the distinctions between the two sorts of image presentations. For example, we stress the questions: How \[125\] is a perceptual presentation distinguished from a phantasy presentation directed toward the same object? And again: How is it distinguished from a presentation directed toward the same object by means of a physical image? Here no further deliberations are needed: The apprehension underlying the perceptual presentation \([\text{Wahrnehmungsvorstellung}]\) (in the narrower sense) has the character of presentation \([\text{Präsentation}]\); in the other cases, however, the apprehension has the character of image re-presentation. How the re-presentation is then differentiated, depending on whether it is a question of phantasy images or physical images, has been thoroughly discussed above — up to \[33\] the distinction between sensations and phantasms.

A more comprehensive consideration, on the other hand, demands the question: How is the perceptual presentation of an object distinguished from the presentation of “the same” object as a phantasy object? The latter presentation is not supposed to be a phantasy presentation of the object (in the normal sense, made precise above). This presentation may perhaps arise from such a phantasy presentation by turning one’s interest back toward the image object, just as it appears. The image-characteristic may then remain unnoticed or disappear altogether.
We designate the perceptual object and the phantasy object as “the same,” since in both cases the determinations constituting them are “the same.” This does not mean, however, that those determinations that are primarily presented in the one case and in the other also need to be the same. The phantasy thing can appear to us from one side and the seen thing from a different side. If we also imagine that complete likeness is produced in this respect, then we must ask in just what the difference between the two presentations is supposed to consist. Both are presentations of the same object. They are perfectly alike as far as the character of meaning the object is concerned; again they are alike with respect to the character of the apprehensions underlying them: They are presentations — moreover, presentations of the same object, therefore alike not only with regard to the genus of apprehension but also with regard to the division of the genus. Moreover, in both presentations the object is supposed to present itself from the same side; hence there will be perfect likeness down to the most subtle ramifications of the internal differences, in mutual and univocal correspondence. If the phantasy object is charged with a re-presentative function, although not meant as an image, a difference is already implied. Indeed, it even establishes for us the possibility of elevating the image-characteristic at any time into a consciousness that means its object, and this would surely be sufficient for us to distinguish judgmentally between the seen thing and the phantasied thing (at least as image thing). But how, if the phantasy object does not in the least function re-presentatively? Is it then a perceptual object, or, correlativey, is its apprehension a perceptual apprehension? Naturally one will answer: Aside from the fact that the turning of the apprehension toward re-presentation will be possible in connection with every phantasy object by virtue of dispositional relations, in each case there certainly exists a further difference, which is inherent in the presenting contents. No matter how precisely their internal differences may match one another with regard to genera and species, they are, nevertheless, sensed contents on the one side and phantasied contents (phantasms) on the other.

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<§ 9. The universal characteristic of presentation: to make an object appear. — The answer to the question about the distinction between phantasy appearances and perceptual appearances leading back to the clarification of the distinction between the presenting contents>

Thus we encounter the same distinction everywhere, and for reasons that are easy to comprehend. In the act-experiences enumerated above, we have to do with complexities. Common to them all is the circumstance that an object appears in them; in other words, a presentation lies at the basis of all of them (for this is precisely the strict sense of the word “appearance”). The universal characteristic of presentation is: to make an object appear. The particular character of the presentation is determined according to the object; and again, in another direction, it is determined more precisely according to the appearing side, that is, according to the determinations that make their appearance directly. Speaking as a matter of principle, in all of these multiple acts the same object can appear from the same side. But even if this is the case, another distinction seems to remain, which we take into account by means of the contrast between phantasy appearances and perceptual appearances. By phantasy appearances, of course, we understand appearances such as those that underlie phantasy presentations, without concern for whether they are of a normal or of a modified sort. By perceptual appearances, we understand appearances that underlie perceptions or also perceptual presentations and all other experiences organized in the same way. And so the question arises: What distinguishes phantasy appearances and perceptual appearances? For us there is only one answer: If a distinction exists at all, it can only lie in the presenting contents. For if we think of the act determination as completely the same in both cases (the same object appearing from the same side), as we repeatedly did above, then certainly only the following can remain: A distinction between the contents exists that is wholly without influence on the act-characteristic. The contents can be determined exclusively by the species and genera

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35 The text from here to p. 144, 2, replaces a text furnished with deletion marks and with the comment “rejected sheets” in the folio of the manuscript. The text is reproduced in the critical notes to Husserliana XXIII (p. 631 ff.). — Editor’s note.
of the contents and content moments with the exception of a single
species or genus, which makes up precisely the distinction between
sensations and phantasms.

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According to our most recent reflections, the distinction between
sensation and phantasy\(^{36}\) proves to be decisive for the distinction be-
tween perceptual appearance and phantasy appearance. Here, how-
ever, we must heed the sense of our purpose in making these distinc-
tions. In this case it is exclusively a question of the differences internal
to the appearance in question. We do not ask whether it is given as
mere presentation or also in a re-presentative function; we do not ask
about the acts, based on these apprehensions, that mean the object;
and finally, we also do not ask about the far-reaching interconnections
of experiences and dispositions to which the compared appearances
or the higher acts grounded in them belong. We take the appearance
purely by itself and ask what distinguishes it in this mental isolation.

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<§ 10. Internal and external distinctions; class distinctions; and
distinctions between the appearances of perception and the
appearances of phantasy, which correspond to one another in pairs>

The question about the distinction between the appearances of per-
ception and the appearances of phantasy becomes differentiated still
further, however, if we undertake the following deliberation.
A) Internal distinctions
1) Class distinctions
   1) Essential generic distinctions pertaining to contents, \textit{eo ipso}
      sharp distinctions. Therefore \textit{essential} class distinctions pertaining
to appearance.

\(^{36}\) The German term is “Phantasie.” However, to be consistent with the text above
and with the rest of the sentence, “phantasm” should probably be read in place of
“phantasy.” — Translator’s note.
The internal distinction of the appearances on both sides will be sharper if there is a distinction between their presenting contents, therefore between sensations and phantasms. There are several possibilities here. A fundamental and essential distinction could exist between sensations and phantasms; it could be based in the strictest sense on a distinction in genus, just as a distinction exists, say, between quality and intensity. Correspondingly, the appearance belonging to perception and the appearance belonging to phantasy would then be assigned to two essentially different classes as well.

2) Sharp, but not essential distinction.

Sensations and phantasms, however, could still be sharply distinguished without the difference depending on a strict generic distinction. This would be the case if the different species of a genus were so divided that some could occur only as presenting contents of perceptual appearances and others only as presenting contents of phantasy appearances. If, for example, the distinction were based on the moment of intensity or on an analogue of it, then intensities below a certain value could be reserved exclusively for phantasy, intensities above a certain value exclusively for perception. The presupposition of sharp differentiation could be satisfied by the fact that, instead of a limit point, there would be an intermediate zone of possible intensities, which, however, would never be realized. Hence a break in intensity would occur in the shift from perception to phantasy.

3) Fluid distinction

The second possibility is immediately connected with this: the possibility that the transition is a continuous one. The distinction would then be a flowing distinction, in the sense in which we distinguish between high and low tones, between strong and weak tones.

Accordingly, a class distinction would still exist between the appearances; specifically, a sharp distinction in the one case, a flowing distinction in the other.

II) Not a class distinction, only a distinction of corresponding appearances.

If none of these possibilities were realized, one would no longer speak of a class distinction pertaining to contents and appearance. Nevertheless, the possibility would still remain that a certain distinction in content would obtain between each perceptual appearance and the phantasy appearance corresponding to it, insofar as a certain
perceptual appearance, in the shift into the corresponding <phantasy appearance>, would always undergo certain modifications of content — which, however, could occur in precisely the same way in perceptual appearances of other objects. This would be the situation, for example, if, in the shift into phantasy, all the intensities of perception were to undergo a constant diminution in intensity, while the possibility that the diminished intensities would also occur in perceptions of other objects would not be excluded. For their part, the latter perceptions, in shifting into the phantasy appearances corresponding to them, would then undergo a modification in content to the same extent or measure or of completely the same sort.

It is clear that in this case a perceptual appearance or phantasy appearance, taken in isolation, would not be characterized as perceptual appearance or phantasy appearance, which is not to say that the being-given-together of corresponding appearances would suffice. Rather, the distinction, as a distinction between perception and phantasy, must be marked by external moments. Nevertheless, we would have to say in this case that an internal distinction between the corresponding experiences of perception and phantasy also exists, except that it would not be a difference that would be sufficient to distinguish the two.

B) External Distinctions

The possibility of differentiating between the appearances of perception and those of phantasy is not annulled if there is no internal distinction of any kind between them. The differentiation could find an adequate basis in external distinctions, in the act-characteristics and their more extensive interconnections.

Various questions result when we take all of this together. In relation to the presenting contents taken by themselves, the following questions arise: Whether sensation and phantasm can or cannot be taken universally as contents belonging to different classes. In the first case, the classes could be essentially different; that is, be based on a difference in Aristotelian genus (e.g., if there were to be found in the concrete unity of content a moment that could not be severed from the unity and that, within a more comprehensive genus, would be generically different in the two cases). Furthermore, the distinctions could simply be based on continuous differentiation and give rise to a sharp or fluid division of classes, depending on whether or not a break in continuity occurs.
In relation to appearance, however, these questions arise: Whether there are merely external or also internal distinctions between perception and phantasy. In the latter case, whether there are class distinctions (essential and extra-essential distinctions, sharp and fluid distinctions, depending on the circumstances), or whether the distinctions touch merely the pairs of appearances corresponding to one another.

* * *

\[ \text{§ 11. On the systematic answer to the question about the distinction between perceptual appearances and phantasy appearances in the case of an identical object: Possibility of making the distinction, in the complete absence of essential internal distinctions, by means of external distinctions involving function} \]

Distinguishing between these various questions and possibilities is very useful for the clarity of the investigation. In the usual way of treating the matter, which would follow under the ambiguous titles “distinction between perceptual presentation and phantasy presentation” or simply “distinction between perception and phantasy,” this did not happen and could not happen, since in the deficient analysis the concepts of sensation, perceptual appearance, perception, and perceptual presentation, and again the concepts of phantasm, phantasy appearance, phantasy presentation, and presentation of phantasy objects were confused. Thus we meet with obscurity and confusion in the customary explanations. Sometimes it is a question of the distinction between sensations and phantasms as contents; sometimes it is a question of the distinction between the perceptual appearances and phantasy appearances based on the contents. No differentiation is made here between internal and external distinctions, between class distinctions and distinctions of appearances corresponding to one another in pairs. The question with which one ordinarily begins is the following: How can one distinguish the two sorts of appearances from one another? This question obviously embraces all of the questions that have been raised, and, as an initial question, is no doubt quite
useful. In a systematic answer it would have to be preceded by something like the following:37

If, in the case of an identical object, we ask first of all about the criteria for the differentiation in judgment between the appearances on both sides, then only two kinds of things can come into consideration: the (sc. presenting) content belonging to the appearances and the function of the appearances.38 As for the first of these, the contents of appearances belonging to possible perception are called sensations and the contents of appearances belonging to phantasy presentations (in the normal or modified sense) are called phantasms. Here, therefore, the question is directed toward the descriptive differences between sensations and phantasms. We put this question aside for the time being. As for the function,39 on the other hand, it offers multiple criteria for judgmental differentiation. All of the marks of differentiation between “perceptual presentations and phantasy presentations” that one customarily specifies are more or less distinctly and directly related to the function.

We pursue a subsidiary explanation. Let a perceptual appearance be compared with a phantasy appearance. Both appearances, as appearances, are by all means like each other. This refers to the presentational function. If we assume that in one instance they would also be like each other — completely like each other — with respect to the presenting contents, that consequently no internal distinctions whatsoever would exist on either side between sensations and phantasms, distinctions could still exist, a different objectivity could be apprehended in both cases by means of identical contents. That is to say, the apprehending acts would certainly both be presentations but would be characterized

37 Content — internal distinctions
Function — external distinctions
   a) Discussion of external distinctions. The customary traits: fullness, intensity, etc.
   b) Discussion of internal distinctions. It follows from our investigation that despite the complete absence of internal distinctions, the external distinctions would be quite sufficient to explain a distinct characteristic belonging to experiences.

Whether internal distinctions are to be assumed nevertheless? In any event, they are not sharp. Otherwise confusion would not be possible. On the other hand, it is questionable whether intensity is a useful trait. For do all contents have intensity? Or does every concrete complex of content have a moment of intensity? What is the situation in the case of phantasy presentations of psychic acts?

38 The one yields internal distinctions; the other yields external distinctions.
39 External distinctions.
differently, despite having like presenting contents. (Of course, in the dispositional direction, they would also belong to different presentational complexes that would correspond to different objects and, actualizing them, make them appear “from all sides.”) Now if we also think of perfect likeness in this respect, then the appearances as a whole are absolutely alike — and yet not indistinguishable. In addition, the disparate ways of joining together into more comprehensive act-formations and the availability of correspondingly different sorts of dispositional interconnections offer abundant possibilities for the establishment of distinguishing, even if external, characteristics. Considering the absence of rigorously descriptive analyses, particularly of the pertinent phenomena, it is understandable that psychology up to this point has not succeeded in becoming clear about these matters.

<§ 12. Calling upon physical image presentations with their differences between image and original for the more precise clarification of the different appearances>

A more precise investigation of physical image presentations could have taught us here how appearances that are of completely the same sort when considered in themselves can receive an altered character by means of acts annexed to them, and can appear as arranged in entirely different orders of appearance (worlds, so to speak) by means of dispositions combined with these acts. The image appearance excited by a physical image (the appearance functioning re-presentatively, not the appearance of the physical image as physical thing), considered in and for itself, is of entirely the same sort as the appearances belonging to (actual and possible) perception. However much the person appearing in the photograph (not the depicted person) may be unlike the “real” person being presented by it in size, coloring, and so on, in itself it appears in just the way in which a perceptual object does; and accordingly it would be conceivable as a matter of principle that there is a “real” thing that “exists in exactly the way” in which the photograph presents it. The photographic image object, however, has the character of mere depiction. It functions as an

40 Characteristic of conflict!
image representant, and for that reason, of course, seems to be entirely different from a “real” — that is to say, perceptual — object. Then add to this the above-mentioned dispositional connections in virtue of which the image object cannot be arranged in this nexus of the “real” world as a real thing, but only as a semblance naturally excited by a physical image thing. Obviously there are differences, which normally are never absent, between image and original that excite or make the distinguishing act-characteristics and dispositions emerge, and thus make possible judgmental differentiation as well.

To be sure, one should heed that these are not (or do not have to be) differences that ground an essential distinction between classes of appearances. That human beings as they appear photographically are not to be found anywhere in reality (that is, in the region of possible empirical experience) is surely enough to require the annexation of the different act-characteristic. Deception and sensory illusion of the sort belonging to panorama images, cinematographic images, and the like, depend on the fact that the appearing objects in their whole appearing state are slightly or imperceptibly different from the objects appearing in normal perception. One can know in these cases that these are mere image objects, though one cannot vitally sense this. The character of perception (with respect to the object, the character of factual existence) conflicts with the character of mere imaging, which presupposes that what is depicted (in the act) does not factually exist, that there is a difference between the factually existing image and the thing itself. In the case of photographs, the material difference is considerable, and so the actual intuitive-unitary annexation of the character of re-presentation comes about (for familiar genetic and psychological reasons).

That the appearances do not emerge in isolation but always in connection with actual and possible perceptions comes into consideration here particularly with respect to judgment. A momentary deception is immediately corrected when the least change in the surroundings is not accompanied by the accustomed change in the appearance, as it would have to ensue according to the measure of its appearing relationship to its surroundings. Thus does imagination come into existence

41 “dispositional” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
42 “and dispositions” later placed between brackets. — Editor’s note.
out of perception, something merely painted, imagined, out of the real thing; it is only mere semblance, phantasmagoria, and so on.

§ 13. Application to phantasy images of the possibility, discussed in connection with physical image presentations, of differentiation from perceptual appearances, or, alternately, of the possibility of deception

Now all of this also finds application to phantasy images. If we suppose that the presenting contents are absolutely indistinguishable from those of the corresponding perception, then the phantasy image is related to perceptual appearance in precisely the way in which an image occurring in painting, stereoscopic seeing, and the like, approximates the perceptual appearance, even to the point of possibly deceiving us. Even at this point the possibility of differentiating them would exist, although to a very great extent also the possibility of deception. The situation is entirely different in the case of ordinary phantasy appearances, as one well knows. The differences in content are unmistakable, the possibility of confusion is excluded (in normal cases, I repeat). If, therefore, we abandon the foregoing fiction, if we then also grant differences in content, we could accept these differences as being wholly of the same sort as those that occur between normal images (in the customary sense of the word) and normal perceptual appearances. The ordinary image (the painting, the photograph, and the like) does not deceive us, although the

43 By all means, but there we have the conflict between physical image and image object. In the case of hallucinations, which are set into perception’s field of regard, we have the conflict between the field of touch belonging to actual [perception?] and the field of touch that is apprehended along with and in addition to the perceptual apprehension. Or with respect to the content of the appearing object, the hallucination deviates from the usual content; it is annulled by empirical experience. “There are no half people.” Here we have a conflict between what the appearing object requires in the way of supplements or moments and what it actually offers in the mode of appearance. Further: A dead person appears. Someone absent, living in Australia, is there in the appearance. That is impossible. The appearance requires a supplementary perceptual context, which conflicts with the given context.

In my old exposition, I took into consideration only moments of the latter sort. I did not take into consideration the conflict that belongs to the physical image in itself.
presenting contents are not generically distinguished from those of perception and consequently the corresponding appearances do not show any kind of essential differences either. Phantasy images could therefore deviate from the appearances of perception in precisely the same sense in which painted images do. In spite of the difference in psychic connections, therefore, one certainly would not have to fear confusing the one sort of images with the other.

In fact, the distinction between phantasy images and perceptual appearances extends much further. This is the place to say a few words about the characteristics commonly specified as distinguishing them. In doing so, we still persist in the position of trying to see to what extent we can make do with merely external distinctions. Consequently, we still attempt to take sensations and phantasms as contents of completely the same sort, distinguished only by function.

<§ 14. Continuity or, respectively, disruptive volatility as characteristics commonly specified as distinguishing phantasy images from perceptual appearances>

This is the place to discuss the distinguishing characteristics of continuity or, respectively, disruptive volatility. The external appearance that belongs to perception is continuous; it continuously fills out the act. The phantasy appearance is there for an instant and then has already vanished; suddenly it emerges again, and so on, in free play. Oddly enough, despite the interrupted content, the unitary act-intention seems to continue throughout the breaks. As a rule, great variability in the phantasy images is ordinarily combined with this disruptive volatility. All of this, however, is merely a peculiarity of the appearance and not of the presented object. The presentation attributes nothing of this variation to the object. The image changes with inconceivable volatility and continuously means the unchanging thing itself. Similar circumstances are also found now and then in areas of perception. When illumination is interrupted and varying, the same unchanging object also offers interrupted and varying appearances within an act-intention that, so it seems, is unitary and continuous throughout all the breaks. And in this act-intention the object is continuously perceived (judged) as unchanging. This analogy
again shows that these distinctions cannot pass themselves off as class distinctions between perception and phantasy, but that they only segregate correlative appearances from one another empirically by offering a particular foothold for the re-presentative act-characteristics and the dispositions combined with them. The disruptive volatility, the unique flexibility and poverty of content, are traits that, singly and considered with regard to their elements, are also found in the case of perceptual appearances. In the case of a given phantasy image, however, they emerge in such a way that they determine a material difference between the image and the corresponding object of possible perception that is sufficiently great to distinguish them. Such differences, although they are of a secondary nature, nevertheless suffice to guarantee the customary annexation of re-presentative characteristics and the possibility of an essentially changed judgment.

15 § 15. The characteristic of fullness. Inquiry into differences in intensity as transition to the discussion of internal differences. Whether one should also speak of intensity in the case of phantasy images of psychic acts>

Analogous execution for the characteristic of fullness. Cf. the rejected sheets. Vagueness. A difference in intensity can also function in the same sense.

Intensity, however, also seems to come into question as an absolute characteristic.

This leads us to the discussion of internal distinctions. In connection with the whole preceding discussion, we really must consider the question whether we have to do, not with internal, but with essentially external differences. Can precisely the same appearance function as a phantasy appearance and at another time as a perceptual appearance? One will have to say: it is possible in borderline cases; it is not possible in general.

In any case, it has become apparent that distinguishability is not excluded despite the complete absence of internal distinctions, at least of essential internal distinctions.

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44 Cf. for this the critical notes to the text, Husserliana XXIII, p. 631ff. — Editor’s note.
Now the question is whether a sharper or stronger distinction must be assumed in the contents themselves. Intensity: Does every concrete content have an intensity?

One denies intensity in the case of psychic acts. But we do have phantasy images of psychic acts.

* * *

<§ 16. Descriptive classification of presentations from the point of view of direct and indirect (imaging) intuitiveness and positing> [136]

According to these considerations, we have acquired the following purely descriptive classifications of presentations: If we take as given the distinction between intuitive and conceptual (intuitive and conceptive\textsuperscript{45}) presentations — a distinction we will not investigate until later — then in the case of intuitive presentations two classes become separated from one another: perceptual presentations and imaging presentations. Both have in common that a present content is apprehended as an object, or, as we can also say, that an object makes its appearance through a content while the content is being experienced. But a different mode of presenting is combined with the apprehension of the object in the two cases — a different mode of presenting in the sense of focusing one’s attention on something, of being occupied with it, of being aimed at it, of meaning it (by which, however, no judgmental process of meaning is understood). In perceptual presentation, the appearing object itself is meant, and consequently it presents its object as given to it, as grasped “itself.” In image presentation, on the other hand, it is not the appearing object that is meant but another object, for which the appearing object functions as a representant by means of its resemblance to it. The image presentation, therefore, has an indirect way of relating to its object. The image appears in it immediately, “in person”: It appears, but in the strict sense is not presented; rather, it only illustrates intuitively

\textsuperscript{45} The German text reads: “anschaulichen und begrifflichen (intuitiven und konzeptiven).” — Translator’s note.
the presented object, which does not appear “itself.” Making distinctions here, we can speak of directly intuitive and indirectly intuitive presentations, or also of presentations that intuit and presentations that illustrate intuitively. Perceptions do indeed presume to intuit the object; image presentations merely illustrate it intuitively in an image.46

Now instances of taking something to be true can be combined with all of these presentations in an inexpressible way. If we were permitted to broaden the term “perception,” it might fittingly be applied to this whole class. However, it is better not to burden the term, which is ambiguous enough anyway, with new concepts that could scarcely count on universal acceptance. We prefer to speak of intuitive posittings (positions), understanding by “positing” every sort of nonpredicative grasping of being, therefore every sort of grasping in which the being of an object (event, etc.) is accepted on the basis of some presentations or other without the predication of existence. Intuitive posittings then form that class for which intuitive presentations form the foundation. In conformity with our classification of intuitive presentations, this class breaks down into the class of positions that intuit directly, that is, into the class of perceptions, and the class of positions that intuit indirectly or in image. Memories and expectations, insofar as they are not mediated conceptually, belong to the latter class. Every positing apprehension of an object presented in a physical image belongs to it as well. That there are such posittings is unquestionable. For example, I look at the picture of a person familiar to me. The person does not simply face me in the image but is also subtended by the consciousness of being actual. (Natural discourse also speaks of “memory” in these cases. The picture reminds me of the person, and, of course, in reminding me of the person, also excites memories in the other sense, which one can easily call to mind and annex.)

46 Presenting and re-presenting presentations.
APPENDIX II (to § 9)

<DESPITE THE FACT THAT I TURN TOWARD THE PHYSICAL IMAGE THING IN AN ACT OF MEANING, I STILL NOTICE THE EXCITED APPEARANCE OF THE RE-PRESENTING IMAGE>

<probably 1898>

When we turn toward an object functioning as an image, it does not for that reason cease to be an image, although we perhaps do not focus on its re-presenting. The apprehension reaches further than the act of meaning. This is also the case when we turn toward a physical image (toward the instigator of the re-presenting image).

If I contemplate this picture hanging on the wall, though not as a picture but precisely as a physical thing hanging on the wall, the presented image nevertheless appears and presents a certain subject. However, I do not particularly heed that.

But not to notice the excited appearance at all is, of course, impossible. If I see the physical image, I also see the excited appearance. However, it is one thing to focus specifically on the excited image, to be absorbed specifically in the presentation of the subject, and another to focus specifically on the physical image. For example, the rough surface of the paper (China paper) of this copperplate engraving belongs to the physical image. This determination conflicts with the female form appearing on the surface. The presented image is arranged in a spatiality that is incompatible with the spatiality appearing in the physical image. And there are other differences.
What relationship obtains between image and subject?
What relationship obtains between image object and subject?

1) Every “image” must be the bearer of a sensuous semblance; it must make intuited an “image object” different from it, built along with it on the same presentational foundation, hence standing in partial conflict with it.\(^1\)

2) Can the image object be perfectly like the “subject”? Can it even be completely like only one side of the subject? Depiction obviously presupposes resemblance, indeed, even perfect likeness. This must be our point of departure.

But a) the likeness must concern what is intuited, the appearance of the subject, not merely the unintuited determinations. b) Can the appearance of the image object be the same as the appearance of the subject, be completely like it? Yes and no, depending on how one takes it.

If the image-object appearance were really to be completely like the subject, not only as momentary appearance but as temporally continuous appearance, we would have normal perception and no consciousness of conflict, no image-object appearance. The image-object appearance, however, can be perfectly like one part of the synthetic appearance and conflict only with other parts. But as soon as it is like only one part, we have another conflict: Image consciousness and perceptual consciousness conflict with one another. Nevertheless, image consciousness is theoretically possible here. What belongs to the image consciousness that becomes clearly separated off and is not

\(^1\) The reason why there can only be visual images and tactile images, while other senses by themselves have no capacity for imaging [Bildlichkeit]. But the church bell rings in the theater, and so on.
interrupted by a reversion to perceptual consciousness is not complete likeness but resemblance.

3) What kind of resemblance? In what does the resemblance between the painted plastic form and the perceived plastic form consist?

That something three-dimensional is not sensed in the first case but is in the other? An element of the local signs is missing and conflicts with other local signs. The drawing is flat; the plastic form is three-dimensional.

The color too is different. Although I see the image (the photograph) as grey, the subject does not appear as colored. In the image I do not become conscious of what the subject is with respect to color. On the other hand, I do “see” the plastic form in the image. What constitutes the difference? I see the shades of grey in their different levels of brightness as well as the differences in the “flat surface.” I sense grey and something flat and interpret the plastic appearance in them. But certainly not in a merely symbolic way. (I even apprehend the distant landscape as having plastic form without seeing differences in depth.) Perhaps it is analogous to the way in which I apprehend, symbolically but vividly, the back side of something, etc., as belonging to it, perhaps doing so in such an intensified way that I occasionally have hallucinations; that is to say, sensuous reproductions that are carried into the nexus of sensory perception. But surely this would not go on unremittingly; in any event, there would be conflict with what is given in sensation. The color, of course, does not have this intimate connection with the spatial form; hence it is not interpreted into the spatial form “intuitively.” Finally: The sensing of depth is just as slight in the case of most perceptions. The plastic form is therefore given, but given in such a way that a portion of the supportive sensations, which are usually on hand and give more fullness to the consciousness of the plastic form, more “force and vivacity,” are missing and are replaced by sensations conflicting with them. The color of the subject is not given; the plastic form, however, is given, at least on the whole.—

The situation would be different if depth were actually original, if it had equal standing with length and breadth, or if depth were mediated only by reference to certain signs of depth. This way everything operates with the same tendency and yields the “intuition” of depth in the same sense. Yet something is missing here — which must be worked out more precisely.
APPENDIX IV (to § 15f.)

<GENUINE PRESENTATION — NONGENUINE PRESENTATION>
<probably 1904/05>

1) Genuine presentation [Vorstellung] (apprehension), immediate intuition.

I. Presentation [Präsentation] (genuine presentational objectivations). The now in the now. The object of presentation now, the act also now; both “present.”

II. Representation [Repräsentation] (re-presentation [Vergegenwärtigung])1 (genuine <re->presentational presentations).

Phantasy presentations and memorial presentations: better, memorial presentations in the broader sense.

The act present, the object not present. The not now re-presented in the now.

2) Nongenuine presentation.

I. Imaging presentations (imaging in the true sense, imaginatio in the strict sense):

1) by means of presentational images: on the basis of perceptions; [140]

2) by means of re-presentational images: on the basis of phantasy presentations; in phantasy to make an image for oneself of something that one does not remember.

II. Symbolic apprehension.

1 Husserl often uses the terms “Repräsentation” and “Vergegenwärtigung” interchangeably. “Repräsentation” occurs much less frequently in later texts. As noted earlier, “Vergegenwärtigung” is always translated in the present volume as “re-presentation” and “Repräsentation” as “re-presentation” or, in cases in which there is little possibility of ambiguity (such as the present case, in which the two terms appear together in the same line), as “representation.” “Vorstellung,” as noted earlier, is usually translated as “presentation,” though occasionally as “representation,” if the sense demands it. — Translator’s note.
One could also designate heading 2) as symbolic <presentation> in the broader sense.

How is this distinction connected with the distinction between direct and indirect presentations?

Indirect presentations, which present their objects as objects of other presentations or as standing in relation to such presented objects. *Logical Investigations* <p.> 543.2

Imaging presentation: presenting the object as the *analogue* of the object presented by the image presentation.

Symbolic presentation: presenting the object as something signified, as that to which the sign points. But this is not to be taken in the sense of <p.> 543. The fulfillment is not a mediate fulfillment, and the presentation does not contain a presentation as object. The image presentation presents its object as the analogue of the image object. The latter stands before us as appearing. Its presentation is nothing to us, and this object stands characterized as the presentant of resemblance: a characteristic like the characteristic the symbol has, except that the content of the symbol is a matter of indifference to us, [while] the content of the presentant of resemblance is important to us. The constituents that function re-presentatively (not all of the constituents of the image object need to have the character of representational constituents) are taken as analogues of what is meant. What is meant is something of a specific sort, an x, formed in such and such a way. Or what somehow resembles it, what is exhibited. Naturally not through the mediation of such thoughts. Nothing with these categorial forms [is present here]. Just as in the case of the symbol. We do not present what is signified by “π,” but we do understand π. It indicates such and such to us; we are “conscious” of it in the manner of an empty intention. Thus do we understand the image. In looking at it, we see into it. In a peculiar way, we go beyond the image-object consciousness while we nevertheless also live in it. And if a lively and richer phantasy presentation of what is depicted makes its appearance, the subject then lies within view, fulfilling the intention, in which case what analogizes in the image object comes to “coincide” with the image subject, attains to a unitary consciousness of perfect

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likeness. The image content is essentially involved in the fulfillment in this case. And at the same time one sees that no “conceptual” elements, no accessories of a “higher” intellectual function, are present here. For that would have to show itself in fulfillment: the categorial too requires fulfillment.
APPENDIX V (to §§ 15f., § 25 and § 27)  

IMAGE PRESENTATIONS (PICTORIAL — SYMBOLIC).  
<SHIFT FROM IMAGE CONSCIOUSNESS TO THE  
CONSCIOUSNESS OF ANALOGICAL RE-PRESENTATION  
(SYMBOL CONSCIOUSNESS)>. CLEAR, EMPIRICALLY  
CONNECTED PHANTASY PRESENTATIONS  
<probably around 1905>

Physical image objects. Can I take one twin as the image of the other? I can take one as the image symbol of the other: I represent, for example, another human being who appears to be perfectly like someone, who is like someone in all but insignificant differences. The oil painting of a person whom I do not know: “someone, who is represented by this picture.”

a) Being re-presented internally in the image with respect to analogical moments.

b) Pointing beyond the image by means of nonanalogical moments. If I were to accept the image object just as it appears, I would not have an image object. I would consider the image object as some sensuous appearance [Schein] or other. As some appearing object, infected by a conflict.

A white bust: white head (accompanying psychic phenomena, etc.). Then again in the opposite direction: not white. Natural complexion. Small head — large head.

Different apprehensions interpenetrating. A nexus of grasping. What does it mean to have the subject re-presented in the image? To live in the consciousness of resemblance and the blending of resembling moments with the nonanalogized but co-intended moments accompanying them contiguously. Furthermore: Analogy of this whole with what is intended (change of size, supplementing in matching size, perspective, and so on). Does not every image, therefore, necessarily possess in itself a relation to something external?
External intentions do not simply attach to the image object by means of mere contiguity, as they do to ordinary signs; rather, the image object pre-presents in itself the subject by means of analogizing traits. But these are interwoven with other subject-intentions, which disagree with those appearing and belonging to the image object. To that extent, the consciousness of the subject runs throughout the image-object consciousness and goes beyond it. And, in fact, something different from what appears is meant — something different, and yet something re-presented in what appears (with respect to the resembling traits). The subject intention finds fulfillment through an original. [It finds] provisional fulfillment through an intuitively perfect phantasy presentation: something is gained here, but something is also lost. For the resembling traits in the image object give more than the corresponding traits in the phantasy image give. Except that the phantasy gives all at once, unitarily, or, as far as all the moments of appearance are concerned, gives without conflict in itself.

Here, therefore, the subject intentions and the image-object intentions coincide with respect to the analogizing aspects. However, instead of pure coinciding (consciousness of perfect likeness, indeed, consciousness of identity: one sees the subject in the image; it appears in the image just as it actually is), impure, imperfect coinciding is also possible. A tendency toward coinciding, toward a relation of coincidence, which, nevertheless, does not result in an actual coinciding. This is the case of more or less perfect resemblance.

What resembles not only calls to mind what resembles it but also has the tendency to overlap, to coincide with what it resembles. For example, the plastic form can be taken as the form of the object itself as it really is. We see in the form the object as it is. Re-presentation. But it can also be taken as mere resemblance. Bad reproduction. Coinciding and, in the process of coinciding, consciousness of difference in varying degrees. “Approximately” the contour of the madonna. And yet it is different. And so in all respects. Here we do not see what is resembling in what resembles; however, while we are turned toward what is resembling in the object, we do have the consciousness of the subject coinciding confusedly with what resembles it, although we surely have a consciousness of its being otherwise. Without, let us say, the two existing in juxtaposition. They are not separated; they do not form a duality of appearance. The appearance is only one, the
appearance that belongs to the image object (thus the “being otherwise” of the color does not appear either and yet is felt). The appearance naturally triumphs. However, the relation to the subject is there and partially coincides with it intentionally, but with disparities. The situation is entirely different in connection with the rest of the moments in which resemblance does not mix with nonresemblance, but instead pure conflict presents itself and there is no consciousness of resemblance.

We still have the exhibiting of the subject in the image object here, but the exhibiting is impure. We do not have re-presentation of the subject itself in traits that are perfectly like it, but impure exhibiting, a falsifying differentiation of what resembles (with a tendency toward blending), a mere simulation that makes the consciousness of the subject vivacious but cannot be taken as a re-presentation of the subject in what appears. The more impure the exhibiting is, the more the image consciousness changes into the consciousness in which what appears “recalls to mind” something else resembling it in this and that respect. The image consciousness changes into symbol consciousness (in the narrower sense), or, better, into the consciousness belonging to analogical re-presentation. Image consciousness and symbol consciousness are therefore continuously mediated with one another just as identity and resemblance are. Consciousness of identity and consciousness of difference understood as consciousness of resemblance, which implies the consciousness of disparity.

However, there is still a more clear-cut distinction to be made. For the genuine image-consciousness does indeed truly see the like in the like; it is characterized by pure re-presentational consciousness. And this is something fully characterized phenomenologically. Only the “impure” consciousness has its degrees. It is still image consciousness as long as we have in the appearing object an image object in which we find the subject re-presented with respect to at least certain moments (the spatial aspect must be there; the color is not enough: why?). As soon as we sense the impurity, we can no longer see the subject in the object exactly as if it were there itself. It is then no longer genuine re-presentational consciousness with regard to what is perfectly like it. It is only a presentation through resemblance with regard to analogous

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1 Why must the plastic form make up the foundation of image consciousness?
moments and even assumes the character of “memorial” consciousness (terminology!). Or re-presentation struggles with “memory”: We have the object before us, and yet again it is not before us; there is a conflict in the very thing that resembles. If the disparity is very great, then a tendency toward coinciding identification no longer occurs. On the contrary, a mere hieroglyph, a mere resemblance-sign is there. When this occurs, we find in the content of the sign the meaning of what resembles it. Or by immersing ourselves in the content, we feel ourselves brought near, as it were, to the subject, without the two melting into each other and without a re-presentational consciousness, distorted by deviation from the line of perfect likeness, coming about.

A rough silhouette can still be sensed as an image, and indeed quite purely if we concentrate our interest precisely on what comes to presentation there. If our interest goes further than that, then “memory” no doubt predominates. If, however, the silhouette deviates greatly, as it might in a child’s drawing of a human being, then the image means a human being — we know this, we are reminded of a human being and know that the image is supposed to represent a human being — but for all that we no longer see a human being in the drawing. Or perhaps just a little. We have the human being in coincidence; the two coincide partially, but there are yawning differences. The difference is so great that we no longer feel disturbed by the consciousness of falsification in the inclination toward identification. On the contrary, the inclination toward identification is missing; and in the case of great disparity, we find the representation comical. Indian signs, hieroglyphic signs.

In the one case, therefore, pure identification, that is, congruence, coinciding without difference; in the other case, a partial coinciding of two intentions along with the consciousness: the same thing is meant. They are posited in relation, brought to synthetic unity. They yield a certain consciousness of agreement, but not congruence; rather: a) approximate likeness — namely, resemblance — in which one blends into the other and yet again is sensed as different; b) rough resemblance, which excludes any blending — strong conflict within a universal resemblance (agreement) and synthesis of intentional identity.
Moreover: One recalls the other and is supposed to exhibit it and claims to exhibit it (the symbol-characteristic). The following produces the relationship of one to the other; that is, the relationship of remembering and remembering by means of resemblance: finding in one an echo, an analogue, of the other. And in the case of the symbol, \( \alpha \) means \( A \), in the one the other is supposed to be exhibited. But it is not exhibited; it is a mere indication, a mere meaning.
APPENDIX VI (to § 17)

<WHY NATURE, A LANDSCAPE, ACTS AS AN "IMAGE" — AESTHETICS: INTEREST IN THE APPEARANCE. THING APPEARANCES ALWAYS EXPRESS SOMETHING FROM WITHIN FOR ARTISTIC CONTEMPLATION>

<probably 1906>

Historical pictures indicated as historical by means of titles. The subject indicated first of all and then presented pictorially. Music characterized by means of titles as music that presents something. Pastoral Symphony.

Why does nature, a landscape, act as an “image”? A distant village. The houses “little houses.” These little houses have a) an altered size in comparison with houses as we ordinarily see them; b) a more shallow stereoscopic quality, altered coloring, and so on. Like toy houses, they are apprehended in a manner similar to that in which we apprehend images. Likewise the human beings: dolls.

In image contemplation, we take them as not present: as images. We take as present what is in our immediate surroundings, what we “see, just as it is.” We take the appearances of the village, of the tiny human beings, and so on, as images for the nonpresent possible present, for the appearances that we would have, if, etc.

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1 Inserted in the transcript: “sometimes.” — Editor’s note.
2 “similar” missing in the transcript. — Editor’s note.
3 “dolls” changed in the transcript to “tiny little dolls.” — Editor’s note.
4 “as not present: as images” changed in the transcript to “not as present: but precisely as images.” — Editor’s note.
5 The last sentence was changed in the transcript to: “We take the appearances of the village, of the tiny human beings, and so on, as images: for the inactual possible ‘present’ (the nonpresent present, as we could say paradoxically), for appearances that we would have, etc.” — Editor’s note.
We distinguish: Interest in the appearance (in that which is actually “intuition,” though intuition of the subject) [from] interest in the subject.

It is the appearance that comes into question aesthetically. Is every interest in the appearance aesthetic? Certainly not. The psychological interest is not. The purely “sensuous” interest? The interest in the appearance precisely as it is and not for theoretical purposes, such as the epistemological, the psychological, and so on. “Delight in the perception,” but, much more, delight in the appearance. Different appearances of the same object are not equivalent in this affective direction. The disposition of vases, ashtrays, and so forth, in the drawing-room. “Which arrangement is most beautiful?”

Hence this is already a question of aesthetics. One selects the most favorable appearance. This involves: a) the appearance that contains in itself the maximum stock of sensuous moments and the particular combination of such moments that arouse pleasure; b) the clear awakening of the consciousness of the object, although the interest does not concern the object as an element of the actual world with respect to its objective properties, relations, and so on, but precisely the appearance alone. However, since the objective apprehension is there and, of course, unavoidable, and since the function of the object, its purposes, and so on, are co-excited, they must be there in clear fashion. The object itself, adapted to its purpose, [must be there], or otherwise [there would be] conflict between the form of the object and its function. Something unpleasant mixed in. The form also impressing, expressing, in a certain sense depicting — namely, analogizing as much as possible (as intuitively as possible) — the function in a clear way.

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6 A principal point is not mentioned here: In the psychological attitude, the appearance is an object; in the aesthetic attitude, I do not think about the appearance and do not make it into a theoretical object. I do contemplate the object in perception or the object depicted through the medium of the image in image contemplation, but I am not in a theoretical attitude in which I am directed toward “being” (true being), perhaps in order to describe it, or even, in a practical attitude, to transform it, to claim it as my own, to desire it, to take delight in it as something actual. The pleasure here [in the aesthetic attitude] leaves existence out of play and is essentially determined by the mode of appearance. If it is an object of use, then it is not its existence as an object of use that is in question, but how the object of use presents itself as an object, etc.; and thus many other things — see the text and Kant’s theory.
So, too, in the presentation of human beings. Groups. Not masses of human bodily members, in the presence of which one would not really know where or to what the members belong. To which head do these legs, these arms, and so on, belong? What is she doing, where is he standing? Characteristic position. Instant photography: Among the innumerable particular positions that actually occur, which is the one “noticed”? And among those that are noticed, which is the “best”? Every nerve, every muscle, attuned to the action. Nothing indifferent, nothing random. Etc. As much expression as possible; that is to say: the excitation with the greatest possible wealth of appearance, the most powerful and most intuitive excitation possible of the consciousness of the object — specifically, not of the “human being” as a physical thing but of the human being in its function, in its activity (a pugilist), in its doing and suffering, which is supposed to be precisely the object of presentation. With as much unity as possible. The pugilist can, of course, simultaneously have a stomachache, and the gripes can express themselves in his grimace. Now that would be a beautiful aesthetic object: A pugilist or discus thrower who simultaneously has a stomachache.\(^7\)

\(^7\) The “things,” that is, the thing appearances, always express something, signify something, present something; namely, for artistic contemplation. Aesthetic appearances are appearances exclusively, appearances that express something, present something; and they do not do this in the manner of an empty sign. They always express from within, through their moments, through moments of analogy, and only then do the aesthetic distinctions between the “more beautiful” and the “less beautiful,” the “beautiful” and the “ugly,” come into consideration. What expresses nothing is the aesthetic αδιάφορον.
APPENDIX VII (to §§ 22, 24-26 and 32)

CONFLICT AS FOUNDATION OF IMAGE PRESENTATION
<CONFLICT BETWEEN WHAT APPEARS AND WHAT IS
DEMANDED EMPIRICALLY: LOGICALLY MEDIATED, NOT
MERELY SENSUOUS SEMBLANCE. WHAT APPEARS
WITHOUT CONFLICT “EXISTS,” IS VALID>
<probably around September, 1906>

Looking at my old statements calls my attention to the fact that, in
the lectures, I took into consideration only a particular class of empir-
ical motives of conflict, the very class that I had earlier overlooked.10

The way in which the image object is characterized in physical
imaging as a semblance object, the empirical conflict between ap-
pearing image object and the physical object, is not the only sort of
empirical conflict. To begin with, in the case of physical images them-
selves there is a different sort of empirical conflict: The human beings
appearing as grey. There are no such human beings. The appearance
of human beings demands such and such colors, such and such sizes,
such and such movements, such and such changes accompanying the
movement of one’s glance, and so on.15

There is more. Image objects of this sort are certainly not the sole
semblance objects. For example, hallucinations in the midst of the
field of vision. Nicolai’s half-human-beings, etc. There, too, we have
empirical conflict, but not with a physical image and not even with
the surroundings; rather, moments belonging to the appearance de-
mand, empirically, certain other moments, certain supplements, which
are missing here, and so forth. Hence conflict between what appears
and what is demanded empirically. The empirical demand can relate to
the content of the object, thus to the internal nexus of possible appear-
ances that “can” belong and does belong to one and the same object.20

But it can also relate to the external connection of the object with other
objects in the unity of reality (the unity of “nature”). Here, however,

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not only the immediate intuitive connection with the surroundings (the intuitive present) comes into consideration, but also the circuit of memories, the “elaboration in thought” of empirical experience, the supplementing of one’s own experience by means of information from others, and so on.

The object appears as A, but in appearing it shows properties that conflict with what we know and with our knowledge of what holds universally, with our empirical laws. Our knowledge defines expectations that are not fulfilled, demands properties that are not forthcoming. If the judgment is firm, then A cannot exist, or cannot exist in this way, and so on. Accordingly, this is a logically (intellectually) mediated semblance, not a merely sensuous semblance.

What appears directly and without opposition, and is also not contested by any external intentions (hence there is no talk about the pictorial and the symbolic), “exists,” is valid. What conflicts with what appears without opposition (with what is given without opposition) does not exist.

What appears in image in memory, provided that it shows no contradiction with what is present and is therefore uncontested memory, is accepted without further ado as having existed. What is expected “will exist.” What is phantasied is not accepted at all. If it can find a place within the nexus of a field of memory, then it did exist. If it can find a place within the nexus of a field of expectation, then it will exist. If it conflicts, then it does not exist.

Can it not a) appear and not find a place anywhere, within any field of temporal being? b) appear and yet not conflict with any field of temporal being? b) is nonsense. Set into a field, it harmonizes with the field or conflicts with it. One or the other. Hence a) and b) are the same. Everything that can be phantasied breaks down into something that belongs to a field or that does not belong to a field. In the first case, it exists (in time); in the other case, it does not exist (not now, not in the past, not in the future). Here, of course, there is no distinction between subjective and objective time. But then: All temporal fields <form> one nexus, the continuous nexus of time, and so on.

In a certain sense, however, b) is not nonsense after all. That is to say, a phantasy image can appear in a field of phantasy, and hence without conflicting with any field of memory. In that case, the characteristic of memory and the characteristic of belief are absent. In what respect
do we say that it is mere phantasy and nothing actual? It does not *appear* as actual, as present, past, future. But that still does not mean that it simply appears as *inactual*. The possibility of its having a place in some actuality certainly exists. (What is present, past, or future is actual, of course.) a) What is not given in perception, memory, and expectation, but by means of its connection with this primal actuality is taken and must be taken as present (although not perceived), past (although not remembered), future (although not expected), and, in addition, the demand in all of these cases [to accept what is thus taken as] “objectively valid.” b) What excludes this possibility from the beginning and characterizes mere fiction. One has not encountered centaurs: No empirical grounds of any sort exist for their acceptance. Empty, “groundless” imaginings.

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1 “and must be taken” was probably crossed out at the time it was written. — Editor’s note.
APPENDIX VIII (to §§ 22, 24-26 and 32)

<INQUIRY INTO THE SORTS OF CONFLICT
CONNECTED WITH THE FIGMENTS OF PHANTASY
AND OF MEMORY — RESISTANCE OFFERED BY
EMPIRICAL EXPERIENCE>

<probably 1906>¹

We have a figment in the case of physical imaging for two reasons: 1) the conflict that comes from being placed into the surroundings of “reality”:

2) **empirical conflict** (there are no human beings in photographic colors).

Is this also true in the case of the figments belonging to phantasy? Is it because they are contested by the demands of empirical experience inherent in them that they are not accepted as actual? This would also hold good for their fleetingness, their variation, their intermittency. The latter constantly violate empirical demands. On the other hand, these figments are not meant as they appear there; on the contrary, an object is analogized in them. Hence we actually do have imaging here.

In phantasy] a fixed image object does not re-present the subject. Rather, fleeting and multiple appearances yielding changing, fluctuating image objects support the imaging consciousness. In addition to this, there is another conflict: the conflict with perception. This, however, is a conflict of an entirely different kind from the conflict that belongs to physical figments.

Even in the case of clear and fixed memories and phantasies, the situation is no different: The subjects are there themselves, and yet again are not there. Not only does perception oppose them inasmuch as it retains a power of opposition even when we are not living in

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¹ Copy. The original has not been preserved.
it, but *empirical experience* also offers resistance. Even if we do not distinctly note the inadequacy of intensity, we find something similar to what we find in the case of physical fictions. Painted colors are not exactly like actual colors. The difference *can* be perceived. In any event, even without actual consciousness of conflict there is a consciousness-characteristic that contributes to it.
APPENDIX IX (to § 17, § 25 and to Chapter 6)


Now is the interpretation of phantasy presentation as image presentation actually justified?

The objection that thrusts itself to the fore here concerns the apprehension, allegedly occurring first, that furnishes the image, though not yet as image. In the case of paintings, busts, and so on, the matter is clear. In the painting I at first see a white form, very tiny, etc.; this

¹ These sheets contain, in addition to the general discussion (about whether phantasy presentation is image presentation) very important statements about image presentations, especially about, on the one hand, presentations that symbolize by means of an image and, on the other hand, aesthetic image-presentation (grasping the subject immanently in the image object).
is the “Sacred Love.” I see the “background” — a grey landscape, distant church tower, flock of sheep, and so on. Of course, I do not take what I see to be “real.” It does not exist. Indeed, it conflicts with the reality surrounding it. However, it does appear as an object. But then it represents something.

Here I could say: It represents Titian’s picture. What would be implied in that? As a representant of something it resembles, it points to the painting in which the same objects appear “in different dimensions” and, above all, as colored. Phantasy perhaps offers me the following: This is what the picture, whose photographic reproduction this is, presents. Here, therefore, we clearly have the essence of image re-presentation. We have a significational consciousness on the basis of analogy. The image points beyond itself to something else, which itself appears in a different act. One can and should bring about an identification with this act. The act offers fulfillment. Now is the phantasy image itself again an image in this sense? Does it refer beyond itself?

The white form stands before me and is accepted as something else. In a manner similar to that in which the word-image, the visual and acoustical word-image in its context, stands before me and the significational consciousness gives it signification with respect to something else, which can be present (or re-presented) or not. (Since, of course, the image functions here as a depiction of another image.)

What about phantasy? Do we also have in phantasy a pointing beyond itself, a standing before me in the appearance — however unsettled and fluctuating it may be — which, however, is not taken as itself but as something else?

Is the talk about imaging not carried over to phantasy on the basis of the knowledge of the difference between appearance and “reality”? If, living in phantasy, I go back in memory, if, for example, I think back on the Wolfgangsee, on a watering place, on the trip in the boat, on the Gellow, on the blacksmith and his hammers, and so forth — if, I say, I live in phantasy, then I do not notice anything at all in the way of a re-presenting consciousness; I do not see an appearance before me and take it as a representant of something else. On the contrary, I see the thing itself, the event, and so on.

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2 “himmlische Liebe.” As later passages in this appendix make clear, Husserl is referring to Titian’s Sacred and Profane Love [Die himmlische und irdische Liebe], c. 1514, in the Galleria Borghese, Rome. — Translator’s note.
Then I dream. Phantasying as daydreaming or as dreaming while sleeping is not re-presentational consciousness. From time to time the consciousness of “semblance” shines through: I wake up again; that is to say, I experience conflict with the perceptual present or deviation from it. I experience the not now, the not here. Which, of course, would have to be explored in earnest. Is this conflict? Surely one cannot say that. Transition from the not now into the now, from the shadow world into the world of reality or actual perception. Competition between what actually fills my perceptual field of regard and what phantasy’s fields of regard offer: Why is what is perceived accepted as reality here? There must be some distinctly marked difference. The phantasy “image” disappears as soon as I become conscious of the perceptual reality. I am constantly conscious of the latter to a certain “degree”; and for that reason, the consciousness of illusion, which is more or less distinctly marked, becomes apparent. I live in the memory of my summer with Brentano at the Wolfgangsee, and then the reality of the present, the paper on which I am writing, the rumbling carriage, prevails for a moment. The phantasy image recedes, loses itself in the mist or vanishes entirely, returning immediately after that “in person.” I then live in it again, and it becomes clearer — for awhile it is almost like actual life; then suddenly there is an interruption, another phantasy image, then again another, and so on. The “incoherence of

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3 When we turn to one, the other flees. The situation is similar to what it is in the competition of visual fields. But is this conflict? Conflict lies in the intentions, in the intuitive acts. But these fields do not conflict with one another, unless I want to interpret a phantasy image as existing in the visual field of perception. If I phantasy a line as on this piece of paper, I experience empirical conflict. The line does not exist on this piece of paper; the paper is blank. If, however, I represent the children’s room, this representation does not conflict with the perception, although I cannot simultaneously hold both in truly intuitive vitality. Hence it surely follows that it is not a question of serious conflict, since I continually have acoustic phantasy images in internal speaking, without the images being disturbed by what is actually heard. And finally, while I am presenting some painting, etc., to myself, the perception of the visual field does not disappear. However, I cannot become absorbed in both simultaneously and cannot include both in the same intuition. And I can, in any event, maintain undisturbed the intentions aimed at both, as I do in the case of comparison. These are compatible, not incompatible. On the other hand, the intention aimed at the bent stick is incompatible with the perceptual apprehension of reality. The intention aimed at the line on the sheet of paper is incompatible with the perception of the paper, and so on. What is not present is incompatible with what is present, if what is not present claims precisely to be present.

4 But only for the most part.
the association of ideas” really means nothing else than incoherence in phantasy. What is coherence (naturally, objective coherence among affairs, but what is that?), and what is incoherence? This will have to be our question. Before turning to that, however, we will continue to consider the question: Do we have an *image consciousness*? Do we have consciousness of inactuality and consciousness of conflict in the same sense in which we have them in ordinary image consciousness? The “image” claiming a place: but [is] the place set into reality? The image space set into the “actual” space of perception, but not fitting into this space? Conflicting with it? The image [is] not actual but re-presents the subject: the nonpresent subject. The nonpresent subject: the physical image appears as present. With conflict, of course. The little figure in bronze: It is supposed to be a human figure; it is apprehended as a human figure (very much in the way children apprehend dolls). It appears as there; but only the thing made from bronze is there in reality, and the image object signifies something else.

(Indeed, does the image-object apprehension as such belong essentially to image consciousness? Can I not say: The material of sensation is immediately apprehended there as re-presenting the subject? No, that won’t do.)

Hence the “nonpresence” of the image object signifies: It appears as present, but is a *semblance*. It is not compatible with what is actually present: It is mixed with the latter; it is filled with contradiction (with conflict).

In the case of the “phantasy image,” however, we have no appearing present and thus no contradiction with the actual present. The phantasy is not mixed into what is actual but forms a realm of its own, the realm of shadows. I leave behind the ground of given fact and soar into an airy realm, transplanting myself into the “world of phantasies,” of memories, of imaginings. In the case of the physical image, I have an intermingling action of two perceptual apprehensions, a permeating with conflict. Not so in the case of the phantasy image. Here we have nothing in the way of permeation. We do not have the same material of sensation undergoing manifold apprehension;[5] we do not have the

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[5] When the same material of sensation undergoes manifold apprehension, the interpenetrating perceptions *necessarily* give rise to conflict, with the sole exception of the case in which the corresponding objects stand in the relationship of whole and
appearing of something within the solid world of the present. (Physical image objects are semblance things of exactly the same sort as sensuous semblance, the bent stick, etc. — mirror images as well — to the extent that in the latter cases there is any consciousness of conflict on hand at all, specifically, any sensuous-actual consciousness of conflict.) The sensory and perceptual reality, the actual present, is one thing, and the phantasy world is another. As soon as I turn toward the latter, the former is gone, evaporated, with the exception of empty intentions or faint, floating shadow images. But one thing is certain: there is no conflict in the genuine sense here. And I repeat: Difficulties pertaining to perceiving or to the focusing of one’s attention on perceived objects while simultaneously phantasying I find above all in the field of vision, not in the field of hearing. I present a waltz to myself, and simultaneously I hear the ticking of the clock, voices from the next room, and so on.

I also find no important difficulty in connection with the sense of touch, though one would have to establish precise examples. Furthermore, in the case of ordinary external perception: I supplement what is seen, often by means of phantasies that refer to the unseen sides of the object and even by phantasies of touch, and so on. Of course, I believe that, inspected more closely, precisely corresponding fields of touch cannot be filled out simultaneously as fields of sensation and as phantasy fields: this can only happen in conscious succession, just as in the case of the field of vision. If I focus my attention on a place that I see distinctly and if I simultaneously hold firmly in consciousness a phantasy that pertains to this place, then I am able to find nothing but the phantasy image in competition and <in> partial coincidence. This is something one must heed, therefore. One must consider the corresponding parts of the sense fields. Present and not present can be combined here only in the form of succession.

If we break off further investigation, the following is nevertheless certain: The physical image is a perceptual object, standing in rank and file with other perceptual objects; it belongs to perception’s field part, and in a part-relationship (partial coincidence) of whatever sort. If both perceptions have coinciding — totally coinciding — material of sensation, conflict necessarily occurs.

6 Perhaps there is something similar in the field of hearing. A melody forms a partial field. Then I cannot simultaneously present anything conflicting with it. At the same time, however, I can represent a noise, etc.
of regard. It turns into an image through conflict, through double per-
ceptual apprehension of the same sensation foundation, in the course
of which one apprehension belongs to the unity of the perceptual ap-
prehension of the total field of regard and the other conflicts with it.
Moreover, the physical image re-presents. It is something appearing
as present, but it re-presents something not now. It often also excites
one to present the latter by means of a different kind of presentation,
which gives to the object the character of the not now, of the not actu-
ally there. The “phantasy image,” however, belongs in another world.

We must note: There are also genuine image presentations in phan-
tasy. For example, I produce an image of Caesar for myself, and so
on. This is not a proper presentation of Caesar, not a direct object-
consciousness of him as someone who is not present. Not a “memory”
of him.7 On the contrary, it is a phantasy presentation (a presentation
of someone who is not present), which presents an object (a nonpre-
sent object) that, for its part, “presents” Caesar, traces out an image
of him. This is a genuine image presentation. I “know” that the image
is not Caesar but only presents Caesar to me as a more or less satis-
factory analogue. Of course, the extent to which and the respects in
which the presentation is like the object is not entirely indeterminate
(perhaps it conforms to pictures I have seen; these moments of the
physical image are then the ones that serve me).8

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Here we have multiple kinds of imaging.9

1) I take “Sacred Love” (a charming little advertising image for
“Masterpieces” lies before me) as a picture of the large reproduction
in “Masterpieces,” which, of course, is itself a reproduction of Titian’s
picture. This is supposed to give me a “representation” of the excellent

7 Or the artist traces out his picture in advance in phantasy: He presents to himself
the death of Caesar — .
8 Memory of our photograph of the Madonna — and memory of the Dresden Madonna
itself.
9 The following text is related to the paragraph, reproduced earlier, beginning with
the words: “Here I could say: It represents Titian’s picture” (p. 178, 6). Cf. the critical
notes to Husserliana XXIII, p. 641. — Editor’s note.
reproduction in “Masterpieces.” Here an image is the image of another image; it is not the image in individuo and not the physical image of another physical image in individuo. We surely have imaging here: the physical image, as generally arranged in such and such a way and offering the consciousness of such and such an image object and of such and such an image subject, re-presents to me in general a physical image with a different image object and image consciousness. And the latter is then the subject. In just this way, [if I have an] image of Titian’s picture (directly), then Titian’s picture is the object.

2) I immerse myself visually in sacred love and do not “think” at all of Titian’s picture (the original); rather, I am related to it as if the Titian itself were there. Then the subject is precisely sacred love, this glorious, superterrestrial female figure, and so on. Here we have an entirely different consciousness than we previously had.

In 1) we have external re-presentation in addition to internal representation. Properly speaking, what is expected here is that we should produce for ourselves (following the analogy of the intuition of the image that is given) a representation of what is not present. We are pointed to another representation, another intuition, which is what is properly meant. We have a “reduced” depictive image, a colorless depiction “in place of” a colored depiction, a photograph instead of a painting or marble sculpture, and so on. If we were to sketch out a phantasy image following the directions furnished by this depiction, we would apprehend the phantasy image as a more authentic representation of the subject. Here we have an image of the same sort as, for example, the depictive image of a strange flint ax or of a city, and so on. Every photograph of a human being belongs here as well.

These are inauthentic representations, though on the basis of images. The imaging consciousness is connected with intentions that refer to an object that is different from the object appearing in the image object and stands to it in certain characteristic relations, which, in addition, can serve to establish another representation, more direct and more authentic. We do best to say depictions, representation by means of more or less imperfect copies or depictions. (Hence copies of pictures belong here as well.)

How do matters stand in 2)? Is Titian’s work a depictive being and a making present by means of depiction? We distinguish between image and subject. But is the “subject” an object that is re-presented
by the image understood as a *depictive image*, which is supposed to serve as the foundation for an inauthentic representation relating to the object? Does another intuition give a more authentic presentation of what is meant in aesthetic image-consciousness? Would I have a more authentic presentation if I were to present the object as the object itself and from all sides...? Of the object certainly, but that would not be a fulfillment of the image intention. The interest here is not directed toward the object as such, toward its being presented as such, but toward the object’s *exhibiting of itself in the image object*. Toward the image object so far as and inasmuch as and just as it makes the subject intuited. I see the subject in the image object. Living in its analogizing traits, I have an intuition, an analogical consciousness of the object; and it interests me just as I have it there, precisely as it “appears,” exhibits itself, there. My interest is in the exhibiting of the object and not in the object. Every depiction contains an image consciousness, an exhibiting in which I have analogical consciousness of the object; but this exhibiting serves as the foundation for an indirect representing.

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Note\(^{10}\)

Titian’s picture represents to me sacred and profane love. From a definite standpoint. For this standpoint there is a representation such that a feeling of inauthenticity with respect to what is presented does not come up at all. What interests me in this case is there; it is not indirectly represented.

The image does not have the function of representing something “else.” What does that mean? It is not supposed “to remind me of something else” and to represent it indirectly by means of resemblance and other relations. But this is still not enough to clarify things!

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\(^{10}\) The text of this note (up to p. 187, 24) relates to the arguments starting on p. 182, 22 and running to p. 184, 18. Cf. the critical notes to the text, p. 641. — Editor’s note.
In any event, consciousness of agreement and consciousness of conflict blend in the image. What is resembling is re-presented in what resembles it; it is the same. In what does not resemble it, it is something different. If the resemblance is slight — sufficient to bring to mind what resembles but not to see what resembles in it — then the image operates entirely as a symbol. The meaning is directed toward something else; it brings something to mind, and what it brings to mind is what is meant. The name, too, brings the person to mind, just as a rough and unfaithful silhouette does. And the latter can also serve as a symbol (hieroglyph), perhaps on the basis of an agreement, of a voluntary stipulation (I choose to use it as a hieroglyphic sign, as a mark of resemblance, as a memory sign by means of resemblance). Then the characteristic of pointing fastens to the sign; it is not the sign but what is signified that is supposed to be meant. Not only does the act of meaning aim at what is signified, but the sign also sensibly possesses the tendency to push the meaning away from itself and toward what is signified. Phenomenologically, therefore, something indeed fastens to the sign; when we focus our attention on it, we notice that it has the function of the sign. It is supposed to function as the bearer of an intention, of an attentive act of meaning that aims at something else; it is not supposed to be taken independently, by itself.

A resemblance-symbol also has this property. What is meant is not what appears but something else. It is the latter that is supposed to be meant; the “image” has, sensibly, the character of a sign. By means of resemblance and other relations combined with it, it is supposed to represent something other than what appears in it itself (the image object). The meaning aims at something else; the consciousness of resemblance that is excited is supposed to signify something else. What resembles points, as a sign, to what it resembles. I look at this small advertising reproduction of the Pieta of Fra Bartolomeo. I grasp the image at one glance. The consciousness of agreement does not fill me. I do not live in the image; on the contrary, I feel pulled outward. I experience the image as a sign for the original, which I have seen at an earlier time. The meaning is not inherent in the image; rather, it is inherent in a second meaning-consciousness grounded on the image consciousness and connected with the image consciousness in the way in which a symbol and an intention that points beyond it are connected.
The consciousness of resemblance can be wholly subordinated in such cases. Thus, for example, in the case of a silhouette that gives a rough indication of something — say, in the catalogue of a publisher of artistic reproductions (Nonny). Here the resemblance operates only symbolically, only as signifying. Likewise onomatopoeic words. As long as the resemblance is still felt.

The situation is otherwise when the agreement is thoroughgoing and the consciousness of it is dominant. The more we immerse ourselves visually in the image (the image object), and in doing so focus our attention on the moments of agreement, on the analogizing moments, the less the relation to the object is an external one, pointing away from the image object. The symbolic relation points away from the symbol object to what is symbolized. A new intention is there, often an empty one, though one that also often changes into a filled intention. We then have, in addition to the symbol representation, a second presentation, the presentation of what is symbolized, connected in such a way that the symbol object points to what is symbolized, [which is now] given in appearance. So it is also in the case of images functioning symbolically. The immanent image-consciousness — that is, the consciousness in which the image functions as the immanent representation of the object and not as a symbol, not as an external (transcendent) representation — is characterized by the fact that the representation of the subject is not a second representation in addition to the representation of the image object and joined with the latter through a symbolic connection; rather, it is a representation that permeates the representation of the image object and partially coincides with it. When the subject does not coincide internally with the image object, the consciousness of difference does indeed occur; it disappears, however, when the interest lives in the moments of agreement.

We see the subject in them, in them we have a “representation,” an intuitive presentation of the subject. What differs presents nothing in the object; it does not signify anything either. What resembles, while it presents, may — and will — at the same time contain intentions of an external sort aimed at what is connected with them but not exhibited. Precisely these conflict with what appears intuitively in the image object. But for just this reason, signification, and so on, is excluded.

Better than in the lectures.
Why do we so often not feel the conflict? As a rule, it does not even emerge.

The image in the steel engraving has a double conflict: conflict with the physical present and conflict with the subject. Both can emerge when we join the apprehensions in question with our own intentions. Otherwise, the conflict is not sensed as the “[being] different.” If our interest is directed specifically toward the color, or also toward the color, then we feel the colorlessness of the engraving as an absence. We cannot carry the colors into the image, since it offers the appearance of a sensuous present. We can only form a new appearance in phantasy, produce a reproduction of the subject: We must therefore go outside; we must leave the image behind. As long as we live in the immanent image-consciousness, we live in the intuition of the image object, but not as if the image object signified nothing else. On the contrary, we live in it in such a way that we experience the resembling traits as resembling, as exhibiting, and see the subject in them, while the rest of the moments belonging to the image (to the image object) do indeed appear but are not accepted as being true of the image subject.

If the image function is interwoven with the depictive function and the externally, indirectly representing function, the consciousness is directed inward and then again outward. The image makes the object intuitable, re-presents it; and then again it stands before me as pointing toward the object, toward what is to be represented in another place.

* * *

Reflection on the image of Fechner

If I look into [the photograph], I see Fechner in the image (after the manner of a presented partial bust). I see the photographic tints. But while I see Fechner himself in the plastic form with respect to his shape, I do not see Fechner in the photographic tints. I am always turned toward the person, the presented person. The white is accepted by me as the white of his hair, but the face is not accepted by me as far as its color is concerned. His eyeglasses are taken by me to
be eyeglasses; I see something else into what is sensed. In strictness, of course, I cannot do this. Phantasying does not take place. But the sensed is meant; it obtrudes in conflict with the false colors, as a conflict intention or as an intention that does not accept the colors as an analogical presentation, while the plastic form is immediately “accepted.” Here, therefore, we have an internal re-presentation as opposed to the external re-presentation that pushes outward toward another exhibiting, toward another appearance, as ordinarily happens in the case of a poor image or of an image designed to be a symbol and functioning as a symbol. The image can bring something to mind externally, something resembling it — perhaps the object with respect to the part of it that is presented, perhaps the whole object, all the situations in which it belongs. The image can habitually or conventionally have the function (and be felt by us to be charged with the function) of doing this. It can operate in this way by chance as well; and in that case, too, the image appears, phenomenologically, as that which brings something to mind. This, however, is not immanent re-presentation, which can be combined with transcendent re-presentation but does not have to be. Up to a certain degree, some immanent re-presentation is present even in the case of the worst image, even when the image is charged with an intention directed outward, with a transcendent re-presentation, with a symbolic though analogical re-presentation.

It is true of every immanent image-contemplation that phantasy images may arise and serve for clarification, producing the consciousness “It is this” or “It is thus”; contemplation, however, again and again returns to the image.

The intention aims at Fechner: hence, when anything about him appears in full intuition (his color, voice, movement, entire figure), the consciousness of fulfillment is given immediately. To the extent that the image actually presents him adequately (or adequately for my sensing), to that extent I see him in the image. But to the extent that the image does not present him adequately, to that extent the image obviously does not suffice — I am pointed beyond what appears in the image. In that case, however, the intention aims at the substitute, the supplement, or at the improvement and corresponding modification of the image moments while the residual image is kept in mind. These are moments. In the case of a transcendent image-function, the whole
image points me to something else, to a “phantasy image,” a more complete phantasy intuition, a memory in which I would have a more adequate intuitive consciousness of the object.

* * *

Multiple imaging

1) The engraving as image of the original: The original is the Madonna in Dresden.

2) The engraving as image: I immerse myself in it visually and have the image of the Madonna. Original = Madonna.

1) Likewise the reproduction of a sonata by the piano player and the sonata itself. The original is the sonata just as Beethoven meant it. Or rather, as the person who brings about this image consciousness apperceives the sonata as the sonata meant by Beethoven.

2) The sonata as an expression of such and such feelings, moods (music as expression).

Everyone has his ideal Beethoven. Every artist interprets him differently. One artist, hearing another artist’s interpretation, takes it as a good or bad, adequate or inadequate image of his own Beethoven, of his own interpretation. Perhaps in his own performance he will fall short of his interpretation. He fails to bring out this or that passage as he intends.

An adequate image; that is, in the case of images of images, an image that is a perfect copy of the original image such that the image apprehension could no longer feel any duality at all and therefore image apprehension could no longer occur.

But now, owing to the empirical experience of the conflict of the representations with the original image, or owing to the knowledge (gotten by study) that more lies hidden behind the work, and so on, we will establish the following standard for every representation: We have an intention excited by each such representation, hence we grasp each as an intention aimed at the original. This intention can be fulfilled perfectly by the representation: the perception of the original; or it can not be fulfilled perfectly. Mere image intention, mere representation,
now a bad representation, and so on. Wish and expectation exist here, hence disappointment and conflict.

In the case of paintings: The images of paintings can be adequate if, say, the image intends to be the image only of the plastic form. In this respect we have perception; we have fulfillment of the intention. Or we have no intention relating to the plastic form that remains unfulfilled. In spite of that, we only have an image: since the grey indeed does not intend to be an image (has no analogizing function), although, on the other hand, it surely does intend to be an intention aimed at the original. Namely: colors, “certain” colors, belong to the original. Thus we see the original in the image according to one side—a seeing, a having of fulfilled intentions, but not a perceiving, since it is a question of moments that are combined with other moments that have not been granted the favor of fulfillment.

Comparison of the performance with the ideal (“How Beethoven himself conceived of the Sonata,” or how it “should” be played).

Ideally: I study the Sonata: Demands that the parts of the aesthetic whole reciprocally exert — this would correspond to the knowledge of the subject of the work and of its aesthetic presentation in these tonal structures. As in the case of any art work, “absorption” is needed in order to produce the interpretation adequate to it. What did the artist intend to present, and how did he intend to present it? What feelings did he want to excite, and so on? But not abstract reflection. In itself, every aesthetic apperception is ambiguous. Which interpretation is the appropriate one? Which attitude toward the image, which mood, and so on? Understanding the image yields this.

On the other hand, repetitions of the image; that is, another manifold of different, more or less faithful repetitions. In music: The repetition, the replaying and replaying. And the correct playing, corresponding to the understanding. Then the different sorts of repetition, more or less adequate (corresponding to the different sorts of reproduction of the images). Comparison with the idea: If the name “Sonata x” is mentioned, or if perhaps the first measures heard, then the idea is awakened (the intention aimed at the sonata in the sense of the understanding I have acquired by studying it), and the reproduction is compared with it: very much as a woodcut is compared with the idea of the image itself. Coinciding and conflict.
APPENDIX X (to §§ 42f.)

<CLEAR AND UNCLEAR PHANTASY IN CONTRAST TO PHYSICAL IMAGING>

<probably 1905>

And yet\(^1\) the situation is entirely different from what it is in the case of the ordinary contemplation of an image.\(^2\) In the latter case, we contemplate the image object; and this is first taken to represent something, to be an image of something else.\(^3\) This something else is excited dispositionally and pushes itself into prominence, often in the form of phantasy presentations, if we are acquainted with it, and perhaps only with respect to certain moments: This hair is blond (the appearing grey deputizes for the blond, and so on).

In phantasy, however, what appears is not accepted as something else. \([\text{We do}] \text{ not first [have] something appearing, and then, based on what is appearing, acceptance of something else.}\)

In phantasy we have not constituted an image object that, differentiated for intentional experience from what is meant, would exhibit the latter.\(^4\) In ordinary imaging, we contemplate the image, a full phenomenal object, which is also meant, although not meant as the final target. It is meant inasmuch as it exhibits. It is meant precisely inasmuch as it is supposed to be a depictive image.

In phantasy, however, it is otherwise. We have different cases here.

1) The phantasy appearance is a clear, fully elaborated appearance. For example, if I think of the rathskeller or of the loggia of our town

\(^1\) The text of this and the following two paragraphs, as well as the accompanying notes, was crossed out later; presumably only the text following them was supposed to be worked out. — Editor’s note.

\(^2\) Inserted somewhat later above the line: “in the depictive image-apprehension [Abbild-Auffassung].” — Editor’s note.

\(^3\) This is true only of the depictive, symbolic function.

\(^4\) Yes, if the phantasy presentation is perfect! Otherwise we have an image consciousness that is aware of or can be aware of its difference from the object meant.
hall, “I see it before me.” And I look at it. Here I do not have the sort
of consciousness in which I contemplate the “image” and accept it as
the image of something else. On the contrary: This is the thing itself.
The appearance brings the thing itself to consciousness for me, only
the thing is not something present.⁵

2) If the phantasy appearance is imperfect, if it is incompletely
sketched out with padding of “one knows not what,” if it is unstable,
its colors emerging and again disappearing, or if one does not really
know what color it has, if only isolated parts emerge with proper
color, and so on, the intention nevertheless aims at an object in a
direct way. One does not consider the image to be an object consti-
tuted in its own right that one takes to be independently existing and
then accepts as an image. Rather, throughout this peculiarly volatile
appearance the intention aims at the thing itself in a manner similar
to that in which one apprehends an object in an obscure perception
at twilight, but does not take the perception by itself and make it into
an image.⁶ We can heed the appearance, we can constitute an image
object and say that the thing now appears in this way and now appears
in a different way and that this appearance presents the thing itself
to me. Hence the reference to a phantasy image. (Moreover, we even
speak of a perceptual image, if we put the appearing side and the
single appearance in relation to the identical thing itself. But these
are only indirect and analogical ways of speaking.) In the experi-
ence itself, however, we have not constituted a double objectivity and
have not built one act of meaning on another act of meaning, one
apprehending on another apprehending.⁷ In physical imaging a grey

⁵ And not to mention the consciousness of coinciding (of adequate coinciding) be-
longing to the intention — the image can be clear and yet there can be no such
consciousness.

⁶ With “does not take [the perception] by itself and make it into an image” in the last
sentence, the reverse side in the original manuscript begins. Husserl later placed an
arrow pointed downward at the top of the page and noted: “The text is noteworthy
and nicely done. The marginal notes do not seem very cogent.” These notes are
reproduced here in footnotes. Cf. the critical notes to Husserliana XXIII. — Editor’s
note.

⁷ ([which would be the case with] a re-presenting apprehending, a representant, a
depictive image, a symbol).
thing appears, which presents something colored. I see the grey thing; I see, as it were, something grey. The image object is grey, has become constituted with the grey.

Grey may be there in the phantasy. No grey thing appears, however. The grey spreads itself out within the contours (to the extent that the contours are not so unstable that they escape my grasp). But this grey is not objectivated into a grey thing that I would contemplate. It is an obscure background through which the contours shine but which is not objectivated. The phantasy meaning is directed toward the thing itself, and what flutters by is its basis, a basis in resemblance: what resembles is grasped in what resembles it. It is difficult to make assertions here. I think of our reception room. The picture by Brentano, the reproductions of works of art installed there. Well, it is these I have in view. Not other things that only have a signification to them, even if that relation is in the mode of image representation, of exhibition.

Certainly this is a firm distinction. In physical image contemplation we do indeed have conflict in the perceptual field of regard. There, two intentions overlap. In phantasy, either we have full intuition — then we do not have image consciousness proper but a direct consciousness of the object, although of “something not present” — or we have

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8 (Certainly if I carry out the depictive image apprehension, which, of course, I can always do. The situation is different, however, if I live in the image consciousness, simply immersing myself in it visually, if I live in imagining proper and not in a re-presentation based on it that perhaps leads to a new imagining.)

9 (and then re-presents as depictive image).

10 So too, certainly, in purely imaginative consciousness, in being visually absorbed in the physical image.

11 I live purely in the intention aimed at the object. In the case of aesthetic image-contemplation, however, my interest is directed toward the image object itself just as it exhibits the image subject.

12 No sort of presentational act of meaning is directed at what appears just as it appears, but only at the subject meant.


14 Gegenstand, referring to the phantasied object, such as the picture of Brentano in the reception room. — Translator’s note.
the intention aimed at the object\textsuperscript{15} and those “shadows” that do not bring about \textit{stable} image objects, that perhaps bring about a depictive image-consciousness or an intuitive image-consciousness mingled with conflict. Except in certain cases when we do indeed have full phantasy-appearances but do not know whether the person is blond or not, and therefore have intentions involving indeterminacy.

Now how do those “shadows” function? They are “vaguely” mutable, unstable, frequently changing appearances, indeterminate in many ways — with respect to color, and so on. The object appears in them, only indistinctly, “imperfectly,” “indeterminately.” As if through a veil, a mist, as if in twilight. In the case of the physical image, what does not analogize is stable and clear. Hence the image object forces itself upon one as homogeneous, at least superficially. Properly speaking, the image object becomes constituted only when one’s interest is directed toward it. In the case of the shadows, no stable unity can be formed. The object intention runs through the analogical moments. The image object does not become constituted as a clear, stable unity.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Objekt}, meaning in this case the phantasy image or appearance, not the phantasied object. — Translator’s note.
APPENDIX XI (to § 45)

<VACILLATION OVER WHETHER I AM PHANTASYING OR PERCEIVING>

<around 1905>

Perception’s field of regard is a coherent whole; corresponding to it is the coherent whole of sensation’s field of regard, the nexus of the field of sensuous sensations. What exists in this coherent whole of perception’s field of regard, as far as its content of apprehension is concerned, is sensation, which, in being apprehended, is perception. But then vacillation over whether I am phantasying or perceiving sometimes occurs. Specifically, in the presence of weak sensations. Here we have intermittency. The field of regard fluctuates with respect to its content. If I vacillate over whether the stroke of the clock is heard or imagined, then I vacillate over whether it is an “actual” or imagined stroke. Here we have the apprehension content in the field of sensation, just as we do in a hallucination. We do not have a phantasm, something severed from the nexus of sensations (and, as a phantasm, necessarily severed from it).

But surely one could say: In the case of very weak sensations, it is certainly possible to detach the sensation from the field of sensation (it does not find a place for itself within the field with certainty) and to assign it to a phantasy. Conversely, in the case of certain phantasms it is possible to fit them into the field of sensation. Normally we have a separation, although in certain limit cases we do have partial coinciding. A tone sounds: Do I still hear it (the ticking of the clock)? We have similar situations in phantasy as well: The intermittency of the “images” and the doubt: Do I still have the phantasy image? The intention aimed at the object is continually there; the image fluctuates back and forth. We believe that we still have it. But we are not quite sure. “Am I only imagining that I still have the phantasy image?” This imagining is not phantasying, of course. We must certainly take note of that.
Let us return to the case of the sounding tone. Do I still hear it? Here it is doubtful whether we still have anything at all, whether sensation or phantasm. Despite the intermittency of the sensation, the intention abides. When the sensation slips away, however, we surely cannot say that a phantasm has taken its place.

When we believe that we are hearing a stroke of the clock, we have sensation and perception. If we suddenly doubt whether we are hearing it, we can very well continue to have the sensation, the same sensuous content. However, we are in doubt about whether or not it is a subjective appearance (a hallucination) to which nothing corresponds objectively.
APPENDIX XII (to § 37 and §§ 51f.)

<SENSATION — PHANTASM AND THE "APPREHENSIONS" ESSENTIAL TO THEM>¹
<probably 1904/05>

We can apprehend the phantasms as well as the phantasy presentations as present. The Roons now hovers before me. I perceive the phantasy presentation. The phantasy contents are also present, although naturally not the phantasied contents.

The phantasy judgment is present, only it is not an actual judgment.

I “do not actually believe”; I present an act of believing.

If we assume an original distinction between sensation and phantasm, then it is not just the apprehension of something as not present that determines the modification; on the contrary, the content itself is a “modified content.” In ordinary external imaging, unmodified contents serve in a phantasy function. In that case, of course, the contents are taken twice — once in a perceptual function, and then something present appears in them; and at the same time in a phantasy function, and then something not present is re-presented: it is made intuitable in the external image. In the case of phantasy imaging on the basis of phantasms, hence in the case of phantasy proper, phantasms do not serve in a perceptual function. However, they can do so insofar as the phantasm can be regarded as something present.² In this case, however, the phantasm is necessarily also apprehended as something not present. Its phantasy function is there; the phantasy is present in the same sense in which a perception, an actual judgment, or any other actual psychic experience is present. The phantasy presentation is not itself a phantasm. The phantasm, however, is a part of the presentation. Is it a self-sufficient part? Can the phantasm exist without serving as the ground for a phantasy presentation? One could

¹ (Only for aporetic presentation).
² There’s the catch.
likewise ask: Can the sensation exist without serving as the ground for a perceptual apprehension? If a sensation is apprehended, it is necessarily apprehended in the form of a perceptual apprehension. The most that it can then support in addition is a phantasy apprehension in the form of a mediate imaging (of a permeating imaging). — If a phantasm is apprehended, it is necessarily apprehended in the form of a phantasy apprehension. The most that it can then support in addition is a perceptual apprehension; that is, the apprehension of the phantasm as something present in phantasy consciousness. In the first case, the perceptual consciousness serves as the foundation for a phantasy consciousness; here the phantasy consciousness serves <as> the foundation for a perceptual consciousness. Mediacy exists in both cases. Concrete perceptual consciousness, the perceptual apprehension, constitutes a perceptual object that serves as an image. However, this happens in such a way that the sensations, which essentially support a perceptual function, at the same time and nonessentially support a phantasy function. But this presupposes that the perceptual apprehension has already been carried out. On the other side: The same sensuous contents that essentially support a phantasy function at the same time and nonessentially support a perceptual function: The perceptual function presupposes that the phantasy apprehension has been carried out and has been taken to be present as a whole.

Or: sensations can also be modified, can be apprehended in the manner peculiar to phantasy. But they can be apprehended as “phantasy representants” only in a whole of consciousness that apprehends them first as sensations, as perceptual representants. Their acceptance as not present presupposes their acceptance as present. The acceptance of the phantasms as present, however, presupposes their acceptance as not present. These, then, are essential differences between sensations and phantasms. Sensations can undergo only one sort of immediate apprehension and characterization: apprehension and characterization as concretely present. Phantasms can undergo only one sort of immediate apprehension and characterization: apprehension and characterization as not present. It belongs to the essence of “what is actual” (the sensation) that it is first of all called to be accepted, to exist, in its own right, and only then possibly to exhibit something else.
It belongs to the essence of the content in phantasy that it is first of all called to be accepted as something else, and then it can also be accepted as something in its own right, which, however, is then charged with the exhibiting function.

We must consider whether phantasms not only ground the possibility of functioning as contents of apprehension for phantasy, but also whether they always necessarily carry this function with them. Whereas this is not the case as far as the analogue involving perception is concerned (except perhaps in the case of sensation).

Or should we say:\(^3\) There is consciousness of all the contents, all are “contents of consciousness.” However, consciousness in the sense of the “act of meaning,” of the primary act of meaning, of the meaning of the background, and so on, is not needed for this. There would then be “consciousness” of all the apprehensions and meanings, but that would not mean that they themselves would be meant. The simple consciousness of a content would not be an act of apprehending that means something. But should one say that every content is apprehended as the content itself or as something else, and that the act of meaning follows after this?

What is this “consciousness”? If it is a characteristic, then we ask: Is there consciousness of this characteristic in turn, and is it therefore again the bearer of the “consciousness”-characteristic, and so *in infinitum*?

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Inspection of the essential division between sensations and phantasms and at the same time of the division between the two modes of consciousness, presentation and re-presentation. Sensations can only undergo the first apprehension; phantasms can only undergo the second.

There is an argument, which I had not encountered before, that speaks in favor of the latter position. If what functions as sensation and what functions as phantasm, that is, if what stands in the function

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\(^3\) The text of this and of the following paragraph was later placed in square brackets and crossed out diagonally. — Editor’s note.
of presentation and of re-presentation, were to depend only on acci-
dental psychological grounds while no essential support for either [166]
apprehension would be inherent in the contents functioning in this
way, then it would certainly also only be an accident, perhaps of our
“psychic organization,” that the actual experiences that make up the
unity of our consciousness are concretely present and therefore real-
ities.

It is conceivable that all of the contents whatsoever in a conscious-
ness would be apprehended as phantasms; in that case, an exclu-
sively phantasying and nonperceiving consciousness would be con-
ceivable. … But might there not also be disadvantages inherent in
this?

Hence, according to its essence, everything that is really experi-
enced, everything that makes up the unity of consciousness, cannot
be apprehended otherwise than as something given, as something
concretely present.4

But then what about the so-called “phantasms,” the modified ex-
periences, the sense phantasms, the modifications of judgments,
feelings, and so on? Do they not also belong to the unity of con-
sciousness? Certainly, in their modifications.

4 The last sentence was later changed as follows: “According to its essence, everything
that is really experienced, everything that makes up the unity of consciousness, must
be apprehensible as something given, as something present.” — Editor’s note.
APPENDIX XIII (to § 37 and to Chapter 9)

PHANTASMS AND SENSATIONS AS PERCEPTUAL OBJECTS AND AS APPREHENSION CONTENTS OF PERCEPTIONS (OR, RESPECTIVELY, OF IMAGE PRESENTATIONS AND OF PHANTASY PRESENTATIONS, MEMORIES)>^{12}

(transcript and more precise statement of some notes from 1905)

Question: Are phantasms contents that appear as present? A peculiar question.

Can they appear as present? If what is phantasied does not appear as present, does not the phantasm likewise appear as nonpresent?^{3}

What about the case of perception in this respect? The sensation appears as now; the perceptual object also appears as now. To go further, what about the case of image presentation; for example, of a photographic image in which something not now, an earlier situation, is presented? Here the apprehension contents are again sensations. They constitute an image object that appears as present, and the latter exhibits what is not present — in this case, what is past. It “brings something to mind.” In phantasy, no present image object becomes constituted. There is nothing present in phantasy that “brings to mind” something not present. Naturally, this is true of phantasy in the widest sense, including memorial presentation. In a memorial presentation, does something present lie within view (does something present appear) that “brings to mind” something that is not present?

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1 Also treats image presentation and phantasy presentation.
2 Good presentation of the older conception, which views the phantasm as something experienced that undergoes apperception into something that is not there itself. Obviously untenable substantively.
3 Obviously.
Certainly we must work this out with greater precision:

If I execute an image apprehension (always in the proper sense: in the sense of a physical image), then I am absorbed visually in the resembling features; I live in the consciousness of the object without the image object’s “reminding me of” the object (the subject), consequently without its functioning as a resemblance representant, a resemblance sign. Namely, this is the way it is in the case of immanent contemplation. Only for reflection and transcendent contemplation do image object and image subject become opposed, and only for reflection and transcendent contemplation does the former “recall” the latter, or, when one is not referring to memory (the object is one with which I am not acquainted), exhibit it as resemblance representant. Particularly when the differences are trifling, I see the subject in the image object according to everything that the image object offers in itself in the manner of appearance, apart from external relationships; I see the subject through the image. On the other side, I see imaginatively in the image consciousness that is made possible by differences, at least the differences belonging to the total objective complex of what is concretely present.

We can also say: We live at some moment in symbol consciousness (significational consciousness), which is unexplicated. The resemblance representant is a resemblance representant, but that for which it serves as a representant is not re-presented. And no explicated act of relating to the object meant and re-presented in the phantasy presentation is on hand, and in transcendent contemplation it is on hand. In the case of image presentation, the image object is something that appears as present; the image subject is therefore re-presented in it.

But what about phantasy presentation? Here we do not have something present that re-presents something not present; here we never have something appearing as present (having the function of the image object), something appearing as “there itself.” Here there is nothing to explicate (at least if we take a good, complete phantasy image), for what would do the explicating would again be related to a phantasy image.

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4 Hence this is altogether like the case of significative presenting: explicated and not explicated.
And does this not point to an original distinction between sensations and phantasms?

The phantasm has the original characteristic of “reproduction” or the characteristic of “nonoriginality,” of “not being there” (“Nicht-da”) (compared with sensation).

Sensation and phantasm. The presence of the phantasm

But is the phantasy presentation — the phantasy presentation as a whole, as object of internal perception — not something present, something appearing as present? And is not the phantasm in this phantasy presentation again a now, something present? Should we say: If a sensation (a phenomenological content with the character of originality; specifically, of sensation) is apperceived objectively and in the manner appropriate to a physical thing [dinglich], apperceived as “the appearance of something external,” then an object that appears as present becomes constituted, a perceptual object or a present object, something there itself (perhaps disavowed). If a phantasm is apperceived — specifically, apperceived as a physical thing — then it is necessarily apperceived as a nonpresent physical thing, not there, not present in its own person, but thoroughly “presented” with regard to everything “that it is.”

If phenomenological apperception takes place, however, then the phantasm, just as much as a sensation, is a “this,” a moment of “consciousness” — a real [reelles] moment (in contrast to the symbolic or transcendent moment). And if psychological apperception takes place, the perception, the presentation, the this-apprehension too, and so forth, belong to me, to the empirical Ego; and every real “this” is something psychologically present, having its place in the individual consciousness and thus in objective time. The sensation and

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5 There’s the mistake.
6 “-dinglich” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
7 “physical thing” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
8 The fundamental mistake is to take the “phantasm,” which is “characterized” only as a representant, as something present — against which the statements of the previous page already argue.
9 Then, of course, it is natural to say “here is the great temptation, but this is just untenable.” The “this” is re-presentation of a “this.”
the phantasm exist in objective time: namely, as something existing at this moment or that in objective time and as belonging to an individual consciousness, to an Ego. However, the sensation no more has its position in real = physical nature than the phantasm does. It is not “there” in nature, either actually or supposedly there in actual appearance.

Perhaps one must also append the following: The phantasm is not something self-sufficient; it necessarily supports\(^{10}\) the apperception-characteristic of what is not original. The sensation is not something self-sufficient; it necessarily supports the apperception-characteristic of what is original, of what is present. Namely, every primary content, according to original necessity, is apperceived in the manner of a physical thing (even if at first nothing is said about transcendence through contiguity). However, the consciousness to which this apperception belongs, as soon as it is made into the object of a new consciousness (this belongs to the essence of consciousness), undergoes a new apperception, the “internal” apperception; and this new consciousness has the character of an impression.

The phantasm as apprehension content of the first apperception (of the presentation directed toward it or toward an “external object”) has the characteristic of the not now, of the not there itself.\(^{11}\) This apperception gives it this characteristic.\(^{12}\) And it necessarily has this characteristic in the world that becomes “constituted” by means of this apperception.

However, the phantasm as a component of such apperception has in the new internal apperceptions the characteristic of “the internal present,” “of the internal being now and being there itself,” just like perceptions and presentations and memories and so on taken as a whole. And then there arises in the logical interrelating of both kinds of apperception, in their logical working: a single world, the physical world and the mental world united with it, body and soul, and so on. And then neither sensations nor phantasms have a place in it as physical objects; rather, the physical things that become constituted

\(^{10}\) It “supports”?\(^{11}\) Inserted later: “the idea.” — Editor’s note.\(^{12}\) How can an apperception confer on something experienced the characteristic of the not there itself?
through them have such a place. On the other hand, sensations and phantasms do have their place in the mental complement, in the world of the psychological, as components or foundations of apperceptions and, furthermore, of acts of perceiving, representing, and so forth.
No. 2

<FROM THE THEORY OF RE-PRESENTATION IN PHANTASY AND MEMORY TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF REPRODUCTION OR DOUBLE RE-PRESENTATION>

<texts from approximately 1904 until about 1909, perhaps 1912>

<a> Aporia. <Double apprehension of the same appearance: as phantasy of the perceptual appearance in relation to the actual Ego or as perceptual appearance in relation to the phantasy Ego. Whether or not it belongs to the essence of every phantasy presentation and memorial presentation to present an appearance in re-presentational consciousness. Reflection on phantasy presenting>

<probably 1904>

I transplant myself in phantasy into Hereroland.¹ I dream of the dry deserts, and so forth. These are phantasies. I have no adequate descriptions of this land; at most, I have imperfect descriptions to guide me in my imaginings.

I am now having phantasy appearances; I am having acts of imagination. But at the same time, I “transplant myself there,” into Hereroland; I “see” the bush, I see the wide, dry deserts, . . . I “see.” The objects, the events, do not appear as here and now in the real sense; I am not now having perceptions. I am having phantasies [Vorstellung]. Do I not thereby also have phantasies of perceptions? The events appear as not now, in that the appearances are taken as contents of perceptual experiences, though <of> perceptual experiences that I [171] am not now having but into which I “transplant myself.” It is obvious that it cannot belong to the essence of “phantasy” that I phantasy to myself that I am perceiving — hence the phantasy that I am perceiving A cannot belong to the essence of the phantasy of A. For then an infinite regress would result.

If I am perceiving A, if I am sitting in the rathskeller and looking at my friend Schwarz, for example, must I not also perceive that I am perceiving him? Of course, I will apperceive my friend Schwarz in

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¹ A region in southwest Africa, formerly a German colonial possession. — Translator’s note.
relation to myself, just as I apperceive all external objects in relation
to myself. I will therefore perceive him as sitting across from me,
conversing with me, and so on. At least the spatial location of every
external object in relation to me, to my body, to my head, also belongs to
the apprehension of the object. However, it is not inherent in this
that I necessarily apprehend myself as someone perceiving, hence
as someone performing the perception. I can do that at any time. I
“know” that I have my eyes open; I can state that I am seeing my
friend Schwarz. He can sit across from me without my seeing him. If
I have closed my eyes, if it is dark, and so on. I see him, I have the
perception of my friend sitting across from me; I experience the act of
perceiving, his appearing perceptually. He himself is there in front of
me. My friend’s being there now, himself, is an experiencing that exists
and is my experiencing. It is something included in my experiences,
my mental Ego. All of this occurs again in new perceptions and
in the relationships brought about in perception. If I perceive, I am
turned toward the object, the friend who is situated opposite my body;
and it is evident that where this experience exists, the possibility of
the former reflection and relationships also exists.

Now if I have a representation [Vorstellung], an appearance in phan-
tasy or an intuitive memory (a re-presentation), then in a certain sense
I also see, for example, that my friend is sitting across from me, is
speaking to me. The situation in representation is not different from
the situation in perception: The appearance of the external object is
put into relation to the appearance of my body, which is somehow
more or less clearly co-presented in all phantasy of what is external.
(Specifically, with respect to seeing: chiefly the seeing eye, but not
as an object that one sees itself; rather, as presented by the muscular
sensation of the opened eyes, by sensations of accommodation, and
the like. Facial image of the nose reaching into the field of sight, and
so on.) I also see my hands: They too are put into relation to my head,
to the bodily center of sight.

This center of the physical relation of sight, however, is not itself
presented in this way. To be sure, if I turn my attention toward it, then
I present to myself my head and perhaps even myself as a whole, as
when, for example, I know “myself” in the mirror, through which the

2 Inserted later: “normally.” — Editor’s note.
singular relation of the center of sight to something else then ensues again.

Well good. If I now think back on my lively time with Schwarz in the rathskeller, and, specifically, on how I sat across from him at that precise moment, in that specific situation, I then have a “phantasy” presentation of the whole situation; particularly, a “phantasy” presentation of myself. And just as I can identify a table that I am now seeing with a table that I remember in a phantasy appearance (the location, the look may be changed, however), so I can identify the memory of the Ego with the Ego that is sensed or perceived now. In phantasy, therefore, the object stands over against my Ego (my Ego in a certain phantasied situation, position). Naturally, the perceiving is not phantasied in this process, and yet I can again say: the object appears to the Ego; specifically, in such a way that the Ego perceives the object, has its eyes open, looks at the object in such and such a way, and so on.

Now if I reflect on the act of phantasying, I stand in the present. The act of phantasying finds its place in my actual Ego: It is perceived. The appearing in such and such a way, the hovering before me of the image, and so forth, is something actually perceived and belongs to the sphere of the “psyche.” The “image” of the situation in the rathskeller, of Eugen Schwartz, and so on, hovers before me in just this way. But I can also relate the appearance to the phantasied Ego, not only to the physical Ego but to the mental Ego as well. If I live in phantasy, I live in the image consciousness that embraces intentionally that phantasy Ego and that phantasy object, that phantasy situation. A phantasy consciousness with psychic experiences also belongs to the phantasy Ego, and to these experiences also belongs the appearing of the object standing opposite the Ego, its standing over against the Ego, its factual existing for the Ego itself.

If I relate the phantasy appearance “my friend S” to my perceived Ego, then I have precisely a phantasy appearance. My friend hovers before my perceived Ego; my Ego has an experience of the intuition of my friend, but of an intuition that is not “actually itself the being there of my friend,” not “itself the now standing-over-against,” not itself the being present of the friend, not perceived being. If, however, I relate

3 “Ego” later changed to “phantasy Ego.” — Editor’s note.
the appearance to my phantasied Ego, then it is a psychic experience belonging to this Ego; that is, this Ego can be apprehended as having this appearance. Of course, the phantasied Ego cannot have the present appearance, identically the same appearance. “The phantasied Ego has the appearance”; that is to say, to the phantasying of the former situation there belongs the jointly included possibility that the following is implicated in the mode of phantasy (as an implied assumption): “the having of the appearance must then belong to the phantasied mental Ego.” The phantasy Ego, however, is not the actually present Ego; it is, indeed, identified with the latter, but not in the sense that its phantasy experiences could now be actual experiences. I can phantasy myself “just as I am” in the land of the Moors, but not entirely as I am. Namely, I cannot retain my perceptual surroundings. They really do conflict with my phantasy surroundings. My present field of vision is incompatible with my phantasied field of vision, and so on. This concerns all parts of the content of consciousness that are accepted exclusively in the manner of phantasy but are not now on hand. Surely re-presentational consciousness is possible only in this way.

Now does the imagined Ego also have, in the manner of a phantasy appearance, the appearance that I am presently calling phantasy appearance and that my present Ego has in this manner? If I imagine that I was sitting across from my friend S, it is “implied” in this that I am imagining that I would have the perceptual appearance of my friend himself sitting across from me. The appearance of my friend himself, his sitting opposite me, is itself attributed to the phantasy Ego. The appearance that is understood as re-presentation and not taken as perceptual appearance is attributed to the actually present Ego. The same appearance is apprehended twice. In relation to the phantasy Ego, it is perceptual appearance: I phantasy that “I, existing in such and such a situation, perceive this and that”; that is, in phantasy the appearance is attributed as perception to the phantasy Ego. In relation to the present Ego, it is phantasy of the perceptual appearance, but
as phantasy actually attributed to the present Ego together with the phantasy of the Ego in the former situation.

Does it not belong to the essence of every phantasy presentation that it exhibits an appearance in re-presentational consciousness? To live in this consciousness is to present the object, my friend S, “in phantasy.” To reflect on this consciousness means to look at it, to perceive that this presentation, this phantasy, exists. Now just as the appearing object is a phantasied object (a re-presented object) by virtue of the re-presentational consciousness, and just as the primary contents experienced in this process — the colors, and so on — are representants for the same nonexperienced contents, so also the appearance can necessarily be taken as the re-presentation of a perceptual appearance. To phantasy “my friend Schwarz” does not mean to phantasy the perception of my friend Schwarz. But if I do phantasy him, I can apprehend the phantasy — that is, the appearance that I am now having — as the image of a corresponding perceptual appearance of my friend.

To phantasy X = to phantasy the object X \( \equiv \) to phantasy that X is there, is present \( \equiv \) to phantasy that X is perceived, that X appears in the mode of perception \( \equiv \) to phantasy to oneself that in the present appearance the perceptual appearance of the same object is re-presented.

One can also state it in the following way: To phantasy an A (the town hall, my friend Schwarz) means to make this object hover before me; that is, to make it appear as being there itself\(^6\) (to make it appear, to make it hover before me and \(<\text{to make it appear}> as being there itself are one and the same). Of course, not as now existing, as existing here in my present surroundings! That is something quite different. I can also phantasy something not existing or not presently existing as in this very moment of the now (in the present, existing in the present temporal flow) and in the present surroundings of this room, and so on. Here I experience the actual now and the actual surroundings and phantasy something into them, in conscious conflict with whatever is actually experienced. Living in the phantasy presentation of an A that is not phantasied into my present surroundings in this way, I imagine a now, surroundings, and so forth, without mixing them with my actually experienced surroundings. An object, something appearing itself, is

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\(^6\) “it . . . as being there itself” later changed to “it itself (being there).” — Editor’s note.
represented: I live in the re-presentational consciousness, which is different from the consciousness of the actual now, different from something’s actually being given itself, from something’s actually appearing itself. The object is, as it were, there itself. It is there itself in such and such an appearance, appearing from such and such a side, and so on. However, this appearance is not a perceptual appearance; it is, instead, the re-presentation of a perceptual appearance. The consciousness belonging to phantasy is not perception, but perception “as it were.” The whole consciousness is re-presented and is representant.

I do not simply have sensations as I do in the case of perceptions, the sensations apprehended as <exhibiting> the same object, fashioned into a like appearance. And the difference does not consist merely in the fact that in the one instance an unutterable characteristic “of perception” is there, in the other instance a correlated characteristic of “phantasy.” Rather, I have, on the one hand, the characteristic of the appearance of something itself, on which I can reflect in such a way that I find: The thing is there, it is directly grasped. But the phantasy brings a modification: The thing is not “actually” there, not present now, not actually now and present; I merely have a “re-presentation.”

The town hall only appears as present; it only hovers before me. I have a presentation of the town hall: I have a consciousness of the town hall itself as standing before me. But it is not, after all, actually present. It appears differently from the objects of perception; it appears in the mode of re-presentation. The consciousness of the objectivity itself is now only a similitude, only a representant: I notice that when I focus my attention on the consciousness. “I am presenting to myself in phantasy that I am perceiving the town hall”; hence I am phantasying the perceiving of the town hall, which customarily

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7 (The object appears, the object itself, but as not present now, as in conflict with the present. Its appearing falls into the present, but it itself is characterized as not present or as in a “determination of being” that conflicts with the present. It does not exist in the actual now. Its “present” is a different present, another time-determination; and time bestows individuality.)

8 Inserted later: “that is, appears, when we focus our attention on it, in the mode of the not now.” — Editor’s note.

9 This is misleading; at most one can say the following: The characteristic is not unutterable. In the one case, there is something actually present. The actually given “reality.” In the other case: something not present, something not now.

10 Inserted later: “as if it were existing.” — Editor’s note.
means nothing else <than> that I am imagining the town hall and how I am standing across from it. Then, however, I can reflect on the act of perceiving and take it as a representant or find it as a representant. In the strict sense, to imagine the act of perceiving signifies: “I imagine: I am perceiving.” Then the consciousness of the perceiving of the perceiving belongs to this. I imagine my perceiving of the town hall. I transplant myself into the perceiving of the town hall; I imagine that I am reflecting on it <and> hence would have a perceiving of my act of perceiving. But <I would have> all of this only re-presentationally.

All of this appears with the characterization: not now, not actually present.

Let me disregard all reflection. I represent the following (but do not think of the fact that I am doing so): “The town hall stands before me, I see it.” The quotation marks indicate the modifying consciousness. I can reflect on the “perceiving,” the “seeing,” the “standing before me”; I then grasp the perceiving, the standing before me, and so on, “in phantasy.” But again this is modified. It is accepted only as re-presentationally. I can then bring to consciousness, as something present, all that is in the re-presentational consciousness: I now have the appearance of something facing me, the representation that the town hall stood in front of me, that I contemplated it in phantasy. The whole phantom, as re-presentation, as modification, is brought into relation to the actual, present perceptual consciousness and is really fitted into it as act.

Is it representation of perception? No; it is representation of the object. But if I then want to represent the perception, the consciousness of the object’s being present itself? The re-presentational consciousness, which we call representation (in phantasy) of the object, is not representation of the consciousness of the being there itself of the object, but representation of the being there itself. If I reflect on the re-presentational consciousness, on the act of representing in phantasy, then the re-presentational consciousness is something actually perceived, something now.

If I focus my attention on the phantasy appearance of the town hall, this appearance is something now. I can, however, also apprehend it as the appearance of an appearance that I have had earlier or that I am not having now but into which I phantasy myself as the representant of the actual appearance of the object itself.
To phantasy the perception = to take the object’s appearance, which exists in the phantasy, as the representant (for the perceptual appearance, which, however, is not again presented) and likewise to take the phantasy positing (the modified positing) as the representant for the actual positing.\textsuperscript{11}

The possibility of reflection belongs to the essence of perception: Instead of focusing my attention on the object, I can focus it on the act of perceiving the object, on the appearing of the object itself and on its being believed and taken to be factually existing. There belongs to the essence of phantasy the possibility of focusing my attention not on the object but on the appearing of the object, on the object’s being phantasied as factually existing, on its “being believed in phantasy.” I have the appearance in phantasy just as I have it in perception (in essentials, to be sure, at least in the fully intuitive, very “clear” phantasy), but its “mode” is different. The consciousness is modified.

If the town hall hovers before me, I have “perception”; the town hall stands before me, and it stands before me from such and such a side, in such and such an appearance. The “perception,” however, is not actually perception; “it represents perception.” The whole consciousness, which is almost as it is in actual perception, re-presents the consciousness belonging to actual perception.\textsuperscript{12}

All of this carries over to memory. I do not mean direct memory, primary memory here, but recollection, re-presentational memory.

We also find recollection in phantasy, the word taken in the widest sense. In phantasy in the narrower sense the characteristic of belief is missing, whether entirely or with respect to the phantasied whole. A consciousness of time is implicated throughout. Even if I phantasy a knight in armor fighting a dragon, or a chariot battle at sea, I have a presentation of time. If I do not present the event as in the past, or as phantasied in the surrounding present, I nevertheless present duration, process. I “transplant myself into the perception” of these things and phantasy their now, their temporal present, whether I am

\textsuperscript{11} Presentation of a perception, presentation of an imagining, of an earlier memory, and so on. And in the same way this represented memory can again be a memory of a perception, of a presentation, etc.

\textsuperscript{12} This is “perception” in comparison with “memory”: I now present to myself how I sat in the rathskeller and such and such “phantasies and memories” hovered before me, and how I then became attentive again to my “perceived” surroundings, etc.
also focusing my attention on it or not. These things do not occur in “objective time”; that is, they do not occur in the time of actual things and events, since that is not at all what they are taken to be: They are fictions; their time is likewise fictional.

In memory, what I phantasy I believingly posit in the past; in recollection, what is not now (which is inherent in all phantasy) re-presents a past.

Of course, one can ask here: How does the re-presentation of the past come about? I experience the past in the perception of a succession; I have the past presented intuitively in the recollection of a succession. If, however, I “think back on” a situation, on my visit to Munich’s Pinakothek, for example, and on a particular situation, on my seeing of a specific picture, I do not then intuit any being past.13 Suppose one justifiably makes the association there and says: A passes over into BC — and in doing so, A changes; it undergoes “being shoved back” into the past. In this way, it receives the characteristic of the past. If A again emerges, it excites the order of succession to which it belongs, and above all the past.

This is not satisfactory. For the whole process, as far as I follow it, has the characteristic of the past, even the intuitive past that makes its appearance there. In actual experiencing, the past also becomes something past, of course; every characteristic, even the characteristic of the past, is pushed back. And that is probably the reason why what was said above is not satisfactory.

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We have to distinguish:

1) Presentation of a judgment, of a volition, a feeling, even presentation of a presentation, presentation of a presentation of a presentation, etc.; perception of, intuitive presentation of, symbolic

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13 Inserted later: “but instead a ‘now.’” Probably at the same time, Husserl noted on the margin: “The present memory is executed as consciousness of the past.” — Editor’s note.
presentation of a perception, and such like; intuitive presentation of an intuitive presentation, and so on.

2) The imaginative counterpart, the modification of a judgment, of a feeling, of a volition. The immersing of oneself in a judgment, etc.

We immerse ourselves in the characters of a novel, of a play, and so on, judging, feeling, willing along with them, irrespective of whether we make their judging, etc., into the object of a presenting, a perceiving, an imagining, etc.\(^{14}\) I live in memory: I immerse myself in a past situation — in a conversation with Fitting in Halle, for example — in past judgments, wishes, and so on. Inasmuch as I merely immerse myself in them, I do not actually wish, I do not actually judge. I can now actually judge about the matters of fact belonging to the memory, I can now actually be annoyed about them: whereas at the time I did not judge in that way, was not annoyed in that way; or better: whereas these judgments, these feelings, do not belong within the scope of the memory (in which I am immersing myself). I can also immerse myself in a judgment in memory and now also judge in the same way, also feel in the same way, and so on.\(^{15}\)

In any case, the distinction between the presentation of a judgment in which the judgment is an object, the presentation of a volition in which the volition is an object, and the imaginative judgment, the imaginative volition, and so on, is clear. Or is it unclear?

Is there not a distinction between the presentation of a judgment and the judgment, the actual judgment or the empathized judgment? Between the presentation of a joy and rejoicing, and the empathizing with the rejoicing? Clear examples!

I present to myself how I was angry the other day. Here I surely present the anger and the events as a whole. Is this different from “immersing myself in” something? Does not everything become objective in phantasy? The example is probably somewhat too complicated.

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\(^{14}\) But must we not distinguish the internal sympathizing, or, correlatively, the performing of acts as motivated in the phantasy ground, from mere phantasying without motivation? But are there really phantasy acts without phantasy motivation?

\(^{15}\) To be distinguished: Reproducing and [reproducing] by means of sympathizing or empathizing in the sense that I again bring about the motivation. More is involved in that.
In the actual lived experience of joy, I am turned toward that in which I rejoice, but “sense” the joy. In the actual experience of judging, I am turned toward the matters judged: $S! \text{is} = P$, this ink is bluish. In the actual wish — Would that I were finished with these difficulties! — or in the actual willing (I am intent on solving the problems now mastering me), I am turned toward the things themselves: I will; I do not focus my attention on the willing, do not make it into my object. Is there a distinction between the perception and the perception of the perception, between the judgment and the perception of the judgment, between the wish and the perception of the wish? That is what I am asking. In that case, am I not turned toward the matters I am asking about? Or am I turned toward the question? I am depressed, I am solving nothing — am I then turned toward my displeasure and not toward the matter itself?

This is also true of memory and “phantasy.” I think to myself: I am questioning, I am displeased\(^{16}\) that I am making no progress. I judge, I will, I perceive, I remember.

These differences obtain in the same sense in every case. The actual question — the question in imagination; the actual judgment — the judgment in imagination; the actual wish — the wish in imagination. In place of imagination: memory.

In both cases, I can make the “acts” into objects “whereof or about which.” Nevertheless, there is certainly a distinction here. Hence <I can make an act> into a This, into something referred to, of which something holds good, which is an object to which a questioning then relates, to which a wishing relates. However, I keep the following firmly in mind: When I wish, the wish is not the object I am wishing about; when I judge, the judgment is not the object I am judging about.\(^{17}\)

How, then, can I present a perception in imagination, make it into an object?

1) The perception of $A$
2) Its counterpart: The imagining of $A$
1') The perception of the perception <of> $A$

\(^{16}\)“I am questioning, I am displeased” later changed to: “that I am questioning, that I am displeased.” — Editor’s note.

\(^{17}\) A sheet is missing from the original text at this point. — Editor’s note.
\(\alpha\) The perception of the imagining of A
\(\beta\) The imagining of the perception of A
\(\gamma\) The imagining of the imagining of A

There are four possibilities altogether \((1+3)\).\(^{18}\)

\(\alpha\) Naturally, the imagining of A — for example, the springing forward of a centaur, in the imagining of which I am living straightforwardly — can be objectivated. To bring about the imagining of the centaur (the centaur stands before me in the manner peculiar to phantasy) and to make the imagining into the object of a perception are two very different things.

\(\beta\) What does the imagining of the perception of A signify?

Naturally not the imaginative counterpart of the perception of A. That is simply the imaginative consciousness of A. What is meant, as everywhere, is what is on the right side of the “of”: perception of, imagining of (making into an object). Hence I imagine and in my imagining make the perception of A into an object. If I am having the perception of A, <is it the case, then, that> I cannot make it into the object of an imagining, but only into the object of a perception or of some other impressional act? Can I not imagine that I am not now perceiving this? Indeed, I can imagine that I am perceiving everything else differently, but not this. I can even imagine that I am having this perception (which I actually do have now). Of course, this is an imagining into which this perception does not actually enter; rather, I close my eyes, say, and then imagine that I am perceiving this (which I have just perceived). I can imagine that I am phantasying all of that.

While keeping the perception firmly in mind, however, I cannot carry out any actual imagining of its content. Impression and idea exclude each other in the actual present. But now let us disregard the case in which the perception that I am supposed to be imagining would actually be performed. How does the imagining of a perception look?

I imagine that I am perceiving A.

I phantasy myself into the act of perceiving: Well, the object then simply stands before me in phantasy. The immersing of oneself in the perceiving of the object \(A = \text{phantasying}\); namely, the phantasying

\(^{18}\) Arranged as follows: Perception of 1) <above>, phantasy presentation of 1), perception of 2), Phantasy presentation of 2). Phantasy of must not be confused with modification.
of the object A. But here it is A and not the perception that is the object.

If I make this imagining into an object, I have the perception of the phantasy of A. Now is perceiving that one is phantasying A the same as (having a phantasy presentation of the fact that one is perceiving A? or, since the expression is poor) having a phantasy presentation of the perception of A? But the former is certainly a perception, the latter a phantasy presentation! Let us reflect on it once again. In one case, I perceive the phantasy appearance of A; in the other case, I phantasy the perception of A. A distinction is supposed to be inherent in this. Phantasying the perception of A is not supposed to signify the phantasying of A but the phantasying of the perception of A. The perception of A is the object in the perception of the perception of A. The corresponding counterpart is the phantasy of the perception of A.

I carry out the phantasy of A = the quasi-perception of A. But then I am not carrying out actual reflection on this quasi-perception; that would be perception of the quasi-perception or imagining of A. Rather, I carry out reflection “in phantasy”; that is, I not only imagine A, but I also imagine that I am making the consciousness of A into an object. I imagine the object, the perception of A (the consciousness that gives A). I phantasy a house. I make the phantasying of the house into my object: This is the object, which I call precisely the phantasying of the house. But while I am carrying out this modified consciousness of the house, I can also reflect in modified fashion.

Within modifying activity I can perform all acts of whatever sort — foundational acts, relating, comparing, distinguishing, reflecting acts, and so on — and they are then absolutely and in all respects modified acts. Hence modified reflection derives from actual reflection, and this is the consciousness: “phantasy of the perception of A.” And if in turn I actually reflect on this, then there arises the perception of this phantasy, which finds its conceptual expression precisely in being named “phantasy of the perception of A.”

19 Probably a little later, Husserl crossed out the text in parentheses with a wavy line. — Editor’s note.
20 Inserted somewhat later: “of the.” — Editor’s note.
21 Regarding “reflection in phantasy,” Husserl later noted in the margin: “cf. 3≡”; that is, No. 2c below. — Editor’s note.
22 Inserted somewhat later above “aktuellen”; “wirklichen.” — Editor’s note.
\( \gamma \) Imagining that aims at an imagining of \( A \). Roughly expressed: I imagine that I am imagining \( A \).

I can perceive that I am imagining \( A \) (the perception of an imagining of \( A \)). I can modify this perception just as I can modify any perception.

I cannot modify an imagining of \( A \). However, \(<I\ can\ modify>\) the perception of the imagining. I live in the imagining of a centaur. I imagine that I am carrying out this imagining. For example, I phantasy myself into the following situation: I am traveling in Africa; I rest from my march and give myself up to my phantasies; I think of centaurs and water nymphs in the world of the Greek gods. These phantasies are not taken as present phantasies but as phantasies that are themselves phantasied. Within the phantasy, a distinction is again made between reality and dreams (phantasy).

So far everything is in order. But if we consider the latter situation, does it not contradict the assumption we have made up to now that phantasies of phantasies (modifications of the second degree) are not possible? If I dream myself into the situation in which I dream myself as dreaming, or more distinctly, in which I dream that I am dreaming, must the dreamt dream become an object there? It certainly seems not. (Just as little as images turn into images of images in the activity of imaging.) This must be considered further.

\* \* \*

The imagining of the imagining of \( A \) must not be confused with the modification of the imagining of \( A \).

In the first case, there is a phantasy presentation that has as its object the phantasy presentation of \( A \); in the second case, there is a modification of the phantasy presentation of \( A \) that stands in the same relationship to it as the simple phantasy of \( A \) stands to the simple perception of \( A \).

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23 The text of this and of the following paragraph were added later, probably in 1908/09. — Editor's note.

24 Inserted later: “imaginative.” — Editor's note.
Reflection <and phenomenological reduction> in phantasy

First of all, let us take a look around the more universal sphere of phantasy. If I re-present the house (which, of course, I do not now see) as facing me in phantasy, then I see it “as it were.” My glance wanders up and down; I make a circuit around the house “in phantasy” and see it from all sides. The seeing, however, is not seeing; it is “as if” I were seeing. The house is not actually present and does not “actually” appear as present, and yet it is “present as it were.” The present as it were is the modified present, what is re-presented. So too in a phantasy that is wholly free.\(^5\)

I live in quasi-perception and quasi-perceptual judgments; that is, in the carrying out of phantasy presentations of the house. Having said that, I have phantasied and have reflected on the act of phantasying and compared it with the act of perceiving, with the genuine and proper act of perceiving. But then one must note: Here and now I present the house vis à vis. I can reflect on this living act of re-presentation, analyze it. And, in doing so, I would find that “in phantasy” I let my glance wander up and down, that “in phantasy” I see now this and now that part of the house, now this and now that characteristic of the house. But inherent in this is a surplus that has not yet been described. The house, which is not present, becomes constituted as re-presented, as phantasied, in acts and apprehensions that are given as re-presentations of perceptions and presentations. The house stands before me “as it were”; it hovers before me in the character of phantasy.\(^25\)

If I look at the constituting act, however, I also find a hovering before me of the seeing, of such and such a perceiving of the house, and this perceiving becomes an object for me in reflection.\(^26\)

I can reflect “in phantasy”! That does not mean: If I really reflect on the actually present phantasying, I find that the act-moments and

\(^{25}\) This is not a matter of quality.

\(^{26}\) Here we must add: Included under seeing is

1) going around the house, letting the eye wander up and down, and the like. This belongs in the province of the physical, just as the objective background of the house does, which is also there as co-re-presented;

2) the presenting, the act, the heeding that means the object (while the heeding is not directed toward the background), though “in phantasy.”
apprehensions and meanings themselves again possess the character of re-presentations with respect to the actual moments and apprehensions of the corresponding perception. I can reflect in phantasy and normally always do so in such a way that I do not think at all of the actual, present phantasying — that is, do not make it into my object in actual reflection.

But how am I to understand this reflecting in phantasy, and does not an infinite regress threaten me here? Re-presentation of the house; that is to say, phantasy presentation of the house. The house is my object and [is there] in the mode of phantasy. Now if the act-moments belonging to the act of phantasying were re-presentations in this sense, that would mean that the act of phantasying is not only a presenting of the house but at the same time a presenting of the perceiving of the house, and in both cases in the same sense. The seeing, the perceiving of the house as an act of perceiving would be an object in the act of phantasying. And presenting the house would be possible only by presenting the perceiving of the house; it would consist precisely in that. Now it is clear that this conception — which, by the way, would lead to an infinite regress — does not correspond to the facts. The house is my object in the act of phantasying, not the seeing of the house. Phantasying, however, is brought about as an apprehending that is a modification of original presenting (and, in this sense, of perceiving); specifically, a modification such that the evident warrant exists of seeing in it a re-presentation of the perceiving of the house (that is, of the act of perceiving correlated with the actual being-given of the house). But is it not actually seen in it? Well, in phantasying the house to myself, I present, as my object, precisely the house and not my act of seeing the house. I present the house and do not present to myself that I am seeing the house. And yet the phantasying of the house becomes constituted in apprehensions that are modifications of perceptions.

27 Reflecting in phantasy.
28 If — in phantasying, of course — I present as an object my consciousness of the act of seeing, the consciousness of the having of a house as present, then, to be sure, this phantasied object becomes constituted in an act that can again be apprehended as the “re-presentation” of a perception; namely, of an “internal” perception. Just as I recall a perception (recall that I had a perception, that I had a consciousness of the having of something as present) by empathizing with the fact that I am looking at the perception: hence “presentation” of the internal perception.
such that I can immediately make from them presentations of perceptions, of the perceptions that I would have if I were to perceive this house in precisely parallel unmodified acts and that would actually lie within my internal view were I to reflect on these acts in unmodified internal perception.

Of course, it is also like this in the case of memory. I remember an event: It stands before me in “phantasy” and at the same time in memorial belief as having in fact existed. But not only that: I have perceived the event; it is evident that I have perceived it. The present memory is a re-presentation of the event, but the re-presentation consists of acts that, in reflection, have the character of re-presentations of earlier perceptions. In the memory of the event, I do not call to mind the perceptions in which it was given to me. However, if the object was given, it was given in perceptions; and the modifications that I now have acquire a presentational relation to these perceptions, exhibit them, although not as memories in the same sense in which the event is remembered.

Just as I can “reflect in phantasy,” I can also carry out the phenomenological reduction in phantasy. I can look at the “content” of the phantasy appearance, find in it the quasi-given color contents, and so on. And these then appear to me as “re-presentations” of those color contents that would have to function presentationally in the corresponding perception. Hence the re-presentational contents belonging to phantasy are now given as re-presentations of presentational contents belonging to a corresponding perception, the perception which as a whole finds its “re-presentation” in the present phantasy presentation as a whole.

And again, this re-presentation of the presentational contents in the re-presentational contents and of the whole perception in the whole phantasy does not signify that the perception, the apprehension, the present contents — the perceptual phenomenon as a whole — would actually be presented as objects in the present phantasy and would be re-presented in the manner of the house.

29 The representants belonging to phantasy: These are not, however, real contents that belong to the phantasy experience and undergo actual apprehension in it; rather, they are phantasied contents that “undergo” precisely phantasied apprehension.
<d> Two kinds of perception — two kinds of phantasy>
<probably 1907/08>

Examining matters more closely, we note that two kinds of phantasy are in question here. Or: just as I have two kinds of “perception,” so I have two kinds of “phantasy.”

1) I said two kinds of perception: Namely, a) if I perceive a house, I have the “actual” appearance of the house included in this perception. This appearance is “perception”; namely, perceptual appearance of the house (this is sense a). b) And, on the other hand, it is an actually present appearance, an actual experience and an originary experience, not a “modification” of another experience. Impression or “perception” as the way in which I am conscious of the house appearance as something originary (not a “copy” of something else); and, on the other hand, perception in the sense in which the house is perceived or in which the house appearance is perceived in an act of immanental perceiving.

2) So too in the case of phantasy.

a') In one instance, we have phantasy as the phantasy consciousness of the house.

b') We find, however, that a phantasy appearance of the house is really contained in this phantasy consciousness. This phantasy appearance is a consciousness of the appearance of the house, but it is not...
the sort of consciousness I have when I contemplate the appearance of
the house (the re-presented perceptual appearance) in “internal phan-
tasy.” This internal phantasy is the modification of internal perception,
5 hence a modified act directed toward the appearance. However, the
mere phantasy appearance, as I produce it in every phantasy of the
house, is indeed a modification of the perceptual appearance, but nat-
urally not a modification of the immanent perception of the perceptual
appearance.

In short, we have a distinction between the simple phantasy mod-
ification, “phantasy appearance of the house” (the “idea” of the per-
ceptual appearance of the house), and the internal phantasy that has
the appearance of the house as its object (the idea of the imman-
ent perception of the perceptual appearance of the house.)

On the other side, we have the unmodified consciousness: the per-
ceptual appearance of the house (the perceptual appearance is an
originary experience); and, on the other hand: the immanent percep-
15 tion (again an originary act), which is directed toward the perceptual
appearance (as its object).

Paying attention presupposes an unmodified or modified act, more
precisely, an objectivating act. Paying attention passes through the
phantasy appearance of the house (the phantasy consciousness),
which I merely experience, toward the house. Furthermore, paying
attention can pass through internal phantasy.

On the other side, in experiencing the perception I can focus my
20 attention on the house. And again I can relate myself perceptually
to the perceptual appearance and in this act of perceiving focus my
attention on it.

<e) Two re-presentations: “reproduction of something” in contrast
to “phantasy of something” = phantasy presentation>

<probably 1908>

The exposition34 is very difficult, since we have to distinguish two re-presentations.

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34 Husserl subsequently inserted above the line: “3- to 6-”; this reference concerns
the texts of No. 2c), No. 2d), and No. 2f) in the present edition. — Editor’s note.
Perhaps as follows: We call the consciousness set in opposition to *impression*, “*reproduction*”; specifically, 1) if I have a perception, the perception of a house, say, then we call the perception as a whole “impression,” just as we call all of its real parts “impressions.” An example of the latter would be the sensation in which I am conscious of the color and the other sensuous contents belonging to the perception in such a way that we can then carry out adequate perceptual positings and acts of meaning on their basis. Moreover, we call the apprehensions in which objective moments of the house present themselves, the forms of union of the apprehensions, and so on, “*impressions*.”

This is an edifice of impressions, therefore; and an intending aimed at the apprehended object, the house, “lives in it.” There is consciousness of the impressions; the house is known, meant, intended (in the doxic modes of belief or nonbelief, and so on). Now a new impression can be built on top of this edifice of impressions, “apprehending” it or its parts; the new impression, therefore, is an apprehension. And it can then be the “carrier” of an intention in which the impression serving as its basis is what is meant. The latter is now in the “position of the object.” The positioning as object, however, is the work of a new impression, of which there is “consciousness” in turn.

Now if we again take the simple perception, a simple phantasy corresponds to it.

2) Now we call the modifications of impressions “*reproductions*”: Every reproduction is the reproduction “of” an impression. The whole phantasy, however, is reproduction, reproduction of the total impression. Also necessarily reproduced in the phantasy is that which determines the directedness toward the object, the house — specifically, the unity, the form, of the total apprehension. And the intentional mode, as opposed, say, to the normal positing perception, is the modification: “the reproduction of the positing.” We would likewise have to assume this for all partial apprehensions, which will surely also have their positing characteristics. The house is then *quasi*-known: It is something meant as a whole: something *quasi*-meant. At the same time this signifies no more than the following: The impressions form a certain total impressional unity, the apprehension of the house; and eo ipso this unity has an intentional character (a mode of belief) and a mode of attention, specifically or incidentally meant.
time, however, my attention actually and without modification aims at the phantasied house. Hence: 1) the sense in which the house is phantasied (re-presented) and 2) the sense in which the house apprehensions are phantasied (re-presented) are different.

In the case of the perception of the house, there is “consciousness of” every impression. In the case of phantasy, of phantasy re-presentation, we have “quasi-consciousness” of these impressions; and this quasi-consciousness is re-presentational consciousness in the sense of reproduction. The object, however, is not reproduced, but phantasied: a re-presented [vergegenwärtigtes] object, a represented [repräsentiertes] object.

I can phantasy simply: I have a re-presentation in the sense of the reproduction of the corresponding perception and all of its impressional components, and I “mean” the object. The object is what is quasi-perceived; namely, that toward which the reproduced perception is directed (a directedness that is itself reproduced). And “I live” in the reproduction of the direction; that is to say, my attention aims at the object.

However, I can also direct my attention to the reproduced impressions: Just as in perceiving the house I can turn my attention to moments of the perception, for which a perception of the perception (a new apprehension) is needed, so I can generate a reproduction of this perception of the second degree, look at the reproduced perception, make the reproduced impression into my object. It is, however, necessarily a phantasied object, since the reflection that I carry out is not an actual reflection but the reproduction of the perception of the perception (hence the reproduction of a reflection), and this is “to reflect in phantasy.” I can then reflect in turn on this reproduction, reflect again in phantasy on a new level, <bring about a> modification of a perception of a reflection (or perception of the third degree), and so on.

<f> Perception of a phantasy (reflection) and phantasy of a phantasy>

<probably 1909 at the earliest; perhaps 1912>

I live in the phantasy of a “clown.” I perceive this phantasy. It is “contained” in the perception just as every experience on which I
reflect is contained in the reflection on it. I can also imagine that I am phantasying a clown in front of me. Instead of perceiving the latter phantasy, I imagine it. Therefore I phantasy that I am phantasying a clown (I imagine that a clown is hovering before me [in phantasy]).

This is a phantasy of a phantasy. Now how is the clown phantasy contained in this phantasy of the clown phantasy?

Let us take a memory of a phantasy that I have had. This memory is something that now exists. And I ask: Is the phantasy I had contained in it? Certainly not. Is a phantasy perfectly like it in content contained in it, which re-presents to me again the phantasy I had? Do we therefore have an image consciousness? But in that case this memory is formed differently from any other memory. And can we say that in the memory of an external event that occurred yesterday a present event perfectly like it in content is really there, and there as an image?

That would surely be nonsense. I have a modification of the event. And a phantasy modification. Hence one would certainly have to say that I have one in the other case as well. In the memory of the phantasy, the phantasy is the object of recollective re-presentation, and the phenomenon that recollects re-presentationally is the phantasy of a phantasy.

The modification of the perception of a phantasy seems to demand that the perception be converted into phantasy and the sensed phantasy be converted in a modification into phantasy-phantasy, just as the modification of the perception of a sensed color seems to demand that the perception be converted into phantasy and thereby the sensed color (the experienced color) into a color phantasm (reproduction). Hence must there not be phantasy of the second degree?

<\g> Whether the succession of modifications “perceptual appearance — phantasy appearance — phantasy appearance in a phantasy” is a series of iterated modifications> <probably 1909 at the earliest, perhaps 1912>

Question: Can one actually describe this succession of modifications: perceptual appearance, phantasy appearance, phantasy appearance in a phantasy . . . as a series of iterated modifications?
In this succession, the phantasy appearance *in* a phantasy is supposed to have the value of a phantasy modification of a phantasy appearance. But the phenomenon belonging to a phantasying in a phantasy really *contains* the phantasy appearance that was supposed to undergo modification there. The phantasy allegedly modified in phantasy is, it seems, of precisely the same internal content and character as a simple phantasy, except that a characteristic is added to it.

If I proceed from a perception to its modification, then in this modification of the perception a perception is not again implied that would merely be characterized further.

Hence that speaks *against* the idea that what is in question is an iterated modification series. One might also take notice of the modification proceeding from the sensation:

Sensation — phantasm — then there must be a phantasm of the second degree. And so on.
APPENDIX XIV

<a) MEMORY AND HAVING PERCEIVED>

<about 1898>

Problem

I am now having a memory phenomenon. Something emerges from the more remote past and appears to me now with the peculiar characteristic: “remembered.” For example, the image of the Tiergarten in Berlin or the Brandenburg Gate wells up with the characteristic of memory. I contemplate it in the memory, and I contemplate everything that is past in the remembered surroundings. All of this is characterized in a definite way. The primary attention, however, rests on these past events.

Now with what right do I declare that I have experienced what appears if it is only the “image” — characterized specifically as a memory image — that is present? How can I claim it to be evident that, when I describe the content of my memory, I can say that I was there, that at that time I did perceive what appears?

The answer to this question, which is given in more detail below, runs as follows: The memorial apprehension reaches further than the remembered event. The earlier act of perceiving also belongs to it necessarily, and without doubt many more things besides that I attribute to my Ego. And all of this too lies within my view “in image,” with the characteristic of memory.

[194]

1 Time.
2 Only the remembered event is “remembered.” It is remembered, however, only because the earlier perceptual consciousness is “re-presented,” “reproduced.” One can reflect in turn on this consciousness “in the memory,” and then it too stands there as having been, but not as “having been present.” Now I am reflecting in memory. At that time I did not reflect and did not make the consciousness into the object meant.
One speaks of image with respect to the present memory in a number of ways: What appears is the image of the object, and the appearance (the memory appearance) is the image of the perceptual appearance. And this holds good for everything objective re-presented by memory and for all of its forms of appearance.

The answer, however, rests on the fact that I understand by my past Ego at its core nothing other than remembered acts (of which I am intuitively conscious as past) and their real contents; and that under the supposition of the veracity of my memory, it is then evident that I must have existed at that time, since the remembered acts quite certainly belonged to the domain of my Ego. Furthermore, in this answer I made use of the distinction between what is reproduced (remembered) and what is meant, as also of the distinction between what is reproduced and what is not meant.

Briefly, the problem that memory poses for us here is the following: How do we explain the evidence that the statements, “I have the memory of A” and “I have perceived A earlier,” in the sense of “I remember having seen A earlier,” are equivalent to one another?

Solution. First of all, one must remark that the Ego, which, in judging, we introduce into these statements, does not have to be heeded (meant) either in the memory or in the earlier perception. To be sure, the object in perception does stand over against me, over against me the empirical Ego, to which I am accustomed to relate everything objective and which is itself something objective. As a rule, however, I focus my attention only on the perceived object. Just as my surroundings are apprehended objectively (in the mode of perceptual apprehension), so too the Ego, which as counterpoint belongs to these surroundings, is apprehended objectively. But I mean only the perceived A.

This is true in the case of memory as well. The past Ego and the past surroundings are apprehended along with the remembered A, but if “I remember A,” then I mean just A. In any case, the A with

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3 are apprehended = appear.
its surroundings and its Ego cannot be remembered along with a reference to an Ego belonging to the more distant past, which would certainly lead to an infinite regress.4

We then asked how the evidence just characterized would be possible, in what it would be grounded.

If we remember A, we have a “phantasy” appearance of A; that is, according to my presentation, an “image” appearance, which, therefore, in spite of all the similarity with a perceptual appearance, is differentiated from the latter by the characteristic of “imaging.”5 A, as well as its surroundings, has this characteristic.6 Here, however, the mode of apprehension is not the mere apprehension belonging to a phantasy presentation.

What appears in image is apprehended as something past; specifically, as something that has been present (to me). The image apprehension of the content yields the appearing object, or, rather, the image appearance of the object. This appearance, however, is the foundation for the temporal apprehension by means of which the object receives the characteristic of having been; specifically, of “having been present” in this mode of appearance. However, not only the A at which I am looking, but also the whole unity of consciousness,7 and particularly the reproduced Ego and the reproduced perception of A, serves as a basis for this temporal apprehension. The appearance of the meant A is part of a more encompassing appearance in which the past perception and its Ego appear. I therefore have at the same time an “image” re-presentation of the earlier perception, and accordingly not only the image of the past object but also the image of the earlier perception of this object, through which it is given that not only the object is represented in image but that its appearance is the image of the earlier perceptual appearance. The appearance, and along with the appearance the reproduced perceptual characteristic, is the object of

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4 The part of the sentence beginning with “along with a reference to . . .” and extending to the end of the sentence Husserl later placed between square brackets, inserting a period before the start of the brackets. — Editor’s note.
5 Of course, not imaging in the proper sense. Hence the expression is false.
6 The A-appearance, or rather, the appearance of A in its surroundings.
7 “unity of consciousness” later changed to “unity of the field of regard.” — Editor’s note.
a consciousness that apprehends in image. And this whole complex possesses the temporal characteristic. In the act of meaning, however, I look only at the object A and at its temporal determination. I can equally well reflect on the perception and heed its identical character. At the same time, the necessary relation obtains: An object can be remembered only owing to the fact that its earlier perception is present in image and is therefore, implicite, also remembered; the difference consists only in the fact that an act of meaning directed toward what is remembered also ordinarily belongs to the concept of memory. Put more adequately:

We must distinguish: memories in the sense of intuitive re-presentations of what is past and memories in the sense of acts that mean and even posit what is thus re-presented. The former — the intuitive re-presentations — are either complete or incomplete. It belongs to the complete re-presentation (memory) that some object or other along with its surroundings is the object of a remembered Ego and is re-presented as such.

Everything intuitively re-presented as past is necessarily the object of an Ego. Hence whatever we designate as re-presented is either an object or an object with its Ego. Incomplete re-presentation, therefore, is only one part of a total re-presentation.

Memory is an intentional relation that is directed either toward a part of the complete re-presentation or toward the whole. The possibility of reflection on the total re-presentation, however, necessarily belongs to every memory in such a way that the proposition, “I remember the object (the event, etc.) A,” is equivalent — even evidently equivalent — to the proposition: “I remember that I perceived A,” while the latter proposition permits no further recasting of that sort.

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8 “in image” [bildlich] later changed to “imaginatively” [imaginativ]. — Editor’s note.
9 “present in image” later changed to “‘present’”; probably at the same time Husserl noted on the margin: “itself [selbst] or *re-presentatively (not in image in the proper sense).” *) “or” changed, probably somewhat later, to “but.” — Editor’s note.
10 “des sich erinnernden.” Husserl inserted this note later, and it seems to contradict the sense of the text preceding it. The next note, which was in the original text, seems to convey the correct sense. — Translator’s note.
11 What is meant is: of the remembered Ego.
Hence, according to this conception, which is certainly correct, in the case of memory not only the remembered object, the remembered event, appears as past, but—whether we are now specifically conscious of it or not—the same is also true of the corresponding earlier perceptual appearance, for which the present memorial appearance is the image; specifically, the *recollective* re-presentation. 12 And the same is true of the recollectively re-presented objects belonging to the surroundings of the remembered event and of the perceptions corresponding to them in the past, finally of the whole former consciousness that is more or less clearly re-presented recollectively. The earlier Ego exists in this consciousness only phenomenally, insofar as the body remains out of play (the supposedly earlier Ego — false interpretations certainly may accompany it). The “present Ego” — phenomenally — is the unity of present acts and of acts characterized as present and of their real components. In just the same way, the sum total of remembered acts and real contents of these acts appearing in present acts of memory (re-presented and apprehended in the appropriate temporal determinacy there), hence in acts that belong to the present Ego, find their place within the phenomenon “my past Ego” (namely, my Ego belonging to a determinate time-point or part of time, even if not to a part firmly determined objectively and logically).

A great deal that belongs to the present Ego is not separately perceived — just as much that belongs to the past Ego is not separately remembered. And yet each thing, whether it is made explicit or not, has its temporal character, which quite certainly permeates everything.

The past Ego is the Ego that was present earlier; the remembered Ego presents itself as the Ego that was earlier perceived as present.

We have the evidence that if the memory of A is sound, it is also certain that we have perceived A, that A was present to us. I understand by my “past Ego” (and I intuit it as such) the Ego to which the remembered acts, taken concretely, collectively belong; and however much I may be mistaken in this respect, as soon as I posit some domain of remembered acts, however small, I have *eo ipso* posited my past Ego along with it.

12 *Wiedervergewährigung*.
The following is an evident proposition: Every memory of an A is at the same time the memory of an earlier perception of the A.

I remember an event: Implicit in this, everyone will say, is that I experienced it, perceived it. I remember a melody: I heard it at that time. I remember a torch parade: I saw it at that time. I remember a theorem: I became acquainted with it at that time. And so on.

The two propositions are obviously not perfectly alike in signification; they are not equivalent as expressions of identical objective states of affairs. I can have experienced an event and yet have no memory of it. They are also not alike in signification in the mouth of the one uttering them. I can be convinced that I have witnessed an event and yet need not have any memory of it. However, it is certain that if I do have a memory of an event, then the memory “implies” with evidence the conviction that I perceived the event: The memory of an event implies with evidence the memory of the earlier perception of the event.

How is this implication to be understood?

An event is remembered; that is, there is an experience, specifically, a memorial presentation that is an intuitive presentation of the event. This presentation is then a “depiction” of the earlier perception; more precisely, the appearance of the event in memory is an “image” of the appearance of the same event in the earlier perception.

However, the memory of the event certainly cannot also be memory of the perception of the event in the same sense. Otherwise memory of the perception would in turn be memory of the perception of the perception, and so on.

To perceive an A means to grasp an A as present itself; to remember an A means to grasp an A as having been present. The “being present” of an A “implies,” evidently, the being present of the memory, and so on.

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13 “to grasp” later changed to: “to present intuitively and believe.” — Editor’s note.
14 Inserted later: “itself.” — Editor’s note.
perception of A; that is, if A is present to me (to anybody perceiving), then the perception is also present to me implicite — namely, there exists for me the possibility of perceiving the perception of A.

Again: If I remember A, if A stands in relation to me as having been present, then the past perceiving of A is also re-presented implicite; that is to say, there exists for me the evident possibility of a “memory” of the past perception of A. The perception of an A is not actually perception of the perception. The memory of an A is not actually memory of the earlier perception.

In the memory16 of an A, I have an appearance of this A that re-presents recollectively the earlier perceptual appearance. Indeed, the memory as a whole, the whole concrete act, is a recollective representation of the entire earlier perception. In this characteristic of recollective re-presentation, however, we have to distinguish a twofold relation; namely:

1) the relation of the recollectively re-presenting experience (1) (the memory) to the re-presented experience (the perception);
2) the relation of this experience (1) to the intentional object of the experience, which was perceived earlier and is now remembered and named as such.

It is the latter relation that belongs to the proper sense of our reference to memory as relational: In the proper sense, I remember the torch parade (perceived earlier). The act of remembering, however, is itself a “recollective re-presenting” of the earlier act of perceiving and also signifies, in a loose sense, memory of this act of perceiving.

If I have a memory, I have an appearance. This appearance presents an object. The appearance has the characteristic of memory; and the fact that the object — indeed, the object just as it appears here (from this side, and so on) — appears as having been present depends on this

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15 Husserl later crossed out the last sentence up to this point and noted in the margin: “One cannot express oneself in this way! What does the being present in quotation marks mean? Surely the being grasped as itself, as now, and naturally this implies the possibility of perceiving the grasping itself and of positing it as present itself.” — Editor’s note.

16 “Memory” [Erinnerung] later changed to “recollection” [Wiedererinnerung]. — Editor’s note.
characteristic. The statements, “the object appears to me as having been present in this way” and “I have the intuitive certainty that I earlier perceived this object in this way,” are equivalent. The perception, however, is not “remembered” in the same sense as the object. The perception does not appear as having been present, although, objectively speaking, it was simultaneous with what was perceived.17

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17 The text of this note is based on the slightly changed transcript of a later insertion into the compilation. The original text of the insertion bears the note “transcribed M.” and is crossed out; the text is reproduced in its entirety in the critical notes to Husserliana XXIII. —

“The town hall hovers before me in memory. This appearance hovering before me is characterized as past appearance. I can live in this appearance (properly speaking, in the present modification of this appearance, of the earlier perceptual appearance, which modification is now actually experienced); I can focus my attention on its object: The town hall appears as having been present.

I can also focus my attention on the appearance, therefore on the having appeared or, correlatively, on the appearing to me, on the having perceived. The act of memory = consciousness of the object as object of an earlier perception (which ‘hovers before me’).

1) I can focus my attention on the object (the remembered object, which was perceived at that time).

2) I can focus my attention on the appearance of the object, on the perceptual appearance of that time.

3) I can focus my attention on the present appearance, on the present memory; that is, I now perceive that I am having such and such a memory.

The consciousness belonging to that time is ‘reproduced.’ It hovers before me now as something not now; it hovers before me in the memory image. I live in the re-presented act of perceiving; I do not focus my attention on this act of perceiving (the earlier perceiving). It hovers before me in the memory image, and I live in it in such a way that what I mean is its object. The ‘reproduction’ of the earlier perceiving, hence a modification of it, is present. I live in it, and this means that I am turned toward its object. But I can also focus my attention on the reproduced perception. Thus I do not reflect on the modification of the perception, the modification I am now having, and consequently I do not reflect in such a way that I mean the modification as I am now experiencing it. Rather, I reflect on it in such a way that I apprehend it as the representant of the perception.

If I live in the ‘reproduced earlier consciousness,’ I have modified acts and am turned toward the objects of those acts: past objects, characterized as past.

But I am also capable of ‘reflection in memory.’ The objects were given at that time in acts that are now also re-presented recollectively. Their recollective re-presentation, of course, makes possible the modified consciousness of the objects. I focus my attention, however, on the recollective re-presentation as re-presentation; I focus my attention in the now on what is not now, on the ‘perceiving’ in which the object is the remembered object.” — Editor’s note.
My deliberations concerning memory demand corresponding supplements with regard to perception.19

The perception is an act that is a single particular in an enveloping total consciousness, and no total consciousness consists exclusively of a perceptual act and nothing else. It is also a fact that no perception is performed by us without being related to the subject. Not merely that we must connote this relation in our expressions and therefore say: I see, I hear, and so on. — To be sure, an expression of this form [200] presupposes a reference to the Ego and presupposes this relation such that we perceive not only A but also the Ego in this relation to A. It is certain, however, that not every perception actually presupposes perceptual reflection on the Ego. Absorbed in the contemplation of the object, we do not focus our attention on the Ego. On the other hand, it is no less certain that just as the spatial surroundings of the object have not disappeared for the apprehending consciousness no matter how intense our absorption in the object may be, the relation to the Ego has not disappeared either. We apprehend objectively a great deal more than we attentively consider and specifically mean.

There is a great variety of things that we notice incidentally or do not actually heed at all, although they are nevertheless there for us. Above all and in every instance, the Ego, when it is not an object we are heeding, belongs to this variety. To that extent, then, there is certainly no perception without a perceiving subject.

The question, however, is the following: Is it to be accepted a priori as something evidently necessary that no perception is possible without the Ego (which is not identical with the perception)? Now here we must remark that in this universal relation to the Ego we mean by “Ego” the empirical Ego, the human personality. Its central core, to which everything else that belongs to it is connected, is the body. All “psychic,” “internal” experiences — the desires in the breast, the pains in the different members and organs, and so on — appear as

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18 This is true of every psychic act. The whole observation applies to psychic acts universally in relation to the Ego.

19 The last sentence was later marked out crosswise. — Editor’s note.
localized in it. Now much later the philosopher arrives, and by accepting the body merely as an external, physical object, forms the concept of the unity of pure consciousness, the concept of the purely spiritual Ego. (Even the popular imagination is in the habit of separating reflectively the “body” from the “soul” with respect to dreams, death, and immortality. The soul, however, is thereupon provided with the phantom of the body as a new body, which in relation to the psychic experiences plays the same role as the real physical body.) I must then firmly deny that this purely spiritual Ego plays the least role in actual intuitive presenting, hence that this Ego <makes up> the phenomenal reference point for any perception. And likewise I must attack the philosophical fiction of the pure Ego, which has arisen purely from the analysis of the word “consciousness.”

However, if we fix the concept of the Ego, as we usually do, as the concept of the unity of pure consciousness — namely, as the concept of the unity of the experiences belonging to an individual and in opposition to the multiplicity of perceived or supposed external objects — then the assertion “No perception without a perceiving Ego” means the same as: No perception is conceivable without a more comprehensive unity of psychic experiences with which the Ego is temporally at one, which we designate as the unity of consciousness. (That the perception and the Ego would not be one and the same is, of course, presupposed as obvious.) I cannot find any such evidence, however. It is a question of a mere universal fact of reflection. If one points to the evident possibility of perceiving a perception in turn and to the fact that it evidently forms the possible basis of feelings, and so on, I do not deny these evidences. These possibilities, however, are not real but ideal; they do not presuppose any actual consciousness of an enveloping sort (as existent), but only a possible consciousness. Every real being — this is evident — can possibly be perceived as present by a possible perceiver. If an A exists in a now, a perception must be possible that posits the A as now existing. If, ideally speaking, this possibility were not to obtain, then the object would not exist in this time-point either.

20 That is beyond me. Nevertheless, it seems to me that every perception — the word taken in the full sense — is an act that seizes and picks out, and as such presupposes a priori a nexus of consciousness.
APPENDIX XV

<IMMEDIACY OF MEMORIAL PRESENTATION AND PHANTASY PRESENTATION IN CONTRAST TO IMAGE APPERCEPTION>

<probably 1904>

Reid believes that the memorial presentation is an immediate presentation. Is there not in fact a great difference between a presentation that is consciously pictorial, such as a presentation by means of genuine images (actual image apperception), and presentations by means of phantasy images and memory images?

It is certain that phantasy presentation is not different from memorial presentation in this point. That there exists a difference in the mode of consciousness between phantasy presentation and perceptual presentation is certain. We take as characteristic of perception something’s being there itself in the perception, its being grasped immediately and as itself. Is the object there itself for me in memory as well? The intention aims at the object itself. That is certain. For example, I “re-present” to myself the dining room in which I had a meal a short time ago. I re-present to myself how my friend Schmidt enters, the “hello” with which he is greeted, and so on. I re-present to myself the sofa with the Persian rug, the china and glassware cabinet standing in the room, the shelves on the walls, the red wallpaper, the window with its curtains and Jugendstil design. The picture of Bismarck on the wall — I run my eyes along the walls.

I “see” these varied things in differing “freshness” and “vividness,” in differing “fullness” and “fragmentariness,” much as if I were seeing through a sort of thick fog. Often it is as if I were looking through the perceptual field of vision (the accommodation to circumstances is relaxed, the eyes are placed parallel, hence obscure double images), yet without locating what is phantasied as behind what is seen. Sometimes the phantasy image appears as a faintly tinted silhouette on the perceptual field of vision, even “on the rug, on the wall,” and so on.
APPENDIX XVI

<THE MEMORIAL APPEARANCE TOGETHER WITH ITS BODY OF SENSUOUS CONTENTS AS RE-PRESENTATION OF THE EARLIER PERCEPTUAL APPEARANCE — BEING MISLED BY THE FALSE THEORY OF REPRESENTATION>

(1904)

A present red as sign for a past red? No. A present red would be a perceived red. The [past] red, however, is certainly not perceived; it is not characterized as present. But does not the state of consciousness that I <call> the “presenting of red,” the “having of a phantasy appearance of this red” — specifically, the having of it now — actually contain a red moment? The phantasy state is now: I look at it; I find it. This “internal perceiving” gives it the determination “now.” Does this determination not belong to each part, to each moment really contained in the phantasy state? Hence the red now hovers before me, and a red is there in the phantasy state. Therefore I perceive a red; that is, I perceive a red within the nexus of the “memory of a red.”

Now let us look at the matter naively. I now remember vividly the terrain of a military exercise. I have the color of the sky, the varying tints of green of the meadows, of the trees, the grey of the Hardenberg ruins, the red of the roofs vividly in memory. Or [I have] the memory of the cheerful green of the new rug, the red of the old rug, the brown of the sofa, and so on. These colors are past colors; namely, colors of objects that I am remembering but that certainly do not stand before me as objects that are now present along with all their determinations. Are there (I am now remembering) other colors in the memory phenomenon? No, the colors that are experienced there are ascribed to the past.¹ In memory I see the roofs of the village of

¹ The last sentence was later changed as follows: “Should one say: ‘The colors that are experienced there are ascribed to the past’?” Husserl noted on the margin, probably
Nörton\(^2\) and their red. The actually experienced sensuous contents seem to be related to the remembered contents in precisely the way in which the actually experienced sensations are related to the properties of the object in the case of perception.\(^3\) In actual perception, the sensed colors are taken as belonging to the same temporal position as the perceived colors. The situation is analogous in the case of memory.\(^4\) The memorial appearance together with its body of sensuous contents (which themselves fall into the appearance) is taken to be the re-presentation of the earlier perceptual appearance;\(^5\) consequently, the sensed\(^6\) color, just like the remembered color, is taken as having been. The appearance is related to the earlier Ego as the same Ego’s perceptual appearance “at that time,” which coincides temporally with the object that appears there, or, rather, with the object that appeared at that time.

While I am now remembering, however, the appearance now exists. If I live in the memory, “the earlier appearance” appears to me, and through it, the remembered object. Or the earlier perception “is revived,” “reproduced”; and in my living in this perception, its object stands over against me. I perceive it “again,” as it were; I see it, as it were. I see it “in memory.” “I am displaced into the past.”

If I say I am remembering, then I relate myself to the now in which I am perceiving this and that; the memory as a concrete phenomenon exists simultaneously, hence exists now. The “reproduced” earlier appearance belongs to the content of this concrete phenomenon. Inherent

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at the time of this change: “But no. What does ‘the colors that are experienced there’ mean? Are they therefore there themselves?” — Editor’s note.

\(^2\) Nörton-Hardenberg is a village north of Göttingen. — Editor’s note.

\(^3\) At the beginning of the last sentence Husserl later inserted “Should one also say;” and changed the period into a question mark. Probably at the time of this change he inserted at the end of the sentence “No, that would also be absolutely false.” And he noted on the margin: “The false theory of representation misled me.” — Editor’s note.

\(^4\) Inserted later: “Are the colors then sensed in memory’s case? The remembered color-phantasms naturally belong to the same temporal position as the remembered color of the object.” — Editor’s note.

\(^5\) False. Do I then have an appearance, and is this appearance taken to be something? The appearance is certainly not an image appearance such as it is in an ordinary image, when I actually have an appearance (hence a perceptual appearance) and this appearance pictorializes.

\(^6\) “sensed” later changed to “experienced.” — Editor’s note.
in this, however, is the fact that this appearance is given in the character of “recollective re-presentation.” Generally it will not remain constant. It disappears. It fades. It is “driven out” by the present perceptual appearances (in the manner of a contest). It is revived again. I have within the preserved memorial intention a second intuitive memory, perhaps several in succession — hence “now” in different time-points, but always in the continuous consciousness of identity. [204]

I compare the different appearances reflectively; that is to say, I remember the memories themselves. Let us leave this aside for the present.8

I now have an appearance, therefore, but it bears a different characteristic. I call this the characteristic “of already having in fact existed,” of having appeared earlier, and the like, in contrast to the perceptual appearance, which does not have this characteristic. I can already have had two similar things,9 indeed, the same thing, and even a completely equivalent perception. In another sense, the object also has the characteristic of what has already appeared, already been seen, and so on. We do not, however, mean the characteristic of recognition here, but rather a different characteristic, precisely that of “recollective re-presentation,” which is different from the “there itself.” Just as the perception belongs to the present Ego, so the re-presented appearance belongs to the past Ego.

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7 No. This appearance is itself a recollectively re-presented appearance and not a given appearance that represents something else and has the characteristic of representation, of re-presentation.

8 Husserl later inserted: “This must be discussed separately,” and he placed the paragraph in square brackets. — Editor’s note.

9 After “I can [already have had] two,” Husserl later inserted: “now have a perceptual appearance and”; following the sense of this insertion, the sign for “two” [zwei] would then have to be interpreted as “indeed” [zwar] and the clause would read: “I can indeed now have a perceptual appearance and similar things, . . .” — Editor’s note.
APPENDIX XVII

<MEMORY: IT IS NOT ENOUGH THAT PERCEPTION BECOMES MODIFIED INTO RE-PRESENTATION OF WHAT WAS PERCEIVED; THERE MUST CORRESPOND TO THE PERCEPTION AN ACTUAL OR POSSIBLE MEMORY OF THIS PERCEPTION>

<1904>

Memory: Just now I was at the rathskeller. I found the rooms newly renovated. The agreeable company consisted of Schwarz, Morsbach, Kohn, Andres. On my return route, I looked back at the town hall, looked with pleasure at the old arbor, as well as at the graceful modern fountain representing Gänseleisel.

We speak of the Ego who has perceived this and that, experienced this and that, felt this and that, and so on. Corresponding to the sense of the memory, therefore, we must say: At that time, such and such experiences in which such and such contents were presented, judged about, valued, and so forth, existed; and these experiences were related as experiences of these kinds to my “Ego,” which for its part again appeared in certain experiences. The latter experiences, of course, were in general not related to the “Ego.” While I contemplated the fountain with pleasure, I related the contemplating to the Ego, but I did not in turn relate the experience of the Ego to the Ego.

I “contemplated the fountain,” I “saw” it. Does this contemplating, this perceiving, this experiencing, does this, I ask, signify an act of apperceiving, as if I had focused my attention on the appearances of the objects and on the act-forms rather than on the objects? That would be the question. First of all, an analysis would be required in this case that would indicate: I see a lamp, a human being, etc., here. One could indeed adopt the view in this case that object and Ego are both presented, and so on, as physical objects in spatial relationship to one another. Nevertheless, the appearing of the lamp, etc., as present
itself is certainly meant by this mode of expression. And the merely physical Ego is certainly not also meant.

But does there exist an essential and necessary relation of every-thing perceived to the Ego? A relation that in this sense is original?

One could say that nothing can “stand over against” as an object without standing over against me, an Ego. Necessary correlativity! But if one is focused on a pain, a discomfort, a pleasurable sensation, and so forth, would there be a need for such a correlation, as there is in the case of external things?

Let us assume, therefore, that perceiving does not necessarily presuppose a relation to the Ego. Where it occurs, where perceiving itself is reflected upon, hence where perceiving itself is perceived, there the remembering will also be the remembering of the event and the re-membering of the perception of the event. But where perceiving is not reflected upon, this will not occur. But how, then, do I come to the assertion: What I am now remembering I did perceive in an earlier now? How do I come to the assertion that what is past was present? Past = having been now or having been present. It is not enough that perception somehow becomes modified into re-presentation of what was perceived; on the contrary, just as the perceived event or object turns into a past object in memorial consciousness (while remaining the same object), so too there must correspond to the perception of the event an (actual or possible) memory of this perception.
APPENDIX XVIII
MORE COMPLICATED IMAGE PRESENTATIONS
<probably 1898>

1) Physical images of a higher degree (images of images). An image A, which exhibits an image B. The latter image perhaps again exhibits an image, the image C. Images of the second and third degree. For example, a painting of a room in which a picture hangs on the wall. The picture hanging on the wall exhibits, say, a picture gallery, in which, therefore, pictures again appear.

10 1) The physical image A,
2) the image exhibited by the physical image A,
3) the object presented by 2.

A physical image, which is now presented pictorially, belongs to this object. But that involves:

15 1) the pictorial presentation of the physical image,
2) the pictorial presentation of the exhibited image
3) the pictorial presentation of its subject

All of this in the second degree

Namely: A re-presenting image — for the sake of simplicity, a man on a horse — actually appears to me. The re-presenting image, however, does not belong to a perceptible physical object but to an object presented in the image. And this also influences, so to speak, the value of the re-presenting image. What appears there is not the re-presenting image belonging to that painted picture but only an image of it. The appearance I would have if I were looking at the picture itself — I mean the appearance coming to appearance in this image — I do not now have; on the contrary, I have only an image of it. And we are also conscious of this imaging situation.
Likewise, what is presented in the painted image (more distinctly: in the other painting brought to appearance by the painting) does not become presented in the way in which the object of a painting of the first degree becomes presented. It is brought to presentation by means of a pictorial presentation of a pictorial presentation, and consequently is an object of the second degree.

We could speak of intuitive presentations of the first, second, and third degrees (similarly: mirror images of mirror images).

2) Phantasy images of physical images. For example, I present the “Theologia” in phantasy. Here we have complications entirely analogous to those we had before, except that the phantasy image itself has no instigator.

3) Are there also physical images of phantasy images? For example, the painting of a form produced in a dream. Yet one will not accept such productions as purely intuitive. Conceptual-intellectual mediation. Grillparzer’s “Der Traum ein Leben.”
1) Memory in a mere phantasy
2) Phantasy in a memory
3) Memory in a memory
4) Phantasy in a phantasy

I phantasy: I am riding on the train and become lost in daydreams (phantasies), and in my daydreaming I linger in the memory of my early days — my childhood home hovers before me, I play as a child in the beloved rooms I know so well, and so on. Here we have a phantasied memory, a modified memory — I should say, more distinctly, a memory in phantasy. To be sure, I have not just now experienced this invented case; what I have stated here I have carried out only in an act of indirect presentation. I present a train trip (perhaps a memory) intuitively. At the same time, I symbolically relate the other memory — of my childhood — to the symbolically presented daydreaming. But is that not possible to do in a genuine way?

It is easier to form a phantasy in a memory and a phantasy in a phantasy (or in a mixture of phantasy and memory, as in the case of most phantasies). Of course, the fourth possible case also presents itself: memory in a memory.

Take the case of reading a novel in which the hero phantasies, dreams, remembers. The story in the novel: It is not, however, an actual story; on the contrary, it only represents such a story. This is an image consciousness. Is not the phantasy here in other respects phantasy in phantasy, supposing that intuitiveness is on hand? (But how, if I am only understanding symbolically?) The dream here becomes an object; through “judgment” (judgment on the basis of phantasy), the dream is attributed to the phantasied hero as the one who is dreaming. If, however, the judgment “produces an effect,” then intuitive
consciousness of the hero’s dreaming results. The reader endowed with “vigorous phantasy” will surely be able to bring this consciousness about.

How does a writer bring us to the point of actually producing memory in phantasy? Certainly in such a way that we intuitively witness certain events along with the hero, and the hero recalls these events in later parts of the fictional work. We then remember along with him. The example, however, is in need of more precise analysis.
There are not only transcendent image-presentations but immanent ones as well.\footnote{What color, then, does the background of Titian’s picture have? Well, I can paint it here. The painted present color is then indeed an “image” of the absent color. But, of course, I do not see the absent color in the painted color, since the former is precisely the color of an object and cannot be seen without the object. What is painted here is necessarily a different object (a daub, etc.).}

They are particularly of service in the case of empathy. For example, I can pictorialize to myself the perception that belongs to someone else by means of a perception that I myself have. And in the same way, I can “make a presentation of” — that is, pictorialize to myself — someone else’s phantasy presentation by means of a phantasy presentation that I have.

\textit{Question:} Can one interpret “phantasy in phantasy” as pictorialization?

Naturally, I can employ a phantasy as an image, as we saw above. However, if I am now remembering that yesterday I phantasied an A — a clown, for example (and I am now actually remembering this) — can I say in this case that I am using a present clown-presentation as an image?

Now if occasion should arise, it is certainly possible to form an analogical presentation (precisely an image presentation) of something that we ourselves had remembered earlier. But when we simply recall that we had presented the clown to ourselves yesterday, we then simply live in the past and in the past act of phantasying, precisely as we live in the past in other respects: except that we can carry out at any time the easy modification that \textit{<would>} make a present phantasy out of a past phantasy, out of the memorial modification of phantasy.
APPENDIX XXI

REFLECTION IN PHANTASY IS ITSELF PHANTASY

<probably winter, 1909>

Does the possibility of reflection in phantasy (of “looking” at the phantasm of the appearance or also of looking at the “perceiving of the object”) require the assumption that the unmodified experiences, the “impressional” experiences, are already contents of a consciousness, of an impressional consciousness? Hence an internal consciousness, the modification of which would be the phantasm as phantasm-consciousness? However, we would then have to assume an internal consciousness for every experience and say that all experiences are given in consciousness. We would arrive at an infinite regress. That will not do.\(^1\) It may be the case, of course, that psychologically every experience leaves behind “traces,” and that recollections and along with them phantasy modifications of the experience emerge. Modification, however, does not imply that what is said to be modified was already there earlier, only precisely as unmodified.

To be sure, I find a difficulty in the fact that a regard directed toward the object of a phantasm (= the object of a reproduction) is possible. If I experience a phantasm, I can direct my regard toward its object. This looking-at manifests itself as a reproductively modified looking-at: as a phantasm of looking-at. If a memory emerges, I can look at what is remembered; and this looking-at is itself a modified looking-at, a “phantasm,” even if I cannot always characterize it itself as a modification of memory. This is the case when I perform the phenomenological reduction in memory. I focus my attention in the memory on the “phenomenal color,” on the phenomenal form, and so on. They belonged to the remembered appearance, which was a unity constituted “in the memory,” a unity that I had perhaps never made

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\(^1\)“That will not do” later underlined; in the margin to what follows there is a large question mark. — Editor’s note.
into a meant object. However, in my present remembering, I am now looking at it. And yet this looking at, understood as the being occupied with the phantasy appearance (the phantasm of the appearance), is a being occupied with something that is not given itself; it is a being occupied “in phantasy.” It itself has the character of the phantasm. What I now call my being occupied with the object of memory or the phantasy object and their respective appearances is, in truth, a phantasy consciousness that has the character of a phantasy of the being occupied with what is remembered. I cannot occupy myself in the proper sense with reproductive appearances, with appearances that are not present but past.
APPENDIX XXII

<“REPRODUCTION OF” IN CONTRAST TO “PHANTASY PRESENTATION OF” UNDERSTOOD AS AN OBJECTIVATING ACT>
<probably 1909>

There are originals that are not in turn presentation [Darstellung], and there are presentations [Darstellungen]. Reproduction is therefore reproduction of (phantasy of). Wish-reproduction is therefore the reproduction of a wish.

But what does the “of” signify here? Not the same thing that I mean when I say that I have a phantasy presentation of,¹ that I have an objectivating act. The phantasy presentation of a house, of a wish, and so on, is an act that has the house, the wish, as its object. Mere reproduction, however, is not an objectivating act, not a presentation of.

For example, if I have a phantasy presentation of a house, the house is the object. In phantasy presentation, however, phantasms make their appearance as “re-presenting contents.” They are not presentations of. (At least that is one view of the situation, which seems very question-able.) Should we say: The sensuous contents are objects of phantasy presentations?)

Just as I must first reflect in perception in order to bring the sensation contents into the position of objects, and hence just as possible conversions into immanent perceptions that I must first of all provide for myself belong ideally to the sensations, so too here. I must “reflect in phantasy.” Accordingly, no wish-presentation is given in the wish-phantasm. The wish is not the object of a presentation here, and likewise there is no wish-perception in the actual wish. I wish, for example, without my wish being made into an object of perception, and likewise wish-reproductions may be active and may exist as

¹ Inserted somewhat later: “= directed toward.” — Editor’s note.

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experiences without my having presentations in the objectivating sense. So it is everywhere.

Every impression, however, establishes the possibility of a perception; and according to an ideal possibility, a phantasy presentation corresponds to every reproduction, to every phantasm. To take a specific example: judgment — perception of the judgment, propositional presentation — phantasy presentation of the judgment.2

Now, however, it seems that we must take a further step: Just as a reproduction (phantasy) corresponds to every impression, so too an empty consciousness [corresponds to every impression].3

Sensation — phantasm — empty, obscure consciousness.

And again there corresponds to every empty consciousness a formation of objectivating acts.

An empty presentation of (understood as an objectivating act) corresponds to every empty consciousness.

2 “propositional” to “judgment” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
3 Or should we say: “reproduction is full or empty”? 
APPENDIX XXIII
WHAT CONSTITUTES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ORIGINARY AND NONORIGINARY EXPERIENCE?
<Possibility of a Double Reflection>
(1910)

The “as it were” belongs to nonoriginary experience, and this is probably a very common characteristic (the “as it were,” however, is ambiguous, since we can also speak of the “as it were” in the case of inactuality). In any event, nonoriginary experiences permit a double reflection: an originary reflection and a nonoriginary reflection.

For example, the re-presentation of anger permits: 1) a reflection in which an intending regard is directed toward the re-presented anger experience; 2) a reflection that is directed toward the actually present consciousness of the anger’s standing before me as not present. Here, therefore, obviously toward 1).1 (Of course, one can still say here: Thoughts, feelings, and so on, emerging in confusion, can turn one’s internal regard in their direction before one’s regard is directed through them to the intentional object.)

In any case, one can say: Universally every experience permits a transmutation into a perception that makes the experience into its immanent object. (This is to speak in terms of an ideal possibility, of course.) Every nonoriginary experience, however, permits an immanent grasping (we do not say perception here) of what is re-presented in it immanently (of that of which it is the immanent re-presentation) and in addition permits a conversion into an immanent perception, which grasps the experience itself as a re-presentation.

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1 Cf., however, the example of the house-phantasy further below.
If, for example, I have the phantasy of a house, I can convert the experience into an immanent phantasy-meaning directed not toward the house but toward the house-appearance, toward the “appearance in phantasy.” On the other hand, I can form an immanent perception of the phantasy of the house.
PHANTASY AND RE-PRESENTATION (MEMORY).
<THE QUESTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
APPRHENSION AND BELIEF QUALITY>

(copy <probably 1905/06, with supplementation probably
from 1909>)

Schematic deliberations:
Certain contents: “sensations”; their apprehension as the Roons: perceptual apperception; belief quality.

Other contents: “modified contents of the same genera,” “phantasms”; apprehension as the Roons: phantasy apperception (memory, re-presentation); belief quality.

The case of the perception of the Roons. Let us assume that the side of the object turned away from me is re-presented intuitively in phantasy. Naturally, it has the belief-characteristic. This phantasy is not merely added to the perception of the side facing me — in our case, to the perception of the Roons “seen from the front.” It is made one with the perception through the identification and unification of the transcendent intentions on both sides. On the other hand, the phantasy presentation or phantasy positing also has an “intention” aimed at the corresponding perception (namely, at the perception of the Roons seen from the same standpoint as the one from which the phantasy presentation “sees” it). We distinguish:

a) the “re-presentation” of the side of the object turned away from us, the “intention” belonging to the appearing side directed toward the side turned away from us.1

This re-presentation occurs in the perception; it brings it about that the whole object stands before us as meant. In modified form, this re-presentation occurs no less in phantasy: In phantasy, too, the whole object lies within view (precisely in the manner of phantasy). This representation, accordingly, is obviously not itself again phantasy. Here, indeed, the possible subsequent continuous multiplicity of phantasies of the appearing reverse side fulfills the intention, which is therefore

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1 The intention aimed at the side turned away from us must not be confused with the intention aimed at a perceptual image or phantasy image of that side; such an image is certainly not the side itself. The side turned away from us makes its appearance in a continuity of new perceptions, each of which brings fulfillment when it comes.
something different from each of these phantasies. Within perception, perception fulfills; within memory, memory fulfills. Within phantasy modification, phantasy fulfills, in modified form.

b) The re-presentation making up the essence of the memory that re-presents something now existing. The “intention” belonging to the phantasy appearance, to the phantasy appearance posited in memory, aimed at a perceptual appearance of the same side, which for its part is charged with like intentions aimed at the side turned away from me.²

I)³ Perceptual belief

\[ P_1 P_2 \ldots P_n \ldots P_2 P_1 = \]

a nexus of perceptions

\[ A_1^p A_2^p A_n A_1 \]

\[ \rightarrow \rightarrow \rightarrow \]

combined by the unity of identity

Arrows = intention a) in continuous identification within the continuity of the nexus of perceptions.

= “intention” that apprehends by means of resemblance and contiguity.

II) Memorial belief (I mean reproductive belief)⁴

\[ Ph_1 \ldots Ph_n \ldots Ph_1 \]

\[ A_1^{\text{ph}} \text{ re-presents } A_1^p \]

\[ A_1^{\text{ph}} \rightarrow A_n^{\text{ph}} \rightarrow A_1^{\text{ph}} \]

\[ \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \]

\[ A_1^p A_n^p A_1^p \]

\[ \downarrow \text{The arrow now signifies the re-presentational intention b).} \]

But now the question of the relationship of apprehension and quality arises.

How does the quality participate in the intention — in its fulfillment? Let us take a mere phantasy: A knight in the moonlight. The knight turns his horse. His back appears as belonging to the unity

² Inserted later and subsequently crossed out: “This is incorrect; phantasy and not memory itself has — without more ado — nothing less than an intention aimed at the corresponding perception.” — Editor’s note.
³ The texts reproduced under I) and II) together with the schematic expositions as well as their notes were later marked out crosswise and provided with a zero. — Editor’s note.
⁴ “Ph” here signifies memory. Incorrect, cf. the beginning of the previous page <that is, the beginning of the sketch>.
⁵ The unique relation of memory to the memorial nexus up to the actual now would have to be put in place of this erroneous illustration.
of the object: “fulfillment.” The front “intends” the back. If phantasy produces the back, then identifying “fulfillment” takes place.

This intention is “modified intention,” and its fulfillment is “modified” fulfillment. The first intention was already directed toward a whole object: “the knight, and so on.” But this complex intention only “verified” with respect to the front; as intention aimed at the whole object, it was fulfilled by what was given of the front. Even this fulfillment, of course, is a “modified” fulfillment. There are empty, entirely unfulfilled intentions. Here we have an intuitive and therefore partially full, partially fulfilled, intention. The intention is partially empty; it aims at further fulfillment. It finds it in new partially fulfilled intentions, which, of course, are again partially emptied out.

In contrast to this, perception is a complex of unmodified intentions, of belief intentions. The latter are not empty qualities plus the apprehension of the object somehow bound together with them. On the contrary, they are belief apprehensions, the determination of the relation to the object; that is, the determination of this apprehension, what differentiates it, what produces the determinate believing, the determinate perception.

Naturally, the determinateness of the belief is not the same as the sensation content.

If we now take mere phantasy, everything continues to obtain, except that everything is “modified” into what is quasi; that is to say, everything is imaginatively modified. In the comparison of what is modified and what is unmodified, there is an identical essence in abstracto: the same objective apprehension, appearance, the same.

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6 But how, if I take a perception and an illusion of the same apprehensional content? In the latter case, [there is] a quality degraded by conflict with competing perceptions or empirical experiences to a mere belief tendency, a belief tendency that is no longer belief. What is modified here? Surely only the quality. The situation, however, is entirely different from what it is in the case of the phantasy of the same content. One will perhaps object: This modification is entirely different from modification in phantasy.

Certainly, but belief, after all, can either exist or not exist in phantasy. A bare phantasy may have the “same content” as the former hallucination. What determines the difference? Well, in the one case, there is perceptual appearance; in the other, phantasy appearance.

* The last sentence was later changed as follows: “One will rightly object: This modification, as modification of belief, is entirely different from the imaginative modification, from the modification in phantasy.” — Editor’s note.
front side (“the same” object appearing from the same side), and so on. This is identity of “matter,” understood as identity of sense?7

But this seems to concern only the “mere” phantasy presentation. However, it can be connected with phantasy belief as well.

How, then, can the relationship of belief to apprehension and of belief to intention be better and more precisely understood?

I8 would reply: As far as memory is concerned, it is not an imaginative but an impressional act, founded in “mere phantasy.” In contrast to the simple perception of something external, of a physical thing, for example, there is the simple, pure phantasy of the “same” thing; that is to say, the pure phantasy of a thing that is perfectly like the perceived thing in content (a phantasy of the same phenomenal appearance). A memory of this thing is not to be compared with the phantasy as being equivalent to it, inasmuch as the memory brings a new apprehension that posits the thing, which to begin with is phantasied, as past in relation to the actual present; specifically, as something re-presented as “given again.”

But now we must consider the following. Is the positioning of certainty that is inherent in perception not also related to a nexus, and accordingly to an apprehension that posits what appears in a wider context? Perception has its fulfillment in transitions from new perceptions to new perceptions, and in this process not merely from presentations of the same object but also from perceptions of its surroundings. The physical thing belongs to the spatial world, which is a spatial unity and, with regard to time, a unity that endures in spite of all the changes in its content.

Memory, however, transplants what is phantasied (what is quasi-perceived) into the past and fits it into the same world, specifically with regard to the world’s past. The mode of its legitimation requires transitions from “phantasy” to phantasy, but this mode is likewise

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7 It must be noted that the “essence” is identical, but not the appearance, which in one case is perceptual appearance and in the other case phantasy appearance — in one case impressional matter and in the other case matter imaginatively modified. I cannot properly speak of the same (individual) object either; rather, the object is of precisely the same content or essence, just as the appearance on both sides is “essentially” the same.

8 No. 3 was supplemented, probably in 1909, from here to the end of the sketch. — Editor’s note.
characterized over and over again as memory. Do not external (transcendent) perception and external memory therefore run parallel? Do we not simply have in the one case perceptual appearance in the mode of the positing of certainty, and in the other case phantasy appearance in the mode of the positing of certainty? Perceptual appearance, however, must be understood as what distinctly appears and is meant with its background in the determinate apprehension. Likewise, phantasy appearance is again meant with its background, to which, however, belongs not only the physical background (in quasi-coexistence), but also the temporal background in the succession of events up to the now. Considered more precisely, therefore, memory, or rather the memorial series fulfilling memory, would be the precise counterpart, not of perception as such, but of the perceptual series running from the past now up to the present now, which indeed makes up a unitary perceptual consciousness of a succession of durations and changes.

In strictness, however, every perception already is such a consciousness; it is by all means a perception of something that endures, or a perception of events, and so on. If we take the perception as a perception of an event, then memory as recollective consciousness (re-presentation) corresponds to it; for example, the recollective consciousness that I may have of the beginning of an event at its end. It is not just phantasy of the event but precisely memory; that is, recollective consciousness of the beginning together with the intention leading up to the now, which is always advancing perceptually. The latter intention belongs essentially to the recollective consciousness.

Perceptual positing possesses the system of evidences belonging to the idea of spatiality, which, collectively, are again instances of perceptual positing. Memorial positing possesses the system of evidences belonging to the idea of temporality, which, collectively, again have the characteristic of memorial positing.

Mere phantasy (perceptual phantasy) is imaginative modification of perceptual positing (along with its intentional system). It is phantasy presentation of a now, of an enduring or changing objectivity,
and so on. Memorial phantasy is phantasy presentation of a past in relation to a now.

If this now is the actual now, the “positing” of this phantasy immediately gives rise to actual memory. If the now is a phantasied now, the positing requires the positing of the phantasied now, and this now is only possible as a remembered now, hence as a being past.

How can a formation produced by phantasy be posited? Only as something now, past, or future. In relation to actual reality and therefore to the now of actual perception. Great and difficult problems!

All positing of what is individual is positing in space and time, and in relation to the here and now.

Mere presentation can simply be a perception, but a perception that is absolutely not situated; anything in the way of a relation to the “here” is missing. Belief is missing.

On the other hand, mere presentation can be a pure phantasy; it is without relation to the here and now. Belief is missing.

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BELIEF AS IMPRESSION. <INTERPRETATION OF THE OPPOSITIONS BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND PHANTASY, OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MEMORY AND PHANTASY, OF ILLUSION, IMAGE PRESENTATION, EMPTY PRESENTATION>¹
(October 11, 1908)

If we attempt to apprehend belief as an impressional characteristic (not at all as the impressional characteristic) such that the opposing “mere presentation” would always have to be accepted as a modification — for example, the mere presentation of a proposition standing in contrast to the predicative judgment, that is, in precisely the sense in which the phantasm stands in contrast to the sensation — then our problem would be how we must interpret the oppositions between external perception and the corresponding mere phantasy, the relationships between memory and phantasy, and the phenomena of illusion, of unmasked hallucination, of image presentation (or pictorially positing presentation), of empty presentation (and positing empty intention).

In particular, difficulties exist here concerning the relationship between “apprehension” and “belief,” and the relationship between “belief” and its different modifications, such as inclination to believe, “nullified belief,” doubt, and so on.²

What is the situation in the case of perception, for example? Do we have a separate perceptual apprehension there that undergoes characterization in the mode of belief-impression in such a way that this characteristic is an adventitious second moment? Something separable but entwined with it? Or is the belief a modal characteristic belonging to the apprehension and inseparable from it? Specifically, in such a way that there are different impressional modes of apprehension, and impressional apprehension is eo ipso impressional apprehension possessing this mode or that? And then are the corresponding phantasy modifications supposed to stand in contrast to these impressional apprehensions? If, however, we speak of the same apprehension in different modes, then what would be held in common would be an

¹ Cf. in this sketch <p. 271f.> about impressional image consciousness.
² Naturally, belief not so much as decision, affirmation, and the like.
abstract essence. To make further distinctions: an intuitive essence (intuitive apprehension) or an empty essence. On the other hand, let me now refer briefly to the difficulty about what has to be taken as modification in the case of the “same apprehension.” For example, if I modify a perception and assume that two moments — apprehension and belief — are on hand, then I can modify each independently. The apprehension, accordingly, can be impressional and the moment of belief either belief as impression or a corresponding belief modification. As if one were to say, for example: The difference between the perception and the illusion of the same appearance content (apprehension content) consists in the fact that in the first case impressional belief and in the second case the modification of belief is interwoven with the same impressional appearance. Likewise the difference between the memory and the phantasy of the same “appearance content” consists in the fact that in the one case actual belief and in the other case modification of belief is combined with the same modified appearance. The phenomena can be interpreted differently, of course, especially if one does not inquire more deeply. For example, there is the interpretation that, in the case of the same appearance content, belief can cease entirely without being replaced by any other mode; or that, inasmuch as the same sensations might at one time undergo impressional apprehension and at another time phantasy apprehension, the differences are already inherent in the apprehensions; or that new apprehension moments, and so on, might be combined with the same apprehension cores (the same appearances).

I now want to attempt to establish the legitimacy of the view that interprets belief not as a separate characterizing moment but as the impressionality of the “apprehension” itself, in which case, however, the comprehension of the word “apprehension” must be sufficiently broad.3

Let us now go on to consider the relationship of normal external perception to a precisely corresponding pure phantasy. In this relationship, the latter phenomenon is modified through and through; that

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3 Husserl subsequently changed the last sentence as follows: “I now want to attempt to establish the legitimacy of the view that interprets belief not as an adventitious characterizing moment but as a certain impressional apprehension itself, in which case, however, the comprehension of the word ‘apprehension’ must be sufficiently broad. But this is certainly not expressed well.” There follows a passage, probably
is to say, it is the modification of the first phenomenon. What speaks in favor of the simpler view that we are attempting to establish here? Namely, the view that no specific moment of belief has to be assumed, and that consequently no complex of apprehension or (if we also take the sensuous foundation) of appearance and belief (or modification of belief) has to be assumed?

a) In the case of the apprehension complex one would say: The perceptual appearance has its being-imagined in the phantasy appearance precisely corresponding to it. And in both cases belief can either occur or not occur.

b) On the other hand, could one say: If, in the phantasy, I have no belief, hence if I bring about a pure phantasy, do I not thereby eo ipso possess modification of belief? Do I not therefore already possess the full imaginative modification of the whole perception together with its belief? Living in pure phantasy, it is as if I were seeing the thing, the event; it is as if it had such and such determinations, and so on. What is this other than appearance in the modified consciousness of belief?

inserted at the time of the reproduced change, which was again crossed out or else copied, somewhat changed, on a sheet probably inserted in the summer of 1909; the text reproduced in what follows is based on this paragraph, while the passage inserted originally is presented in its entirety in the critical notes to Husserliana XXIII: “The two views: belief as a specific, separable moment; belief as a mode. — Belief is not a separate ‘feeling,’ not at all a separate phenomenon that would supervene as a second phenomenon on a ‘mere presentation.’ The full concrete phenomenon of a belief with such and such a content is not something to be modified doubly in the impressional sense (with respect to the moment of belief and the presentation that serves as a basis for it). Rather: Among impressional experiences we find a class, the objectivating experiences, and among these objectivating experiences we in turn find a species, the phenomena of belief. Consequently, not every objectivating experience, in so far as it is an impression (unmodified), is eo ipso already an ‘act of belief.’ Thus an inclination to believe is an impression, but not belief. So too a presupposition. In addition, on a lower stratum: a phenomenon of image presentation, an illusion. Belief is objectivating certainty (positing with certainty). Here we distinguish belief quality and belief content (matter). This matter, however, is an abstract essence. The quality can be changed into inclination to believe, doubt, and so on. These are pure impressions, and each therefore has its impressional modifications.”

* “impressional” subsequently changed to “reproductive.” — Editor’s note.

4 Husserl later critically marked “Living in pure phantasy” and commented in the margin: “Of course, I living in phantasy.” — Editor’s note.

5 Inserted later: “But I see this!” — Editor’s note.
Hence only something simple presents itself. The sensation is modified into a phantasm (a quasi-sensation); the apprehension\(^6\) is modified into an imaginative apprehension.\(^7\) And this is\(^8\) already modification of belief, just as, on the other side, actual belief is inherent in the impresional apprehension.

Now I can also have belief “on the basis of phantasy.” Namely, that which is at the basis of the apprehension in this case is not sensation material but modified material, a complex of phantasms.\(^9\) On the one hand, the apprehension itself can be an impresional apprehension; on the other hand, it can equally well be a nonimpressional apprehension. And then, depending on the circumstances, I have memory or pure phantasy.

I must note: It is said that belief is not a separable moment, though belief is not apprehension-as. If, say, sensation is the foundation for the apprehension of something as a physical thing, then this apprehension can most certainly be modified independently. It is not belief but precisely apprehension that, modally, is now belief, now consciousness of nullity, and so on.

This all seems to work out quite well.

Now, however, I must consider what I have argued repeatedly in my lectures — that if apprehension is carried out on the basis of phantasms, whether in the form of pure phantasy or in the form of memory (positing phantasy, as I called it in the sense of the other view), this apprehension has the characteristic of the as-it-were throughout, and accordingly, so it seems, the character of imagination. Below everything else, I have, as it were, sensations. This is the consciousness: “phantasm.” But even further: On the basis of the sensations, I see, as it were, the phantasied or remembered situation and find myself in it, as it were.\(^10\) And if we now privilege memory, then this means in addition: I believe as it were, I perceive as it were, predicate on this basis as it were, and so on. I believe as it were — but I also now really believe!

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\(^6\) Inserted subsequently: “speaking concretely, the appearance.” — Editor’s note.
\(^7\) Inserted subsequently: “appearance.” — Editor’s note.
\(^8\) Inserted later above the line: “no.” — Editor’s note.
\(^9\) Inserted subsequently at the beginning of the following sentence: “And then one might say:” — Editor’s note.
\(^10\) Husserl later marked as questionable “find myself in it, as it were.” — Editor’s note.
Can one therefore be correct in supposing the following: Phantasms can undergo an impressional apprehension, and they can equally well undergo an imaginative apprehension (an imaging apprehension)? And then correspondingly on the other side: Sensations sometimes in an impressional apprehension, sometimes in an imagining apprehension?

Without doubt this is impossible.

We will have to assert: Sensation can immediately undergo only impressional apprehension. There is, however, not only one impressional apprehension; namely, the one that we call “perception” in the narrowest sense. If we take the current field of sensation, then it continually undergoes perceptual apprehensions. However, perceptual apprehensions can enter into conflict with one another. Here belong the impressional phenomena of vacillation, doubt, or, correspondingly, of the tendency that is always connected with the apprehension. Likewise the resolution of the doubt.

But other phenomena also occur, are also possible. A perceptual apprehension conflicts with the perceptual apprehensions of the “surroundings.” The latter hold their own as impressional perceptions, and the former perceptual apprehension is “annulled.” Or without a specific process of vacillating, conflicting, and so on, we find connected with perceptual certainties (impressional belief) an “annulled” perception, which is a new impressional phenomenon — not “mere presentation,” say, but “semblance perception.” Something does not appear in this perception in a certain extremely narrow sense; on the contrary, something stands before me as a semblance. In relation to the annulling perceptions, it stands forth as “nothing,” as null. In itself, it is there “without belief”; but it is by no means a phantasy. It is a mere “image,” which, however, must not be taken to mean that it has a symbolic, pictorially exhibiting function. In genuine impressional image consciousness, we have, on the one hand, as foundation the function in which the “image object,” which is precisely what

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11 Inserted subsequently: “according to the mode.” — Editor’s note.
12 Inserted subsequently: “and belief of any sort.” — Editor’s note.
13 Obviously these are not different apprehensions; they are different modes of apprehension. The fundamental mode of primal apprehension = belief.
14 Inserted later: “that is, a figment [Fiktum].” — Editor’s note.
we have just designated as image,\textsuperscript{15} appears; and [on the other hand] a symbolizing function — specifically, an analogizing symbolizing function, which constitutes imaging proper. (Which is also an impressional consciousness.)

5 We must note that image consciousness in the one sense and image consciousness in the other sense (illusionary\textsuperscript{16} consciousness, we could say, and image consciousness proper) are, as I have just said, without doubt impressional\textsuperscript{17} acts. Imaging presupposes perceptual surroundings. And imaging can be brought about in phantasy as well as impressionally:\textsuperscript{18} Phantasy surroundings, which function as quasi-perceptual surroundings, then correspond to the perceptual surroundings of impressional imaging. Everything is then imaginatively transformed. The “being annulled” by “conflict,” the analogizing, and so on. It is therefore certain that the illusionary\textsuperscript{19} apprehension is not perchance phantasy apprehension\textsuperscript{20} of sensations; and it is certain that sensations can in fact immediately undergo only impressional apprehensions, of which there are many kinds.\textsuperscript{21} We call all of them impressional apprehensions, since the unique mode of modification that we call “phantasy” stands opposed to all of them in the same way.\textsuperscript{22}

10 Now what do the\textit{mediate apprehensions} look like? If I focus my attention on the things at the margin of my visual field, they “awaken” the presentations of the things that follow in the order of the surroundings and that I would see if I were to turn around and then walk into my surrounding world in this or that direction and go on walking further and further into it.

15 It is clear that the intentions that radiate out, so to speak, from the things that I do see into what I do not see are impressional and nonintuitive.

\textsuperscript{15} Inserted subsequently: “figment.” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{16} Inserted subsequently: semblance [Schein]. — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{17} Inserted later: “(mixed!).” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{18} The relation to what is depicted in the manner of phantasy, however, can be without belief, cf. <p. 277>.
\textsuperscript{19} Inserted subsequently: “figment.” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{20} Inserted subsequently: “(impressionally modified apprehension).” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{21} Later marginal note, which was crossed out: “Phantasms likewise can immediately undergo only phantasy apprehensions (quasi-apprehensions), and only then impressional apprehensions.” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{22} Inserted subsequently: “(reproduction).” — Editor’s note.
The relationship of mere phantasy presentation and memory according to this theory

If “phantasy presentations” then emerge, I accept what hovers before me in them as really existing. Obviously, I do not have pure phantasm presentations, but motivations (impressional rays of apprehension proceeding from what is perceived) that determine those phantasm presentations themselves in their character. And this character — what is it other than an apprehension of an impressional kind founded in the phantasy appearance? In this way what is phantasied gets a relation to reality, is apprehended in this relation, and the apprehension has the impressional mode of belief.23

And so memory as such, then, in its various forms (I am taking the term here in a very general sense) is a founded impressional apprehension, even possessing the mode of belief.24 That means: Memory is at all times more than mere phantasy and is a phenomenon of a higher, founded level. Mere phantasy is the modification of perception (in the strict sense); simple phantasy is the imaginational modification of simple perception. We must note here specifically that mere phantasy contains nothing that is impressional, just as mere perception contains nothing that is imaginational. In the case of imaginational modification, therefore, I have to think of each and every thing in the corresponding perception, even its nexus of the hic et nunc, as modified.

On the other hand, in memory’s case I have phantasy as a foundation. But over and above that, I have a new impressional apprehension that confers actuality on what is phantasied; that is, confers the intentional relation to the hic et nunc:26 to my actually current now, [225]

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23 That won’t do. The phantasy appearance itself has the character of reality here, just as a perception has the character of reality without regard to the intentions aimed at the surroundings.
24 I have abandoned this again.
25 mere = pure.
26 There’s the error. We certainly do not have 1) pure phantasy with its phantasy nexus, spatially and temporally; 2) a new, supervening, impressional apprehension. On the contrary, memory is reproduction through and through; and this reproduction has the characteristic of reproductive actuality (if occasion should arise, we also have mixtures; some detail is not real, is left undecided, is mere phantasy). The characteristic of actuality and the characteristic of impression must be distinguished. That every memory is itself something that can again be reproduced does not speak
whether what is phantasied is “posited” as now or as having existed earlier (earlier in relation to the actual now). The new impressional apprehension has the modal characteristic of belief (naturally, other corresponding modes and perhaps modes of a higher level can occur: memorial inclination, doubt, resolution). This impressional apprehension has its imaginational modification. I merely present to myself that something now exists or did exist, and in so doing we have the full and pure imaginational modification. If we do not posit the now at all, then, of course, an imaginational now is presupposed as reference point. This is the case, for example, if, proceeding from a quasi-perception (hence from a simple phantasy), I phantasy myself into an act of remembering. Moreover, here and everywhere there are mixed phenomena. Just as I can phantasy something that is not in my perceived surroundings as in them (conflict with what is given; I must indeed posit it in the place of a perceived object), so I can also phantasy something as now existing in relation to what is becoming constituted hic et nunc with the perception (what can be posited as existing with no legitimizing basis at all and for which no legitimizing basis whatsoever is even given in advance; it is indeed just phantasy and not belief). Or I can phantasy something as having existed or as existing in the future. The phenomenon here is complex, inasmuch as the apprehension is imaginational, though on a certain impressional ground. If I imagine something as now existing (the phantasy-now, which belongs to the pure phantasy as modification of a perception with its actual now), the phantasy-now becomes identified with the now of the impressional perceptual consciousness, which at the same time fills me with phantasy, precisely against this, and that the actual memory has a connection with the actual now does not speak against it either.

27 Inserted subsequently: “also.” — Editor’s note.
28 This must not be understood as supposing. “I am living in phantasy” and remembering “in” phantasy.
29 Supposing this paper to be red while it is white. This is, of course, not a mere phantasy but a new impressional mode of “apprehending.”
30 To speak of a phantasy phenomenon here is questionable. Properly speaking, the whole is certainly not in the present sense a phantasy, since modally it is really a consciousness of nullity by virtue of the supposing and of the setting into reality. If we call every complex phenomenon in which appearances built from phantasms emerge a “phantasy phenomenon,” then that is something different.
as in the case of the memorial positing of a present (of an unperceived present).\textsuperscript{31}

Just like memory in its various forms, \textit{symbolic}\textsuperscript{32} apprehension — the intuitive and signitive apprehension — is also a founded apprehension. And here again the cases\textsuperscript{33} of impression and imagination are clearly different. Let us take, for example, a genuine image apprehension, the portrait consciousness. A consciousness of illusion as nullified perception lies at the bottom of it. Hence an impressional act of the sort described.\textsuperscript{34} The semblance object, however, is an image, an image of an “actual subject.” The apprehension in this case, therefore, is an impressional\textsuperscript{35} apprehension; indeed, it requires and permits fulfillment, grounding, corroboration: all of which makes sense\textsuperscript{36} only for impressional\textsuperscript{37} acts (and these new acts are themselves again impressions\textsuperscript{38}).\textsuperscript{39}

On the other hand, we also have an\textsuperscript{40} imaginational modification:

The image object is apprehended as an image, but “without belief”; that is, in mere “phantasy.” As in the case of many works of art.

This is also the case when I phantasy the reverse side of a physical thing with which I am not familiar. Indeterminate intentions (impressional\textsuperscript{41} intentions) are directed toward it; the back, of course, is the sort of aspect that belongs to a corporeal thing in three-dimensional space, that can be sensuously apprehended in some way, and so on. However, if I imagine something definite, then, taken in general, this...
is “phantasy”; on the other hand, it is certainly a mixture of impressional apprehensions and phantasy apprehensions. To the extent that what is phantasied as the back must fit harmoniously with the front, I have an impressional frame. All the rest is mere phantasy.

5 The mere phantasy is here the filling-in of an impressional frame. On the one side, motivating intentional rays radiating from what is actual; to that extent, [I have] something motivated and consequently marked out impressionally. All of the rest is unmotivated; it is mere phantasy.

10 According to the sense of our analyses to this point, we must say that we may not suppose without more ado that belief = impressional objectivation. For surely we also classify presumptions, tendencies, and so forth, with objectivating acts. Belief is determined impressional objectivation (impressional certainty). Furthermore, this does not at all change the fact that we must maintain the differences in the matter, the “what” of the modes of apprehension, in contrast to the series of impressional differences — certainty, deeming possible, presumption, doubt, and so on. We can speak without hesitation of qualitative differences (differences in modes of apprehension) and differences in “content,” in matter.

In the case of intuitively simpler acts, we can also speak of appearances and of the mode of actuality apprehension (modal differences), but here great care is called for so that we do not misunderstand the nature of the situation. For example, sensuous material is apprehended: an appearance — this is sensuous material apprehended in such and such a way. If the apprehension is simple, the total consciousness is necessarily impressional consciousness when its basis is sensation, and imaginative consciousness when its basis is not sensation.
On a higher level, higher apprehension-characteristics are based on these; and the whole that arises by means of the founding process must be formed differently from impression or nonimpression. The higher apprehension-characteristics can be imaginational, and then the whole receives its imprint. Or everything can be imaginational throughout, and so on.

(As far as predicative acts are concerned, we have distinctions in their case analogous to those we have at a lower level. Predicative judgment impressions — predicative judgment modifications = predicative mere presentations. Yet we must note that a predicative mere presentation (a propositional mere presentation), taken phenomenologically, is only the modification of a judgment. This modification is of precisely the same phenomenological essence in the sense in which not every phantasm of a certain red quality is a modification in relation to the red of the same quality presenting itself here, while nevertheless every phantasm is a modification and every sensation is an impression. The mere presentation “S is P” is not an act but an act-modification (an act-phantasm).)

Free, unchecked objectivation, primitive objectivation (also unchecked “apprehension”) = belief. Inhibitions, conflicts with other objectivations, or inhibitions of tendencies of objectivation by other objectivations: these result in new modes of objectivation.

For example, the semblance judgment (the judgment at the theater, e.g., which matches with the whole of the image situation) corresponds to the semblance perception, to the perception conflicting with what is given; hence the judgment tendency corresponds to the perception reduced to perceptual tendency, and so on. The semblance judgment, of course, is impressional.

49 Before the equal sign Husserl later opened a square bracket and noted at the end of the sentence: “Refuted by further investigations, likewise what follows.” — Editor’s note.
Now let us consider the act of consciousness called memory. As unmodified consciousness, it is “sensation” or — which is the same thing — impression. Or more distinctly: It may contain phantasms, but it itself is not a phantasy modification of another consciousness understood as corresponding sensation. An apparenz, however, is contained in it. I recall an event: The phantasy apparenz of the event, which appears with a background of apparenz to which I myself certainly belong, is contained in the memory. This total apparenz possesses the character of a phantasy apparenz. However, it has the mode of belief that characterizes memory.

We can then put memory itself into phantasy: memory into phantasy, and then, furthermore, memory into memory: I live in a memory, and there also emerges the memory “that I have remembered such and such.” Likewise memory in phantasy: I phantasy that I am remembering. In doing so, of course, we find the modality of memory converted into a corresponding phantasm, but the matter of the memory, the memorial apparenz, is not itself modified further, any more than the phantasms contained in it have been modified further. There is no phantasm of the second degree. And the whole memorial apparenz making up the matter of the memory is a phantasm and also undergoes no additional modification.

If, going further, I then have a memory of a memory, a “modified” memory emerges in the nexus of a memorial process; that is to say, in the nexus of a consciousness in which phantasy apparenzies are there and run their course in the qualitative mode of memory. We must say essentially the same thing here that we said previously. The qualitative mode of simple memory is replaced by “memory of memory”; that is

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1. **Apparenz.** Husserl occasionally uses this term to indicate the kind of appearance found particularly in phantasy, memory, and so on. Hence it usually carries the sense of semblance or appearance in the forms of phantasy appearance, memorial appearance, and the like. The English term “apparenz” in these senses is obsolete. Still, in the absence of any obviously preferable translation, Dorian Cairns suggests using it in order to avoid confusion with *Erscheinung*, which is translated exclusively as “appearance.” “Apparenz” will therefore serve as the translation of **Apparenz** in the texts that follow. — Translator’s note.
to say, I have a memory phantasm in the qualitative mode of memory (in union with the whole memorial process). The memory phantasm, however, has the character of memory of, grounded on a phantasy apparency. And this apparency is identically the same in the case of simple memory of memory.

If one says that what is characteristic of memory, as opposed to everything that makes up its content, is the fact that it has an apprehension that gives its content a relation to actually present perceptual reality, then there is certainly something correct in that, but this changes nothing about what has been said. In the case of this apprehension itself, we then have to distinguish content and mode of belief. The apprehension is different, of course, in the case of a simple memory, which, let us say, I am now having, and the memory of a memory, which relates the remembered memory to a remembered now as point of actuality. The main thing here, however, is that the apparencies (which we take altogether intuitively, precisely as appearances) can undergo no modification. And the same thing will be true of the content of the memorial apprehensions that give the apparencies a relation to the now: apparencies that, of course, will not be fully intuitive.

So far, everything would seem to be in order.

But then the question arises about the connection between modal characteristics and apparencies. In the case of memory, for example, we see that the mode of “belief” that is said to characterize the memory apparency is not an empty moment of “positing.” Nevertheless, it belongs to the essence of the appearing [apparierenden] events or things as remembered events that they have a background to which the belief relates, and that the belief relates the event, which appears and is characterized specifically as remembered, to the actual now, understood as the reference point for the past. We could say that the consciousness of actuality, whose emanation point is the now-consciousness, is in a certain sense united with the memorial consciousness, figuratively speaking: Intentions radiate backwards from the now to the event and, conversely, move forward from the event to the now. And is memory possible as memory without that? Well, not every memorial consciousness (memorial consciousness in the widest sense) is consciousness of the past. I recall the Roons: the Roons that stands before me as now existing, though merely
re-presented. But we have the connection even here. Could there be a 
positing consciousness on the basis of a phantasy apparency without 
such a connection? I can, of course, have an indeterminate memory, 
inasmuch as I can order the appearance in an unfamiliar way and have 
in indeterminate fashion the mere consciousness of “having been.” 
Likewise, I can have the bare consciousness of the “familiar,” under-
stood as the consciousness that something given, say, to perception, 
is at the same time something remembered in an indeterminate way, 
and hence is the same as something that has been (the act of recogniz-
ing). Can a phantasy image that emerges suddenly also have the bare 
characteristic of the “familiar”? Of course. I phantasy before going 
to sleep. All sorts of faces appear, now clearly, now indistinctly. And 
then I recognize one as a sailor whom I once saw in Heligoland, and 
another as a head that I know from a picture. And what is more, I 
remember that I had already repeatedly phantasied the head.

However, this is not an empty positing; on the contrary, it is an ap-
prehension that takes the “image” as a member of a spatio-temporal 
environment and fits it into the “world” in a determinate or indeter-
minate way. But, of course, one may say: It is an apprehension that 
encompasses the apprehension of the salient apparency and gives to 
it the mode of belief. And this belief with this apprehension content 
and the content’s respective determinacy and indeterminacy, if it is to 
be valid, requires a legitimation; and this legitimation then leads, ac-

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phantasy of the head. And the apparency, “head,” is the same over and over again in these cases. I am now having my perceptual consciousness and, in the nexus of the same consciousness, the phantasy of the head. The phantasy of the head is a consciousness, even if a modified consciousness, a phantasy consciousness; and it belongs in the nexus of the total consciousness in the now.

Later on, I remember: The earlier total consciousness is now there in a modified way as phantasm (more or less obscurely), and perhaps in the character of memory (when not there as mere phantasy).

And in the nexus of this consciousness, the earlier apparency, the earlier phantasy consciousness, then makes its appearance, but not in such a way that everything would now stand in a sequence. The phantasy consciousness of the head [is] the same, and the actuality consciousness in which it finds its place [is] modified in phantasy. (The head at that time belonged in the earlier actually present reality!) The phantasy consciousness is itself modified in turn, although, after the modification, a phantasy apparency is again given in it. How is that supposed to be understood?

Should we say: It belongs to every consciousness as living consciousness (as lived experience) to have its place within the total consciousness with its now? This insertion is something real and characterizes the consciousness in question (the “act” in question, here the phantasy act). In recollection, we have this whole complex “recollected.” And even if everything there may now have the characteristic of phantasy, the nexus is one nexus; and in their insertion into this one nexus, the memory is related to the phantasy consciousness of the head of the sailor. As far as the other members [of the total consciousness] are concerned, [the memory is related] to perceptual consciousness, judging consciousness, and so on.

But how can I remember a perception and a simultaneous phantasy as distinct from one another, since, if I now execute a memory, the perception itself is modified and the phantasy as well? The perception is now replaced by a phantasy. The phantasy, however, was already a phantasy anyway, so what else can it be now? Hence I now have no distinction: I have phantasy on both sides.

It is clear that the phantasy is also modified, and precisely in the sense in which the perception is. And yet: Are phantasied phantasies not just phantasies again?
APPENDIX XXIV

THE APPEARANCE, EITHER PERCEPTUAL APPEARANCE OR PHANTASY APPEARANCE, AS MATTER FOR POSITING AND FOR TEMPORAL APPREHENSION

<probably 1908>

Phantasy\(^1\) is placed in opposition to perception,\(^2\) yet here we have a wealth of difficult modifications.

The living perception with its phases sinking back into the depths of the immediate consciousness of the past. The “fresh,” primary memorial consciousness that follows on the perception (which is only just over with). The memory that re-presents again (reproductive memory along with its reproduced phases of the past).\(^3\) The re-presenting presentation of something continuously existing and presented as belonging to what is co-present (e.g., the presentation of the Roons, not the memory of the past Roons). The depictive presentation of something presently existing or existing in the past, or coming to be in the future. Simple phantasy presentation, and so on.\(^4\)

The consciousness of essence \([\textit{Wesen}]\) based on these modifications and presentations\(^5\) runs throughout all of them.

If, however, we distinguish what varies from what alone comes into question for the seeing of an essence, then certainly only the

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\(^1\) From here to “consciousness of essence” (below, line 18) the text was crossed out. — Editor’s note.

\(^2\) Inserted later: “for the purpose of grasping the essence.” — Editor’s note.

\(^3\) For example, “repetition” of a measure just heard and still “remembered.”

\(^4\) “Simple phantasy presentation, and so on” was subsequently crossed out; probably at the same time that he crossed it out, Husserl inserted: “And all attendant modifications. And all these perceptions, memories, pictorializations, and so on, or their phantasy modifications, can be perceptions, memories, etc., of the same ‘essence,’ of the same matter of ‘appearance.’” — Editor’s note.

\(^5\) “Presentations” \([\textit{Darstellungen}]\) subsequently changed to “impressions.” — Editor’s note.
“appearance” remains. The appearance is either perceptual appearance or phantasy appearance (assuming that one finds that these two will suffice). For example, we find perceptual appearances in perception, in hallucination and illusion, in image presentation; we find phantasy appearances as matter for positing and also for temporal apprehension in “mere” phantasy, in memory, expectation, and in representing presentation of every sort that is not actually pictorializing presentation.

We finally come back to appearances, therefore, and to this fundamental distinction between appearances. The object appears in them as this object or that, and the object that thus appears is precisely of such and such a character. We can look at the essence apart from existence or nonexistence and apart from temporality, and also apart from position in space (in actual space).

But then the consideration of the essence can also be directed toward the duration, toward the object in and with its duration, toward the temporal form in the case of objects (events) variously taking shape in time, toward the spatial configuration, and so on.

The appearance of the enduring object (the object in its duration, the object in its temporal form, etc.) then comes into question again. And the acts are: Perception of the temporal objectivity in its temporal form, memory, depiction, hallucination, mere phantasy.

What are these “appearances”? For example, the enduring perceptual appearance (or the enduring appearing of this tree in perception) presents the tree to me as a tree appearing in such and such a way. The enduring image appearance of a perfectly similar tree contains “the same appearance.”

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6 Inserted later above “appearance” [Erscheinung]: “apparency” [Apparenz]. — Editor’s note.
7 Somewhat later a question mark was inserted after “suffice,” and the following was asserted after the parenthesis: “One could say, that is:” — Editor’s note.
8 Husserl erased something before “in image presentation” and somewhat later inserted a comma and the words “on the other hand” after “in image presentation.” This insertion, however, may not make any sense; “on the other hand” could probably be correctly inserted only after “perceptual appearances.” — Editor’s note.
9 Inserted somewhat later: “intuitively.” — Editor’s note.
10 The [same] “essence” too, which is the same independently of position in time and space.
a) An essence, a phenomenological act-essence, is common to both sides, although in one case the appearance (the appearing) is experienced in the mode of uncontested perceptual intention, of uncontested belief intention, and in the other case in the mode of contested belief intention, toward which, if I take the “tree” to be actual, an image consciousness, a pictorializing intention is additionally directed. The semblance tree image “of” the actual tree. In [235] the semblance tree I intuit its original, the actual tree.

The illusionary act and the simple perceptual act are about the same essence. In what sense? Well, in the sense that the same thing presents itself from the same side, except that in the one case it is uncontested and in the other it is “annulled.”

b) The appearance in the objective sense — the objective sense, what appears as it appears, not as something existing but as what is identically meant as such.

If we take for this purpose a phantasy (a simple modification of perception) or a memory, then what is meant as meant can be the same, hence the essence of the “intentional object.”

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11 Somewhat later, Husserl inserted at the beginning of this paragraph: “phantsic.” — Editor’s note.
12 Inserted later: “(in phantasy).” — Editor’s note.
13Inserted somewhat later: “ontic.” — Editor’s note.
I can remember the past in the ordinary sense of the term. I can also produce a presentation of it in image; that is, produce a presentation of it according to a description or on the authority of skeletons, and so forth. Following a description, I produce a presentation of the attempted murder of Queen Elizabeth. The latter presentation, in relation to the past, is to be placed on the same footing with the presentation that, following a description, I produce of a present, of a present thing and event, which I myself do not remember.

Memory is direct presentation of what is past, just as perception is direct presentation of what is present. Direct presentation. What does that mean? It certainly will not do to subject perception and memory to the same measure: Perception is impression. The appearance is unmodified appearance. It is surely already inherent in this that belief is also there, as unmodified (“pointing” to the nexus). In memory, the appearance is modified appearance, the belief is modified belief, the whole phenomenon is one of modification. This modification, however, is not the one that we are in the habit of designating as mere presentation.

To be sure, examples and analysis using living intuitions are required here again and again. What I ordinarily find as “mere presentation” are appearances in the nexus of memorial appearances. For example, I imagine how good it would be if I were to have such and such a change made involving my desk. I present to myself how the cabinet makers come in, shift the piece of furniture, and so on. I have my remembered room in this presentation, and within the nexus of this memorial intuition there is only one appearance that “does not
belong,” that conflicts with the memory, with this memory and with the temporal nexus in which my room has been temporally extended since the construction of the house. Hence precisely as it is in the case of the perceptual image. Now where are examples of absolutely free phantasies? Is not my Ego, at the least, involved in the latter? And this Ego certainly also has its nexus of memories and its nexus of perceptions, and consequently everywhere the same situation. Do I therefore come back again to this: that all presentation is presentation by means of an image?

Or rather, do we not come back, both in the case of sensations and in the case of apprehensions, in short, in the case of appearances, then again in the case of apprehensions in the new sense,\(^1\) in the functioning as an image, to the distinction between impression and idea . . . ? Hence we have to revise [what we have said].

In any event, something identical seems to stand out as core, as appearance, in memory, expectation, free phantasy (in phantasy within a memorial background and in allegedly absolutely free phantasy). The same appearance [stands out] in the manner peculiar to memory, in the manner peculiar to phantasy, and so on. This appearance, however, cannot be called phantasy appearance. Why not\(^2\) memorial appearance? Both phantasy and memory are equally entitled to the appearance. We therefore need a new term.

\(^1\) Inserted later: “that is to say.” — Editor’s note.
\(^2\) Inserted later: “just as well.” — Editor’s note.
APPENDIX XXVI

NOTES. PROBLEMATA. <THE “SURPLUS BEYOND THE APPEARANCE” AS ACCOUNTING FOR THE DIFFERENCE IN THE CASE OF NONPERCEPTUAL APPEARANCES> 

<probably 1909>

1) “Sensuous intuitions.” What is their characteristic supposed to be? In the Göttingen lectures, I distinguished *transeunt* (transcendent) and immanent intuitions. Does a division of intuitions into sensuous and nonsensuous intersect with the latter distinction? Hence immanent intuitions [divided into] the “sensuous” (a tone: taken immanently) and the nonsensuous: immanent intuition of an “act.”

In the *Logical Investigations*, I differentiated “contents” into primary contents and act-characteristics, but all of this is fundamentally in need of new investigation. What is “content”?

2) The problem of the relationship between perceptual experience (the perceptual appearance in it) and imaginational appearance (mere phantasy appearance), and also memorial appearance. Moreover, the appearance belonging to expectation. One could say that in the case of all of these nonperceptual appearances (intuitions), the appearance is the same. The difference lies in another dimension, in something that transcends the appearance.

3) The problems that concern the “surplus beyond the appearance.” Above all, the characteristic of “positing” and the parallel characteristics that lie under the title “nonpositing.” Or is positing a universal characteristic that would have to touch belief, unbelief, doubt, deeming possible, and so on, and all of the modifications belonging to them as well: impression — idea?

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APPENDIX XXVII

<THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ABSTRACTIVE DIFFERENTIATION OF APPREHENSION (APPEARANCE) AND QUALITATIVE MODE>

<probably 1909 or 1910>

In addition, we must note the following. One often calls a memory a phantasy. One also speaks of phantasiy a centaur in the room; one can phantasy “anything possible” into the given reality. On the other hand, one also calls an image, an illusion, a “formation produced by phantasy.” Above all, one preferably speaks of phantasy when a “phantasy appearance” built out of phantasms is given. A memorial appearance may be consciousness of the “actual” past, [but] it is first of all “phantasy appearance.” A consciousness of something that is, as it were, factually existing, a modification of a perception, specifically, of a sensuous perception, presents itself. Now let us take into consideration that we can abstract from the modal characteristic. Thus, in the case of an image, we can speak, without being troubled, of a “perception,” of a perceptual appearance in the face of what is illusory, hence in the face of the consciousness of nullity: There is an impressional apprehension on the basis of sensations, irrespective of the mode of belief and irrespective of further intentions that might possibly be built on them. In abstracto, therefore, we can differentiate appearance (apprehension) and mode; namely, the qualitative mode. And then perceptual appearances and phantasy appearances stand in contrast. In what way, then, is “phantasy appearance” the imaginative modification of perceptual appearance? Certainly not on the side of the qualitative moments, which are not in question here at all. On the other hand, must one not speak of an all-inclusive modification

1 The text of this appendix up to “… this would still have nothing to do with this imaginative modification” (below, p. 292, 5) is crossed out in the manuscript. — Editor’s note.
here? Phantasms correspond to the sensations, but the apprehensions in both cases are also modified in the same proportion, irrespective of the mode of belief.

Now if one were to assume that it would also be the case that appearance in this sense would necessarily demand a qualitative mode, this would still have nothing to do with this imaginational modification.

Well, one can make the further objection: If we do then assume modes in this way, they can, of course, also be modes modified in the manner peculiar to phantasy. I am able to present to myself in phantasy any mode of belief, doubt, inclination, and so on, along with the corresponding rays of motivation. This, however, does not determine the phantasy appearance as phantasy appearance, which, on the contrary, can remain identically the same in whatever way these matters may additionally develop. And should not a pure phantasy be possible as pure phantasy appearance without any modes of belief? Above all, does it not therefore follow that imagining a thing does not mean the same as quasi-perceiving in the sense of quasi-believing? Rather, [it means] quasi-perceiving in the sense <of> having the modification of an impressional “appearance,” just as I have it in an image without belief. Hence belief, and just as little any other determinate mode, is not always co-imagined. To imagine a house does not mean to imagine the perception of a house implicitly. If perception is precisely the act of belief. It is certainly otherwise in memory, which in fact offers not only imagination and an actual belief besides, but also, imaginatively, perception in the full sense, and in addition those belief intentions that lead to the actual now.

Consequently, I must carefully think everything through again; and I see once more that the other possibility — according to which we must consider “apprehension” (appearance) and mode as relatively separable — [is to be] preferred.

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2 Inserted somewhat later: “whether unmodified or modified.” — Editor’s note.
3 Just as to have a “perception of a thing” (impression) (understood as impressional appearance) does not mean to perceive it actually.
4 The part of the sentence running from “just as I” to “belief” was crossed out somewhat later. — Editor’s note.
5 But surely some mode or other is!
APPENDIX XXVIII

IMAGE APPARENCY <PHANTASY APPARENCY AND THE QUESTION OF “ITS INSERTION INTO THE NEXUS OF ACTUAL EXPERIENCE”>

<probably 1912 or somewhat later>

This apparency consists of a harmonious intentional complex. Intentions aimed at the surroundings. The latter in conflict with the rest of the perception. The apparency that makes up the image appearance remains harmonious in itself, but along with its image-space receives the characteristic of nullity. On occasion, the image apparency presents another object by virtue of symbolic intentions. These intentions can have the modal characteristic of belief, etc., or also of mere presentation.

Cannot an image apparency make its appearance precisely as it is without any conflict? Or, on the contrary, is it then not really an image apparency? Hence we do better to say that a perceptual\(^1\) apparency has the characteristic precisely of perception, and modally this is the characteristic of “belief” (perception). And consequently the apparency also has its belief surroundings; what appears has its place in the perceptual world (continuously extending out on all sides from what is perceptually given). An illusionary apparency has its place in this same world by means of conflict. But is an apparency not conceivable that has no place at all in the world-appearance, that, say, has no mode of belief or of illusion or even of doubt in “competition” with another apparency, and so on?\(^2\) For example, if we could voluntarily produce a visual hallucination in the dark, and if, in doing so, all other sense apprehensions of what is sensed in the other sense-fields would be without intuitive relation to what is hallucinated?

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1 Inserted later: “impressional.” — Editor’s note.
2 But is this not true without further ado of the aesthetic image?
In such a way that an “appearance” would hover before me without any consciousness of the situating reality, but also without consciousness of the nullity surely related to it by means of its conflict with reality, as well as every other mode of belief that would give it a position in relation to the world and to the Ego. We approach this when, for example, we see some impressional apparency in a stereoscope, without, however, noticing what belongs to the perception of a box, and so on.

Or if we otherwise conceive of a visual image that fills out our whole field of vision while we pay no heed — living entirely in visual perception — to the rest of our sense-fields. But, of course, so much always remains left over there that a characterization of nullity remains attached.

My experience shows that there can be sensation complexes (“finger — in the mouth”) without any insertion [into the nexus of actual experience], without their being apprehended as an apparency by an apprehension that brings about [such an] insertion — this is a datum that is not a “reality” and that does not represent any reality. More important, however, is the question whether or not an apparency can be given in the described way, therefore in precise analogy to a “pure phantasy.”

In pure phantasy we also have an apparency, a phantasy apparency, without any relation to reality. I, of course, do factually exist and have my place in reality, which I certainly continuously perceive, only without directly heeding it. But at the same time, I have the “image,” the phantasy apparency; and this is given without any conflict with the perceptual apparency that furnishes the ground of reality, and without any relation to it through intentions and modes of belief somehow combining with it. The image also does not positively appear as null (as illusionary, as conflicting); every characteristic of positing (which would have to be legitimated by connections of memories or analogous connections of posittings ending in actual perception) is absent.

In the case of a pure phantasy, one does not say that some relation to the world of memory would have to present itself, hence that what appears in phantasy, what is dreamt, would have to undergo a negative positing. To be sure, we can say at any time here that this is mere imagining. Looked at more closely, however, the ultimate ground, the ground for taking something as existing or as having existed, is
simply not there. Positively, we could produce only a vague survey of our lives and say that in the whole field of my memory, to the extent that I can bring it into view, I come upon nothing like this; there is nothing to insert.

5 Semblance objects without intuitive conflict: abstention from belief

And let us assume further that in a completely darkened room we look into a stereoscope and see nothing of the actual world beyond the world of the semblance object, and that our attention is turned away from the other sense-fields, particularly the field of touch — that, in any case, nothing is there that could visually, perceptually, show these images to be illusory images. Only faint stirrings are possible, if perhaps there were to remain over a knowing — indirect intentions — that the offering of “images” is in question here. Do we not then have a full analogue of pure phantasy events, of pure phantasy formations? The former images appear in the now, as things that are concretely present. The latter, however, do not appear as concretely present. And what is the situation in the case of the intentions? They are there, but modified. The “insertion of something into the nexus of actual experience” is missing.

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3 Or belief annulled by knowledge.
4 N.B.: Pure semblance images, not images of actual objects, are supposed to be shown.
5 (but not depictive of landscapes belonging to reality).
MEMORY AND PHANTASY.

<MODIFICATION OF BELIEF FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FROM MODIFICATION OF IMPRESSION IN REPRODUCTION. APORTIA: WHAT KIND OF MODIFICATION DOES MEMORY UNDERGO BY SHIFTING INTO “MERE PHANTASY”?>

<probably the first half of 1909>

The perception of a physical thing, the image appearance (the consciousness of a semblance image) belong here, but also vacillation, doubt: “Is it an image or is it a human being?”

The following is clear here: The difference between perception and fiction does not consist in the fact that in both cases we have the same sensation and the same apprehensial sense, though in such a way that the apprehension of the same sensation would at one time be impressional apprehension and at another time modified apprehension in the sense of phantasy. Of course, one might well say: In the case of fiction, I have only a phantasy; the object is only a phantasy object. And this is explained by the fact that I do indeed have sensation as a foundation but that I apprehend it, in the manner of phantasy, not as something present but as something present as it were.¹

For the object in fact stands there as present, as there itself and as actually there, just as much as it does in perception. The appearance is an appearance of the present, a perceptual appearance, precisely as it is in normal perception.

In both cases, therefore, the appearance is an impression. In one case, however, the apprehension intention is unimpeded, existing harmoniously in the system of intentions relating to one another, and so the impression has the characteristic of harmony.

In the other case, the apprehension intentions are checked, annulled, and in this sense modified, and consequently we have the characteristic of a figment or the characteristic of conflict between two apprehensional possibilities: mannequin or human being, and so on.

Hence these modifications that convert belief (that is to say, the characteristics of harmony) into disbelief, doubt, are fundamentally different from the modifications by means of which impression is

¹ Inserted later: “This is not correct.” — Editor’s note.
converted into reproduction. The first of these modifications all occur within impression; normal perception, illusionary image consciousness as fiction, vacillating perceptual consciousness are all impressions.

5 What, then, about image consciousness proper — not illusionary image consciousness but the exhibiting consciousness based on image consciousness?

A portrait. An original represents itself to me in image consciousness. In the figment, by means of image consciousness, I re-present to myself something else, something that does not appear. However, we have yet a second case here. Or, more distinctly, we have two cases: What is exhibited is taken as something actually existing or as actually having been (perhaps also as something that will come into being), or it is a “mere phantasy.” How are we to describe this phenomenologically?

Should we say that in the one case a further intention with the characteristic of memory (or an analogous characteristic) is grounded on the figment consciousness, and in the other case a modification of this intention? But what kind of modification? Here we will ask first about what kind of modification it is that memory undergoes by shifting into “mere phantasy.”

First View

Obviously one cannot get by with saying: A phantasy appearance serves as the basis here, only in one instance a moment of belief is present while in the other it is not. Just as little as one could describe, say, the illusionary consciousness of a figment in contrast to perception by saying that belief is absent in the former and present in the latter.

Second View

30 It will not do to say the following either: In one instance the phantasms undergo an impressional apprehension, and in the other a reproductively modified apprehension. (And likewise in the other case: In one instance the sensations undergo an impressional apprehension, in the other a modified apprehension.)
Can one somehow separate sensuous material and apprehension in such a way that each could be modified independently in the manner peculiar to phantasy?

One could point here to the cases in which, say, we phantasy into a given appearance an appearance different from it. As when I alter the house appearance fictionally, but in such a way that the material of sensation remains untouched. I imagine, for example, that a theatrical scene rather than the house is actually there, and so forth. Then we would at least have a part of the apprehensional components modified in such a way that we would have ascribed phantasy components to them. Of course, what the ascribing signifies and how the whole example should be analyzed more precisely is still the question.

Third View

It is obvious that when we compare memory and phantasy we must be careful in our choice of examples and not treat as the same what is not entirely the same.

For example, memory of a soaring bird and phantasy of “the same” = a bird the same in content within phantasy surroundings the same in content. In both cases, we have the same appearances (the unity of the same appearance, including the background), and yet not full equality such that we could say that in one instance the moment of belief is added and in the other instance it is absent or is modified in the manner peculiar to phantasy. For if in one case memory presents itself by virtue of which the event is taken as past, then obviously we must distinguish in the memory: 1) the event running its course as it were, which appears there in the manner of phantasy; and 2) that which makes it into a “representant,” into a recollective re-presentation of a just past event.

Is this distinction not altogether analogous to the distinction between semblance consciousness and image consciousness? The semblance, the figment, “is not taken to be something self-sufficient.” We represent something else in it, we look at something else representatively; that is to say, a new intention is there that has the character of a “representing” intention. So too what appears in phantasy, the

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2 ad 1.
event referred to above that is running off as it were, is a repre-
sentant of a past event. That is to say, a founded consciousness is
there; specifically, an impressional intention that refers to a nexus of
intentions through which the relation to the actual now is brought
about.

The “belief” is not belief in what appears in phantasy; it is rather
the consciousness of harmony belonging to the representing appre-
hension. The apprehension is unchecked intention. Specifically, im-
pressional intention. But as far as pure phantasy is concerned, which
forms the basis here, the consciousness is a modification, “phantasms
in such and such an apprehension.” The whole appearance is some-
thing modified (something reproductive, something derived), and so
are its intentions. This constitutes the difference in this case from the
figment in image representation. The figment is given impressionally;
and the modification that presents itself in its case or in the case of
the semblance perception consists in the annulment that the impres-
sional rays of apprehension undergo, hence in the consciousness of
disagreement, and so on.

It is natural to say: A sensation (any impression) immediately al-
 lows only impressional apprehension, just as a phantasm immediately
allows only phantasy apprehension.

But mediately, in the form of representation, in symbolically in-
tuitive apprehension and symbolically empty apprehension (analo-
gizing internally and designating externally), it can be otherwise.

Unmodified and modified intentions can fit in there.

The first proposition is surely questionable.

The latter interpretation of memory, however, will also excite
doubts. Is a pure phantasy therefore supposed to be what serves as
the basis here, and are intentions of a higher level just supposed to be
built on it? But if I now re-present Sieber\(^3\) to myself, for example, do

\begin{footnote}
\(3\) Sieber is a place near Herzberg in the Harz Mountains. — Editor’s note.
\end{footnote}
Fourth View

One could say: A fundamental modification converts perception into memory; specifically, perception is impressional phenomenal belief — memory is reproductive phenomenal belief.

Impressional phenomenal belief — taken concretely, perception — can be annulled by conflict, and in different ways, of course. In the case of the mannequin/human being, we have continuous component parts of the appearance that are not annulled (clothes, hair, and the like, and above all: an actual physical thing, a physical body). We then have a) a deceptive object proper. Perhaps vacillation over whether the object is this thing or that (supposing that no decision occurs making one of the members, one of the possibilities, appear as a deception).

b) In other cases, conflict obtains throughout; namely, in such a way that no concrete part of the appearance remains accepted, not even an intentional core of appearance: No physical body whatsoever is there; there is nothing. In spite of the nullified intention, the appearance nevertheless continues to exist. The belief, the intention belonging to actual experience, is annulled, but the appearance is preserved. Now, indeed, we do have precisely a deceptive object. A nullity.

But should the consciousness in this case, in which nothing remains of the appearing object, be characterized as pure phantasy? That is to say, does pure phantasy signify nullity consciousness? Nullified consciousness. Do we have partial phantasy in the other case, the case of partial annulment by means of which the object is null but nevertheless exists, only as “otherwise”? (Disbelief here is certainly not negative judgment. Just as belief is not affirmative judgment. Rather, it is a question of the characteristic of perception, of intuitive positing, or whatever one wants to call it.) Annulment of positing, of the whole positing not only as a whole but with respect to all of its parts, would yield the appearance of an object that would include nothing whatsoever of positing: pure presentation (pure nothing, pure figment).

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5 The last sentence was later changed in part as follows: “Rather, it is a question of a characteristic of perception itself, characteristic of intuitive positing.” — Editor’s note.
In memory there would correspond to this: 1) the case of the mixture of memory and nullified memory, and 2) the case of purely nullified memory. That is to say, all of the elements of the whole of the appearance may be elements of memory, but they are annulled through and through; they yield a *memorial figment*.

(Now one does not need to understand by memory here a complete consciousness of the past. If an “image” suddenly rises to the surface with the consciousness of having been, or in the consciousness of being belonging to memory, then I do not at all need to be capable of fitting it into the one valid nexus of memory.)

Now what about the feasibility of this interpretation? According to the interpretation, memories are supposed to conflict with memories. In the previous case, elementary intentions belonging to actual experience conflicted with one another within the sphere of perception and were alternately annulled (which, of course, is far from being a serious description). In the present case, we would have phantasy modifications (“memories”) and here too the conflict of memorial intentions, and, in the case of pure memory, complete annulment: It is nothing, pure imagination. (Or, on the other hand, what is remembered did exist, but not as it appears here; this and that in the appearance is pure “phantasy.”) — The interpretation therefore actually seems to work. We would only have to add that memory here would not first of all have to signify consciousness of the past but instead, so to speak, *reproductive consciousness of being*, whatever more precise developments it may then permit.

Accordingly, we would have: 1) perception, semblance consciousness; specifically, partial and total semblance consciousness, pure perceptual fiction; 2) memory = reproduction; partial semblance-memory and total semblance-memory, the latter pure memorial fiction, “mere phantasy.”

Thus it is in the case of harmonious acts of perception and memory; that is, I disregard cases of vacillation and “doubt”.

*Accordingly, “phantasy” would not be an original and primitive modification.* Memory would be something simple, and phantasy

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6 The comma was later changed into an equals sign [=]. — Editor’s note.
would obviously not be something simpler. Phantasy would be the mode of “nullified” memory.\(^7\)\(^8\)

Now we would have to reflect carefully from this standpoint on all of the modifications. Hence memory of the second degree. Phantasy of the second degree. Image representation, and so on. As far as the image representation is concerned, obviously it would offer no difficulties. Just as little as significative presenting and positing. Namely, inasmuch as we can say: The given appearance is the bearer of a new intention.

But now, after all, a difficulty does arise. We surely have the distinction between positing and nonpositing\(^9\) in the case of\(^10\) pictorial and signitive presentations, and likewise in the case of free empty presentations. Is nonpositing here also the annulment of positing, its neutralizing, so to speak? Or should one say: Here there is a non-positing or “mere presentation” that contains nothing at all in the way of such neutralizing? But how does this accord with the theory we have tried, which, in the sphere of perception as in the sphere of phantasy, reduces all “mere presenting” to modes of belief-intentions? Naturally, it would not be a serious objection against the attempted interpretation to say that we took no note of the tensions, oppositions, nullifications of the intentions in phantasy. We do not note these in the case of impressional fiction either: as long as we do not analyze and focus our attention on the single moment.

But, of course, the difficulty itself remains unresolved. One will certainly not want to say that these presentational positings and mere presentations are fundamentally different from those belonging to the first sphere?

However, as soon as we say that it is a fact that mere presentations come into being in the impressional and memorial spheres in the indicated way, or even say only that the fact that mere presentations arise in this way is grounded in the essence of impressions and memories,\(^11\)

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\(^7\) Brief definition of the fourth view.

\(^8\) The following note appears on the margin, scratched out but still easily legible: “Of course, this theory is refuted later on.” — Editor’s note.

\(^9\) Not the image figment, therefore, but the image-subject presentation.

\(^10\) Inserted later: “symbol presentations as.” — Editor’s note.

\(^11\) Inserted later: “(in the annexation to them as empty intentions).” — Editor’s note.
we have granted that mere presentations are not mere formations produced by other intentions but instead only arise from them; and we must grant that they are something peculiar. If we do that, we then have a peculiar modification of perceptions, mere presentations, just as we have a peculiar modification of image positings, “mere” image presentations. It is not easy to make up one’s mind.

Should we say: the portrait-appearance awakens a memory in me (specifically, a memory that has not been annulled or is not being annulled in intuition), but the mere aesthetic image awakens an annulled memory? Or not only the image as figment is annulled, but also the image subject? But that would certainly be very doubtful. And yet again, why should it be so doubtful?¹²

¹² The following, however, is very doubtful indeed. Namely: perceptual appearance has either the mode of belief, in which case the internal and external intentions (the intentions aimed at the surroundings) harmonize into a unity: the object, as well as all of its surroundings, is there in the mode of actuality. Or we have discordances, and the mode of appearance is then an inclination to believe, a doubt, the mode of nullity, and so on. Likewise reproductively in the memory. But also with respect to the memory itself. With respect to pure phantasy, however, we find this only if we posit the phantasy in relation to “reality,” make a supposition and the like. We find no such modes in the phantasy itself.
The “tendencies,” the intentions, produce apprehension unities; and these apprehension unities contain in part sensations, in part elementary memories, and intentions proceeding from both. These intentions unite to form a total intention or — what is the same thing — a total apprehension. When the elements are memories, the whole has the character of a memorial unity.

But then we must also distinguish the tendencies, the intentions that as unmodified belong to the sensations, from those that as modified (precisely as memorial) belong to the elementary memories.

We would have: the original (originary) flow of sensation (temporal flow) and, on the other hand, the derived flow of secondary memory (the temporal flow of memory belonging to recollection). And with regard to the apprehensions, we would have the originary apprehension grounded in the flow of sensation: perception; and the derived apprehension grounded in the flow of recollection: memory. In both cases, harmonious consciousness is presupposed.

The same modification that leads from sensation to reproduction (always understood here as elementary memory) leads from the sensation intention (which leads beyond the given sensation consciousness and has its basis in it) to the memorial intention, and from the total sensation apprehension — that is, the originary appearance (sensation appearance, perceptual appearance) — to the memorial appearance (reproductive appearance).

However, by virtue of the intentions connecting them, perceptual intentions can also enter into conflict with perceptual intentions, perceptual apprehensions with perceptual apprehensions, in part becoming weaker, in part stronger, and so on. The harmonious consciousness is only one case. There are coordinate cases.

Thus the “semblance” consciousness, the fictive consciousness, whose object is given in consciousness as a figment, precisely, as a semblance. Here, in the pure semblance consciousness, we have a unitary complex of intentions harmonious in themselves united in
the form of a perceptual appearance, but combined in the synthesis of conflict with intentions aimed at the surroundings or with harmonious perceptions that, as far as their mode of belief is concerned, are certain. This last statement can only mean: The latter complexes, intentional and at the same time impressional, remain “unbroken,” “steadfast,” and the others become broken down through conflict with such “steadfast” intentions. They receive the modal characteristic of the consciousness of nullity.

The parallel in the sphere of memory (according to the view put forth here), then, is phantasy fiction. Included there is pure, “mere” phantasy. The elements are still memorial elements. The intentional whole, however, is characterized as “free invention,” annulled by conflict with memory and perception having the characteristic of certainty. Of course, I have had doubts about interpreting the consciousness belonging to phantasy as figment consciousness. But that was essentially because, for comparison, I looked only at semblance consciousness in the ordinary sense, in which a semblance object stands before me as a figment within the fixed perceptual world. However, is it not also possible to have on the impressional side a case in which the total visual perception turns into a semblance, and a figment is not set within the visually given world? In the case of phantasy we have analogies to semblance consciousness: namely, the memorial semblance set into the world of memory as a certain and fixed world, or into the past reality and generally into the remembered reality, which is there intuitively and with which an “image” conflicts. Pure phantasy, however, stands in a “world of phantasy,” which itself conflicts totally with all reality characterized as certain.

Now is this interpretation feasible? Can one say: Every free phantasy, every phantasy without exception, dissolves into memories, but in such a way that the intentional unity established there is not a memorial unity, not an “unbroken” unity with respect to its intentional composition? On the contrary, the constituent intentions and the intentions aimed at the surroundings — each and all — are in considerable conflict with one another. The appearing whole is a nullity, a pure nothing.

\[^2\text{No.}\]
Initially everything seems to be in order here. However, on closer inspection we will have to make a different judgment.

Although otherwise remaining in what is universal, let us enter into a consideration of what is elementary. We come to sensations and primitive reproductions of sensation, which I called elementary memories. On the other side, we come to sensation intentions (understood as transeunt intentions adhering to the sensations) and to their modifications, hence memorial intentions.

Perception consists of complexes of sensation that are bearers of perceptual intentions; these would be unmodified. Transeunt memory consists of complexes of modifications of elementary sensation (hence of complexes of elementary memories) that are charged with the parallel modifications of perceptual intentions, hence with memorial intentions. Now let us consider the question: What is sensation? A purely immanent consciousness of a sensuous content. Nothing of the spatial present is in it. It does, however, essentially involve the temporal present (even if not in the form of a point), for sensation is nothing else but the original consciousness of immanent time.

Now what about the corresponding so-called “memory”? It is supposed to be pure modification of sensation. We then have purely immanent memory, it seems. But if the term is to be applicable, does not consciousness of the past belong to memory, and does this not imply a relation to the actual now? Are not intentional connections indicated thereby that lead from what is reproduced, from what hovers before one intuitively in a modified way, to the now? And do they not demand for their fulfillment certain continuities — not given — of further memories? Is it not evident that we must distinguish between, on the one hand, the consciousness belonging to the intentional relation to the now, to the actual now of the current perceptions, and [on the other hand], the pure counterpart of the sensation in which something sensed stands forth as a unity in a temporal extension, such that this counterpart is precisely the bare modification of what is sensed: the modified content, extended in time in such and such a way, or rather quasi-extended? Hence what were called memories there, the elementary modifications (not of perception, but) of its sensation component under the complete exclusion of all transeunt intentions,

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3 Refutation of this view in appendix β₁,₂ <i.e., Appendix XXIX>. 
were not memories at all but just *phantasms*. In the phantasm one is conscious of a content as *quasi*-immanently given, a content *quasi*-given in a temporal extension, and nothing further.

Likewise, if we take the counterpart of perception, and of the full perception with its total perceptual background, then modified intentions also correspond to all of the perceptual intentions. These are not memories in the proper sense either, but phantasy modifications. And we can think of every other consciousness as modified in exactly this way — for example, even genuine memories taken wholly and completely, together with their connection to the actually present perception.

Now it is clear that “memorial intentions” in the sense discussed here are not intentions at all, but reproductions of intentions: of actual intentions such as fasten on to sensations as sign intentions or as perceptual intentions that conflict with one another and are reinforced, inhibited, and so on. Genuine memorial intentions are also intentions, but they are not correspondingly reproductions of intentions. On the contrary, such reproductions do not confirm one another and do not conflict with one another; instead, only reproductions of conflict and concord belong to them.

It must be noted again and again that the mere reproduction of a sensation is not a memory; that, on the contrary, an actual intention, combining in a certain manner reproductive consciousness with the consciousness of *actuality*, belongs essentially to memory. Every intuitive memory includes reproduction but is more than mere reproduction; it is an act (an “impression”) grounded on reproduction.

Now it could certainly be that pure phantasy arose from impressions of memory understood as elements; namely, through the complete suppression of memorial intentions. And it could be that every pure

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4 Inserted later above the line: “phantasy-.” — Editor’s note.
5 Inserted later above the line: “phantasy-.” — Editor’s note.
6 Inserted later above the lines: “phantasy-.” — Editor’s note.
7 Inserted later above the line: “phantasy-.” — Editor’s note.
8 But one can object again and again with what is explained in β_{1, 2} <i.e., Appendix XXIX>. *Actuality* is not something that can be combined with mere phantasy; on the contrary, the latter is modification through and through. From the inactual intentions, actual intentions come to be.
9 Inserted later above the line: “mere phantasy-.” — Editor’s note.
phantasy, in itself, consists of such suppressions. And it was this, no doubt, that I really had in mind.

But, of course, this is a construction. We come upon perceptions, and within their complex unity we come upon sensations together with their apprehension intentions. We also come upon semblance perceptions, the consciousness of sensuous nullities. Moreover, we come upon actual memories with their consciousness of things belonging to the past, which have their relation to the now. Within the sphere of memory, we again come upon fictions. Once more we come upon free phantasies and, in them, phantasms. Living in phantasy consciousness, we have a consciousness of what is, as it were, now; of the physical thing, event, and so forth, given as it were. Living in the phantasy consciousness, we have no consciousness of nullity; but as soon as we direct our regard to the now and to actual reality as such, and give to what is phantasied a relation to them, we surely do have such a consciousness. Then what is phantasied is null; it is nowhere at all, not in any space, not in any time, and so on. If we compare memories (intuitive memories) and pure phantasies, we find the same content — an appearance content that, fundamentally, is perfectly alike — with a different characteristic. We find phantasms and the apprehension of phantasms constituting an objectivity that has the characteristic of being present as it were; and, in the other case, we find a consciousness of the past, which bestows on this present the characteristic of a present that has been, of a present that stands in a definite relation to the actual now, specifically, in the mode of positing. Mere phantasy in itself is mere modified consciousness (I always indicate this by the “as it were”). It posits nothing: it “merely presents.” If it is a question of a phantasy objectivity that I transplant to the remembered street, to the Hohen Weg, then it has the character of a figment.

The remembered street makes demands. The demands that it makes are related to possible natural objects or likely natural objects, and accordingly a human being with six heads is excluded. However, a fancy-dress parade that one chooses to phantasy as taking place on the street is indeed possible. But if I take a definite memory, the

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10 Inserted later: “mere.” — Editor’s note.
11 One can, however, make the objection: Bare phantasy is not combined with positing, cannot be combined with it at all. On the contrary, what positing signifies here is the modification of actuality!
demand that it makes is that no fancy-dress parade occur on the street but instead that certain specific events and no others occur there, and so on. In such cases, therefore, I do not have pure phantasy but a consciousness of conflict. Yet how is this possible? The displacement of what is phantasied into actually experienced reality conflicts with the theoretic positing belonging to the latter. Free phantasy as free contains no mode of positing whatsoever. Nota bene, completely free phantasy, if one grants that there is such a thing. A mode of positing, however, is not an annex, like the mode of assumption, of supposition!!

If I phantasy “freely” and in a purely playful way — if I “day-dream” — that I am walking on the Friedrichstrasse and there encounter Goethe, who addresses me amiably, and so on, then there are reality positings here. There is the Friedrichstrasse, etc., but what is phantasied in addition is not annulled. And yet do I not take part, I who I am now here and have never experienced such a thing? Here I surely have no supposing and positing-in. On the contrary, it “comes to mind in this way,” and I playfully pursue “what comes to mind.” Everything is “not true”; it is “nothing.” Hence the consciousness of conflict and nullification can certainly ensue without specific assuming, supposing, and so on. What abides are the positings. The posited Friedrichstrasse populated with such and such multitudes of human beings and endowed with phantasy events, phantasy formations, along with the posited I that goes for a stroll there: This unity, which contains in part the positing that belongs to actual experience and is in part phantasy and as a whole phantasy, conflicts with the total actual experience into which these positings must be inserted. The combination of what is phantasied with what is posited also gives to what is phantasied something of the character of positing, a claim on reality, on actuality, which is annulled by the actuality posited as certain.

In all of these complexes we then find a component of phantasy appearance as matter for memorial positings in the widest sense (positings belonging to actual experience), and these are not mere “shades” of the phantasy appearance. On the contrary, there is a consciousness that posits the relevant appearing objectivity as standing

12 Of course, not a proper “positing” supervening on “Friedrichstrasse,” but simply memory.
in such and such a relation to the actual world. This leads to intentional interconnections that combine “active” intentions — actual and possible — with one another. Determinate paths of fulfillment (and types of fulfillment), always running their course in actual intentions, are predelineated. Moreover, we have a component of phantasy appearance, not as matter for memorial positing, but in combination with memorial apprehensions, and in and by combining with the latter also characterized and degraded as consciousness of nullity.

Now is there phantasy appearance without any mode of positing? If so, one is naturally not permitted to say: The elements — the red, for example — were already given in countless situations and combinations; no one of these is privileged, since each annihilates the others, and so on. Or they were already given in every particular combination that occurs in the present phantasm, but never in this complex. And since every combination has an intention aimed at combination with other combinations as they occur here, everything is annulled. For this is certain: Annulment in the sense of mutual inhibition yields no nullity; rather, annulment is required by the rocks of given certainty: by perception, memory, and so on. Only thus can we conceive that, taken psychologically, the dispositions pertaining to the possible actualization of certain actual intentions are inhibited in such a way that the relevant apprehension does not come about at all. In that case, not the apprehensions but the apprehensional dispositions are inhibited, and the apprehension is simply not there. Consequently, no conflict and no annulment of apprehensions are there either. Annulment as positive act-occurrence must not be confused with the annulment of dispositions, which is a matter of psychological, constructive explanation, not of phenomenological analysis.

A case of such dispositional annulment, which prevents any apprehension of sensation from arising in the sphere of sensation, would be the “finger in my mouth” experience, in which I had sensation but no determinate insertion of this sensation group — in the sense of

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13 Again, this is unclear. Memory is memory of an objectivity, and that means to posit it. As far as the appearance of the objectivity is concerned, however, taken concretely it is the memory itself; but [the situation is] otherwise [in the case of] the essence that memory and bare phantasy can have identically in common.

14 Inserted later: “of course x:”. — Editor’s note.
objective apprehension — into an Ego- and world-apprehension.\textsuperscript{15}
This would be an exceptional case of a pure datum of sensation; and, of course, the sensation content here was not characterized as a semblance object. A semblance object or deceptive object is inserted into the world of actual experience.

I attempted to say above (p. 249f.): The same modification that leads from sensation to primitive reproduction (\(=\) sensuously immanent memory) leads from transeunt sensational intention to the corresponding memorial intention.

First of all, therefore, I contrast sensation and reproduction as memory. (Hence not sensation and mere “phantasm.”)\textsuperscript{16}

Let us consider the following. A memory, the reproductive consciousness of the past, points to interconnections. First of all, we have originally: A certain running off of impressions — a sequence of tones runs off, let us say. We have already studied time consciousness. Hence this consciousness gives an altogether determinate flow in which the originary sequence of tones becomes constituted as perceived.\textsuperscript{17}

Then I have a recollection of this tonal sequence. It runs off once more, but as “modified.”

1) Every tone — phenomenologically, the whole flow corresponding to it — has the modification of “representation.”\textsuperscript{18} The tone is not a now-existing tone; on the contrary, it represents. Something is there as it were (perception as it were). The now is a now as it were; the duration is a duration as it were; the tone quality is a tone quality as it were, and so on.

2) The intentions belonging to actual experience — these bring it about that the now that appears (the now as it were) represents something past, something that actually has been.\textsuperscript{19} Pursuing the fulfillment of these intentions, I am led to a nexus of memories (complexes characterized in the same way, with similar representations and intentions,

\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, was no indeterminate insertion whatsoever supposed to have played a part there?
\textsuperscript{16} Also for the theory of thing consciousness and time consciousness.
\textsuperscript{17} “perceived” later changed to “present unity.” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{18} Inserted later: “reproduction.” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{19} By all means, but what I deny is that one can separate these. They are completely indissoluble, and the tone phantasm is essentially characterized modally.
which finally “empty into” the now of actual perception and are united harmoniously with it).

Perhaps we should also refer to the following: Does not every sensation have its intentions that lead from the now to a new now, and so on? The intention aimed at the future. And, on the other side, the intention aimed at the past. Then, as far as memory is concerned, it too has its memorial intentions aimed at the future. These are completely determinate insofar as the fulfillment of these intentions (if it is at all at one’s disposal) runs in a definite direction and is completely determined with respect to its content, while in the case of perception the intentions aimed at the future are in general indeterminate with respect to their matter and only become determinate by means of further actual perception. (It is determined only that something or other will come.) As far as the intentions aimed at the past are concerned, on the other hand, they are wholly determinate in perception, but, so to speak, reversed. That is to say, there exists a determinate connection between the currently actual perception and the chain of memories, but in such a way that the memorial intentions (as one-sidedly directed) terminate in it. Now these memories, of course, are only possibilities. Only exceptionally are they, or some of them, actually co-given with the perception. On the other hand, it is certainly the case that perception is endowed with corresponding intentions aimed at the past — but empty intentions, corresponding to the memories or memorial connections just discussed. On the one side, the empty just-past, which has its directedness toward the actual now; but in addition, as one is surely permitted to say, vague, also empty intentions that concern what falls farther back. All of them directed toward the now. These intentions become actualized — come to fulfillment, in other words — because through recollection we put ourselves back into the past by a leap, so to speak, and then intuitively re-present the past to ourselves recollectively in its advance up to the now.

This, therefore, is the chain of one-sidedly directed temporal intentions (from the pre-now toward the now and from the now toward the future).

(Pure phantasy has, in its specific way, modified temporal intentions that do not posit any actuality and accordingly cannot be actually fulfilled.)
Hence the intentions of actual experience (the intentions belonging to memory that bring it about that what is perceived as it were, what as it were exists now, and what as it were has just been, represent what is past) belong to the former “temporal intentions.”

5 But how are we to conceive of this?

To begin with, there is a very important point to be retrieved here. I said above: Every perception is endowed with temporal intentions. What was described there was in fact only a particular sort of intentions belonging to actual experience. I could say the following of such intentions: The present was continually born from the past, a determinate present from a determinate past, of course. Or better: A determinate flow continually runs its course; the actual now subsides and flows over into a new now, and so on. Even if it be a necessity of an a priori sort, an “association” still restricts it; that is to say, the connection to the past and, in the other direction, “that something or other will come” are determined by actual experience. But then we will surely be led from this, which is secondary (the complex of intentions belonging to actual experience that we called temporal a short time ago), to what is originary. And that consists in nothing other than precisely the transition from the actual now to the new now. It belongs to the essence of perception that it not only has in its regard a now with the character of a point, and not only dismisses from its regard something that has just been of which it is nevertheless “still conscious” in the appropriate mode of “just having been” (primary memory), but also that it passes over from now to now and goes to meet the now with its regard. The waking consciousness, the waking life, is a living toward, a living from the now toward the new now. Here it is not merely and not primarily attention that I am thinking of. On the contrary, it might seem to me that independently of the mode of attention (attention in the narrower and wider sense) an originary intention reaches from now to now, combining itself with the experiential intentions — now indeterminate, now more or less determinate — which arise from past experience. Indeed, the latter marks out the lines of combination. However, the regard from the now toward the new now, this transition, is something originary, which first paves the way for future experiential intentions.

I said that this belongs to the essence of perception. I would do better to say that it belongs to the essence of impression. For we also include with perception the act of looking at in the sense of
attention. Now by no means should it be said that every actual mental process is an impression in the latter sense. But surely [what was described in the previous paragraph] should be said of every “primary content,” of every sensation, for example. A consciousness is aimed at the sensation content (the primary content) and is directed toward it from now to now. Every primary content becomes constituted as a unity of duration and change in originally impressional consciousness. (On the other hand, the same should not be said, for instance, of this consciousness itself.) Now if we live in this consciousness of unity, we have attention. (The question of the limits of sensuous contents remains.) The “phantasm” — above all, the content of primary memory, a sensuous content — implies modification: that is to say, the corresponding representational consciousness. Here, too, therefore, a consciousness of . . . (a “looking at”) that constitutes a temporal unity. This consciousness, however, is a “consciousness as it were.”

If it is actually supposed to be memory, however, then something more belongs to this consciousness as it were. The fitting into the past. The memorial modification consists in the fact that the total originary consciousness belonging to the moment in question receives its modification wholly and completely. Hence the temporal intentions in whose nexus the impressional regard belongs are modified totally, and so the whole intentional nexus into which that originary impression is inserted and which endows it with its character is universally modified. (We would have to say, then, that unity exists not only in the transition from now to now, but also in each now; and the total unity in question is reproduced: namely, the intention aimed at what is coming, as well as the intentions aimed at what is simultaneous and at what has been, adhere to what is reproduced. This full modification is the characteristic of memory.)

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20 Husserl later placed the last sentence in brackets and noted: “See below.” — Editor’s note.
21 It belongs to the constitution of the unity of the content of consciousness that a unitary intention flows over from now to now.
22 “(a ‘looking at’)” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
23 Inserted somewhat later: “(Nota bene, an actual consciousness.) It is important to note here that it belongs necessarily to this actual reproduction that it is either memory or expectation or in some other way has its intention aimed at its surroundings, temporal and perhaps spatio-temporal.” — Editor’s note.
This also states what the memorial modification of the perception of a thing looks like. I should say “the thing appearance” (impressional, of course). It is distinguished from an impression of the species of sensation because sensation is combined with certain intentional complexes, which we must characterize more precisely. We include in sensations only the consciousness that constitutes the unity of the duration and change of sensuous contents. Interwoven with this consciousness, however, we not only find those intentions that belong to the sphere of memory in the specific sense and that relate — as far as the datum of sensation is concerned — to what is earlier and later as well as simultaneous, but there also come into consideration complexes of motivated intentions that relate to “perceptual possibilities” (to motivated possibilities of temporal connections of sensations and of the intentions appertaining to them). Now all of this, representatively modified, yields not only the perceiving as it were (the appearing as it were) of the physical thing, but also the “as it were” with respect to the intentions that relate to the nexus of the temporal flow (and to the objective connection among the things in time) up to the now, hence everything that is given memorially.24

(Thus, on the one hand: I am, as it were, seeing the thing. And along with the sensations as it were, all the intentions that relate to the motivated perceptual possibilities of this thing are there reproduc-tively. On the other hand: the thing belongs in the running-off of the remembered happening. I saw the thing as I was walking toward it at that time. Before that, I was in the city, and then I approached the thing. And further, after I saw it, I did this and that, and such and such things and events ran their course in appearance: up to the now.)

This modification, therefore, is the modification of “being conscious again”; specifically, of recollection. These intentions that belong to being conscious again, reproductive intentions in the proper sense, then undergo modifications in an entirely different sense, the “qualitative” modifications (belief modifications). They are reduced

24 All of this is correct. The modification is actual re-presentation = being conscious again; specifically, the mode of certainty in recollection corresponding to the case of certainty in perception. Mere phantasy, however, is precisely the same (with all possible modes) in the absence of actuality. And everything in the sense of appendix \(\beta_1\) and \(\beta_2\) <that is, Appendix XXIX> also agrees with this.
to dispositions; they enter into conflict with one another; they undergo strengthening and inhibition, and so on. “Bare phantasy” is now supposed to be a kind of inhibition; specifically, the “annulment” of these intentions. A determinate occurrence in this series. For example, a mere phantasy of an enduring thing. That which belongs to the universal thing-form has an intentional nexus. But I have never experienced just this nexus. The nexus does not fit into any temporal series, and not only as a figment. On the contrary, it lacks belief intentions; that is to say, the intentions that in this respect are unmodified, whose fulfillment requires transition to the now.

But how, indeed, do they come by this modification? Or rather, how should we characterize this annulment more precisely? We can easily dispose of the case in which one phantasies something into a nexus of actual experience, by means of which a figment arises annulled by a resisting memory. (I phantasy to myself that a short while ago the house stood before me in flames, and so on). But does this really dispose of it? We have in this figment a mixture of memory and of something else. In the case of the burning house, what, indeed, is it that characterizes this something else? Does it itself have a characteristic that states: It belongs to a different memory and not to this one? And [what about] the arbitrary forming together of elements from different memories?

Probably nothing remains, therefore, except to contrast to every impression, first, recollection, and second, mere phantasy, the two distinguished by the mode of belief.26

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25 According to the theory tried out experimentally above, but already refuted.
26 Inserted later: “Mere phantasy does not have the mode of certainty, the mode of inclination, the mode of annulment of a positing — in short, it does not have any modes of positing at all. But all modes of positing can be found in phantasy, precisely in the mode of phantasy. Since the acts here are objectivating acts, naturally the ‘mode of belief’ makes up the difference between actual re-presentation and mere phantasy. For the mode of belief is nothing at all other than the objectivating mode understood as actual; and the phantasy modification of the mode of belief, the modification that belongs to the essence of the objectivating mere phantasy, is nothing other than this mode as inactual.” — Editor’s note.
APPENDIX XXIX

<ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MEMORY AND MERE PHANTASY: THE NEXUS INTENTIONS CANNOT BE CUT AWAY; THE CHARACTERISTIC OF ACTUALITY OR, RESPECTIVELY, INACTUALITY AS THE DISTINGUISHING FACTOR>

<probably about the end of February, 1910>

The arguments on this page permit a negative criticism. The relation to an actual now that belongs to memory is, of course, something highly important and noteworthy. It has an obvious analogue in the relation of every perception to an actual here. Furthermore, just as every memory points to an infinite nexus of memories (even to the earlier nexus of memories), so every perception points back to an infinite nexus of perceptions (and to a manifold infinity). (The here in perception is not perceptible; the now is not recollectable — that is to say, not given in the memory itself.) Now we can also take a perception purely by itself: outside its nexus. However, even if the nexus is not really there as the connection of the perception with further perceptions, it nevertheless lies in the intention “potentially.” That is to say, if we take the full perception at any moment, it still has a nexus in the form of a complex of determinate or indeterminate intentions belonging to it that leads on further and in its propagation becomes fulfilled in further perceptions. These nexus intentions cannot be cut away. As far as the single sensation is concerned, it is, in truth, nothing single. That is to say, the primary contents are in every case bearers of rays of apprehension; and they do not occur without such rays, however indeterminate they may be. This is also true in the case of memory. Memory possesses in itself its “nexus”; that is to say, as memory it has its form, which we describe as intentional moments directed forward and backward: again, it cannot exist without such moments. Its fulfillment requires series of memories, which empty
into the actual now. It is not correct that we can cut the memory off as something self-sufficient, disregarding the intentions that connect it to other memories, and that we can cut off these intentions themselves. The memory as something self-sufficient, the alleged mere phantasy, already has these intentions. Suppose, however, one declares: Though memory is indeed memory of an earlier now, a quasi-perception bringing such and such a temporal flow to consciousness once again, why should one not be able to hold the whole phenomenon firmly in consciousness and cut away the genuine memorial intentions on both sides? What could one reply to that? Perhaps this: The perception itself, the “originary” act, has not only its connections of spatiality (relating to the constitution of space), but also its connections of temporality. Every perception has its retentional halo and its protentional halo. The modification of perception must also contain this double halo in the mode of modification; and what distinguishes “mere” phantasy from memory is that this whole intentional complex has, in the one case, the characteristic of actuality and, in the other case, the characteristic of inactuality.

This takes all of the phenomenological requirements into account and eliminates all of the difficulties. Hence what was said in the text is useful only as aporiae. Obviously what was said also extends to the elements belonging to phantasies and memories, or to the elements of sensation belonging to perceptions. In these cases, too, the halo is indispensable.

Furthermore, the theory that seeks to turn mere phantasy into nullified memory will certainly not permit itself to be established. After perusing additional sheets, I find that the new interpretation, which I worked out in this supplement, is in fact quite sufficient.
APPENDIX XXX

MEMORY, RE-PRESENTATION OF ABSOLUTE SENSUOUS DATA AND OF SENSUOUS FORMATIONS

<probably 1909>

If I remember a melody, does not every single tone, along with its quality and intensity, have the characteristic of memory, hence the characteristic of thetic re-presentation?

If, however, any measure of a melody that I arbitrarily choose as the beginning measure is played in a pitch shifted at my pleasure (say, \(1/10\) pitch), and if the memory of the melody then unwinds, the whole complex has the characteristic of memory; and the characteristic extends throughout everything.

Is it really inherent in this that I must mean that I have already had the sensuous material in its qualitative and intensive character? I can certainly arbitrarily choose different pitches and produce memories in different registers of pitch. I always say, of course, that it is the same melody and that I am remembering it.

Compare to this Hume’s objection to his own doctrine that every idea points back to an impression: Qualities as gradations in continuous blending, and so on.

In any case, there are problems here.
<PHANTASY AS “MODIFICATION THROUGH AND THROUGH” ON THE REVISION OF THE CONTENT-APPREHENSION SCHEMA>

(transcription and emendation
<probably summer or beginning of winter, 1909>)

What is the source of the attempt — repeated again and again and failing again and again — to clarify the relationship between perception and phantasy? Or rather, what is the source of the failure of this attempt?

I think the answer is the following! I have not seen (and generally it has not been seen) that in the phantasy of a color, for example, it is not the case that something present is given, that color as a really immanent occurrence is given, which then serves as the representant for the actual color. On this view, sensed color and phantasm-color in themselves would be one and the same, only charged with different functions. I had the schema “content of apprehension and apprehension,” and certainly this schema makes good sense. However, in the case of perception understood as a concrete experience, we do not first of all have a color as content of apprehension and then the characteristic of apprehension that produces the appearance. And likewise in the case of phantasy we do not again have a color as content of apprehension and then a changed apprehension, the apprehension that produces the phantasy appearance.

On the contrary: “Consciousness” consists of consciousness through and through, and the sensation as well as the phantasm is already “consciousness.”

And there we have, first of all, perception as impressional (original) consciousness of the present, consciousness of what is there itself, and the like; and phantasy (in the sense in which perception is its antithesis!) as the reproductively modified consciousness of the present, consciousness of what is there itself as it were, of what is present as it were, of the phantasy present. (A concrete individual is present, it now exists and endures for its time, and so on.) If it is a transeunt, external perception, we can analyze the perception and find in it “the sensation of color”; we then find, in the attitude or focus we now have, a consciousness that is the perception of “color” (an act that means the color), a consciousness in which such and such a
color content is there, present (facing me). I put “color” in quotation marks and also said color content. For this is not objective color, the property of a physical thing, but a “content” in which, by virtue of its function, the color that is a property “is adumbrated.” Still, even if this moment of color-adumbration may be something different from color, as is evident, it is nevertheless something there itself; something posited as an object in the full perception we are now pursuing. In the sensation, we have a “consciousness” of this adumbration, but not a perception. But nevertheless we also have to say here: It is not the adumbration itself that is a concrete component of the external perception, but precisely the sensation; that is to say, a consciousness of this adumbration.2 This consciousness is not the whole perception but is allied with it in its core; it is consciousness of, although not the setting of something over against itself as an object.

The sensation is the substratum for the consciousness “apprehension as,” “appearance of,” a house that is colored. This apprehension consciousness and the whole appearance consciousness is again an impressional consciousness, an unmodified consciousness.

We can perhaps say: If the house stands before me but I do not focus my attention on it, then the consciousness belonging to the perceptual appearance is brought about just as the sensation was brought about before (e.g., within normal perception). We are in the habit of classifying the having of something as an object in the proper sense, this being-turned-toward, this positing of something as a subject for predicates, and so on, with normal and full perception.4 Accordingly, I abandon the identification of sensation and sensation content (which I made in the Logical Investigations), and I return to the view that sensation and perception stand fundamentally on one level, that every

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1 Inserted later: “something (temporally) present itself.” — Editor’s note.
2 But this must not be misunderstood. The adumbration, the “content” understood as a “concrete component of consciousness,” is a unity that first becomes constituted in the flow of ultimate fluents; it is not absolute, but the consciousness of it [is], and this we call sensation of it.
3 “perception” later placed in quotation marks and “act of meaning” [Meinung] inserted above the line. — Editor’s note.
4 Before “this positing of something as a subject for predicates, and so on . . . ,” Husserl later inserted: “perhaps based on this” and placed this entire part of the sentence in brackets. — Editor’s note.
sensation is perception, only not full perception.\(^5\) Or that we must simply distinguish the not yet “actually objectivating” impressional consciousness of . . . — specifically, the consciousness of what is there itself\(^6\) — and the objectivating consciousness\(^7\) in which, in addition, an act of paying attention and the positing of a subject are carried out.

Now in contrast to all of this stands reproductive modification. The phantasm stands in contrast to the sensation. In the former, the color adumbration is there “as it were.” The phantasy of the physical thing, as the consciousness of the thing’s being there itself\(^8\) as it were, stands in contrast to the perception of the thing.

Just as in perception we had the color adumbration as the apprehension content for the objective color (the color of the physical thing), so in phantasy we have the color adumbration as the apprehension content for the objective color. It is the same on both sides. In one case, however, there is consciousness of the apprehension content in the manner peculiar to sensation (as “actual”), and in the other case there is consciousness in the manner peculiar to phantasy (“as it were”). And as far as the apprehension is concerned, it is actual perceptual apprehension in the one case and quasi-perceptual apprehension (reproductive modification) in the other. Apprehension is here understood as the act of apprehending. Above I expressly said apprehension consciousness, consciousness of appearance. That is, it

\(^5\) Probably very shortly after it was written, the last sentence was changed as follows: “Do I therefore abandon the identification of sensation and content (which I made in the Logical Investigations)? In a certain sense, yes. Must I therefore return to the view that sensation and perception stand fundamentally on one level, that every sensation is perception, only not full perception, inasmuch as paying attention to or meaning something is absent?”

Probably at the same time that he made this change, Husserl added the following text in the margin, but later crossed out the addition: “But this just does not seem to be required at all. Whether that which constitutes the unity of the content is something like an apperception, indeed, whether one can say universally that one is conscious of every content as one content, even if it is not perceived? it is certain that the appearance within normal perception and all of its components — the color adumbration, and so on — are actually there as unities, although the transeunt object, which alone is meant, appears in them. Is it not also the case that a feeling, a sorrow, a wish, a volition, a predication, and so forth, are unities? And is there then a limit?”

— Editor’s note.

\(^6\) “There itself” later changed to “present itself.” — Editor’s note.

\(^7\) Inserted later: “that means something” [meinen].—Editor’s note.

\(^8\) “There itself” changed later to “present itself.” — Editor’s note.
seems that we must say: Just as the sensation content corresponds to the sensation, so the apprehension corresponds to the apprehending, the appearance to the consciousness of the appearance. The perception would accordingly be sensation consciousness with regard to the appearance. In fact, just as I can make the content “color adumbration” into an object, so I can make the appearance into an object.

In the case of phantasy, I have modified consciousness (phantasm) of appearance, of apprehension. Hence in analysis I find the apprehension contents and the apprehension (appearance) as phantasied, as factually existing as it were.

The apprehension that belongs to phantasy is the same as the apprehension that belongs to perception. That is to say, perceptual apprehension and phantasy apprehension are essentially the same, just like perceived color and phantasied color.

Inherent in this is that perceptual consciousness and phantasy consciousness ground an identity consciousness here (in fact, an evident identity consciousness).

Of course, I can in turn have a perception of the phantasy consciousness itself, make it into an object; it then stands before me as a present experience.

If I analyze phantasy consciousness (a phantasm), I do not find color or anything else of that kind; on the contrary, I again find phantasy consciousness. Just as I find perceptual consciousness over and over again when I analyze perceptual consciousness. Phantasy is precisely modification through and through, and it can contain nothing but modification. This modification, as modification, is an experience, something that can be perceived; and the perception of this experience then itself has its modification in turn.

Phantasy is modification through and through: It is phantasy of color, of apprehension. In the case of inadequate phantasies: it is phantasy of a faded, interrupted, and fluctuating red with fluid forms, etc. But that is all phantasy too: the fluid forms are phantasied forms, and so on. Just as the perception is perception through and through when a perceptual object presenting itself indistinctly, obscurely, and so forth, is perceived: To be sure, perceptual aspects present

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9 Added subsequently: “better: phantasm (as unitary content).” — Editor’s note.
10 “inadequate” later changed to “transcendent.” — Editor’s note.
themselves there that are not “assigned” to the object itself, though through them “we mean” perceptually what is not obscure, what is not fluctuating, and so on (as we likewise do in the parallel case in the manner of phantasy).

5 We must not confuse:11 Mere phantasy and re-presentation. ”Perception — phantasy” is not the opposition of presentation and re-presentation, for re-presentation is an impressional act, which in turn has its modification. Phantasy is presentation as it were; re-presentation covers the various forms of memory, which again have their modifications. Remembering as it were; likewise representing in image as it were.

The12 as it were is the characteristic of reproduction. Perception as it were [is] the characteristic of phantasy in the narrower sense. Nevertheless, one can say that ordinarily “phantasy” is a wider concept = intuitive reproduction.

11 The text of this paragraph was later crossed out repeatedly and supplied with a deletion mark in the margin. — Editor’s note.
12 The text of this paragraph is placed lengthwise along the margin of the manuscript and was probably inserted somewhat later. — Editor’s note.
IMMANENT AND INTERNAL PHANTASY
(IN THE DOUBLE SENSE). PHANTASY AND PERCEPTION.
<PERCEPTION AS PRESENTATION, PHANTASY AS MODIFICATION OF PRESENTATION>
(September, 1909)

In the case of immanent analysis, we come to say that the “immanent red,” the immanent tone, is something given absolutely. If we then go back to the temporal flow, we will be forced to say that the flow corresponding to the immanent tone is absolute, that its being is the being of consciousness [Bewussteins-Sein]. More precisely, if we do not look at the tone and do not posit it immanently, then there is nothing but this flow; and in it the now moment of the tone itself is absolute being, while with respect to the phases of the past that belong to the same now a kind of exhibiting, a consciousness of . . . , is the absolute.

Let us now undertake the following reflection. If we carry out the phantasy (the immanent phantasy) of the tone, then it is as if this tone stands before us. What we actually have given or can make actually given is the phantasy of the tone. While in immanent perception the tone itself (more precisely, the tone-now) is an experience, in immanent phantasy it is not the tone but the tone phantasm, the tone modification (or, in other words, the corresponding tone-content moment in the phantasied now), that is an experience.

Now, however, we find the remarkable circumstance that we have yet a second immanent phantasy here: Namely, while the phantasy of the tone exists as immanent modification of the tone, it is at the same time the modification of the perception of the tone. How can one and the same immanent phantasy be at once the phantasy of the tone and the phantasy of the perception of the tone? This, however, is a pure illusion. This intermingling obtains only in the case of transeunt phantasies, understood as modifications of transeunt perceptions.

The peculiarity of transeunt perceptions is that they relate to their objects through appearances. The appearance in itself is the exhibiting of an object that is different from the appearance but presented, adumbrated, by it. This perceptual appearance is an experience and relates to, presents, the transeunt object, whether we look at the appearance or
not. Before looking at it, therefore, we already have two very different things: appearance and (intentional) object. On the other hand, if we start from the immanent perception, from the perception of a tone, for example, we do not in this case have a tone appearance functioning as an intermediary that could already be an experience prior to the act of immanent perceiving. The immanent tone and the tone appearance are one and the same here.

(There is also the problem in that case of whether the immanent objects are not also already constituted “objects” — universally or within a certain range — though not meant objects. We would then have to distinguish, say, immanent apprehensions {appearances} and transeunt apprehensions. And we would have to say: In the case of transeunt perception, two appearances intervene; namely, the transeunt appearance is an immanently appearing appearance and at the same time, as transeunt, an appearance relating to an object. And in the case of normal perception, the act of meaning goes through this transeunt appearance.)

In any case, the difference is clear: Immanent perception is simple directedness toward the immanent object. Transeunt perception is a process of meaning that is grounded on a transeunt appearance and “goes through it,” but does not aim at the appearance itself. If modification occurs, we then have phantasy of the directedness toward the object, phantasm of the tone and of the act of meaning the tone through the phantasm. And phantasy of the act of meaning the house = phantasy modification of the underlying appearing and of the act of meaning’s transeunt going-through. If, however, we disregard the directedness, we have phantasy modification of the tone (that is, phantasy modification of the flow of consciousness constituting the tone) and, in the other case, phantasy modification of the house appearance (which itself becomes constituted in a flow of consciousness). In one sense, the house appearance is “house perception”: namely, without regard to the act of meaning.\[272\]

\[1\] House perception = impressional appearance, or, as I can also say: appearance impression.
If, however, I direct my regard toward the tone phantasm, then certainly this is phantasy modification of the regard directed perceptually toward the tone: as reflection brings out. To direct my regard toward the “tone of phantasy,” to present the tone as an object in a phantasy presentation, is certainly to hear it as it were. The directing of my regard does not present itself as actual looking at but as phantasy looking at.

Likewise, to turn one’s regard to the house in phantasy — that is to say, to make the house into the object of a phantasy presentation — is phantasy modification of the act of perceiving the house in the full sense: as reflection also brings out. It is purely “seeing the house as it were.” The turning of my regard toward the house, which becomes constituted as the phantasy presentation of the house, does not present itself as actual looking-at but as phantasy looking-at. Except that here I find the house appearance as quasi-house-appearance; that is, as modification (appearance phantasm). Above, however, I find the tone as quasi-tone, as tone modification (tone phantasm).

Hence, I have the following in the case of immanent phantasy presentation: Immanent reproduction (phantasy modification without an act of meaning) is not something twofold. It is simply phantasm (of the immanent tone appearance). However, immanent phantasy presentation as directedness toward the phantasy object has the character of an (immanent) reproduction of the immanent perception of the object in question (the tone).

Transeunt reproduction (that is to say, the reproduction of a transeunt appearance without an act of meaning that would be directed toward it or toward its object) = phantasm of the transeunt appearance. In itself it is the reproduction of a perceptual appearance; that is to say, of an appearance of the kind that underlies transeunt perception. That it also belongs to its essence to be the appearance of a transeunt object is a second matter (ensuing judgment ascertains both). The directedness toward the appearing object, which is given as phantasy presentation of the appearing (house), again has the peculiarity that it is reproduction of the perceptual act of meaning, the perceptual directedness toward the transcendent object.

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2 House perception in the second sense.

3 Obviously the concept of “internal phantasy” and of reflection in phantasy thereby becomes ambiguous. 1) Phantasy-looking-at the house appearance (perception in the first sense), 2) phantasy-looking-at perception as the full act of meaning.
Now it is important, in addition, to make clear phenomenologically what the *act of meaning* is in contrast to *appearance*.

If it is correct to place the becoming-constituted of the immanent object (of the enduring tone) occurring within the flow of immanent temporalities — *without regard to* the act of meaning through which the object first becomes an *object*⁴ — on a level with the becoming-constituted of the external (transeunt) object occurring within the flow of appearances in the customary sense, or to take it, as far as the main point is concerned, as analogous to it — again *without regard to* the act of meaning the object — then, in the case of each perception, we have to distinguish appearance and act of meaning. In the case of immanent perception, we do this simply; in the case of transcendent perception, we do it in the manner of what is founded: An immanent appearance has an object, which at the same time <is> the appearance of a transcendent object. (Differentiating, one could say that an immanently constituted content, a phenomenon, is the appearance of a transeunt object. We would not call the moments of the flow phenomena, but fluents.) Now, however, the problem is whether the *act of meaning* is only a supervening moment or peculiar animation, in short, what this moment is and does, and particularly how it is related to *judgment, to belief*. And so too in the case of phantasy, in which the act of meaning is modified meaning and yet the bearer of judgments, whose character is then in question.

How would it be to contrast impression and phantasm? Impression understood as the immanently objectivated (but not meant) experience, the act as phenomenon. Phantasm, the act’s phantasy modification: hence phantasy of it. Also taken as phenomenon. Volition = volition impression — volition phantasm, etc.

"Allegedly immanent apprehension, appearance. Phantasy appearance not an appearance, phantasy presentation not a presentation, if perceptual presentation is presentation of its object"

It certainly does no good to speak of immanent appearance in addition to transeunt appearance or even apprehension.

⁴The German text reads: “zum Gegenstande wird.” The sense is that something comes to stand over against. — Translator’s note.
We speak of contents that undergo apprehension and of contents in and with their apprehension, and this makes up the appearance. Instead of apprehension I also said representation, *apperception* — all of these are expressions open to misinterpretation. If we just keep *apperception*, then it must be noted that *apperception* (this “apprehension”) does not yet include an act of meaning, the act of meaning through which an object stands before us as an object (by means of which we say of the object that it is an object). And likewise the concrete appearance.

Contents undergo apprehension (apperception): Contents are then already constituted individual unities. For example, a color adumbration enduring in such and such a way, a tone content enduring or changing, and so on, in this or that quality and intensity. And the apprehension they undergo is something added to the contents (even if not added externally), and perhaps something that varies: itself again a content, a unity in the indicated sense, but of an entirely different sort.

Now to what extent should one speak of “*immanent apprehension*” and “appearance”?

If I am looking at an immanent content and positing it as an object, then, above all, the looking at and the positing must be excluded, since we had also excluded them in the case of transeunt appearance and apperception. Now do we again have content and apprehension before the *act of meaning* (the act of looking at) here? There is a radical difference in this case. Transeunt apprehension and appearance are contents animated by apprehension, which is a new content. In the case of “immanent appearance,” we do not find any content and animating characteristic apart from the act of meaning. That is to say, content and appearance are one and the same in this case, but not in such a way that something like apperception or apprehension is to be found there.

If we do not speak of apprehension (or — what is the same — of apperception) in the case of *immanent* perception, then we must add immediately that we do not speak of it in the case of immanent phantasy either. We speak of apperception within phantasy only in the modified sense; namely, as modified apprehension (as phantasy apprehension of the house, for example).

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5 Concerning the text of this and the following paragraph, Husserl later noted in the margin: “for the presentation.” — Editor’s note.
Of course, it would be fundamentally wrong to speak of apprehension in the case of a phantasy presentation of an immanent red, hence in relation to a red phantasm, especially in the sense, for example, that one mode of apprehension of a red-content would result in the perception of red (the perceptual apprehension of red) and another mode of apprehension of the same content would result in a phantasy apprehension. One should never confuse apprehension and act of meaning; and, of course, one <must> remember that an experienced content can only be meant in immanent perception or be apprehended in the form of transeunt perception, or better, appearance. On the other hand, [an experienced content] cannot be apprehended in the form of immanent phantasy (which makes no sense) or of transeunt phantasy. None of that makes sense. For if a content is apprehended (apperceived) as something, then the apprehension-characteristic is a new content, and the whole formed from both is not a phantasm. A phantasm is not a characteristic that attaches itself to a nonphantasm, a further content adding itself to the latter. Rather, a phantasm is a modification of, and it must be said that every phantasm is a phantasm through and through. Phantasy apprehension is not apprehension but phantasy. Or if we put it more distinctly: The apprehension phantasm is not apprehension but phantasm. Or phantasm of apprehension. So too a red-phantasm is not red and something besides; on the contrary, it is not red at all, but something that “presents” red. One must not confuse this presenting, however, with presenting in the sense in which, say, a perceptual appearance is the appearance of a house and presents the house. If one calls the latter “presentation,” then the red-presenting in the sense of phantasy is not presenting but precisely a modification of presenting, a phantasm of it. Consequently, one must not treat phantasy presentation and perceptual presentation as on the same level. If perceptual presentation is appearance, then “phantasy presentation” is quasi-appearance, appearance as it were, and so on.
In the lectures, I studied the relationship between phantasy presentation, perception, image presentation understood as illusionary presentation, [and] image-symbolic presentation. I did not take into consideration there the “qualitative moments,” the modes of belief, doubt, and so on, although these certainly play an important role. In the Logical Investigations I already sought to distinguish universally between “qualitative modification” and “imaginative modification.” The latter title turns out to be unsuitable, since I intended to recognize that an essential distinction must be drawn between phantasy apprehension and image apprehension proper. In the meantime, I have made considerable progress. I have recognized that phantasy apprehension is not apprehension proper but simply the modification of the corresponding perceptual apprehension, that image apprehension understood as illusion is perceptual apprehension anulled by conflict, in which the “annulling” is a matter of qualification and presupposes the “competition” or “interpenetrating” of simple apprehensions; that is to say, of physical-thing apprehensions. I will have to study all of this again, although I have probably already acquired what is essential (it still needs careful presentation and definition).

First of all, I will have to treat perception and phantasy. I must make this comparison at the outset, since memory and expectation certainly contain phantasy appearances. Likewise, from the start I must refer to symbolic apprehension as empty and as pictorializing, and I must describe solitary empty intentions. Normal perception, illusion,

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1 Related closely to (MA), which is the manuscript group pertaining to the structures of consciousness <cf. below No.15 as well as the pertinent critical remarks to Husserliana XXIII>.
2 Husserl might be referring here to the part of the course of lectures from the winter semester 1904/05 reproduced above as No.1. — Editor’s note.
perception in the mode of inclination and of doubt, of deeming possible and deeming likely, will have to be placed in a series. Illusion functioning symbolically (image presentation) and perception or illusion functioning as outward signs. The series of modifications having in common that they contain “perceptual appearances.”

Then the series of modifications that contain phantasy appearances. Nevertheless, some special deliberations will be needed concerning the order of presentation.

Perceptions and intuitively simple acts that contain perceptual appearances.

1) Normal perception. Uncontested. The mode is that of certainty.
2) Doubting apprehension. Is that my friend Hans or someone else? Is that a hound or a fox? Two perceptual apprehensions: but not normal perceptions. In comparison with normal perception both have a certain modification: namely, with regard to the belief mode. The doubt presupposes a “conflict of interpenetrating apprehensions,” though in the conflict it presupposes common perceptual moments, a common stock of sensations, and a certain common perceptual stock in the apprehensions. Certainly with respect to the form of the physical thing. A perceptual apprehension can also conflict with an image apprehension (a depicting apprehension): as in the conflict “mannequin or human being,” [in which] the mannequin is the image of a human being.

Here, therefore, we have the “interpenetrating” of apprehensions. [278]

As for the modes of belief, there is a “belief tendency,” a deeming possible, for each side. Different strengths of deeming possible. Perhaps a decision in favor of certainty for one side, even though a deeming possible continues for the other side. Or mere conjecture for one of the sides: the outweighing of the deeming possible and its yielding, not to certainty, but to conjecture. An unsettled doubt, however, can continue; specifically, as the consciousness belonging to the [question]: “Is it this or is it that?” The question expressing doubt.

Hence we have to note here: a) on the one hand, the occurrence of the “interpenetrating” perceptual appearances, perceptual appearances in conflict.
b) On the other hand, the qualitative modifications. Each of the appearances standing before me at least as a “possibility” (a deeming possible); in addition, the different weights that belong to the
possibilities (the different strengths pertaining to the instances of deeming possible); furthermore, the phenomena of decision, the making up of one’s mind after vacillating or doubting, and the being-decided “without doubt” that ensues: the phenomenon of certainty along with counter instances of deeming possible with different strengths (material counterpossibilities), the phenomenon of conjecture in which the counterpossibilities are retained, not rejected, not pushed aside. This also plays its role in deciding: I reject the counterpossibilities; I “do not accept them,” although they remain possibilities, correlates of the instances of deeming possible. Or I do accept them, “retain them,” and accordingly bring about mere conjecture. All of this represents an abundance of intuitive phenomena that can come about on the basis of the intuition of conflict, of the interpenetrating and resulting nullification of appearances, and that are founded in this intuition. [We have a] division of appearances such that the one appearance and the other appearance cannot be given simultaneously but only in succession, the givenness of the one excluding that of the other (certainly this is already to put matters in ont<ic> terms; indeed, I can now assert: The being of the appearance in the ont<ic> sense — not the being of the physical thing — annuls the being of the counterappearance and conversely: just as the being of the appearing physical thing then further annuls the being of the physical thing appearing in the counterappearance).

3) Illusion; e.g., an apparition. It is “nothing” or an “image object.” Here, too, we have conflict in the appearances. But there is no competition if it is characterized specifically as an illusion. The appearing “image” is not characterized as a possibility; no tendency to believe (no deeming possible) holds true of it. Here there is no vacillating, no doubting, no making up of one’s mind. Even if the semblance object is perchance posited, as in the case of a ghost, it is not posited in place of another visually appearing object, interpenetrating with it: For it is posited in place of the air, and one does not “see” air. On the whole, therefore, this case is not essentially different from the previous one.

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4 Conviction: More and stronger witnesses speak for something. A belief with overwhelming “grounds” or “possibilities” speaking for it. The countertendencies trifling and perhaps intended as “pushed aside,” not accepted.
I can contemplate a semblance object without paying attention to my unbelief. For example, I follow the actions, and so forth, of a character on the stage. Or the movements of the ghost, its meaningful gestures, and so on. This contemplating is not belief or unbelief or any other mode of belief relating to the being of the thing: It is contemplation of the appearing object as appearing, a positing act that does not posit the actuality but precisely “what appears as it appears” (hence it is obviously not mere presentation in the sense of a phantasy and the like).

What is perceptual is withdrawn here, and on its basis synthesis, perhaps also predication, is carried out; the predication is predication in a modified sense, inasmuch as a modified “apprehension” is at stake.

What is it to leave a thing undecided? In the case of doubt, I can strive for a decision or refrain from striving for a decision. However that may be: I do not decide doxically (doxically with certainty) in favor of this and not that; I do not prefer any of the possibilities, “do not yield to any of them.” I do not even conjecture: I leave undecided.

Taking a position = taking as one’s basis one of the instances of deeming possible (one of the possibilities); and this can mean either to yield to it or to assume, to presuppose, which, of course, is again something new.

If we bring in categorial analysis and synthesis, and perhaps the predicative concept-apprehension as well, there emerge various extremely important occurrences, which then must be studied more closely.

The object S appears (and is perhaps recognized conceptually as S) and is posited in the mode of actuality. P appears with it (which also can be recognized conceptually as p, in this case designating a predicate), and S is posited as p. At the same time, p’ is attributed to S, even if it is not deemed possible. S is at the same time “supposed” as p’; the p’ conflicts with the p and the p’-being with the p-being.

Conflict of the presented predicatively formed affair complexes (conflict of the propositions) having its basis in the different conflict of determinations.

Moreover, I could at the same time suppose S as p’ and p”, in the course of which p’ and p” again nullify one another in their relation to S. But if it is judged that “S is p!” , then this predicatively formed
affair complex stands before me as true; and what is supposed, the
supposition (ontic) that “S! is p′”, is nullified by it. Then the negative
judgment: “(S is p’) is false.”

On the other hand, S! stands before me in truth as p, this p-being
annuls the supposed p′-being: S! is not p′ = S! (is p’)

not.

We must describe another phenomenon; namely, the phenomenon
of free possibilities — that is to say, of possibilities not checked by
counterpossibilities.

For example, I see an unfamiliar box. The back of the box is co-
apprehended but indeterminate with regard to color and form. Then
a presentation that conceives of this back as colored red or green
emerges. Nothing, however, speaks in favor of one color or the other.
In that case, these are free possibilities. They determine the indeter-
minality in a manner that is not prescribed by a determinate inclination
or demand. But they are “possibilities” nonetheless. It is inaccurate
to say, as we just did, that nothing speaks in favor of either of the
possibilities. Rather, nothing speaks more in favor of one than of
the other. When something and even certainty speaks in favor of “a
color,” it speaks in favor of every color, although here in favor of each
in the same way. Indeed, the perceptual apprehension itself contains
no specific intentional rays directed toward such and such determin-
ate colors; on the contrary, it contains only the one indeterminate
intention directed toward “a color.” It is therefore a question of an es-
ential relationship that the apprehension of certainty, this intentional
ray actually contained in the perception, motivates the determinate [281]
colors to be presented as “possibilities.” And these presentations of
the possibilities are obviously not “mere phantasy presentations” but
possess a determinate (impressional) mode of belief belonging under
the concept of deeming possible.

* * *

All of the occurrences in the province of perception, all of the ap-
prehensions that base themselves on sensation and, with sensation,
constitute appearance, along with all of the qualitative modifications,
are carried over in imaginative modification into phantasy. They “make their appearance” in phantasy. Hence all of the agreements and conflicts make their appearance in phantasy too.

Let us consider the following case: A ghost appears in a phantasy environment, in a phantasy milieu. It has the characteristic of nullity: It conflicts with the phantasied physical environment and the latter’s imaginatively modified belief tendencies.

But we can also consider this case: I have a phantasied objectivity, and then I imagine that a stone flies toward a window co-phantasied with this objectivity and goes through the window without shattering it. Here, too, a conflict emerges. The stone’s going through the window does indeed integrate itself into the unity of the phantasy — it is phantasied — but “it cannot integrate itself into it.” Just as I can indeed phantasy in another case that the reverse side of this table is green, but this is immediately characterized as null. Or I can present to myself intuitively that a stone is going through this actual window, but that is “mere” imagination. But while in the latter case I have actual perception with its actual belief, in the former case I have phantasy, and to it belongs the phantasy modification of the perceptual belief. The reality is empirical reality with empirical properties “befitting” a reality, though the reality is quasi-reality, the befitting a quasi-befitting. Then the stone’s going through the window conflicts with this. If it goes through, the empirical reality is no longer empirical reality. The intuition of the going-through annuls the apprehension of empirical reality, modifies it further. All of that, however, is phantasy. Nevertheless, the modified apprehension is there and, as long as the new occurrence has not run its course (“in phantasy”), is identically preserved with respect to its sense. And the quasi-positing of the objectivity of the flying stone, and so on, conflicts with this sense or with the quasi-positing of the objectivity that belongs to such a sense, and annuls it. The situation is therefore the same here as it is in the sphere of perception when a normal empirical apprehension of something running as a hound, for example, is modified in the further course of perception: It is not a hound, but a hare. Then it would have to be said here that in reality it is not a natural object, but something different from a natural object. Are we, however, speaking of an “is” here? Naturally, I phantasy; and living in the phantasy, I see a thing “as it were.” I have, as it were, something existing of
which I can, as it were, assert such and such. As soon as I do that, I do not have actual assertions but quasi-assertions. And I only obtain actual assertions either when I accept what is phantasied or when I not only hold in consciousness what is phantasied as phantasied but posit it; and that is then a mode of apprehension and mode of positing in its own right — namely, not of the actual physical thing but of the phantasy thing as phantasy thing. As has already been worked out above.

If I live in phantasy and if I hold in consciousness what is phantasied in its unity, then motives for deeming possible, for deeming likely, for doubt, for decision can arise in the phantasy situation: all modified. I may therefore “correctly” presume, judge, make assertions in phantasy, in such a way that all of these acts themselves also belong in the unity of the total phantasy. In doing so, assertions made within phantasy must be distinguished from assertions made outside phantasy, which, nonetheless, give expression to what is phantasied: I am immersed in phantasying, say, a stroll around the environs of Florence. I encounter two dishevelled, suspicious-looking men. I surmise that they mean to harm me, and so on. While phantasying, I might at the same time express the phantasy events I am experiencing there. These phantasying judgments and expressions, however, are not, to that extent, judgments belonging to the phantasied situation, as if they too had been experienced by me in phantasy. Just as I might have a memory of all of these things and might express them, although the meaning is not that “at that time” I had spoken of them and expressed them in this way. In the latter case, I have memorial statements; in the former case, however, I have mere expressions of phantasy appearances, of phantasy experiences, which, to be sure, also serve the function of communication and, to that extent, act in an anomalous way as a substitute for other and actual judgments. Surrendering purely to phantasy and without intending to communicate with others, I can also occasionally accompany my phantasies with expressive words. Then, provided that it is not a question of speaking in phantasy, the expressions will belong to the actual world of the act of phantasying, not to the world of what is phantasied, just like the feelings and so on that are associated with the phantasying. For example, “That is an ugly face!” (exclaimed, of course, in interior speaking), “This person is behaving strangely!” and the like. Acts that are purely actual and
not perchance modified in the manner of phantasy, but grounded on phantasy and thereby modified in their own peculiar way.

Naturally, we make no hypothetical suppositions here, no genuine assumptions, and nothing analogous to them either. Holding in phantasy is not a proper act. What appears endures; that is, in such a way that it stands before me as a thing enduring unitarily, and so on. It is otherwise if, say, I hold the window as window in consciousness in such a way that, when the stone flies against it, I do not carry out a modification of the empirical apprehension but just stay with it, and then in phantasy degrade the stone’s going through the window to fiction, to illusion. Then I have precisely the new consciousness: such and such surroundings. A stone flies against the window, and there exists the illusion of its going through the window without shattering it. I do not presuppose that the window is or is supposed to be an actual window; I continually take it precisely as an actual window and constitute the semblance consciousness in phantasy.

I phantasy an animal, and it stands before me as an enduring unity in phantasy. And then, on the basis of this phantasy, I can be certain that or deem it likely that or doubt that it is a mammal, whether it belongs to this or that order of animals, and so on. If it is an equine animal, then I will be certain that it is a mammal. But how can I doubt or deem it likely [that it is a mammal]? Certainly only the distinctive traits belonging to the apprehension come into consideration, and then the question is whether they belong to those traits that are characteristic of a mammal, and so on. I have here a vague concept of mammal and must first of all explicate my conceptual presentation of it. Or I have the word and a very vague signification of the word, along with the annex that a mammal is something the particulars of which are in every zoology textbook.

It is noteworthy that every perception occurs in a nexus of perceptions. All agreements and conflicts, all instances of deeming possible and deeming likely, all doubts and decisions belong to this nexus. The perceptual appearance of a reality and perceptual belief are always already there as the foundation for everything else. And in this constantly changing nexus, new appearances emerge, now with firm modes of belief that are supported by modes of belief already on hand that agree with them; and then perhaps the modes of belief on
hand belonging to the given appearances are devalued — they undergo annulment, etc., through conflict, which simultaneously interlaces the apprehensions and brings them into confrontation (competition, and so forth).

(And in all of this we have perceptual appearances as a core furnished with different “qualifications,” and sensations enter into these perceptual appearances. One can ask concerning these sensations whether they do not, in their own fashion, carry moments of belief: as if sensations were already the simplest perceptions of all.)

For the rest, I stick to the following view: We have apprehensions (in the intuitive sphere), appearances, qualified in such and such a way. The qualitative mode is a mere mode that always presupposes an apprehension material, which, in the intuitive sphere, is mere appearance. Mere appearance, however, is nothing without qualification. In the case of the same material, the qualifications can change. If they do change, then it must be noted that in doing so the nexus of perceptions, memories, in short, of all phenomena, will be the nexus that will carry with it the qualitative changes for the presented phenomenon that is in the nexus and that is supposed to preserve its material. With respect to the nexus, then, this gives rise to a change in apprehensions. As when a perception changes into an illusion, and so forth. Another direction of modification is that of perception into phantasy, in the course of which the essence of the appearance may remain preserved. The imaginative modification touches all occurrences, appearances, apprehension materials of whatever sort, as well as their qualities. What is noteworthy is that mere phantasy can then change into memory in such a way that the phantasy appearance with its phantasy-positing remains and a whole arises that has an impressional character: the impressional time consciousness presupposes a phantasy appearance. Likewise an act of judging grounded on phantasy certainly presupposes phantasy and is nevertheless an impressional act, and is therefore an actual act and not an act modification in the sense of an imagining. Hence acts founded in a phantasy consciousness, as well as what is phantasied, receive the characteristic of having been, which is an actual characteristic and not a quasi-characteristic.

1. Impressional therefore signifies consciousness of actuality [Aktualitätsbewusstsein].
2. Inserted later: “= inactuality” [Inaktualität]. — Editor’s note.
<MEMORY AS CONSCIOUSNESS “ONCE AGAIN” IN CONTRAST TO PERCEPTION AND PURE PHANTASY>

<probably 1909 or beginning of 1910>

5 Perception is the consciousness of being, the consciousness of an existing object; more precisely, of an object now existing, now enduring, of an object existing “here,” oriented (toward me) in such and such a way. An object appearing in a perceptual appearance and posited in a perceptual positing: this is inherent in being perceived.

10 The corresponding memory is perception as it were. It is consciousness not merely of the past object, but consciousness of the past object in such a way that I can say that it is consciousness of an object that has been perceived, that has been perceived by me, that has been given in my past here and now. I “see” the sunset that I remember; I now have the memory of having perceived it. I have a present act of believing that is related in a certain manner to a nonpresent act of believing, to “my” past act of believing. In recalling the Mausberg and my walk to it, I see the Mausberg before me, as it were. But I do “not actually” see it; I feel “put back” in the seeing. Memory is a peculiar modification of perception. Perception has a perceptual appearance (an originary appearance) in the mode of belief (also originary); on the side of memory, a corresponding phantasy appearance together with phantasy belief: I was on the Mausberg with the children, a glorious sunset. The city glowing in the evening light. A locomotive’s clouds of smoke illuminated by the sun. The potato field with long, faint shadows. The soil glowing a deep reddish brown. The return home. The mouse in the bird cage. All of this is not there merely as phantasy. I see it before me again. It is “seen,” and seen “again,” even if with interruptions. Now it is seen as if hidden by a veil, then as breaking through the haze. It is seen again; it gives itself as past.

20 Pure phantasy does not have this character. To be sure, it is perception “as it were”; I see, as it were, “an object in a here and now.” The seeing, however, is not seeing again and already having seen; and the object is not “past” and posited as past, with a past here and now.

25 The “appearance” may be essentially the same for perception and memory, but in one case it is an impressional appearance and in the

1 The Mausberg is found in the vicinity of Göttingen.
other a modified appearance. And both in a different consciousness-characteristic. Above all, the temporal modification. What appears is not now but has been; more precisely, has been perceived. The belief is not simply attached to the imaginative appearance. On the contrary, it “re-presents” the past belief; namely, in the sense that it makes it present again. But what does that mean? What I have is a phantasy appearance (therefore a quasi-appearance), which, as phantasy appearance, must have a belief mode. Specifically, it has the mode “belief,” but, of course, it has it in “phantasy.” Hence it has a phantasy belief, quite like phantasy as mere phantasy and yet again, on the other hand, not quite like it. Obviously there are not two different things present here, the mere phantasy (with regard to “appearance” and mode of belief) and in addition to it a positing. On the contrary, there is a different coloring, a modification that does not change the essence; and this is the consciousness as consciousness “once again.”

In other words, it is the characteristic of actuality: hence memory and mere phantasy are, so to speak, the same, only one is an actuality, the other an inactuality, related to one another as actual predication is related to mere propositional presentation.

And the temporal placement? Here I surely have differences. I can have consciousness “once again,” as when I think of the Roons and at the same time posit it as present reality. (In a certain sense, I can also have consciousness “once again” when I perceive something and, while I am perceiving it, at the same time have the consciousness of being acquainted with it: identification of what is perceived and what is remembered in a memory that is perhaps empty.)

Hence an essential gap exists here. The same mere phantasy (phantasy of the Roons), one could say, can be modified at one time into memory in the ordinary sense, at another time into memorial positing of the present of the Roons. In what does the difference consist?

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2 More distinctly: It is actuality [Aktualität] (which here means impression) in one case, and inactuality [Inaktualität] in the other.

3 The text from here to the end of this paragraph was inserted somewhat later. — Editor’s note.

4 The text of this last paragraph seems to have been inserted somewhat later. — Editor’s note.

5 Inserted later: “re-presentation of the actual past.” — Editor’s note.

6 Inserted later: “actually re-presenting.” — Editor’s note.
Both are consciousness of actuality. Study of the contexts is necessary, therefore, just as it is certainly conceivable that, depending on the “context,” “the same” perception is perception of a small body close by or of a large body far away, and the like.\(^7\)

\(^7\) Inserted later: “The matter is certainly not difficult.” — Editor’s note.
<“SENSATION,” MEMORY, EXPECTATION, AND PHANTASY AS MODES OF TIME CONSCIOUSNESS. CONSCIOUSNESS AS NEXUS>

Up until now I have not given phantasy modification closer consideration, and much likewise remains to be added <concerning> sensation. Hence it is said that to every sensing a phantasying corresponds. Sensation\(^1\) here is either sensation of color or tone, or sensation of pleasure and pain, or sensation of wish and volition. Also sensation of an external appearance or consciousness of an internal state. Sensation of perception understood as an act of meaning, and so on.

However, as I said in the *Logical Investigations*,\(^2\) we have fundamental distinctions in the what, in what is sensed — the “primary contents” of sensing and the “contents of reflection.” And the latter have the characteristic of “consciousness of:”

We view sensing as the original time consciousness: The immanent unity color or sound; the immanent unity wish: liking, and so on, become constituted in it. Phantasying, therefore, is the modification of this time consciousness; it is re-presentation. Re-presented color, re-presented wish, and so forth, become constituted in it.

Re-presentation, however, can be memory, expectation, and the like. Or also “mere phantasy.” For that reason, one cannot speak of one modification of sensation. Sensation is presenting time-consciousness. Even the re-presentation is sensed, is present, becomes constituted as a unity in the presenting time-consciousness.

Do we also have modes in the presenting consciousness? The only thing that would come into consideration here would be the distinction between the presentation of the now and the presentation of the just now, which together belong to the unity of the concrete presentational consciousness. The distinction between the presentation that has *in itself* its now-presentation phase and the self-sufficient retention, which does indeed have a relation to the actual now of a perception but does not itself contain a point of now-presentation,

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\(^1\) Sensation taken in the widest sense.

would also come into consideration. For example, the consciousness of a sound that has just died away.

Consequently, we have as essential modes of time consciousness: “sensation” as presentation; the retention essentially interwoven with sensation but that also attains to self-sufficiency; and re-presentation, which in the manner of “positing” can be re-presentation once again [Wiedervergegenwärtigung] (memory), re-presentation of something contemporary with what is perceived [Mitvergegenwärtigung], and re-presentation of something in advance [Vorvergegenwärtigung] (expectation). Then nonpositing re-presentation: pure phantasy in its different parallel modifications.

Expectation, however, if it is understood as protention, can be better placed on an equal footing with retention, inasmuch as every perception contains it; and we certainly will not seriously want to put protention and memory or phantasy on an equal footing.

Consequently, we have: 1) in the originary sphere in the wider sense, the non-self-sufficient modes of retention, presentation, and protention (with the possibilities of self-sufficiency for retention and protention); 2) then the re-presentation of something once again, in which all these modes make their appearance in the “consciousness of something again”; 3) then phantasy re-presentation understood as pure phantasy, in which all the same modes make their appearance in mere phantasy consciousness.

It is open to question whether still further modifications can be specified. For example, phantasy combined with the consciousness that what is phantasied will occur in the future just as it “appears” in the phantasy. (I depict to myself an expected event.) Of course, we do not have to do here with random events but with modifications of “sensation” or of any lived experience. But be that as it may.

What about analogizing consciousness, image consciousness? And what about symbolic consciousness? Furthermore, what about empathy, which I have pretty well ignored?

However, one could say: Every consciousness can be emptily “intentive” (it is indifferent whether we imply an act of meaning or not: though not genuinely intentive3), and every consciousness can be analogizing. And every consciousness has its modification of

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3 “though not genuinely intentive” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
empathy. But, of course, is it not a question of complexes here? But of which complexes?

Is it not absolutely necessary to add at least the empty modification, empty re-presentation, or to make the distinction between full and empty in connection with re-presentation?4

* * *

Symbolic modification belongs to the nexuses. I have a symbol consciousness and something that is attached to it: a consciousness that stands in combination with it.

Hence we must first consider the modifications that concern the single or solitary consciousness; specifically, those belonging to temporality. And then we must consider the forms of the complexes.

Consciousness is always a nexus and necessarily a nexus. We have the originary nexus, the nexus of originary time consciousness; and in the latter we have the multiplicity of impressional contents (which are not re-presentations) and, belonging to these contents, the sense fields understood as bearers of sensuous perceptions.5 Then the other impressional acts, those that are based purely on the sensuous impressions and sensuous perceptions, and those that already bring in re-presentations (in which case it must be remarked that even if phantasies are not already involved in the sensuous perceptions, empty intentions surely are).

The questions that the nexus necessarily entails with respect to the modifications in the flow are important. In the flow of sensed time and in the flow of fluents, we have necessary dependencies that express a necessary consequence, a necessary becoming-modified in a determinate way; this situation again entails necessities of “coexistence.” Indeed, the whole primal constitution of time consciousness consists of just such necessities.

What role does connection play in the composition of memorial consciousness? Indeed even earlier, in the composition of perceptual consciousness, in the “isolated”6 and yet not at all isolated

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4 But it is a question whether “full” and “empty” (the difference in vitality in this sense) do not belong to every consciousness.
5 Added later above the line: “appearances.” — Editor’s note.
6 Inserted later: “‘self-sufficient.’” — Editor’s note.
retention, in expectation? In the consciousness of something once again (recollection)?

And then, going further, what role does it play in phantasy?

Can there be pure sensation without any apprehension, without a representative function in external perception? Except perhaps through the mutual cancelling of tendencies?

Can there be pure perception without any connection? And what about the genuinely perceptual background and, on the other hand, the background of co-positing?

Can memory turn into mere phantasy only by the mutual cancelling of memorial tendencies? And is every mere phantasy to be interpreted in this way? Is every phantasy a member of connections, or do connections intersect in every phantasy? Are not connections universally either connections of agreement or connections of disagreement, and so on?

Connections of sensations (of impressions7), hence the structure of originary time consciousness. The components within this structure have their determinate intentional form!

The structure of the consciousness of something once again, of secondary consciousness. On the one hand, that which belongs to its constitution insofar as it is a member of originary consciousness as sensed present consciousness. On the other hand, its own structure, its own character.

However, if we focus our attention on single moments, we can certainly often find by means of immanent analysis that a confusion of different memories, to which different temporal connections belong, presents itself in a “mere phantasy.” One cannot, however, declare as an essential law that every phantasy arises from the annulment of memories that interfere with one another.

Furthermore, what kind of “psychology” is it that makes such hypothetical constructions? Is there a psychology that does not operate with physical nature at all, that is in no way a natural science, and yet does not proceed a priori as an eidetic science?8 It would start

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7 “Impressions” later changed to “impressional experiences”; “sensations” simultaneously provided with quotation marks. — Editor’s note.
8 Psychology as immanent psychology, not as natural science, and yet not as phenomenological eidetic science.
from the data of phenomenological “experience”; it would move in the sphere of “immanent” time, but not in the purely intuitive sphere. An infinite time would be assumed in which the experiences of consciousness would be arranged (my experiences, but without regard to my body, unless my body furnishes indications for certain perceptual interconnections). In addition to the actually present and verifiable mental processes available to experience, “unconscious” mental processes would be assumed. And these would be used to “reconstruct” the structure of the “actual consciousness.” Association, disposition, and so on, also belong here.
Does it therefore follow that we cannot actually make do with one modification? And that not everything that brings about distinctions could lie in the manner of combination?

“Appearance:” the term refers either to a complex that is unmodified and therefore impressional, and then we have perceptual appearance, or to a complex that is modified through and through, and then we have phantasy appearance.

Now memories can be based on phantasy appearances by means of the addition of new moments. What appears changes into something past. By what means? By means of certain relations to the actual present. For example, I took a walk a short time ago. If I then extract a memory of this, I do not merely have a phantasy image but also certain “subjective” temporal connections belonging to it. The phantasy appearance takes its place within a nexus of memories. If I run through the nexus, I have the following: I just left [on my walk], and then I run through the series of appearances “up to my return” and up to the actually present now. So far so good. Well, the “intentions” are impressional, and they mark each appearance belonging to this series and give to each one a reference beyond itself up to the now. But then again these intentions cannot be anything added on. Every phantasy appearance has its appearing phantasy duration; and all of the phantasy appearances, put in order, combine to make up a phantasied series of events. Here [in memory], however, the series is not merely phantasied; it is remembered. Can one say anything else here than that

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1 Indeed, I have found two modifications to be necessary; and insist on this. One of these is memorial modification and the other is mere phantasy modification. They are distinguished as actuality and inactuality.

2 The fundamental points [are] on the following pages. This page [is] probably worthless <to p. 356, 8>.
in every appearance a positing intention holds sway, an impressional intention, a belief intention that posits what appears in the manner of phantasy, therefore what is given as it were, and that, by virtue of the transcendence that belongs to the essence of these intentions and that assigns to them determinate sequences of fulfillment, gives to what appears a determinate place in the order of what is given as it were up to the now? These are “re-presenting” intentions and intentions co-re-presenting temporal positions in time, in relation to the now.

Hence the question is: How do these intentions stand in relation to the phantasy appearance? Are they something supervening on it?3

Let us compare a memory and an expectation. I remember the song of Lorelei, which I heard “then, at that time.” I expect the song. I remember a barrel-organ piece, and I expect it. It may be that I present it precisely, in advance; that I have a precise knowledge of it. The knowing is not simply an act of remembering. I know the piece and expect it; accordingly, I displace it into the future: I will hear it. Remembering, however, is consciousness understood as the being conscious once again of the having heard. It situates us in the past. In addition, there are the differences between vague memory and expectation and explicit memory and expectation, in which what is past “runs its course once again” in a reliving of it, or in which what is future runs its course in advance in an experiencing of it beforehand.

Memory displaces what is remembered into a nexus of memories; that is, what is remembered stands before me as having been given and belongs in a determinate nexus of the given past. The memory itself exists in a nexus of memories with an order terminating in the actual now of perception. Now how is that? It belongs to the essence of memorial consciousness that it points forward, which is not to say that it presents what is in advance of it. Memory places what it remembers before it. Memorial appearances, however, have in their memorial character a “connection” and point to one another in a determinate sequence; that is to say, nexus intentions belong to every memory. Must we not say: Every memory tends to flow off, and this flowing off is itself memory; namely, memory of the “earlier perceptual running off”? Every memory of which one is specifically conscious is a privileged member of a vague surrounding memory,

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3 The following was added on February 15, 1910.
of a memorial background. Every memory tends forward, but it is also a terminus of tendencies. It itself has a background of the past, a past that is relative to its now. Memory, therefore, is not mere phantasy appearance and an empty belief, or not just any random characteristic of consciousness together with this material that we call "phantasy appearance." It is a determinate consciousness to whose essence these connections belong, just as spatial connections, as connections of coexistence, belong to the essence of external perception (of spatial perception).

And in the case of expectation we again have phantasy appearance in a consciousness, and this consciousness again has a new characteristic to which new connections of consciousness belong. Every determinate expectation exists in a nexus of expectations, just as every determinate memory exists in a nexus of memories, though they do so intentionally. Every determinate expectation is endowed with nexus intentions that point toward or, rather, point back to connections of expectation, whose target is the expectation.

In every case in which phantasy appearance serves as a basis, we do not have mere phantasy appearance and a mode of belief; on the contrary, phantasy appearance is a distinctive apprehensival core, which is encircled by further apprehensival rays. On the one hand, apprehensival rays that lead over into connections of coexistence: the appearance, let us say, is the appearance of a spatial objectivity that belongs in connections of coexistence, that has its back, its interior, its surroundings, its possibilities of perception from different standpoints, etc. It is an appearance of the object in a determinate orientation among a multiplicity of possible orientations (belonging to the same moment), and so on. On the other hand, the connections of memorial apprehension (or expectational apprehension), which confer position in time and, in doing so, confer temporal givenness on the appearance. The appearance finds its place within the sequence of appearances, which is the sequence of the givenness of the temporalities belonging to the actual Ego. Now all of this is the full material of belief, of perceptual certainty, of memorial and expectational

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4 Husserl later put a question mark on the margin to this sentence and noted: “see the following page for the correct view”; that is, probably line 31ff, below. — Editor’s note.
certainty. The belief, however, is not something that supervenes, not a new intention, but nothing more than the modal characteristic of certainty as opposed to the characteristics of deeming possible, deeming likely, and of the doubt connected with them; and, like all of these characteristics, belief admits of imaginative\(^5\) modification. That is to say, the whole apprehensional nexus with its modal characteristic of certainty admits of imaginative modification. Hence this would be phantasy modification of a memory (or of an expectation). Here, therefore, we have phantasy in nexuses of phantasies of certain intentional combinations that characterize memory or expectation, in the one case in the mode of certainty, in the other case as imaginatively modified. But how? Surely not in such a way that we first have a nexus of phantasies and, in addition, in one case certainty as actual certainty and in the other case the imagining of certainty. Rather, it seems that we must say: To the originary sequence, to the perceptual sequence, there corresponds as one modification: 1) the memorial modification (or, analogously, the expectational sequence) in which everything is modified through and through; 2) and again the phantasy modification as mere phantasy. Now in the perceptual sequence we have sensation material, while in the memorial and expectational sequences we have phantasy material; and in the perceptual sequence the interweaving intentions also have the characteristic of sensation, the originary characteristic, and in the memorial and expectational sequences they have the nonoriginary characteristic. Nevertheless, they have the mode of certainty. In the phantasy sequence, everything has the nonoriginary characteristic too, but no mode. There is the enigma once again.\(^6\) However, ”nonoriginary” signifies in the one case actual re-presentation (re-presentation again, re-presentation in advance, re-presentation of something co-existing) and in the other case inactuality:\(^7\) mere presentation.

Quasi-perception, quasi-grasping of the now; as a parallel, actual re-presentation would be a re-presenting positing of the now, to whose essence a certain sphere of actual connection with what is now

\(^5\) Inserted later: “inactuality.” — Editor’s note.

\(^6\) Yes, if we speak incorrectly. No mode?! No, the same mode as the corresponding memory, except that the mode, like the whole phenomenon, is “mere phantasy.”

\(^7\) Inserted later: “of the re-presentation.” — Editor’s note.

A common element exists throughout: Actual re-presentation and quasi-re-presentation are of kindred nature and are related to one another as actuality and inactuality.

Presentation — re-presentation, actuality and inactuality as intersecting differences

This touches all the phenomena. Hence it also touches phantasm and sensation. Phantasm would be the universal name for the re-presentation that corresponds to sensation, and there too we would have the distinction between actuality and inactuality with respect to the re-presentation. The distinctions precede the specific “meaning.”

On the other hand, sensation and perception are placed under the universal point of view of presentation. Must not the distinction between actuality and inactuality then also be present here? Above all, one will say, sensation is intrinsically actuality. Does the distinction between actuality and inactuality belong only to re-presentation understood as quasi-sensation?8 9

Perception.10 Should we say that here we have the distinction in the form of pure image-contemplation? It is certainly correct that conflicts can be brought to light here. But if we live in the image world and are not directed at all toward the actual world, then there is no consciousness of a conflict there either. The shift into the image world may indeed cause the characteristic of conflict to emerge, and the fact that the image is not posited as actuality may be connected with this conflict. But if we live exclusively in the image world and not at all in the actual world, then only modified perceptual consciousness is carried out: It is “phantasy,” which is to say now that it is inactuality

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8 I have, however, sought to realize the fundamental point of view of actuality and inactuality throughout the whole phenomenology of acts.
9 Inserted later: “(no).” — Editor’s note.
10 Husserl later expanded “perception” into the question: “What is the situation in the case of perception?” — Editor’s note.
consciousness.\textsuperscript{11} It is \textit{quasi}-perceptual consciousness, not actual perceptual consciousness. We see as it were. However, it is a \textit{presenting} consciousness, not a re-p-presenting consciousness. A presenting consciousness, but consciousness as it were. In re-presenting phantasy (phantasy in the other sense), we do not merely have perception as it were; on the contrary, the phenomenon has a re-presenting character. It represents perception, while here in \textit{image consciousness} perception is not represented \textit{but carried out in an inactual way}. Here the foundations are sensations understood as presentations; there they are phantasms understood as re-presentations.

Furthermore, one could also support the view that in the region of \textit{re}-presentation the consciousness of nullity is \textit{possible at any time} in the case of inactuality and plays an analogous role. If I make the shift\textsuperscript{12} into phantasy, I have the \textit{consciousness of passing over} into a null world. What is re-presented does not exist: it neither exists now nor has existed nor will be coming into existence.

This is immediately clear with respect to phantasies that conform, as is customarily the case, to the real world of perception and of actual re-presentation. If we live in the phantasy, this does not disturb us. We do not continually declare [what we are phantasying] to be null. We “dream.” Dreaming\textsuperscript{13} is inactual re-presentation, or it is combined with \textit{inactual} perceptual consciousness if we phantasy into the perceptual world. For one will surely have to say that the datum of perception, through the \textit{phantasying into},\textsuperscript{14} receives modifications that turn it into a complex of inactuality ([with] components of impressional, presenting inactuality and re-presenting inactuality). In the same way, an actual re-presentation also receives the dream characteristic by mixing with phantasy.

As far as phantasies that have no determinate relation to the actual world are concerned, they at least have an indeterminate placement in a “mythical” past or in a “distant actuality,” which is indeterminately distant in space and time. Even there nullity exists: as soon as we heed the actual world and posit the phantasy in relation to it. One could

\textsuperscript{11} Two fundamentally different concepts of phantasy: 1) inactuality, 2) re-presentation.

\textsuperscript{12} Inserted later: “from perception.” — Editor’s note.

\textsuperscript{13} Inserted later: “in this sense.” — Editor’s note.

\textsuperscript{14} Inserted later: “(the involving of the inactual),” — Editor’s note.
also say: In re-presentation we are objectively there, and at any time we can have the consciousness that we were not there. But how much remains to be studied if we are to realize such a view in a decisive way!

An image re-presenting an original: an inactual presentation\textsuperscript{15} combined with a re-presentation with resembling content (with the same essence), in the manner of an analogy. In the same way, a thing or an “image” functioning as a sign “brings to mind” something signified, and so on.

\textsuperscript{15} Inserted later: “(image object).” — Editor’s note.
We start, say, from perception and exclude the possible act of meaning, the “positing act,” retaining the simple perception. This is the act that functions as the substrate on which the specifically theoretical act, the theoretical act of meaning, is founded. I admit that we do not have the right word for this act. For perceptual appearance signifies, after all, the common essence that can be present with a different qualification. And the qualification is not the theoretical qualification, which, on the contrary, belongs to the founded act, to the “theoretical act of meaning,” to the act of objectifying, to the taking of the object as true [Wahrnehmen] and, on the basis of this taking and positing, to the carrying out in different degrees of new positings of a founded sort that are completely theoretical. The word “perzipieren” [“to perceive”], like the word “wahrnehmen” [“to take as true”], then straightforwardly expresses the theoretical positing. When Leibniz opposes perception and apperception, the “merely” attached to perception excludes what the word primarily suggests, and it is “apperception” that first brings it in. On the other hand, my expressions — “apprehension,” “apperception” — were aimed at something entirely different, at precisely the “mere” perception and its peculiarities. Hence one is in a difficult situation here. Let us say, for example, “the act of mere apperancy,” the act of appearing — specifically, of perceptual appearing (but not, in the strict sense, of perceiving, apprehending).

The re-presentational modification — that is, memory in the widest sense (we are moving, of course, within the sphere of actuality [Aktualität]) — stands opposed to the act of simple perceptual appearing. Different degrees of vitality and suitability belong to this modification (this is the case with respect to its suitability inasmuch as single moments of re-appearing objects, of re-presented objects, are not characterized as exhibiting moments, as appearances of the object’s properties themselves; the objective moment can be “re-presented
indeterminately” by the moment of the “appearance”). Through decline in vitality, which touches all exhibiting and re-presentational material (material of appearance), the vitality can finally become null. What does that imply? It implies that a re-presentation is possible that is an empty re-presentation. Something hovers before me, but I have no noticeable “appearance” of it. And yet I am conscious of what hovers before me. Possibly it is even posited theoretically, objectivated, and I can say from which side, in which forms, and so on, I am conscious of it, despite the emptiness. Of course, all of this in general is not as distinct and determinate as it is in the case of the clear appearance, which, however, can also be fluctuating, and so on.

Here, therefore, we have distinctions between clear appearance and obscure appearance, or between re-presenting acts of differing clarity and obscurity in their ways of bringing [what is re-presented] to appearance. Obscure acts (acts re-presenting something obscurely) would be one concept of emptiness.

In this manner, I am conscious, emptily or obscurely, of the objects in a dark room — my familiar room — when I am turned toward an object in the room and when its surroundings are also actually there, while I nevertheless do not have any sort of “intuition,” any clear memorial presentation of all of this, perhaps not even of the object — perhaps not in the least of the object — toward which I am turned, at which I perhaps grasp, and so on.

Furthermore, the re-presentation that occurs in a certain sense through “signs” is also of this sort. Namely, in a clear (more or less clear) intuition (a presenting or re-presenting intuition), something or other hovers before me that “reminds me” of another object not belonging to the “surroundings” of what hovers before me, or even reminds me of an object that does belong to the surroundings, in which case, however, the latter is not “intuitively presented” at all. Whether empty presentations “in the dark” bring to mind empty presentations in turn and how far the combinations go in such cases remains undecided. In any event, what is evoked there, toward which the intending regard of theoretical consciousness can be directed and which it can apprehend, can exist without, for that reason, coming to intuition.
Empty re-presentation and the so-called empty presentation of the back as apprehension

Furthermore, we must emphasize a significant distinction here: If I fix myself on an object in the dark in an act of meaning, the object is meant along with a mode of appearance, even if it is an obscure appearance; and accordingly the excited “surroundings” also possess a certain mode of obscure appearance. Of course, to be more precise we would have to say: Certain closed circuits of appearance-namely, those that I would have in a corresponding perception if I were to look at the objects from my resting standpoint, if I were to look them over with my eyes and look them over again — are privileged; and perhaps I am obscurely conscious of a determinate series of appearances “excited” by this. If my standpoint is not resting, however, then a corresponding section from the series of possible appearances is privileged in an obscure way. Suitably “indeterminate,” of course. But it is evidently possible that I am conscious of a wholly determinate empty appearance or series of empty appearances. There can be a similar situation with respect to the “emptily presented” back of the box I am now looking at. I run my eyes over the clearly appearing — that is, perceptually appearing — box, and if perhaps I am concerned with the seen edge of the box, my regard slides beyond the edge in re-presentation. I slip into a re-presentation: as if I had turned my head and perused a line with my gaze; and thus I am conscious of a re-presented series of appearances of a relatively determinate kind, although my consciousness of it is a little clearer at one moment, a little more obscure at another. On the other hand, while I keep my regard fixed purely on the side of the box actually exhibiting itself, I am conscious of the whole, even of what is not seen, in a more or less indeterminate manner: I cannot say in this case that some of the possible re-presentations of the back or some of its determinate ways of running off are “excited,” are intended obscurely. And yet I do have an empty presentation of the back; and it is a presentation that, with respect to the object, has determinacy contents (significational contents) more richly determined in many respects, and a determinacy that is involved in the empty presentation, in the empty part of the perception. As soon as we turn ourselves in an act of meaning.
toward what is not visible, we find, of course, that some appearances are privileged, but not in such a way that in the turning others could not emerge from the “group” and be posited in their place.

One will feel tempted to say:

If we are turned toward the front of the box, a determinate appearance or series of appearances appertaining to the other sides would always be awakened; however, for the theoretical consciousness that intends the object and is limited to the contemplation of the front, nothing “essential” and nothing noticeable with regard to the appar- 5 ential basis [die apparenziale Unterlage] would change. Nevertheless, we very probably notice an outflashing of determinate appearances of the back. Aside from this, however, we must heed the following: If we are conscious of some appearance or other, even if we are con- 10 scious of it as obscure, it is nonetheless an appearance-of. A back therefore also belongs to what appears, and we also have a distinction between the appearance of the front and the “co-appearing” back within the empty re-presentation, within the consciousness belonging to the obscure appearance. Hence we would have an empty appearance of the second degree, so to speak. But what is this supposed to indicate, if empty appearance signifies much the same as obscure appearance? Is there clarity and obscurity all over again within obscu- rity? Differences in vitality; this certainly now no longer makes any sense.

And, in addition, infinite regresses arise, since the back of the phys- 15 ical objectivity appearing in the obscure appearance would again be intended in an obscure appearance, which itself would again make a back appear, and so in infinitum.

We have adduced stringent proof, therefore, that empty re- 20 presentation understood as the obscurity modification of a clear re- presentation is fundamentally different from the “consciousness of the rear aspects” contained as a constant component in every transe- 25 unt “appearance,” from the consciousness that belongs to the apprehension of the appearing object insofar as it does not come to self-exhibition through sensation or phantasm. I always spoke of “co- 30 meantness,” but it must be noted that co-meaning (when, e.g., I mean the object) presupposes apprehension. We can distinguish in every appearance a sphere of apprehension and a sphere of mere apprehension.
The whole act of apparency then has its empty re-presentation (its obscure act), and every prehension as well as every mere apprehension enters into obscurity. And both are inseparably connected to each other.

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Up to this point, we have moved in a very narrow circle, the circle of acts of apparency.

Now must we not say that a re-presentational modification belongs to every act?

The question to be asked first here is: What does re-presentational modification mean? The model for the formation of our concept is the “memory” corresponding to the apperntial perception. (Properly speaking, it is a question of a series of modifications. It can be a consciousness of the past that is in question, but also a re-presentational consciousness in which a nonpresent now is re-presented. As when I am conscious in the dark of my surroundings as a re-presented present and not as something past.) These are different modes of reproduction, of re-presentation. Normally we say re-presentation with respect to something objective. Here, however, it is a question of a modification of apperntial perception. Specifically, just as perception grasps or makes what is present appear in person, so, if occasion should arise, this modification or reproduction grasps the same object or something perfectly like it, which does not stand there in person but is “re-presented.”

Memory is a reproductive modification of perception, but it has the remarkable peculiarity that it is also re-presentation of perception and not simply re-presentation of what was perceived. I remember lunch. “Implicit” in this memory, however, is also memory of the perception of lunch (irrespective of the direction of my act of meaning).

On the other hand, this is not true of all reproductions. The reproduction of my surroundings (which I do not now see) re-presents these surroundings. But does it also re-present the perception? It certainly seems so. However, the perception (the determinate “appearance”) is not intended as something that has been. And is it perhaps intended...
as something that is now? As a “nonpresent perceptual appearance”? That is scarcely comprehensible.¹

One can deny, on the other hand, that I am conscious of a re-presentation of the perceptual appearance. And I am certainly not conscious of it in the manner of a fiction! I posit the re-presented Roons as present reality. How do I posit this perception when I look at it?² Certainly not as a psychic reality, in the manner in which in the case of memory I can assign the perception in memory³ to me, to my consciousness, as a psychic reality that has been. With respect to the re-presented now-perception, I can only say: It has its determinate motivation. It “is,” insofar as it is posited in such a way that its object “is actually in my surroundings.” Hence there are indeed difficulties here.

Let us think of it as fully clarified. We then have, corresponding to each perception, reproductive modifications that make up re-presentations of the object of the perception⁴ and in a certain manner also re-presentations of the perception itself.

Now what can it mean to say that for every act, for every experience, there can be a reproductive modification? Is every experience a perception, then? Every experience is perceptible. This seems simple. A new act of perception is directed precisely at the relevant experience, supposing, of course, that it continues to endure. But what can such a perception look like? What is the new thing that it harvests? We can find nothing else there than a turning of the intentional [meinen-den] regard toward an object that still endures or that is sinking back retentionally.

**On the theory of internal consciousness and internal reflection**

However, the intentional regard, the positing that makes something into an object, certainly presupposes that an act is already there that

¹ Husserl later placed a question mark in the margin and noted: “This is not an argument. Appendix.” Cf. Appendix XXXI, p. 375f. — Editor’s note.
² The last sentence was later partially changed, at first as follows: “How do I posit this re-presentation of the perceptual appearance, . . .”; then afterwards in the following form: “How do I posit this re-presented perceptual appearance, . . .” — Editor’s note.
³ Inserted later: “the ‘quasi-perception’ discoverable by reflection in memory in the ordinary sense.” — Editor’s note.
⁴ Inserted later: “and its ontic appearances.” — Editor’s note.
has “hidden” in itself the objective something toward which the regard is supposed to be directed. That the act of meaning is directed toward the “objects” of the acts does not surprise us, but how is it supposed to be directed toward the acts themselves, if they are not objects of other acts?

5 Must we not say: Every act is consciousness of something. But there is also consciousness of every act. Every experience is “sensed,” is immanently perceived (internal consciousness), although naturally not posited, not meant.

10 Every act can be reproduced; to every “internal” consciousness of the act — the internal consciousness taken as perceiving — there belongs a possible reproductive consciousness, for example, a possible recollection (in which case the question is whether still another reproductive consciousness is possible). To be sure, this seems to lead back to an infinite regress. For is not the consciousness of something that is internal, the perceiving of the act (of judging, of perceiving externally, of rejoicing, and so forth), again an act and therefore itself something internally perceived, and so on?

20 Now one can perhaps avoid this [conclusion] in the following way: Every “experience” in the strict sense is internally perceived. The perceiving of the internal, however, is not an “experience” in the same sense. It is not itself again internally perceived.

Furthermore, one will also argue:

25 Every experience our regard can reach presents itself as an experience that endures, that flows away, and that changes in such and such a way. And it is not the intentional regard that makes the experience be what it presents itself as being; the regard only looks at the experience. This present, now existing, enduring experience, as we can discover by altering our regard, is already a “unity of consciousness,” of time consciousness; and this is precisely perceptual

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5 The next few pages (though p. 374) are based in part on the same manuscript sheets as the following texts in Husserliana X (which reproduces Husserl’s early texts on time consciousness): No. 41, p. 291; Beilage XII, p. 126, line 39 to p. 129, line 13. — Translator’s note.

6 “perceived” was later placed in quotation marks and the following was noted in the margin: “Perceiving here does not signify being turned toward something and grasping it in an act of meaning!” — Editor’s note.
consciousness. “Perceiving”\(^7\) here is nothing other than the time-
constituting consciousness with its phases of flowing retentions and
protentions. Behind this perceiving there does not stand another per-
cieving, as if this flow itself were again a unity in a flow. What we call
experience, what we call the act of judging, of joy, of the perceiving
of something external, even the act of looking at an act (which is a
positing act of meaning) — all of these are unities of time conscious-
ness and are therefore perceived. Now to each such unity a modi-
ification corresponds: more precisely, a reproducing corresponds to
the originary constitution of time, to the perceiving, and something
re-presented corresponds to what is perceived.

External perception accordingly belongs here as well (apparential
perceiving); it is a constituted unity. I see this paper, for example, this
inkwell situated here, and so on. This enduring “appearance.”

Now this is something present (hence something internally per-
ceived); and there corresponds to it a possible reproductive modifica-
tion as something phantasied, something recollected, and so on.

Just as there corresponds to actual joy the memory of the joy or
some other sort of reproduction of the joy. (Are there several, then?)

However, the important difference here consists in the following:
The external perception is perception. And if the modification of the
perception is then a corresponding memory, we have the remarkable
circumstance that the corresponding memory is not only memory
of the perception but that the modification of the perception is also
memory of what was perceived. I must make this clearer. An exter-

nal perception (an apparential perception or prehension\(^8\), as a unity
of consciousness, as a unity of immanent duration, is itself some-
thing perceived; and to this internal perception (to the consciousness
of the internal) the reproductive modification, the internal memory,
corresponds. Every internal reproduction (no matter what act is in
question) is a reproduction “of” the corresponding internal percep-
tion, precisely its modification. However, it belongs to the essence of
the relationship of reproduction and perception that just as perception

\(^7\) Perceiving in these pages means much the same as having a perceptual appearance,
but it does not mean being turned toward something in an act of positing! This must
always be kept in mind.

\(^8\) “or prehension” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
presents — namely, presents what is perceived in it — so reproduction re-presents. And consequently a re-presented act corresponds to the originary act, to the “experienced” act; that is, to the act perceived in internal consciousness. But a re-presented act is not something really immanent in internal consciousness. Now we put the originary act and its re-presentation side by side.

Hence we have the following situation:

Let A be any act intended in internal consciousness (any act that has become adequately constituted in it). If P_i is the internal consciousness, we then have P_i (A). Let there be a recollection of this, a re-presentation of some sort: R_i (A). But this recollection is then something of which there is internal consciousness.

P_i [R_i (A)].

Consequently, within internal consciousness and all of its “experiences,” we have two sorts of occurrences corresponding to one another, A and R_i (A).

The entire phenomenology I had in view in the Logical Investigations was a phenomenology of experiences in the sense of data of internal consciousness, and this, in any event, is a closed field.

Let us go on. The A can be something different: a sensuous content — say, sensed red. What is sensation? Sensation is nothing other than the internal consciousness of the content of sensation.

Hence the sensation red (understood as the sensing of red) = P_i (red), and the phantasm of red = R_i (red), which, however, has its factual existence in consciousness = P_i [R_i (red)].

Thus it is understood why I could identify sensing and the content of sensation in the Logical Investigations. If I moved within the boundaries of internal consciousness, then naturally there was no sensing there, but only something sensed. It was then correct as well to contrast acts (intentional experiences belonging to internal consciousness) and nonacts. The latter were precisely the totality of “primary” or sensuous contents.

Concerning the “phantasms,” however, it was naturally false to say of them (within the boundaries of internal consciousness) that they were “experiences”; for experience was equivalent to: “A datum of internal consciousness, something internally perceived.” We then have to distinguish the re-presented sensation contents, the phantasied sensuous contents, for example, and the re-presentations of them, the
Ri (s); the latter, of course, are acts belonging within the boundaries of internal consciousness.

Now let us consider the case in which A is an “external” perception. It is, of course, a unity belonging to internal consciousness. And in internal consciousness there is a re-presentation of it just as there is of every act and experience. Hence P_e (o) as P_i [P_e (o)] has its R_i [P_e (o)]. Now it belongs to perception’s essence as perception that a parallel re-presentation corresponds to it in the sense that the latter re-presents the same thing that the perception perceives.

Definition of a strict concept of reproduction

"Reproduction" [Reproduktion] is the re-presentation of internal consciousness. This is a misleading, indeed, a false, expression, inasmuch as it conceals in itself the view that the originary experience belonging to the earlier internal consciousness is now being produced again, as if an echo, reflection, afterimage of the earlier internal consciousness, although weak, were coming back. In truth, it is a re-presentation; and re-presentation is a new kind of act. We still need a separate term for the separate re-presentation of internal consciousness, and this re-presentation may be called reproduction.

The re-presentation of a physical event, then, must not be called reproduction; the term surely will not do at all in that case. The natural event is not produced once again. It is remembered; it stands before consciousness in the manner of what is re-presented.

Now let us consider the remarkable relationship between the two re-presentations to be compared here — re-presentations that obviously differ from one another intrinsically.

1) Over against A = P_e there stands R_i or, as we can now write, Rep(P_e), the reproduction of the external perception.

2) Over against P_e, understood as P(a), the perception of the external object a, there stands R_e; that is to say, R (a), the re-presentation of a.

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9 Why do I not introduce the right terminology: All objects of internal consciousness that are not reproductions = impressions; all objects of internal re-presentation = reproductions.

10 Inserted later: “to be sure.” — Editor’s note.
How does the reproduction of the perception of a house, for example, compare to the re-presentation of the house?

If we always exclude the interweaving acts of meaning (of objectifying positing) and the differences in attention, then surely we must say that the phenomena in both cases are the same, that an essential law obtains here according to which

\[ \text{Rep}(P_e) = R_e; \]

and this is valid for every perception that is not internal consciousness (although for the latter too, of course, as tautological limit case).

But then it remains for us to study the precise relationships when we take into account the different sorts of reproductions or, respectively, re-presentations. And the “empathizings” belong there as well.

In any case, every reproduction and every R (re-presentation) can have differences in “vitality”; they can then also be obscure and in this sense empty. And they can also have the modes we described earlier; they can have the characteristic of inactuality (mere phantasy), and, in addition to the characteristic of certainty, the characteristic of uncertainty and of the different modes of uncertainty.

In this sense, therefore, for every act we have an empty act. And since internal consciousness also has its empty modification in the form of empty reproduction, so there is also an empty phantasm for every sensation content (sensuous content); namely, an empty reproduction of it.

*Internal reflection (perception of the internal)*

Moreover, we can now say: The “objectivating act of meaning” in the specific sense, the theoretical act of meaning, can have 1) the characteristic of “perception of the internal,” of “internal reflection,” understood as “a positing act of meaning of what is internally intended.” The act of meaning can become immersed in the consciousness, can take the internal consciousness as its substrate. Then, to the extent possible, all the objectivities implicitly on hand in the internal consciousness as consciousness of the internal become given; they

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11 “of” later changed to “on the basis of.” — Editor’s note.
become "objects." In this way, sensations, understood as sensuous contents, become objects. And, on the other side, all the acts constituted as unities in internal consciousness, all the act cogitationes, the intentional experiences belonging to internal consciousness.

2) In internal consciousness, therefore, we also have "intentional experiences" as unities, since apparential [apparenziale] perceptions, judgments, feelings, desires, and so on, are there. These unities can function as substrates. Instead of positing and objectifying them in "internal reflection" — that is, in internal perception understood as an act of meaning — an act of meaning immerses itself in their intentionality, and thus "draws" from them the objects intended in them "implicitly" and makes those objects into intended objects in the strict sense of objectivating positing. The act functioning as a substrate in this process can be an act that re-presents something emptily. Naturally, the memory of a joy, of a wish, and so forth, can emerge; and an act of meaning can be directed toward what was joyful, what was wished as wished, without a "living presentation" holding sway in the act. One will certainly not be able to deny this, as little as one will be able to deny it in the case of empty sensuous re-presentations (re-presentations of physical things) or in the case of other acts and their re-presentations.
In addition, we must say:

Appearance, perceptual appearance, can be interpreted either ontically or phansically. Perceptual appearance has the characteristic of the now: of what is actually present, of what is "original." Viewed precisely, however, it is by no means a member of spatio-temporal objectivity. It has its own "now." The quasi-appearance has its quasi-now; and if it is a question of a genuine memorial (recollective) appearance, it has its place in time as past, in which case this past has a position in relation to the past of what appears that is analogous to the position of the "present" of the perceptual appearance in relation to the present of what is perceived. If it is not a memorial appearance, does it have the characteristic of the quasi-now and nothing more? Let us consider the fact that in the case of memorial appearing we have, with respect to the appearance and what appears, something twofold: the quasi-now and the characterization as (actually and not quasi-) past. The quasi-now, however, can also be combined with the characteristic of a now. Specifically, we distinguish two kinds of now: the actual now, actually constituted in the sphere of perception, and the inactual now, the now that is posited by re-presentational positing and that is to be identified objectively as "simultaneous" with the actual now. Of course, I can be doubly conscious of the past as well: as a past that has just been and of which I am conscious as actual, and as a past of which I am conscious "once again" in memory [“Wieder”-Erinnerung] as inactual.

Appearance, however, can also be interpreted phansically. We then have the "psychic" act of appearing, and ontic appearances belong
to it as “immanent contents.” Appearance without [something] appearing is inconceivable. Hence re-presentation of an appearance is a re-presentational modification of the consciousness that we can perceive (with a perceptual content, a perceptual appearance; specifically, “the same” appearance), since precisely the quasi-perceiving, which can be grasped in “reflection in re-presentation,” corresponds to the perceiving.1 In the recollection of what is perceived (or also of the ontic perceptual appearance), this re-presentation of the perception is characterized as something psychic that did exist: a re-presented act of perceiving, and, as a re-presented act of perceiving, a re-presented now, though not posited as “actually” now but as “actually past” in relation to the actual now, the now of present actuality. The quasi-perception (precisely the perception that occurs in memory) is a past psychic experience.

However, if it is not a question of recollective memory, then the quasi-perception does not have the characteristic of a past psychic experience. It has a now-characteristic and a relation to the actual now, though it is not characterized as a “present” psychic experience; namely, as an experience that now exists and is posited by means of re-presentation.

Hence the remarkable thing is: On the one hand, something psychic, and yet not something psychic that really belongs to me, and yet [something] possessing the characteristic of the “now.”2

One could point to the following here: If I am now perceiving a physical thing — this table, this pen — the perception is something psychic that is actually present. But if I turn the thing around in “phantasy,” if I “present” its reverse side to myself in this or that appearance, then these are re-presentations that present to me “what now exists from other sides,” and that have in themselves the characteristic of quasi-perceptions and <of> a quasi-now, which, on the other hand, is certainly not merely quasi-now. This is also true when I have a

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1 The last sentence was later changed as follows: “Hence re-presentation of an act of appearing is a re-presentational modification of that consciousness that we can ‘perceive’ (with a perceptual content, a perceptual appearance; specifically, ‘the same’ appearance), that can be grasped in ‘reflection in re-presentation.’” — Editor’s note.

2 The sentence was later changed as follows: “On the one hand, something psychic and posited, and yet not posited as something psychic that now really belongs to me, and yet possessing the ‘now’-characteristic and posited.” — Editor’s note.
recollection, a determinate memorial presentation of a situation “in precisely the way in which I experienced it,” and I alter my standpoint “in phantasy,” and so forth.

I spoke in this respect of motivations. These are specific positings that can be converted into specific hypothetical positings: If I were to turn my head in a certain way, I would have the appearance, or, in other words, perform an act of perceiving characterized in that way, and so on.
APPENDIX XXXII (to p. 370, 25ff.)

<VITALITY, LIFELESSNESS, EMPTINESS IN RE-PRESENTATIONS AND RETENTIONS. THE EMERGING AND THE FADING AWAY OF RE-PRESENTATION>

<probably 1911 or the beginning of 1912>

In the case of *re-presentations*, I have spoken of “living” re-presentations and of lifeless, “obscure” re-presentations. Now one will say that the same thing is true of the *retentions* into which all perceptions are converted after their “cessation.” It belongs to the essence of perception that a retentional train attaches itself to each perceptual phase. Every perception declines in vitality as soon as it has ceased; that is, it does not cease all at once. In fading away, the consciousness of the now becomes changed into continuous retentional consciousness, and lifelessness passes over into *emptiness*. Of course, this retention and a background of empty retention belongs to every experience within internal consciousness.

Now if we return to re-presentations, in their case too we have to distinguish the “emerging” of the re-presentation, its beginning, which is a re-presenting of an earlier internal perceiving of the corresponding experience, or a re-presenting of its earlier occurring in the now. This is followed by a retentional series, a fading away of the act of re-presenting, in which the fading away of the earlier perception is also re-presented. And if the whole memory has elapsed, a retention still remains; that is, expressed more precisely, a reproduction of the retention that followed on the “elapsed” perception. We also have to distinguish here: the empty re-presentation with its flow and its retention, and the reproduced empty retention, and so on.

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1 Inserted later: “although as perception.” — Editor’s note.
APPENDIX XXXIII

<DISTINCTIONS IN THE SPHERE OF INTERNAL CONSCIOUSNESS (OF TIME CONSCIOUSNESS)>

<probably 1911/12>

We distinguish the following in the sphere of internal consciousness:

1) Impressions in the wider sense as experiences in which an originary present, an originary now, becomes constituted, or an originary just-having-been and yet-to-come; that is, we exclude reproductions understood as experiences in which things of a like kind do indeed become constituted, but in such a way that what is constituted is also the re-presentation of a now, of a just-past, of a future.

Within impressions in the wider sense, we distinguish:

Impressions in the strict sense, impressional experiences from which an act of meaning, when it becomes established therein, obtains a present, a now, a succession as an actually present process, and so on.

Retentions as post-presentations, as concrete experiences in which one is conscious of a just-past and not a now.

Protentions, fore-presentations in which one is conscious of a future, but not of a now or a just-past.

Hence I need “reproductions” in order to define impressions.

To be sure, it becomes apparent that every impression in the strict sense, every phenomenon of original presentation, also involves components of post-presentation and fore-presentation, just as it becomes apparent that no post-presentation and no fore-presentation are possible without internal consciousness also bringing about presentations. These are matters of time consciousness, however, and internal consciousness is precisely time consciousness.
APPENDIX XXXIV

<SIMPLE AND SYNTHETIC ACTS OF MEANING IN RELATION TO THE CLARITY AND DISTINCTNESS OF APPEARANCES AND THE QUESTION OF THE UNITY OF APPEARANCE. DETERMINACY AND INDETERMINACY IN MEMORY AND PHANTASY. EMPTY APPEARANCES>

<probably 1911 or the beginning of 1912>

The act of meaning that posits this, the simple act of meaning and the synthetic act of meaning.

The excited empty appearing. Empty sensuous appearances. Empty nonsensuous appearances.

The positing act of meaning directed toward something that appears as filled. The positing act of meaning directed toward something that appears as empty.

Emptiness, the sphere of confused consciousness. An explicit act of meaning, an explicit cogitative synthesis on the basis of confused appearances, empty appearances. Formations, produced by thinking, that cannot be “cashed in.”

1) The forms of possible cogitative synthesis implied in the essence of “thinking” as such (of the positing that means an object).

2) Prescribed possibilities of synthesis belong to the essence of clear appearances: namely, not possibilities of the connection and relation of appearances as they are, but possibilities of the new formation of syntheses and analyses that detach partial appearances with partial positings from the unitary appearances; and the whole positings are brought into synthesis with the partial meanings, and so on. In what is explicit, therefore, new stuffs (cores) emerge. Hence explication of what is hidden in already given appearances.

1 On this point, see what follows.
But is not the same thing true of the explication of empty appearances?

_Clarity, distinctness_

3) We would have to say: A distinction must be made between perfectly clear appearances and appearances with a lower degree of clarity, and, finally, completely empty appearances in which nothing at all is living.²

Every act of making distinct — that is to say, every act of bringing something out and meaning it — presupposes something’s becoming vital; and the greater the determinacy is, the greater the vitality.

But can that be right? If in the dark I successively single out and mean the objects in the room, does that signify <that> I must have re-presented them intuitively? Can I therefore not single out and mean something without clarity? That seems to be quite certain. Hence one must ask: *What kind of priority does clarity have in that case?*

_Determinacy and indeterminacy in memory_

Everything is not quite right within “clarity” *either*. Let us restrict ourselves to individual appearances of physical things. Something hovers before me in _memory_. “On closer inspection,” however, no determinate memory is connected with the determinate color. Or the color changes, is uncomfortably “ambiguous”; now this color, now that color flashes before me. But I have no consciousness _in_ the color of “its being given once again,” as I do with respect to the form. Actuality pertains to color as such, but not to the determinate color.

After a while I “find” the determinate color “again”; I see it again. But is that possible without a vital seeing-again? And, on the other hand, as we said, clarity alone does not suffice. It depends on the way in which the memorial character spreads over the phenomenon, over the appearance, and to which moments it essentially relates.

And then one will say: It can be just the same in the case of empty memory. In general, of course, greater determinacy exists on the side of clarity. But, again, what does it mean to distinguish _clarity_ and

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² Must one not distinguish “clear” and “distinct”?
**determinacy?** What kind of an amazing case is the following: I have an appearance, an appearance that, in a certain way, is vivacious and therefore certainly a clear appearance, and yet I have no determinacy. I present the children’s room to myself, and the foot rug — red, with its pattern — comes within my view. I do not, however, see the pattern *precisely*. And a deep blue flashes before me. But it is “clear” for only a moment, and I immediately say that this is not it: this color is too blue. How the pattern is formed is also unintelligible; thus I have something vague as far as the form is concerned — something oblong, something quadrilateral — but I cannot say how it is filled out. Or I present the living room: blue wallpaper, Persian rug, but how vaguely the sofa is presented. “Intuitively,” indeed, and yet not clearly; I do not see the pattern of the rug clearly. A “geometric pattern,” small squares in regular sequence, some in gold, others in purple. Now, quite vitally, the green of the other rug, but the pattern, in which heaven knows what kind of role the green more precisely plays there, [is] obscure. For a moment I had the image, but that was before I could articulate it and run through it in detail point by point. But it is surely “vital.” In this fluctuating, however, [there is] constantly a certain unity of “intention.” I mean determinate objects in determinate modes of appearance. Markedly different memories may interweave in this fluctuation, pass over into one another, and so on. Now if I have multiple appearances united in one act of meaning, the question becomes: What is this supposed to signify?

As when I am turned toward the sofa and then have a certain appearance, also fluctuating, of the whole room? What gives the flux [*Fluktus*] a unity of appearance when I am turned toward the sofa in my act of meaning, looking at it and positing it? Is not the reference to an act of meaning ambiguous here?

One could say: These are acts of meaning undergoing revival, or acts of meaning that are not “actual” acts of meaning, not acts that posit, but modifications of posittings, according to which the results of unifying acts of meaning emerge in the background in a mode of mere appearance and then perhaps are actualized. I turn toward them and through the flux perform an actual positing.

When I look at an object, I go around it with my eyes and body; I have ever new appearances and a unity of meaning. The unity of the act of meaning, however, is directed toward the “unity” belonging to
the appearances themselves. They intermingle as appearances of one thing. Hence various appearances can have continuous unity and, even as unmeant, pass over into oneness. As for the background appearances with their fluctuating character [Fluktus], the situation would be the same if the appearances were actually intimately related appearances, perhaps even precisely the same appearances. Thus it is in seeing the background. But what about re-presenting the background? Here, however, it must be noted that the different re-presentations, as re-presentations, have a unity. And we must make distinctions within that unity.

Clarity, veiling, and so on, in memory and phantasy

Re-presentations can be memories. The whole has the characteristic of memory, but the characteristic of memory does not spread over all of the moments of appearance. As memories of one and the same thing, memories blend; they have their unity. Insofar as they are memories, they accord with corresponding possible perceptions; insofar as they are not memories, they possibly drop out of the unity altogether. The question is what this is supposed to mean. We have to distinguish the universal modifications of obscurity — the being-veiled (or whatever one may call it) that all re-presentations can universally undergo — from the modifications that the appearances can undergo with regard to their entire content, particularly with regard to their content of sensuous data. In connection with the latter, the mixing of memories with one another, the passing of memories over into memories in conflict, interruption, and so on, must be described as the main point. I am now presenting to myself a chocolate shop in Berlin’s Münzstrasse. In the shop’s window display there stood (perhaps 30 years ago!) a swan made of sugar. It stands before me again. The bill is yellow. Or is it not black? But then a black swan from the zoological gardens mixes itself in. Or I now have in memory: Heinrich in a grey suit in Ischl, socks black — or brown? Very dark brown shoes?

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3 The whole does have the characteristic of memory, but “on closer inspection” not all of the moments seriously have this characteristic in themselves. The characteristic does not truly adhere to them; it does not belong to them. It only irradiates them, and so on. Filler.
I should mention in this connection the phenomenon of the arbitrary changing of the phantasy image. And I should describe it. The whole formation \([\text{Gestalt}]\) remains: I present the socks to myself as black. To be sure, I now feel a consciousness here of the “not.” Or I now see the socks as green. (There simultaneously stands before me, painted on a signboard, a Tyrolean with green socks.) And so on. This whole region must be described precisely.

Here, however, if I do not make clear — very clear — to myself “how it was” and do not follow up the memorial connections, I have appearances with the characteristic of memory as their collective characteristic while at the same time moments of appearance emerge among them that, “on closer inspection,” are not memories. Or in passing over into one another, appearances that are intended in a consciousness of unity as appearances of one thing coincide, while “on closer inspection” it becomes apparent that with respect to their concrete components they are derived in part from series of appearances of different objects.

Now what if it is not a question of memories but of phantasies? If a centaur hovers before me and I perform a positing act of meaning, the positing is adjusted to the appearance; what appears is “posited,” and posited — in the only way in which such an appearing thing can be posited — as existing in a space, in an environment of spatial things. Now a great variety of things may fluctuate in the background of the appearance, possibly as completely empty or indistinct background, but also in the foreground. Then it can be the case that different “images” push one another aside promiscuously: now I see a white-bearded and white-haired centaur, now a flaxen-haired centaur, now a corpulent centaur raising its arms, and then, without any unity with the corpulent centaur, an entirely different centaur, not corpulent but lean, with its arms loosely hanging down, and so on. And, of course, the backgrounds also change. Or I hold on to the meaning of the first appearance, a white-haired powerful centaur. Well, in that situation an empty appearance is retained, certainly without full determinacy, for generally there is so much indeterminacy in the appearance on hand.

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4 What does positing mean? The turning of one’s regard toward something? Then I can slip from one phantasy into another without maintaining unity. Or, on the other hand, I suppose it, I take it as one and the same.
in this *vague* sphere. It can then be the case that the original image is immediately revived, or a different image is revived that carries on the unity of the object in a fulfilling way. A coherent objective situation can then run its course in a series of appearances, but is then once again breached by something discordant that is characterized precisely as not belonging to the situation. Even among appearances that do belong together, something discordant can emerge. Of course, an object — an object at rest, an object moving in such and such a way — stands forth only in the “unity of coincidence,” in the unity of agreement.

What is discordant is nothing; what pushes itself in is not posited in the unity; the unity of meaning is posited.
Alleged division of all experiences into impressions and ideas

One cannot, of course, say that every experience is either a phantasy or an impression, if one has in view what impression is really supposed to mean in that case. But perhaps one can say the following:

To begin with, every experience, as a unity, is a unity belonging to “internal consciousness.” To that extent, every experience, relatively speaking, is said to be an impression.

Then there are modifications for every experience. Specifically, modification, in contrast to impression, is characterized by the fact that it has the characteristic of a quasi-consciousness-of as opposed to “actual consciousness.” Consciousness-of: This presupposes the distinction between mere consciousness and attention (the act of meaning in the specific sense). Quasi-consciousness is mere phantasy of, mere recollection, empty re-presentation,1 analogizing, and so on.

An experience, of course, is an actual experience; it is an experience experienced, an experience of which one is conscious. And in contrast to it, every reproductive consciousness of an experience is not called “experience” but “experience as it were,” not “consciousness” but “quasi-consciousness.”

Every experience, then, that does not itself belong to the class of modifications, that does not have the characteristic of quasi-consciousness, is said to be an impression. And an experience is also said to be an impression when it contains moments, parts, that are

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1 Inserted later: “also.” — Editor’s note.
modifications, just as an experience is called modification even if it contains parts that are impressions. (For example, image consciousness is not an impression, impressional perceptual consciousness is not a modification.)

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Hence one ought not confuse the following concepts of “impression”:

1) “Impression” as consciousness “actually engaged in” [aktuelles], as “actual” [wirkliches] consciousness, “actual” act: therefore, actually to perceive, actually to remember and expect, actually to have empty acts of meaning, actually to presuppose and posit as consequence, actually to predicate, actually to conclude, actually to wish, actually to have a liking for something, actually to will — in contrast to perceiving “as it were,” remembering and expecting as it were, presupposing and positing as consequence as it were, concluding as it were, wishing and willing as it were. To phantasy or to phantasy oneself into something: not to judge the state of affairs but to phantasy it, not to perceive but to phantasy oneself into the act of perceiving (and to live in the image, but not as positing anything), not to remember but to phantasy oneself into the act of remembering, not to wish but to phantasy oneself into the wishing.

Hence opposition between actuality [Aktualität] and inactuality [Inaktualität].

2) Sensing, in the widest sense of the primal consciousness that constitutes all unities of experience, is an actual consciousness. These unities are immanent “experiences” in the customary sense. They are

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2 *This* terminology, however, is not the terminology to which I will adhere. — I will always speak of *impression* or presentation in contrast to reproduction (re-presentation).
3 “as it were” [gleichsam] changed somewhat later to “inactual” [inaktuell]. — Editor’s note.
5 Simultaneously with the preceding change of “as it were” into “inactual,” “as it were” was crossed out here and in the following places in this sentence. — Editor’s note.
actual data in this sensing. Everything given in this way can be designated as *impression*: To have an impression, then, means the same as *to have an experience*. The opposite is to have a *reproduction*. A reproduction is itself an experience in which an experience is “represented” reproductively. Here we come to the distinction between experiences and reproductions of experiences. This is a relative distinction, and it leads to a distinction that is absolute: between experiences that do *not* themselves have the character of reproductions of experience and those that do have it. But under the title “reproduction,” there is, in addition, something different: namely, with respect to 1) above, actual reproduction or inactual reproduction. This is the distinction between originary experiences and their reproductions, and an experience that is precisely not the reproduction of another experience (even if it contains reproductions of other experiences) is originary.

The originary experience = impression; the reproducing experience = “idea.”

3) Every impression in the second sense can be converted into a *perception* as an act that means something, and every perception is itself an impression in this sense. Every reproduction can be converted into a memory, into any sort of re-presentational act of meaning that is itself a reproduction (for in this case the “act of meaning” is also the reproduction of an act of meaning).

Hence in case an impression or reproduction is not the basis of an act of meaning, I can also say that an act of meaning can be established in them; and in that way perceptions and re-presenting presentations can arise. Here, too, one speaks of impression and idea: But one must not, without further ado, identify these terms with those *sub 2*). Every perception, therefore, [is] an impression; and every reproductive “presentation” [is] an “idea.” Moreover, what is perceived as perceived can also perhaps be called “impression.” To have an impression of an object = to have a perception of it.

4) Perhaps only the sensuous sensation contents are called impressions and the phantasy reproductions of the sensation contents are called ideas.

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6 Inserted somewhat later: “immanently experienced.” — Editor’s note.
It must be noted\(^7\) that mere phantasying is obviously not the inactuality modification of perceiving. On the contrary, inactual perceiving would be perceiving without “positing,” perhaps living in the image (in the perceptual image), but without any consciousness of actuality (positing). Likewise, inactual remembering is precisely no longer true remembering, but mere phantasying. Naturally, every act has such a modification, but it is only the act that has it. A primary content has no inactuality modification. The inactuality modification always refers to a consciousness-of, to an intentional relation. On the other hand, the reproductive modification does not refer to the fact that, for example, an act to which we apply the modification is precisely an act, an intentional experience, but only to the fact that it is an experience.\(^8\) Ultimately, the latter modification goes back to the absolute consciousness and its moments of experiencing. Experiencing is experiencing. Under what is experienced, however, it can happen that an act of re-presenting occurs that itself re-presents an experiencing. This offers a few difficulties, of course.

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{Among experiences, we find two very different kinds:} \\
&1) \text{those that are cogitationes, consciousness-of,} \\
&2) \text{those that are not.}
\end{align*}
\]

The cogitationes break down into different classes, and yet all cogitationes admit of certain modifications. What interests us here is a modification that obtains not only for cognitive experiences but for all experiences.

1) According to an ideal possibility, there corresponds to every experience “a” reproductive experience. The “a” must be understood correctly. There are other modifications that permit every experience (according to an ideal possibility, an eidetic possibility) to be placed in series of experiences in such a way that we speak of “the same experience,” only in a different mode. Attention, for example, as well as clarity of consciousness. By virtue of such modifications, then, there

\[^7\text{The text of this paragraph was added somewhat later. — Editor’s note.}\]
\[^8\text{Experience = something sensed in the widest sense.}\]
are many reproductions for an experience, which itself turns into a plurality by dint of such modifications. Thus, for example, “a” reproduction can be a more or less clear reproduction, and the like. What matters to us is that when we have a perception of a house, for example, there “is” in addition a reproduction “precisely corresponding” to it, just as there is a judgment reproduction precisely corresponding to every judgment, and so on. There is even a reproduction that precisely corresponds to every sensation experience — to a sensed tone, for example.

Every reproductive experience is an intentional experience (a cogitatio), and it has as its intentional object the originary experience of which it is the reproduction. We do best to call all experiences that are not reproductions original experiences (or sensations in the widest sense: sensations understood as breaking down into nonintentional {noncognitive} sensations and intentional {cognitive} sensations, in which case the formation, intentional sensation, is to be understood as intentional experience).

Accordingly, we would then speak of judicative sensations, volitional sensations, as well as perceptual sensations (as opposed to reproductions of judgment, reproductions of volition, reproductions of perception). Then, too, we would speak of sensations in judicative complexes, in volitional complexes; we would speak of sensations in perceptions — of presenting sensations, for example. Judgments pure and simple, volitions pure and simple, perceptions pure and simple would be sensations. The designation “sensation,” however, refers to what is opposed to reproduction. Certainly the choice of such terminology is risky. Cannot one get by with distinguishing between reproductions or reproducing experiences and experiences that are precisely nonreproducing? (This is clear and costs nothing, so to speak. Of course, it is also not very pretty.) Then, additionally, one has to separate the reproducing experiences into those that are reproductions of an experience and those that are reproductions of other individuals (internal and transeunt). And then, in addition, the proposition that every transeunt reproduction is at the same time internal reproduction comes forward.

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9 Husserl later underlined “sensations in the widest sense.” — Editor’s note.
10 Or should we say impressions, absolute impressions?
Finally, when I speak of sensations, of sensation experiences, I must also consider whether I should not speak, in contrast to the latter, of imagining experiences or phantasy experiences. However, there is the problem of the limitation of using the words “imagination” and “phantasy” with respect to the sphere of intuitability (clarity). And in the case of imagination, with respect to imaging. The word “imaging” [Bildlichkeit], however, is itself only a figurative term, and here etymology supplies us with an image that is quite dangerous. At present, therefore, I prefer “reproductive,” which, of course, must also be merely a word and not a concept derived from its ordinary and etymological sense.

II) Internally reproducing experiences have an intentional relation to the corresponding nonreproducing experiences. If the latter are themselves intentional experiences, the reproductions have a double objective reference: not only to the original experiences, but also to their objects.

* * *

Impression — Reproduction

Every experience belonging to internal consciousness is given in this consciousness as an enduring being in “internal” time.

Every experience is either a reproduction or not a reproduction.

A reproduction is the reproduction of an experience that, relative to the reproduction, is originary; for example, the reproduction is a judicative reproduction — that is, the reproduction of a judgment — or the reproduction of a perception, the reproduction of a wish, or perhaps the reproduction of a reproduction, and so on. If we call the originary experience of which the reproduction is a specific “consciousness” (or which it reproduces) an impressional experience relative to the reproduction, we are led from a relative to an absolute distinction. If we speak simply of an originary impressional experience, then we mean an experience that is not a

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11 Husserl later crossed out the text of this paragraph diagonally. — Editor’s note.
reproduction. Whether reiterations of reproductions are also possible must be investigated separately. If we now speak of single-stage reproductions, we mean reproductions that are not reproductions of reproductions.

5 Among impressional experiences we then find a remarkable sort whose intentional objects are themselves once again characterized as impressional. Better: Among impressional experiences we find those whose objects are themselves again individual, and we are conscious of these objects in the experiences in a perfectly similar way. Their objective correlates are characterized in a manner similar to that in which the impressional experiences themselves are characterized in internal being-conscious, in experiencing.

We call these experiences perceptions [Perzeptionen]. Internal consciousness presents experiences in a manner similar to that in which perception presents them, and consequently one speaks of internal perception [Perzeption] (of perception [Wahrnehmung], too, if one’s attentive regard is directed toward the experience). But here it must be emphasized that internal perception, for the time being, is only a word and not at all an experience: It is the experiencing of experiences, but not itself an experience.

In experiencing, one can be conscious of the experiences in different degrees of “clarity and distinctness.” Not only [is this the case in the sense] that certain of them are experiences in which the “Ego” lives, of which it is said “I perceive,” “I judge,” etc., in such a way that I carry on in vigorous fashion a turning toward, a grasping, and the like, by means of which the experiences have a quite distinct mode, a distinctive mark; but it is also [the case in the sense that] other experiences that do not have this mark can be distinguished in another manner, in the manner of something’s forcing its way upward, of being more or less salient, of being in readiness for the modification of attention, and so on. Hence these are universal modes of internal perception, with which, however, what is “perceived” — the experiences — also become modified. Now experiences that are themselves perceptions also have these differences, this modification, by means of which there is consciousness of their objects, the “externally” perceived objects, now clearly, now obscurely, now as heeded in a turning toward, now as unnoticed (which, of course, does not mean that the objects themselves become modified).
Now let us take reproductions of experiences that are perceptions. The reproductions themselves are experiences and can have different modes of clarity (to the point of emptiness), different modes of attention, and so on; and combined with this is the fact that what is reproduced can itself be an experience with a different mode of this kind. Thus, for example, a heeded experience can be reproduced and a nonheeded experience can be reproduced. In the first case, the mode of attention belongs to the reproduced experience itself. Hence we certainly have remarkable differences in both directions here.

Under all circumstances, however, there exists an important and universal distinction between the manner of intentional givenness of reproduced experiences (hence in the experience that we call reproduction) and, if perceptions [Wahrnehmungen] or, in other words, perceptions [Perzeptionen] are reproduced, the manner in which the objects of the reproduced perception are intended in the reproduction. (And much more still, if it is a question of objects of reproductions of the second degree.)

We do well to apply the expression “reproduced” only to experiences and to designate the objects of reproduced perceptions as “phantasied.” (And in each case in a different degree.) Hence I phantasm myself in front of, say, houses, trees, animals, and human beings. (To the extent that a perception of the human being signifies “co-perception” of his anger, mood, and so on, the human being with his psychic experiences is also said to be phantasied.) A reproductive experience is said to be “reproduced” with reference to a reproduction that is immediately the reproduction of it and with the exclusion of reproductions of experiences that, for their part, only have some relation to the experience in question.

Finally, it must be noted that the expression “phantasied” is hardly feasible as the designation for objects of reproduced cogitationes that are not perceptions (or, on a higher level, are not already reproductions of perceptions).

In any case, it must be noted generally that the relation of the reproduction to the corresponding impressional experience is essentially different from the relation of the reproduction to the possible objects of the experiences. We say, perhaps, that there is consciousness
of them in the medium of reproduction, in any event that there is consciousness of them reproductively and intentionally, and so too with respect to all of the correlates.

* * *

1) The internal consciousness, the experiencing,

2) The experience,

3) The intentional object of the experience.

Now if we shift to reproductive modification, we have:

1') The reproductive modification of experiencing, the experiencing as it were, the reproducing in which one is conscious of the originary experiencing in the mode of the as it were. The experiencing-as-it-were “reproduces” the experiencing, the judging-as-it-were reproduces the judging, and so on.

2') In the reproducing, the reproduction of the experience is constituted as a unitary experience; for example, the experience of the reproduction of a perception, the experience “perception of the house,” perception as it were. The following furnishes a determinate concept of “reproduced”: The reproduction of the experience reproduces the experience, the reproduction of the perception reproduces the perception, and so on.

We can also establish the following relation: The experiencing as it were (in 1) reproduces the experience. These are different concepts of “reproduced”; they are different relations, which one must keep apart.

3') One is conscious of the object of the reproduced experience, if the latter is an intentional experience, in another way: it is phantasied if it is an individual object and the experience is a simple act of perceiving in the widest sense. Otherwise, we have no name for this.

It is, however, very important to distinguish sharply between, on the one hand, the relation between the reproduction of an experience and the experience, and, on the other hand, the relation between the reproduction of an experience and the object of the experience.

Apart from the other relations between experiencing again, quasi-experiencing, and experience (originary experience); between
experiencing again, quasi-experiencing, and the object of the originary experience.

* * *

We consider experience and the reproduction of experience to belong together essentially.¹²

The essence of every experience can be gathered from reflection on the experience itself as it is given in originary internal consciousness, but it can also be gathered from any reproduction of it. On the other hand, an experience and the reproduction of an experience do not themselves have any essence in common.¹³ So [it is with] a wish and the reproduction of a wish, a judgment and the reproduction of a judgment, as well as [with] a red-sensation and a red-phantasm.

The essences on both sides correspond to one another, but in the mode of their specific modification. To every essence of an experience, therefore, there corresponds a counteressence as the essence of the reproduction of the experience. This must be particularly heeded in the case of the sensuous sensation and the sensuous phantasm, which are by no means of the same essence. This, of course, also touches all of the correlates of experiences in comparison with the correlates of the reproductions of experiences.¹⁴

Is not something analogous true of experience and the thought of experience within the boundaries in which conceptual modification obtains? Would we do better, therefore, to say position-taking experience and conceptual modification? For example, judgment and mere propositional thought, wish and the thought of a wish, and so on.

¹² Originary experiences break down into genus and species, but all reproductions of experiences form just one genus with species that are counterparts of those on the other side. Surely we would then have to say that all “originary experiences” form one genus, precisely the genus “originary experience.”

¹³ On both sides [one finds] “the same,” and yet [it is] so thoroughly modified that nothing in the way of actual identity remains. Consequently, nothing remains in the way of perfect likeness or genuine similarity either.

¹⁴ Of course, one cannot even say that essence and counteressence belong to the same essential genus. A countergenus corresponds to every essential genus belonging here, a countergenereationship corresponds to every relationship between experiences or experience essences, etc.
Judgment and the reproduction of judgment have “in common” that the same essence that has the actuality of experience in the judgment is reproduced in the reproduction (is the essence of the reproduced actuality).

Judgment and the corresponding mere propositional thought — S is p! and “S is p” — have in common that “the same thing” that the judgment believes and posits as true is thought of in the mere thought.

The essence judgment and the corresponding mere thought are different essences. If I classify judgments, I obtain the system of the kinds of judgment. If I classify thoughts, I obtain the system of the kinds of thought. Both correspond exactly. To every “form of judgment” there corresponds a “form of thought.”

However, must one not say here that a distinction must be made abstractly between judgment and “judgment content,” thought and thought content, and that judgment and the corresponding thought — but so too judgment and the corresponding possibility, probability, and so on — actually have an essence in common; namely, precisely the corresponding “content” as pure unqualified content?

Hence the situation here seems to be different from what it was above in the case of reproduction. A moment of essence becomes individualized in the act of judging and becomes individualized in the corresponding act of mere thinking. But not in the judging and in the corresponding reproduction of the judging. I can “draw” the essence from the reproduction of the judgment, but the essence lies in the two sides in totally different ways. In any event, these are noteworthy phenomenological relationships.
MODES OF REPRODUCTION AND PHANTASY
IMAGE CONSCIOUSNESS
(Also in relation to position takings)
(March — April 1912)

<a) Preliminary terminological considerations relating to the
distinctions that we must bring out between “original” and
“reproduced” experiences, or, correlative, between individual
objects given in consciousness “originally” and “reproductively”>
(March 21, 1912)

Within internal impression, I carry out an apparential consciousness [apparenziales Bewusstsein], an external “perceiving,” an appearing of a physical thing, an appearing of an event. If I carry it out within internal reproduction, I am reproductively conscious of the appearing. But then I am reproductively conscious of what appears, just as I am impressionally conscious of it in the other case.

In the appearing, something temporal appears, the external temporality. The appearing itself is something temporal; it itself appears in internal consciousness.

Now, however, let us take a different experience, constituted impressionally or reproductively in internal consciousness. A judgment; specifically, let us say, a judgment directed toward something ideal, toward something nontemporal, or a wish, a volition, and so on.

The judging has an entirely different “sense,” an entirely different correlate from the correlate the appearing of an individual has. It has a different objective reference: It is not directed toward something temporal. And so it is in all of these cases.

What about reproductive judgment, wish, and so on, with respect to their relation to “objectivity”? The objectivity is not reproduced; it is not re-presented. It is precisely not something temporal.

We therefore have to say: Among experiences, there are two very different kinds: intentional experiences, that is, experiences that have the characteristic of “consciousness of” (cogitationes); and

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1 Inserted later at the beginning of the line: “suppose that.” — Editor’s note.
2 “First of all” inserted later before “among.” — Editor’s note.
nonintentional experiences: the primary experiences, the sensuous experiences (sensual experiences). The *cogitationes* in turn break down into two classes: presentations and nonpresentations. Presentations, the apparential *cogitationes*, have the peculiarity that they are impressions-of when they are impressional experiences and reproductions-of when they are reproductive experiences.\(^5\)

However, this is not true of the rest of the *cogitationes*.

But what kind of wise discovery is this? Is it not mere nomenclature?

Hence we must say: Every experience admits of a fundamental modification.\(^4\) It is called the *reproductive* modification, and in relation to it the unmodified experience itself is called *impressional* experience. We now have two cases. Either the experience (which itself is an individual experience of which one is conscious as an individual experience) is a presenting experience; that is to say, a consciousness in which an individual “appears,” “presents” itself.\(^5\) Or it is a different experience, and specifically a consciousness of something objective that is not intended as something temporal.

Now, however, two different kinds of object-relations belong to every reproduction. The two cannot be grasped in the same way, but by means of different attitudes or foci. 1) The reproduction is the reproduction of the corresponding impression: I can find this in the reproduction itself. 2) The reproduction has a relation to something objective that would actually be something objective in the corresponding impression.

The reproduction of an experience (e.g., of an act of judging, of an act of perceiving something external) is, on the one hand, a reproduction of this experience; hence I can direct my regard toward the act of perceiving or act of judging of which I am reproductively conscious.

On the other hand, I can direct my regard toward “what is perceived,” toward “what is judged,” which in this case, however, are given in

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\(^3\) Inserted later: “But they are precisely impression and reproduction.” — Editor’s note.

\(^4\) Internal consciousness is impression in relation to every experience: every experience is impressional. Every reproductive modification is the reproduction of an experience of which there is “impressional consciousness” internally; there is impressional consciousness of the reproduction itself.

\(^5\) Inserted later: “Then it is itself an impression of something, or, respectively, a reproduction of something, and the latter is twofold.” — Editor’s note.
consciousness reproductively. Now the respective ways in which I am conscious of these two different kinds of objects are very different.

One way is that of the relation of consciousness to an individual, and this is surely an integral part of the essence of consciousness. Then the other way is the one in which the reproduced experience hovers before me as a *cogitatio*. And here what is noteworthy is precisely that a *cogitatio* can not only exist impressionally in relation to internal consciousness but can itself be an impression of something that, for its part, is again an individual, a temporal being. Inherent in this: The second object-relation can be of the same sort in this respect (namely, as far as the characteristic of the object as an “individual” is concerned), but it can also be of a different sort (in this respect).

If we have made this our own, then we understand the following: The terms *impression* and *reproduction* can acquire different senses. Let us take the term “impression” first.

*Impression* can 1) be the name for the *experiencing*, for the internal consciousness in which the experience as an individual becomes constituted; *reproduction* can then be the name for the modification belonging to the re-presentation of the experience.7

Thereby a peculiarity of internal consciousness is established; specifically, as the consciousness of an individual. The individual here is the experience, which is characterized as impressional or reproductive.

2) Experiences themselves, we said, can be the consciousness of an individual and be of a kind analogous to the internal consciousness above, and can therefore be impressional or reproductive.8

If we gather together consciousness of every kind insofar as it is consciousness of an individual and characterized as impressional or reproductive, the concepts of impression and reproduction acquire

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6 Inserted later: “the first.” — Editor’s note.

7 (Now we need a name for experiences that are not themselves re-presentations of experiences, and a possibility for nomenclature consists in the fact that one even speaks of this as *impression*, as I did earlier! Impression is the actual experiencing that is not the reproduction of an experiencing. The internal reproduction itself is then actually experienced.*)

∗ But it is not an impression.

8 On the margin, there is the following remark (which, however, was probably crossed out at the time it was written down): “an experiencing impression, which is not an experience.” — Editor’s note.

9 The last paragraph was later crossed out with an undulating line. — Editor’s note.
a universal sense, satisfying precisely the sense of “presentation” [Vorstellung]. If we take, in addition, the universal distinction pertaining to the consciousness of intuitiveness (clarity, genuineness — whether this is the same I do not know at the moment), we then have, specifically, perception and phantasy (imagination) as particular antitheses within intuitiveness.

3) If the concept of impression or, respectively, of reproduction is limited in this way, then impressions, for example, become separated [on the one hand] into internal impressions and [on the other hand] into impressions of which one is impressionally conscious internally and which (do not, like internal impressions, have experiences as their “objects,” but) are experiences themselves and do not have experiences as their objects.10

What one is conscious of in an experience that is not itself an impression of an individual is not something of which one is impressionally conscious, then. In a judgment, one is not impressionally conscious of the state of affairs. A value, an ethical command. The same is true of reproductions. What one is conscious of in a reproduced experience that is not itself a presentational experience is then not said to be reproduced; one is not conscious of it reproductively.

The reproduced experience is itself characterized reproductively, but it is not the reproduction of something.

4) But then one needs a pair of names in order to express the distinctions in the mode of consciousness that internal impressions and internal reproductions possess, not with respect to their objects, the impressional and reproductive experiences, but which they prescribe for these experiences with respect to their objects.

5) Now how must the terminology be chosen? If one has once recognized that the distinction, seen first, between experiences that are “original” and those that are “reproduced” is subordinated to the universal distinction between individual objects of whatever sort of which one is aware “originally” at one time and “reproductively” at another, then one cannot help but choose the universal expressions corresponding to the distinction. Hence one can do nothing else but distinguish between impression and reproduction, as we did above (and choose in the same way in the case of the concepts of “presentation,” perception, phantasy), and then indicate the particular species:

10 The repetition is in the original text. — Translator’s note.
for example, internal and external reproduction, and so on. Consequently we have no choice here.

On the other side, this prescribes what “reproduced” and “impressed” signify. What is impressed is something objective that belongs to consciousness as an individual, and this is also what is reproduced. And we then have the object-correlate characterized phenomenologically as impressional and reproductive.

A reproduced act of judging, therefore, signifies a judging that is precisely an individual object in the internal reproducing (reproduction in internal consciousness). On the other hand, the “state of affairs” is not reproduced.

In the same way, if I have a wish reproduction in internal consciousness, then precisely the wish is reproduced, but not what is wished for. Now what should we call such objectivities belonging to experiences of which we are reproduatively conscious (inasmuch as they are not presentational experiences)? The term must be chosen in such a way that it also encompasses being-reproduced within its universal signification. For reproduced objects are also objects of experiences of which we are reproduatively conscious.

Perhaps it is best to use the expression “to hover before us” [vorschweben] here. This is then suitable for every intentional content that we can find in reproductive acts; for example, the correlates that are certainly not objects and yet are “given in consciousness” [bewusst] in a manner different from objects. And [given] in reproductive acts in a way different from the impressional.

However, we also need a name for the objectivities (and correlates) of impressional experiences (“acts,” cogitationes). We can perhaps say “actually given in consciousness” (a special case in connection with presentations: actually presented — more precisely, presented “in person” — if the act is a perception). Hence we have the difference between actually [aktuell] given in consciousness and inactually [inaktuell] given (given as hovering before us).

Given in consciousness reproducively.

“Reproduced” is suitable for experiences of which we are reproduatively conscious. Can one say, [assuming] that the barking of a dog is reproduced, “I am reproducing the barking of the dog?” Of course, one also says: I re-present the barking of the dog. I re-present a judgment.

I am conscious of every experience impressionally.
I am impressionally conscious of a judgment that I am experiencing. Experienced judgment, experienced volition, experienced feeling, even experienced reproduction of a judgment, and so on.

If I experience a judgment, the state of affairs is not experienced.

If I experience an act of deeming likely, the probability (likelihood) is not experienced. However, I am conscious of this in a manner entirely different from that in which I experience a judgment-reproduction and have together with it a reproductive consciousness of the state of affairs. The judgment consciousness is reproduced; the state of affairs is not reproduced with it.

Should we say that the judgment or any experience at all that I am experiencing is something of which I am impressionally conscious, something I experience? That the object of the experience is something of which I am impressionally conscious?

I am conscious of the experience reproductively; it is reproduced.

I am conscious of the object of the experience reproductively.11

But what about the specific likeness between experiencing and external perceiving, reproducing and external presenting (phantasying)? Is that a specific likeness?

The It-itself, the intuitive, the actual. The originary. Yes?

I experience a judgment, a wish.

Memory and empathy12 <as reproduction. Two different characterizations of actuality with respect to the “object” of a reproduced act, the possibility of omitting these characterizations (position takings) — the carrying out of reproduction and carrying out in reproduction (living in it, being attentive) in the example of phantasying — thoughtful comportment in comparison with phantasying comportment>

(March 22, 1912)

I hear someone speak; he judges. The judgment is “co-perceived” as an individual fact: He judges. But I do not judge. But is the judgment

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11 Experiences, reproductions of experience, reproductions of original experience. Reproductions [are] always reproductions of experiences.

12 With respect to “empathy,” cf. also the text reproduced as Appendix XXXVIII (p. 507), which was presumably inserted into the present sketch somewhat later. — Editor’s note.
not “re-presented”? And is “he” himself as mind with his whole mental life not “re-presented”?

Is this impression? Well, it is a reproduction (a “memory”), through which a ray positing factual existence runs. The reproduction itself is certainly also an “experience,” a now, something of which I am impressionally conscious; and the actuality-characterizing ray, which runs through the reproduction, is “fused” with it. Just as in the case of every “memory” in the customary sense.

I remember my earlier judgment; I “bring to mind” “for myself” someone else’s judgment (empathy). The actuality-characterizing ray aims at the judgment as an individual temporal being and as a real being in its nexus of reality.

If I remember the act of perceiving that I performed yesterday, we also have an actuality-characterizing ray, in this case relating precisely to the act of perceiving. But what about what is perceived?

I can find the act of perceiving as a fact in memory. I can now be convinced, however, that it was an hallucination, an illusory perception. I have definite grounds for this. If I do not have grounds, then as soon as my regard is directed toward what is perceived, this too will have its actuality-characterization. But which one? The one belonging to the reproduced perception? This it has under all circumstances; that is, even when I now consider the whole complex to be an “illusion.” It is clear that if I take the objects of past perceptions to be actualities that did exist, a new, impressional, actual ray of “actuality positing” aims at what is reproductively intended. To remember past things and events involving such things therefore presupposes two different kinds of actually engaged characterizations of actuality (impressional characterizations of actuality belonging to the real composition of the memorial experience itself, and obviously not merely reproductive characterizations). 1) The reproduced appearing, the reproduced act of perceiving, has the characteristic of being actual; 2) what is perceived has a second characteristic of being actual that is not necessarily connected with the characteristic in 1).

13 Obviously, this actuality-characteristic is there from the beginning and only has the peculiarity that it can be “cancelled” by a second, critical position taking.
14 The “not necessarily” means: A critical position taking can supervene and bring about a cancellation.
Hence this is\textsuperscript{15} exactly like the way in which the memory of past judgments is very often, though <not> always, combined with the actually present characterization of the truth of what was judged then.\textsuperscript{16} I remember the judgment as a fact of experience. This is the first actuality-characterization. I now judge again in such a way that I “concur with what was judged earlier,” or I judge along with the earlier judgment. This is the second actuality-characterization. However, it is not characterization as actual in the customary sense, since the word [ordinarily] refers to an individual. Here one does not speak without further ado of the “memory” of the state of affairs either.\textsuperscript{17}

Memory is a term that usually refers to something individual; specifically, what is said to be remembered is either one’s own internally reproduced experience to which an “actuality-characteristic” relates (an experience to which a belief that confers this characteristic on the experience relates), or an individual physical reality that is the object of an act of perceiving in the preceding sense, or even the object of empathizing, providing it is now still being posited as actual, or . . . , and so on. I remember that he was angry (he stormed, I noted his anger, or I read his rage in his face). I remember that he judged in such a way (he said it).

What about wishing and the like? I remember the act of wishing and the wish (that the wish was wished by me at that time). But I can then send in a ray of “wish positing”: I remember, and at the same time I wish. At one moment I am reproductively conscious of what is “wished for” as wished for in the characteristic of reproduction (or in the sense of my previous explanations: What is wished for

\textsuperscript{15} Inserted later. “almost.” — Editor’s note.

\textsuperscript{16} The question is whether what is remembered, the judgment, is not only reproduced here, but with the reproduction also preserves and maintains its actual position taking as long as a cancellation does not occur. (I have perhaps passed judgments in the meantime that imply the falsity of the remembered judgment; nullifying judgment-motives emerge, and so on.) But is what is later simply right? Certainly not. Hence the matter is not so simple here.

\textsuperscript{17} Yes one does. I remember the Pythagorean theorem and what it states. I remember that the English defeated the Boers. I remember that not all algebraic equations can be solved. What is remembered primarily is the earlier process of cognizance-taking; correlative: its objectivity. Finally, every objectivity belonging to a process of cognizance-taking that is remembered in the first sense (namely, a cognizing reproduced believably) is said to be remembered itself, provided that I steadfastly maintain the cognizing itself.
hovers before me in the characteristic “wished for,” which is then a characteristic “hovering before me”). In addition, however, the actual characteristic “wished for” makes its appearance. Hence we have a duality. Just as we have a double belief in the case of the reproduced judgment: the belief that hovers before us, which belongs to what is remembered, and the actual belief.

This is also true in the case of the memory of a decision and the actual positing of a decision. And so it is everywhere — desiring, and so on.

All of these actual\textsuperscript{18} “positings,” “position takings,” that relate to the “objective something” belonging to a remembered act, to a remembered act of perceiving, judging, feeling, willing, can be omitted;\textsuperscript{19} and finally even the positing of actuality that relates to the acts themselves can be omitted. We then no longer have a memory; in internal phantasy (internal reproduction) some act of cogitating hovers before me (it is phantasied), and something cogitated hovers before me.

What about the case of impression? The experiences actually engaged in have the characteristic “actual,” which cannot be taken away from them. Belief belongs essentially to the content of the total internal (actual) consciousness. Now as far as the cogitationes\textsuperscript{21} are concerned, we first of all have perceptions. They can lose their\textsuperscript{22} belief; we then have mere aesthetic consciousness, as in mere image-object perception. Likewise, the belief-characteristics can change modally. And so, too, the wish-characteristics, feeling-characteristics, and so on.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{18} Inserted later: “actually experienced.” — Editor’s note.

\textsuperscript{19} “Omitting of an actual position taking.”

\textsuperscript{20} “Actual position taking” here means throughout: A position taking belonging to the actual (impressional) composition of the experience itself and not merely an actually reproduced position taking, to say nothing of an inactually reproduced position taking.

\textsuperscript{21} Inserted later: “which, as experiences, are \textit{objects} of internal consciousness.” — Editor’s note.

\textsuperscript{22} Inserted later: “active.” — Editor’s note.

\textsuperscript{23} The first belief, necessary belief in internal consciousness, in experiencing. Its correlate is the characteristic of actuality belonging to every experience. The second belief in the experience, when the latter is, for example, an act of perceiving, judging; its correlate is the characteristic of actuality in what is perceived. The second belief is then characterized, like the whole experience, as actual and “real” [leibhaft].
If we therefore disregard internal consciousness with its necessary belief and with the other (perhaps) necessary parallel position takings belonging to internal consciousness (feeling, etc.), then, within the sphere of experiences, and specifically of cogitationes, there are those that do not bestow on their “objects” actual axiontic characteristics (unmodified characteristics, originating from impression). They do not actually value them, that is, according to any of the possible sorts of “position taking.” (Of course, turning-toward and what is related to it certainly do not belong to the concept of position taking.) Thus in particular: There are pure “perceptions” without a doxic mode of position taking (of actual, not reproductive, position taking) and without one of the additional sorts of possible actual position taking. And likewise pure phantasies. Furthermore: Actual perceptions, judgments, wishes, and so on, are position takings (contain actual position takings).

We are conscious of reproduced perceptions, judgments, and so on, through internal reproductions. And these internal reproductions are themselves experiences; specifically, experiences belonging to the species of phantasy experiences. These phantasies can also be pure, without any actual position taking; only phantasy position takings occur in them. This is obvious in the case of reproduced perceptions. For certainly pure phantasies are eo ipso pure phantasies of perceptions, possibly with objects that again appear individually themselves apart from any position taking. And reproduced perceptions eo ipso jointly present themselves in all reproductions of experiences, precisely because the essence of reproduction consists in being the reproduction of impression: of internal impression, which is always “perception,” that is, which contains belief, though not, of course, turning toward, and so on.

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24 *axiontisch*. This term and *anaxiontisch*, *inaxiontisch* (here translated, respectively, as “anaxiontic” and “inaxiontic”) are adjectives based on *Axiose* (translated as “axiosis”) and *Anaxiose, Inaxiose* (translated as “anaxiosis” and “inaxiosis”), all of which are Husserlian neologisms. Their Greek roots and Husserl’s own statements later in this sketch make it clear that the meaning of *Axiose* and *axiontisch* is “positing” and that *Axiose, Inaxiose* and *anaxiontisch, inaxiontisch* mean “nonpositing,” “neutrality,” and “neutral” or “neutralizing.” *Axiontisch* should not be confused with *axiologisch*, which appears in the context of Husserl’s ethics. — Translator’s note.

25 The actual position takings belong to the actual experience; the phantasied position takings are not actual.
The carrying out of reproduction and carrying out in reproduction

Now let us suppose that we have a reproduced judgment. We can be conscious of it without taking any position (without actual, present position taking), either in relation to the act of judging as an experience, which, however, does not interest us, or in relation to what is judged. Then the state of affairs merely hovers before us; if we look at it, we can say in ordinary language: We are merely “thinking of” it (naturally also without presupposing, assuming, and so on).

Is this the “merely thinking of” in the sense in which we oppose “merely thinking of” to judgment — in the sense in which, for example, we understand the thinking of mere propositions, such as “2 × 2 = 5”? I have very often fallen into that, but I nevertheless bring the following to mind again and again. If I playfully imagine in phantasy: “I am seated in the railway carriage and I experience the passengers moving up and down the aisle. I converse with my fellow passengers, tell them this and that, and so on,” then I am looking in phantasy at the states of affairs belonging to my communicating judgments (in other words, the communicated “facts”). I am, as it were, making the statements; and as in actual stating I am turned toward the matters that are stated, so in stating as it were I am turned toward the matters that are stated as it were.

Obviously this turning toward the states of affairs, this being attentive to, this grasping of the subject, this relational positing, and so on, in which advertence to the states of affairs becoming constituted is continually given — obviously all of this is by no means an actual turning toward; on the contrary, it is a phantasied turning toward. It is precisely the quasi-making of the judgments, which as relational acts presuppose all such act-components. And this carrying out is a carrying out “in” phantasy; that is, precisely, “reproduced.” This is true of judging, as it is of all the feelings, volitions, etc., however vital, in phantasy. And in “carrying them out,” I am also turned toward the wish contents, the decisions, the actions, and so on.
Now the phantasying itself is an actual experience. I am there too as actual Ego, and “at the same time a ray of actual turning toward runs throughout all the turnings toward in phantasy.” Expressed more precisely: A phantasy can emerge, but “lifelessly,” without my “carrying it out.” All of the turnings toward in phantasy that emerge in “obscurity” or relative obscurity are, let us say, “without the ray of actual engagement,” of “carrying out.” It is otherwise when I “live in phantasy,” when I do carry it out. Living in the phantasy, I perceive, I present in the manner peculiar to phantasy; I judge, desire, will, and do so in a vital, living way. Inherent in this, one could then say, is that something living proceeds from me as actual living Ego into the phantasy; as someone living, I am now also engaged with everything that is phantasied.

Nevertheless, caution is in order here. When I phantasy in a living way, when I am completely absorbed in phantasy, I am “self-forgetful.” I am then the phantasy Ego; and all the turnings toward, all the acts I perform, are phantasy reproductions. My “living” then consists in pure reproducing. My “actual carrying out” is the carrying out of these reproductions; and it has degrees of perfection, degrees of “genuineness.” I immerse myself ever more deeply, continually change myself into actual living (genuine-nongenuine reproducing). I bring “what is phantasied ever nearer”; I produce it in detail rather than “in the lump.” Is not this carrying out of reproduction eo ipso not only in general a turning toward in phantasy, but in a certain sense an actual turning toward? In the peculiar manner that, in phantasying, I actually look at all of that, am occupied with all of that, carry it out livingly, as it were, experience it in such a way that, in being turned toward it, I judge, and judge just as if I were actually judging, and so on? Everything in the “as it were,” and yet at the same time in it in such a way that this “as it were” expresses an actuality. A vague background reproduction of the earlier experiencing or a vague background phantasy also shelters turnings toward, but turnings toward that, in a certain sense, are inactual; I do not live in the phantasy, in the phantasy judging, and so on.

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26 “Phantasy reproductions” later changed to “phantasy, reproductions.” — Editor’s note.
27 “or a vague background-phantasy” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
A reproduction of a perception is a phantasy with respect to “what is perceived.” We speak of a phantasy as actually carried out when it is an active, actual turning toward what is phantasied.

A turning toward something phantasied is “actual” turning toward. This must be understood in accordance with the way in which we say of some other experience, perhaps of a perception, a perceptual judgment, a wish, and so on, that we live in it, that in and with these position takings or inaxioses we are turned toward what is perceived, toward the judged state of affairs, and so on.

Since, on the one hand, they are precisely reproductions of experiences and, on the other hand, phantasies of the objectivities belonging to these experiences, the reproductions of intentional experiences permit a different kind of living-in. And what matters for us is the living in the phantasy relation. We carry out the phantasy when, in the mode of actually turning toward something, we perceive it as it were, and so on. Here we must separate the reproduced turnings toward from these actual turnings toward, the reproduced position takings from the actual position takings that we exercise and that we can also exercise in relation to what is phantasied.

(It must still be remarked that the expression “actually to be directed in phantasy” is not useful; that is to say, it is ambiguous. For the two words “actually” and “phantasy” function as signs, and the sign “actually” can be subordinated to the sign “phantasy” and can also be meant in such a way that it is not subordinated to it. It is best to say: “actually to be turned toward something phantasied” and “actually to carry out a phantasy.”)

Now what about the acts that are directed toward what is phantasied? Let the phantasy be a phantasy that carries out; I am actually directed toward what is phantasied. In the process, I can live entirely in the phantasy, just as in perceiving, acting, and so on, I live entirely in the act of perceiving, entirely in the acting. If I do this in phantasy, then I actually carry out this or that quasi-perceiving, quasi-judging, quasi-distinguishing and comparing, quasi-wishing, willing, etc. In all of these performances, I am attentive “in” the phantasy. I am quasi-attentive insofar as, in quasi-perceiving, I am quasi-turned
toward what is perceived and, moreover, take such and such a position toward it, etc.

But then at the same time I can perform actual position takings toward what is quasi-given, toward what is phantasied (in the widest sense). It must be noted to begin with that a temptation exists here that easily seduces one (and has tempted me — originally good — working out of these questions). In particular, it is a question of a dangerous misinterpretation of attention.

Living in phantasy, and [living in it] together with actual turning toward, I am quasi-attentive; namely, in the acts of phantasy that I actually perform I am reproductively conscious of attention. I exist in phantasy as quasi-Ego, in memory as remembered Ego that quasi-perceives, quasi-judges, and so on.

But then one might say that the situation is entirely different when I am conscious as actual Ego and as actual Ego am turned toward what is phantasied, perhaps taking a position with respect to it (actually taking a position), or also not taking a position and then being merely attentive to it. I am also truly active when I elucidate what is phantasied, make it clearer to me, even carry out “reflections in phantasy,” and so on. I do all of this as an actual Ego in actual acts, which, however, relate to the phantasied world. All of that is just fine. But let us take note of the following consideration.

Let us look at the parallel in the impressional sphere. Assume that I have an intentional experience; for example, a perception. I can then live in the perception, carry it out. The consciousness that I am having the perception, that I am perceiving, and that I am related perceptually to what is perceived is something different from this. There I am moving not only in the perception but in the nexus of the actual world. Moreover, I am saying “I.” [Then consider the case in which] I am living in the reproduction; I am carrying out the quasi-perceiving, the quasi-judging, and so on. The consciousness, “I am having this phantasy,” “I am performing this quasi-perceiving, and so on,” is something different. There I am moving within the actual world and am saying “I” in the sense of actual engagement.

But these are difficult matters, and one easily goes astray. Living in reproduction is something just as actual as living in actual perception. And if I then have self-consciousness, or at the same time or in a transition that retains what went before actually perceive and pass
over into actual reproduction and am actually directed at phantasied formations, this only indicates a complication within the sphere of actual engagement. And in the same way, there is a further complication if I carry out sympathetic position takings that are congenial or uncongenial with the reproductive position takings turned toward the phantasied formations. Then, in a certain sense, a stratum of actual belief coincides, say, with a stratum of actual reproducing of belief, a stratum of actual willing with a stratum of actual reproducing of willing, and so on. Or stated more simply: Belief and the reproduction of belief, judgment and the reproduction of judgment, wish and the reproduction of wish coincide in such a way that the phantasied substrate belongs identically to both of the position-taking characteristics, the originary and the reproductive. This is a fundamental phenomenon of “coinciding.” But then it must be said that an involvement of self-consciousness is unnecessary. For I can be actively involved sympathetically without reflecting on myself, just as I can otherwise perform acts without reflecting on myself (e.g., perceptions, judgments, and so on). Whether or not I then have a proper “self-consciousness” and possibly say “I,” it is certain that precisely all actual acts, all the acts in which “I live,” belong to the domain of the “actual Ego.” And the “I live in an act” does not imply that I carry out a reflection on my Ego; rather, it just implies the performing of the act itself, together with the corresponding ideal possibility, understood as belonging to its essence, of being able to find the Ego ray, an Ego relation.

And so in that case the actual phantasying, the actual turning toward what is phantasied, which we call the actual performance of an act of quasi-perceiving, of quasi-judging, and so on, is just as much something belonging to the actual Ego as an act of perceiving pure and simple in which I live. And just as attention in the latter case is actual attention, so too the actual relation to what is quasi-perceived is actual attention: Whether I live purely in the phantasying, or in addition perform acts of nonphantasying impression and perhaps even reflect on myself, is a matter of indifference here.

The actual engagement belonging to the act of phantasying is attention (actual attention) to what is phantasied. And if we distinguish between actual attention and phantasied attention, or, rather, reproduced attention (it would become phantasied attention only through
reflection in phantasy), then this means precisely the same thing as
the distinction between the actual phantasy of a judgment, the actual
phony of an act, and so on, and the phantasied state of affairs; in
other words, the reproduced judgment, the reproduced act.

5     *Actual attention* is not a ray that in some mysterious way shines
a light into the unreal world of what is phantasied. One must not
assume [that it is] an act either, a separate experience that combines
with the phantasy. And one must also not assume, as a second element
in addition to the actual phantasying in which we exclusively live, an
actual paying attention by the actually engaged Ego to the objects
belonging to the actual phantasy: On the contrary, actual phantasying
itself is nothing else than actual paying attention to what is phantasied,
and that is what it is whether or not we are living exclusively in
phony, whether or not we are thinking reflectively of the actually
engaged Ego. Phantasying is an act, an intentional experience. And
the mode of living in the experience is distinctive in the case of every
intentional experience, and it signifies actual attention to the object
of the experience. The relation of the Ego grasped reflectively to the
object of an intentional experience is something new in contrast to
the simple paying attention to the intentional object, and is itself an
act that one performs and is a new paying attention within the act.

Hence if paying attention is absolutely nothing else than an ex-
pression for the “carrying out” of an intentional experience (for the
carrying out of *this* paying attention, understood as being directed
toward, being turned toward), then attention to something phantasied
or the carrying out of a phantasy has only the noteworthy peculiar-
ity that it is the carrying out of an experience whose essence it is to
reproduce a carrying out.28

Now, however, the following *new occurrence* is possible: I not only
actually carry out phantasies, I also carry out position takings, actual
position takings toward what is phantasied, [and] I am or am not in
agreement with the reproduced position takings (the phantasy posi-
tion takings, as I also say). Such position takings do not necessarily
belong to the carrying out of the phantasies. And, of course, there

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28 (On the original sheet 4 I said, correctly, that these are important clarifications: And
yet I have again let myself be led into confusion and pushed toward the assumption
that there might be such a thing as “pure attention.”)
can be position takings of all sorts — simple and founded. A greater complexity is present here under all circumstances precisely for the reason that reproduction is at the basis and, in the cases that we particularly have in view, the phantasy of external objectivities, which in itself is not as simple as the corresponding impression and admits of more distinctions.

One will probably also have to say that here, as in the case of all founded position takings, I can distinguish between not carrying out and carrying out; that is to say, position takings can already coincide with the phantasies that have been carried out, but without my taking a position in the manner of carrying them out. They remain or they do not remain as stirrings in the background of consciousness. A displeasure in what is phantasied perhaps makes itself felt, but I do not live in the displeasure. A rejection of the phantasied state of affairs stirs, but I do not carry out the negation, do not live in the rejecting, and so on.

* * *

Now back again to conceptual behavior in relation to phantasying behavior.29 If I carry out a phantasy, if I live in it, then I am focused actually and in phantasy on whatever occurs in the phantasy in the way of objectivities, states of affairs, wish behaviors, actions, and so on. If it is a question of “pure” phantasy, then I have no actual, impressional taking of a position with respect to what is hovering before me in the manner peculiar to phantasy.

Now, of course, one is not in the habit of saying that I phantasy to myself that $2 \times 2 = 5$. One will say: I phantasy that I judge that $2 \times 2 = 5$. Ordinarily, we do not call the objectivities of acts of which we are reproductively conscious “phantasied” unless they are individual objectivities (houses, and so on): Phantasy for us is ordinarily the reproductive modification of perception. This, however, changes nothing in the fact that the mode of consciousness of this predicatively formed affair-complex $2 \times 2 = 5$ is such that the affair-complex is intended by a reproductive act of consciousness [346]

29 The sheet is immature.
(just like a phantasy house, except that the reproductive act here is not a reproductive perception; and we use the expression “phantasied” in this universal sense). Can I then say that the $2 \times 2 = 5$ is merely thought of in the sense of mere conceptual presenting? One could answer: no. For thinking-of is an actual, lively act and not a mere reproducing. Thinking-of stands on entirely the same level as presupposing, inferring, supposing as, and so forth, but also judging, etc.

Quite right. However, it is not a “mere” reproducing that presents itself here, but a being-turned-toward in phantasy, an actual phantasying. And perhaps it is exactly this actuality of the phantasying that makes up the “mere presenting” understood as thinking-of. Accordingly, one does not need to say that every mere thinking-of is an actual phantasying.

If one were universally to understand thinking-of much as one might understand judging and other acts such that a distinction could be made between carrying out an act of thinking-of (like making a judgment, and so on) and not carrying it out, not living in it, then, to be sure, one would have to say that every mere phantasying — that is to say, every phantasying that is not combined with an actual position taking (whether carried out or not carried out) — is a mere thinking-of. An act (a carrying out) of thinking-of is, then, an act of phantasying (of turning toward in mere phantasy).

However, the acts in which a position is taken toward something phantasied (acts in the strict sense of performances) would be founded acts, founded as axioses, insomuch as a “mere presenting” would be at their basis and a turning toward would be grounded on the presenting in and with the actual position taking.

<e>CARRYING OUT AND ACTUALITY <IN THE CASES OF IMPRESSION, REPRODUCTION, AND REPRODUCTION OF A HIGHER LEVEL — AMBIGUITY OF THE EXPRESSION "ACTUALLY TO CARRY OUT IN REPRODUCTION."

The problem of "turning toward" in the case of the Ego living in reproduction or in the case of the actual Ego</e>

(April 6, 1912)

We have the following distinctions to take into consideration with respect to reproductions.
1) Reproduction itself is an actual experience in which there is [347] reproduced an experience that is not actual, that is just reproduced.  

2) In the case of intentional impressions (intentional experiences that are not reproductions), we are acquainted with the distinction between latently intentional impressions and patently intentional impressions. I also speak of intentional impressions that are carried out and those that are not. This is a specific concept of carrying out. What is meant is the distinction between, on the one hand, experiences in which I live, I judge, I present, I feel, I will — I take part in them actively and exist in them actively — and, in contrast, a hovering before me [Vorschweben] (an ambiguous term) in which I do not live: a feeling, a willing sets in, without my “carrying it out.” And is the following not the distinction between act-experiences of hovering before and specific act-experiences: To every act that is a carrying out there corresponds a possible conversion into a condition of hovering before? However, a second element comes into question there. The distinction between actual turning toward and the carrying out of the intentionality inhering in the act, making it up. I am turned toward a state of affairs that I have just explicitly judged. I am still judging; the judgment is now in a condition of hovering before me, but I am actually turned toward without explicitly making the judgment.  

Now all of these distinctions reappear in the reproduction. First of all, in the following way: I “am living in the reproduction” and I am carrying out phantasies: presentations, perceptions, judgments, feelings, and so on. I explicitly carry them out. Then, “in” the reproduction, they change into hoverings-before; they recede into the “background of consciousness.” Or while I am carrying out such and such judgments, wishes, etc., in phantasy, others emerge in the background in latent form. But always “in” phantasy, etc.  

30 The actual experience of reproduction may posit another experience as existing, as actual, but the posited experience is not an actual experience.  

31 From “latently” to “of” was crossed out later. — Editor’s note.  

32 Inserted later: “energetic or, better, genuine.” — Editor’s note.  

33 Inserted later: “energetically = genuinely.” — Editor’s note.  

34 Inserted later: “(the thesis).” — Editor’s note.  


36 Inserted later: “energetically, genuinely.” — Editor’s note.
Hence, speaking from the standpoint of the experience of reproduction, there is a distinction, depending on whether I actually perform an act of perceiving, judging, etc., in the reproduction — more precisely, on whether I actually carry it out explicitly (genuinely) with respect to its intentional content — or on whether I do not genuinely carry it out and merely glance at what is perceived, judged, and so on, in the reproduction (while the judgment is in a condition of confused hovering before), or on whether I am conscious of experiences of this sort without turning toward them in the reproduction, without in any way carrying them out.

3) But then there are reproductions of a higher level: Hence a reproduction of the fact that I am actually performing an act of perceiving, an act of judging, and so on, or of the fact that I am not performing them and have them as hovering before me reproducitively.

15 “Actually to carry [something] out in reproduction” thus proves to be ambiguous.

4) We say: I live in a reproduction, I carry out a reproduction, when we not only reproduce as such but are turned in the reproduction toward something in the first sense; in the reproduction, we perceive, judge, (even merely present), think of something, and so on. And we say that we live in the reproduction and carry out turnings toward, position takings, abstentions from position takings, and so on, in the reproduction: precisely when we have this actual experience in which we carry out all of this “as it were,” etc. What is marvelous is that all the turnings toward, the performings of the position takings, and so on, are reproduced turnings toward, etc., just as they are impressed turnings toward, etc., in the case of the equivalent nonreproductive experiences: actual experiences, hence unities belonging to internal consciousness. On the other hand, this sort of reproduction expresses an originarity of reproduction. In the actual experience of reproduction and of this reproduction that carries out, each step of turning toward and position taking is carried out “just as” it is carried out in the impression, except that everything is carried out

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37 Better, whether I actually carry out phantasy (to carry out reproduction would be to reflect internally).
38 Inserted later: “(a phantasy corresponding to the reproduction).” — Editor’s note.
39 Inserted later: “in phantasying.” — Editor’s note.
precisely in the all-inclusive modification of reproduction, by means of which everything becomes the reproduction of something. All of the carrying out is carrying out as it were. And yet the reproduction itself, as an actual experience, has the characteristic of an actual carrying out; namely, in comparison with the way in which a reproduction in which I do not vitally participate, in which I do not carry all of that out as an active phantasy-Ego in the manner of phantasy, can hover before me “in the background of my psyche.” The “vitally” here signifies a peculiarity that springs from the manner of reproduction, from this accomplishing, living reproducing. Now in the nexus of this living reproducing, all kinds of background presenting, background judging, and so on, emerge. These are not actually “carried out” in the reproduction; and I am aware of them in a way similar to that in which I am aware when I am not at all reproducing in the mode of vitally carrying out, but instead am turned, say, toward the actual world that is around me hic et nunc, and yet at the same time reproductions of similar presentations, judgments, and so on, emerge. Except that the character of the nexus in consciousness is different.

5) Vitality can also be intuitiveness, clarity. That is of no importance. But then there is a difficult problem in the turning toward, the directedness toward; specifically, on the one hand, as attention, and, on the other hand — if occasion should arise — as actual position taking directed toward what is phantasied. Stated more precisely:

If I live in the act of reproducing, I continually bring about turnings toward objects, objects with respect to which I take such and such a position or of which I “merely think.” All of this, however, belongs to the world of phantasy. Now a possible connection exists between this world and the actual world by virtue of the circumstance that the reproduction is precisely an actual experience.

I phantasy, I carry out memory, insofar as I mentally live the reproduction in the manner of a carrying out: But this can also be understood in such a way that the actual Ego — namely, the Ego intended

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40 I have combined the following here: 1) “Genuine,” explicit carrying out; 2) reproductions of acts; 3) nonposing reproductions. The phantasies, which are inherent in them, of states of affairs, and so on, are carried out.
41 “Genuinely” [eigentlich] signifies something else.
in actual impressions of itself — knows itself to be at one with the
phantasy Ego, and that rays of attention, directions of position taking,
then emanate from the impressional, actual Ego. If I live in phantasy,
the Ego that perceives, judges, acts there — the phantasy Ego — is
accordingly something reproduced (the object of a reproduction), just
as much as the acts to which one refers there. If, however, I live si-
multaneously in actuality and in phantasy, then, speaking abstractly, a
double Ego is there, the actual Ego and the reproductional Ego: both,
of course, posited in a certain manner as united (just how is a matter
for further investigation). Phantasy attention (phantasied attention),
phantasied position taking of every sort, emanates from the phan-
tasy Ego. Actual attention, actual position taking, emanates from the
actual Ego.

And what is remarkable here is that actual attention can go to-
gether with phantasied attention and that an actual position taking
can be directed in actual attention toward the phantasied objectivity,
can coincide with the phantasy position taking or can also disagree
with it, and so on. These are fundamental facts. And one must always
take them into consideration.

Living in phantasy, living in reproduction, I can therefore perform
(reproductively) all of the acts that I perform in impression. I can
perceive in reproduction; I can judge in it, feel in it. I can reflect in
it on the act of perceiving, on the believing in the perceiving, and so
on. I can carry out a mere phantasying in it; I can carry out a mere
contemplating in it — of a picture, for example — and so on. All of
this while I live in reproduction. But as actual Ego, there “in person,”
I can also occupy myself with what is phantasied. I can take a position
with respect to it: an actual position; or I can “abstain” from taking a
position. As actual Ego I can also carry out a reflection in the phantasy
perception or suspend the phantasy conviction, suspend a phantasy
feeling and simply focus my attention on the state of affairs that was
its content: Then the focusing of attention is an actual focusing of
attention, an actual mere presenting (mere contemplating), although,
of course, at the same time a phantasy — presenting (a presenting in

42 That is to say, I carry out in a genuine (explicit) manner the experience-
reproductions (the nonposing or positing phantasies) — the reproductions of per-
ception, reproductions of judgment, reproductions of feeling, and so on.
phantasy, just as the suspending is at the same time a suspending in phon-
tasy).\textsuperscript{43}

And if I take a position as an actual Ego, it may be that as a phantasy
Ego I express a phantasy judgment — for example, $5 \times 5 = 25$ (I do
the calculation in the reproduction) — and as actual Ego I judge in the
same way as the phantasy Ego judges. The ray of turning toward and
its steps (the component rays) consist in a ray of actual turning toward
and, in union with it, a ray of phantasy turning toward; and this is also
true for the position taking. In a similar case of attention (doubled),
however, I can take a counterposition (as, e.g., in the case of $2 \times 2 = 5$).
I then have a phantasy position taking and the actual taking of a coun-
terposition.\textsuperscript{44} Now the latter position taking is plainly distinct from the
reproductive position taking. Clearly it is a different world, existing
within the actual world, fitting into the sphere of impressionality. I can
actually carry out this taking of a counterposition; I can also repress
it. I make the phantasy judgment, but as actual Ego I am aimed in an
actual ray of directedness at what is judged or at what is perceived,
and so on. I note to myself the phantasy formations, the phantasy
predications (the judgments that are made there), and the like. As ac-
tual Ego, I merely comport myself contemplatively; as phantasy Ego,
I perceive, I judge, and so on. If I also exclude\textsuperscript{45} the phantasy posi-
tion taking by executing in phantasy the corresponding modification,
then I have a mere contemplating in phantasy. But then the objects
are different. I am actually directed, in a purely contemplative way,
toward what is phantasied, hence toward “what is perceived,” “what
is judged,” toward “what is wished for,” “what is done,” toward the
judgments made in phantasy, the wishes harbored or uttered, toward
the actions performed. In the other case, I am directed toward the mere

\textsuperscript{43} It is stated here as if it were a question of a positionless phantasy. And one must
take notice of the following: What is actually remembered and what I bring in by
means of operations, perhaps on the basis of phantasies that are positionless but turn
into suppositions, and again, what is phantasy at first and is kept firmly in mind as
phantasy and what new operations bring in.

\textsuperscript{44} Hence on the basis of positing of nonpositing reproductions of experiences, and
founded in these reproductions, we have new acts specifically coinciding with them;
namely, positing or nonpositing acts.

\textsuperscript{45} The text from “exclude” to “position taking” (p. 424, 4) was later placed between
square brackets and crossed out diagonally; a question mark was added in the margin.
— Editor’s note.
“S is p,” what at one time is judged, at another time is wished for, and
at a third time is the content of a volitional decision, and so on. I can,
however, also actually be directed toward the mere “S is P,” but then
I must carry out in phantasy the suspension of the “position taking.”
If on both sides I carry out an ideation “grounded on phantasy,”
then in the one case I acquire the idea of judgment (not judging), of
wish (not wishing), and in the other case the idea of propositional
content (proposition-content). We must learn to have complete con-
trol over all of these distinctions! And, of course, to carry out an
ideation in phantasy and to carry out an actual ideation (actually to
carry out such an ideation) are two very different things. Obviously,
connections that are necessary according to an objective law also ex-
ist: adequate ideation, adequate grasping, cognizing of every sort, all
in phantasy; and likewise, as soon as I bring the actual Ego into play,
every “adequate position taking” whatsoever is necessarily at once
actual concordant position taking.

**Supplement**

I have overlooked the following. Actually taking a position toward
what is reproduced can signify that I have actual self-consciousness,
that I am in the actual world with my reproducing; more precisely,
that I am aware of this. And then a ray of actuality emanates from this
actual world into the phantasy world, from me, from my purely actual
Ego, toward what is reproduced.

On the other hand, although objectively it remains the case that the
experience of reproduction belongs to the sphere of the actuality of
the Ego, the sphere of the actual Ego, and that all actuality, hence, too,
the actuality relating to what is reproduced, is grounded in the pure
Ego, this can nevertheless express ideal possibilities of reflection. The
following can be the case and usually is the case: Living in memory,
I “know” nothing of the actual world and of my actual Ego; that is
to say, of the actual world of the present. I am aware only of what is
remembered, of what appears to me there, and of its most immediate
temporal surroundings. But I am conscious of what is reproduced as
in itself “actual,” as properly “existing”: an existence, of course, that
on closer inspection turns out to be a “having existed.”

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46 Inserted later: “etc. Reproductions can also function in empathy.” — Editor’s note.
What kind of modification converts a reproduction without actual position taking into a reproduction with actual position taking? — Reproduction carrying “actual position taking” in itself in differing senses — The characteristic of familiarity belonging to the phantasied (reproduced) intentional contents — Position-characteristics that did not originate from the reproduction itself — On the attempt to consider every intentional experience as either position taking or non-position-taking>

(April 7, 1912)

Now what matters is to become clear about what kind of modification it is that converts a “reproduction” without actual position taking into a reproduction with actual position taking. Can one present the situation in such a way that the pure reproduction is a thing by itself, and that there simply connects with it, as a second intervening element, “a ray of actual attention” and possibly “strata” of actual position taking interwoven with it?

First of all, it is necessary to note the following distinction. A reproduction can carry “actual position taking” in itself in different senses. 1) Insofar as it is memory. That is to say, the reproduction, as reproduction, is the reproduction of an impression, and in this respect it can be actually positing. Just as the experience of an external perception [aussere Perzeption] in certain circumstances is actually positing with respect to what is perceived (it is then called Wahrnehmung), so the experience of reproduction in certain cases is actually positing with respect to what is reproduced. Reproduction in our manner of speaking is not reproduction of something “external” but of something “internal.” Primarily, every reproduction is (immediately) reproduction of an impression; that is to say, of an experience that is constituted as a unity in the actual consciousness of internal time. Reproduction is reproduction of a perception (as a unity), of a judgment, of a feeling, and so on. And just as in positing perception one is conscious of the individual external object perceived there as actual, so in positing

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47 I say “reproduction without actual position taking”: Reproduction that does not posit any existence and [is] such that no modalized positing and no affective positing is related even to what is phantasied.

48 The latter [is] very important

49 Wahrnehmung here (as opposed to Perzeption) is perception in the sense of “taking as true.” — Translator’s note.
reproduction one is conscious of the individual internal object [as actual]: hence the judgment, the feeling, the perception, and so on, which is reproduced in the particular case. Now, however, what we call living in reproductions is not properly a living in them in the sense in which we live in an act of perceiving or in some other intentional experience: that is to say, in the sense of being directed toward the intentional object. Rather, “in carrying out a reproduction,” we are directed toward the objects of the reproduced intentional experiences: We perceive as it were, we judge as it were (we judge “in” phantasy), and so on. If we call the relation to these objects the reproductive intentional relation or phantasy relation, we then live in this relation; to speak more precisely, we therefore carry out phantasy, phantasy judging, phantasy perceiving, and so on.

Here we must strictly heed the fact that by phantasy judgments we do not understand judgments that are phantasied but the phantasies of these judgments; by phantasy cogitationes of whatever sort we do not understand the cogitationes that are phantasied but the phantasies of the cogitationes. Carrying these out is a particular actually engaged mode of the actual experience of reproduction.

Hence, I ought not speak further of the carrying out of reproductions when what is meant is to judge as it were in the act of reproducing and actually to participate in it in such a way that what is judged about is in one’s regard. I bring about “the phantasy corresponding to the reproduction.” The concept of phantasy is taken so broadly here that not only what is individual is said to be phantasied, but intentional content of every sort. (What is customarily called phantasy is intuitive reproduction: Finally the word is actually used just as broadly as it is used here!) Now we can go on and assert:

A reproduction can be actually positing reproduction (reproduction taken precisely as reproduction!). Now if we live in the corresponding phantasy, the phantasied intentional contents have a universal characteristic, which is independent of whether it is a question of phantasy judgments, phantasy feelings, and so on. This characteristic is nothing other than the characteristic of familiarity. It is therefore the index or correlate of “I have already judged this once before, have already perceived this, have already found it pleasing, have already performed this action, and so on.” The characteristic here is that of definite familiarity. Opposed to it is the characteristic of universal and
analogical familiarity:50 At one time I perceived something similar, and so on.51 Something similar “brings to mind” something similar, analogizes it for me, pictorializes it for me. This piece of image consciousness (in which one pictorializes something else in a figment) is therefore something more universal (in something chosen at will, also in something actual, etc., however one is conscious of it, something resembles something else that is familiar; and following what is resembling, what analogizes is also “familiar,” and, in the case of conceptual comprehension, of a familiar type).

2) The situation is entirely different in the case of the position-characteristics that do not originate from the reproduction itself and from it as reproduction, but instead come from actual position takings that are directed toward the corresponding phantasied (and perhaps “familiar”) object. Through the first position-characteristics, what is phantasied merely became discernible (familiar). Through the new position-characteristics it itself (really for the first time) turns into an object or content of position taking, specifically in such a way that it is at once the content of phantasied position taking (the phantasy phantasys precisely the taking of a position and obviously not freedom from all positions) and the object of actual position taking. Accordingly, I recall having judged (reproduction, positing); the judgment itself is characterized as familiar. In union with the memory, I take a position toward the judgment: I still maintain the judgment. In union with the memory, I actually judge and judge in the same sense. Or on the other hand, I now actually repudiate the judgment.

Here it is quite obviously a question of separable position takings that can be completely suppressed, of new position takings in contrast to reproduction, though founded in reproduction (or based on it). Their essential conditions, moreover, must be explored. It must also be said that such position takings are possible either when the reproduction was a recollective reproduction or when it was a merely phantasying reproduction (mixed or pure), but that the position takings assume a different mode depending on the circumstances. There

50 analogizing (the presentation).
51 Hence what is meant is the following: Memory is not analogizing presentation; memory is direct imagination, to which analogically presenting imagination stands opposed, and to the latter corresponds the second form of familiarity.
are doxic, affective, voluntary assents (approvals) or rejections (dis-
approvals), perhaps in different modes of certainty. We must note partic-
ularly that a certain affective assent is possible even without a positing phantasy underlying it. This is the case when I phantasy a course of behavior and accompany it with condemnation, or when I phantasy joy over something in advance and sympathize with this joy (here one could speak universally of sympathetic position taking). While these sympathetic position takings are merely grounded in reproductions and make up a higher stratum superimposed on them, memorial position takings proper belong to the essential composition of reproduction itself (understood as experience, of course). Similarly, belief belongs to the essential composition of judgment; or attentive perceiving also belongs to the essential composition of a perceptual experience.

I have attempted to establish the theory that every intentional ex-
perience is either position taking (axiontic) or non-position-taking, anaxiontic. Or rather, an “inactuality modification” is supposed to pertain to every taking of a position. But this is ambiguous. Not actually to take a position can mean to have a reproduction of a position taking without taking a position in sympathy with it: And that is not what we have in mind here. It is best if we retain the terms “anaxiontic,” “anaxiosis” and define them precisely by the facts. To the judging that “S is p” corresponds the merely thinking that “S is p”; to deeming likely corresponds the phantasying of oneself into deeming likely; [which is] not deeming likely as the taking of a position, but the “immersing of oneself in the mode of understanding” into the deeming likely. And so it is everywhere. We therefore understand by an anaxiosis a determinate, positive phenomenon, a positive modification of a corresponding axiosis. This presupposed,
it will be correct to bring into this series nonpositing reproduction, 
nonrecollective reproduction. (Naturally, pure reproduction without 
sympathizing.) We would then say that it\textsuperscript{57} is a doxic position taking 
(which, of course, can also have modes of certainty). If the memory 
(the recollective reproduction) is a certain memory, then it is an act 
alogous to an external perception (in the mode of certainty). Just 
as we would contrast to the latter, as an anaxiotic modification of 
it, a pure “semblance” consciousness\textsuperscript{58} in which nothing of axiontic 
position taking\textsuperscript{59} is carried out (or [in which axiontic position taking 
is] not carried out), so we would set a pure phantasying reproduction 
over against the recollective reproduction.

But something is still missing here.

We separate position takings into those that are carried out and those 
that are not, into those “in which we live” and those “in which we do 
not live.” I do not yet know whether I may say: actual and potential 
position takings. Connected with this is the distinction between po-
sition takings that are “genuinely” carried out, explicitly carried out, 
and those that are not genuinely carried out, those that are carried out 
implicitly, confusedly.

May one then assert that anaxiontic experiences, or, respectively, 
the moments of anaxioses, can also be carried out and not carried out, 
and can be carried out genuinely, explicitly, or implicitly? I can have 
the thought that $2 \times 2 = 5$ hovering before me without carrying it 
out, to say nothing, then, of genuinely carrying it out. I can certainly 
be turned toward the state of affairs, a fundamental part of carrying 
it out, but without living in the “thinking of.”

I still sense ambiguities here.\textsuperscript{60} 1) If I am thinking of something 
and turn toward something else, this thinking is “still conscious,” al-
though I am no longer living in it. So much for that. This is the case 
with respect to every act. 2) It is something else, however, “to de- 
prive an act of its being carried out,” “to suspend” the position taking 
(and this applies only to the position taking), “neutralize it,” “abstain” from taking a position. This is obviously something new.

\textsuperscript{57} “it” later changed to “memory.” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{58} = positionless perception [Perzeption].
\textsuperscript{59} Inserted later above “axiontic”: “positing.” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{60} Precarious from here on.
It is a determinate modification belonging to the universal modification of position taking: To every position taking there corresponds a neutralized position taking.\(^{61}\)

a)\(^{62}\) Hence we distinguish the not-living-in-the-act as it appears, for example, when we are theoretically occupied with a matter while at the same time taking pleasure in the act, though not living in it. This “not carrying out” [is distinguished from] carrying out (living in the act), which can in turn have different modes: carrying out attentively (carrying out primarily), retaining as carried out (in a proof), and so forth.

b) The abstaining, the suspending, the not allowing to gain acceptance (if I do not live in the act, the feeling is by no means suspended).

Now if I suspend a judgment as judgment, do I then have the state of affairs as “merely presented”? But in a certain sense, I would also have that if I were to suspend a deeming likely, and so on, and “look at” the state of affairs.\(^ {63}\) And it can certainly also be the case that I have not taken any position whatsoever with respect to some matter, hence that there is nothing there at all that could be suspended. Something that merely comes to mind, a phantasy judgment without sympathetic position taking, and so on. Hence are there not position-free — utterly position-free — experiences?\(^ {64}\) Perhaps even in the perceptual sphere. The question then is what this freedom from any position means. Not taking a position. That certainly. And it also means that the taking of a position, which is [then] neutralized, is not there at first; therefore it means that “not taking a position” is not supposed to have the significance of “neutralized position taking” (“abstention” from position taking). The neutralizing here must also not be confused with inhibited intention, with the degrading of a judgment intention, of a belief intention to a deeming possible and the like by counteracting intentions functioning as countermotives.

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\(^{61}\) I am in doubt here about what that really is.

\(^{62}\) Here the reverse side of the page in the manuscript begins. Husserl later placed a large question mark at the top right of this side. — Editor’s note.

\(^{63}\) I am doubtful about what that is really supposed to be. This would have to be thoroughly studied anew.

\(^{64}\) Not positning is not a privation, and “position taking” is not something that supervenes on an act, if it is understood as “positing,” as we have always understood it up to now.
In ordinary language, looking at what is thought belongs to the thinking of oneself into something, just as attention belongs to a position taking that carries out, assuming that it is a position taking in the strict sense of a turning toward in which a position is taken. It is possible that we have this looking-at in the case of position-free reproduction as well. However, we can suspend this looking-at as something extra-essential and possible at all times.

But to speak of “not taking a position” contains its difficulties. Not taking a position with respect to some matter is surely supposed to signify not taking a position with respect to a matter of which we are “conscious.” And here we must carefully distinguish the following:

We are reproductively conscious of some matter — speaking more precisely, it is something phantasied. “I take no position with respect to it” says that there exists no actual position taking having its basis in the reproduction of the consciousness of this matter. The freedom from any position implies a privation here. The reproduction itself is an actual experience; and like every actual experience, every reproduction can be either position taking or anaxiotic. A position taking can actually be omitted only when it is a founded position taking. No intentional experience can be entirely without the taking of a position. More precisely, the deepest underlying position takings can only be omitted in the sense that they come to be replaced by corresponding axiotic moments. A reproduction must necessarily be either axiotic or anaxiotic. And that a reproduction is merely phantasying does not imply that the reproduction itself has no axiotic moment. It implies only that it has an anaxiotic moment. On the

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65 The text of this paragraph, with which the page of the manuscript with the question mark ends, was later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
66 “position taking” and “anaxiotic” later changed to “positing” and “nonpositing” respectively. — Editor’s note.
67 The sentence up to the colon was later changed to: “No intentional experience can exist without positing or quasi-positing = nonpositing.” Simultaneously, Husserl noted in the margin: “Better: Every intentional experience is either founded of not founded. If it is not founded, it is simple ‘presentation’; that is to say, it just has the characteristic of positing or nonpositing. If it is founded, however, then genuinely valuing characteristics freshly emerge, in which, however, a new positing, or, as the case may be, nonpositing, occurs.” — Editor’s note.
68 “More precisely” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
69 Inserted later above “no axiotic”: “indeed, positing.” — Editor’s note.
other hand, sympathetic position takings founded in the reproductions can supervene as well as withdraw. And again, instead of withdrawing, they can also undergo a corresponding anaxiotic modification, and consequently the complex and the relationships of founding remain preserved.

We will certainly not maintain that if I reproduce at all I must necessarily take a position with respect to what is reproduced. If I live entirely in reproductive phantasy, if actual engagement is suspended altogether, then all sympathizing will be omitted. At least this is possible. But as soon as I am present with my actual engagement — I as living Ego — I will immediately comport myself thus and so in relation to what is phantasied. I will take a position, or I will abstain from taking a position or even “merely think of,” merely understand, taking a position — in short, occupy the anaxiotic position.

Thus it is understood that to live in mere phantasy, or merely to phantasy without taking a position, does not mean to “assume,” to think of, and so forth. The main point is that an anaxiotic modification corresponds to every taking of a position and that every taking of a position can be neutralized [untermbidden.\(^{70}\)]; that, if the position taking is the deepest underlying position taking, it cannot be omitted but can only exist in one of these modes. Furthermore, it will be correct [to say] that mere reproduction (not memory) is anaxiotic modification.

Finally, it must be noted in addition that the neutralizing [Unterbindung]\(^{71}\) of a position taking and anaxiotic position taking are simultaneously compatible, while as a rule\(^{72}\) two actual position takings belonging to one genus are not compatible. Nevertheless, this can be misinterpreted. An anaxiosis is an intentional experience and itself axiosis in the widest sense. It is an “act-characteristic,” and this pairing of axiosis and anaxiosis belongs to every highest genus of act-characteristics. To every axiosis, an anaxiosis corresponds. And I can live in the latter just as I can live in the former, carrying it out.

\(^{70}\)“that every taking of a position can be neutralized” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.

\(^{71}\)“Neutralizing” is something altogether questionable to me, unless I can always phantasy in addition countermotives and can then invent a nonposing for every positing of any content whatsoever.

\(^{72}\)“as a rule” [sonst] later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
But what about the “neutralizing”? Is it perhaps something fundamentally new and something opposed to the anaxiosis? No. It is itself an anaxiosis. I abstain from judgment; this is a species of thinking of “S is p.” Anaxioses can occur in just two forms: Either no axiosis is there “in secret,” “latently” there and then necessarily neutralized; or it is there in neutralized form. Must we not say that an axiosis and a corresponding anaxiosis, just like two axioeses of the same genus, are incompatible with one another in the act of carrying them out? But the peculiarity obtains that an axiosis can be converted into an anaxiosis by virtue of the fact that it can be made latent and, with the preservation of the ray of attention, be replaced by an anaxiosis.

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I see that there is still one distinction that I have not taken into account:

1) A state of affairs stands before me as null, but I neutralize the consciousness of nullity (or a state of affairs stands before me as likely, I neutralize the deeming likely, and so on). Now it can be the case that in doing this I merely think of the state of affairs; I repeatedly “carry it out” in mere thinking-of.

Likewise, I am conscious of something as a figment, as a null semblance; or I am conscious of it as doubtful, and the like. However, I suspend this position taking; I do not live in the carrying out of the nullity. On the contrary, I merely think of it, which means here that I merely contemplate it.73

2) Instead of this, I can carry out the inaxiosis of deeming likely, of negation, and so on. The imagining of oneself into the deeming likely, the imagining of oneself into the negating. Now it is problematic here whether this modification takes place in the same way as the preceding one. One can certainly say in this case:75 If I deem it likely that the weather will be beautiful today, I can indeed suspend

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73 “which means” to “merely” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
74 “inaxiosis” later changed to “neutralization.” — Editor’s note.
75 Cf. the following page <i.e., p. 434, 16ff.</i>
the deeming likely, which, however, then implies thinking that “the weather will be beautiful.” But how am I supposed to suspend the deeming likely and merely imagine myself into the deeming likely?

How, in general, is such an experience supposed to take place? Am I first of all supposed merely to think “S is p” and then phantasy myself into a deeming likely? We still have not perfectly clarified everything here. Does all phantasying-into presuppose a reproductive modification, a nonpositing reproduction? And am I directed toward what is reproduced (what is phantasied), though not merely in phantasying, but instead in an actual supposing, in an actual thinking of “deeming likely”? But why, then, do I need phantasy? First of all, I have the consciousness of nullity. A figment lies within view. Then I can direct my grasping regard toward its being null and then again modify this positing, and then I think of the being null. These matters are highly problematic.

The following must be separated:

1) Is there idealiter an inaxiosis for every “axiosis”?\(^{76}\)

2) If I carry out or experience the respective axiosis, the respective positing act, whether it be an act that simply intuits its object or an act that takes a position in the founded sense, can I produce or construct the corresponding nonpositing act, the inaxiosis, voluntarily? And does the operation of “abstaining,” “neutralizing,” serve for this? And in what might this operation consist?

3) What about the relationship of inaxiosis and imagination; more precisely, as reproductive imagination or pictorial exhibiting (analogizing)?

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a) Actual judgment has its reproductive modification, the judgment phantasy (clear and obscure judgment phantasy); and this judgment phantasy can be actual or inactual. Thus for every judgment we have “mere” judgment phantasy as an inactual parallel act. On the other hand,

\(^{76}\) Inserted later above “axiosis” and “inaxiosis”: “positing” [Posit<ion>] or, respectively, “neutralizing” [Neutr<alisierung>].” — Editor’s note.
b) every judgment has its direct inactuality modification. The thinking of “S is p” that is not a phantasying. What happens here is precisely what happens in the case of a perception — for example, the perception of a landscape — which has as its inactuality modification, on the one hand, the mere phantasy of “precisely the same” landscape, and, on the other hand, the direct inactuality modification: the absence (or suspension) of all actuality along with the preservation of the perceptual content as a whole.

My theory, then, is that every genus of cogitationes is subject to the distinction between actuality and inactuality; that actuality in every genus means much the same as position taking (actual position taking);77 and that in every genus there is abstention from position taking, the suspending of it, in short, the modification of inactuality.78

The matters are so extremely difficult because every experience as experience is something internally “presented,” something of which there is internal consciousness, and presentation as such is a fundamental genus of experiences among others. And add to this that every experience can be the foundation for presentations and for judgments based on them, such that in any particular case it is extremely difficult to become clear to oneself reflectively whether one has carried out modifications within the sphere of presentation on the basis of acts or within the acts themselves: all the more so, since for the purpose of analysis one continually occupies oneself presentationally, reflectively, with the acts and their contents and correlates. —

Note: I hear and understand someone who utters a judgment. What is my experience in that case? Empathy is a difficult point in its own right.

It79 would now seem correct to say that inactuality is compatible in kind with actuality, that on principle the latter can be “converted” into the former with the same phenomenal content. And we call this

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77 Indeed, the term “position taking,” as it is always used here, is precisely nothing else than the actuality belonging to the intentional experience of “positing.”
78 “of inactuality” later changed to “setting-outside-of-carrying-out and neutralizing (abstaining), or also the case of not taking a position (something positive!) without neutralizing. Both, however, are instances of inactuality, or better: anaxiosis.” — Editor’s note.
79 The text from here to “actuality amounts to a concept of originarity” (below, p. 436, 12) and the two notes pertaining to it were later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
the “suspension of position taking.” Every memory can be converted into mere phantasy by means of such suspension.  

Likewise, we have actuality and inactuality within the sphere of impressional intuitions. The actuality then consists in the impressional intuiting pure and simple in its doxic modes — in certainty, doubt, deeming possible, nullity, and so on. The inactuality consists in the analogue of pure phantasy (and amounts to a concept of imagination, inasmuch as mere imagining expresses precisely the neutralizing of actuality). Hence all aesthetic image-consciousness (image-object consciousness) belongs here, insofar as pure image-contemplation is carried out.

Now every judgment has its inactuality modification. Actuality amounts to a concept of originarity. Judgment in the originary and proper sense is the actual act of judgment. Its inactual modification is the mere thinking of “S is P.” I can also do this when I have a conviction about something, but only in the following form: I extricate myself from actual engagement; I push the judgment back and establish mere thought on the basis of the same content.

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20 Through the peculiarity of the internal consciousness to which every act belongs, and owing to the fact that this consciousness is presenting, impressional consciousness and has, as such, its reproductive modification, a manifold inactuality-modification accrues to every act (to every cognitive experience).

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80 Not convert[ed]! What is remembered always keeps its characteristic of being. But in a certain sense neutralized: Just as in perception I can live or not live in the process of cognizance-taking. Hence the distinction between actuality and inactuality is confused here with the distinction between carrying out and not carrying out (neutralizing).

81 1) Mere understanding, mere thinking without actual position taking, whether carried out or not carried out makes no difference. 2) Thinking-of in connection with the neutralizing of a position taking that is on hand.

82 Common to both is the actual directedness toward the state of affairs.
Whether in the case of simple intuitions a “mere” paying attention to what is characterized as actual, and so on, would be possible without carrying out the corresponding position taking and a mere “thinking-of” — contrary to the theory of attention — Many different senses of “not carrying out” in the impressional sphere, indication of problems for the sphere of reproduction or, respectively, phantasy>
(April 8 and 9, 1912)

There it is said: What appears can be characterized as actually existing, as likely, as existing in a condition of nullity, as pleasing, as beautiful, and so on. However, I can direct my attention to what appears without immersing myself in any of these characteristics, without carrying out the corresponding position taking. I “merely contemplate the object.”

ad 1). Here we juxtapose characterization I): 1) as actual, as likely, 2) as null, etc.; and characterization II): as pleasing, etc.

a) In the case of simple characterizing intuition, can I “merely” pay attention to what is characterized as actual, likely, null, “without immersing myself in one of these characteristics” and without carrying out as something new — which is more than “merely” paying attention-either a grasping of the content (which then becomes an object) or a mere “thinking-of” the content, allied with supposing, assuming?

Certainly in the case of founded position takings — for example, joy, sorrow, and so on — there is this distinction: I can live in the sorrow, the joy, the pleasure; or I can be occupied with the object perceptually, conceptually, judgmentally, and still experience the feeling “in the background,” though without living “in it.” And this indicates an obvious difference with respect to the feeling-characteristic of which I am conscious in both cases. The direction of feeling (when I live in the feeling) extends throughout the characteristic. In the other case, it

83 Husserl refers to sheet “M₀”, which is printed in the present volume as Appendix XLI. — Editor’s note.
84 Contrary to the theory of attention. Compare the rejected sheets in the wrapper. — In the rest, still some things worthy of note. Cf. the following pages.
is precisely absent; there, nothing pervades the characteristic. So this is certain. Here, however, we have an underlying act with underlying position takings in which we live. But is there also a “not living” in position takings that have no position takings underlying them?

5 Here, however, we must divide the question again.\(^{85}\)

Since now it can only be a question of doxic position takings, we can either have an unchecked position taking: 1) Then we have belief at its simplest. Not a belief-decision in the face of possible counter-tendencies, but an unchecked carrying out of the apprehension tendency, which is exactly what characterizes the simplest believing. What about the possibility of a “mere” paying attention in this case? [366]

Can position taking here perhaps be abandoned, remain unaccomplished? Namely, when attention aimed at the object is supposed to occur?

10 But cannot a mere thinking-of the same object become established here, just as in the judgments that explicate what is simply believed with respect to its determinations, <to which> mere propositional thoughts can surely correspond? What kind of thoughts are these? A thinking-of: this paper is white (I see it in simplest belief). Does this mean “not to carry out” the belief and merely to pay attention to “this paper is white”?\(^{86}\)

20 2) Then what about the case in which we no longer have a simple belief but an opposition of tendencies and countertendencies, a suggestion that something is possible (the countertendencies are not clearly consolidated into a counterappearance)? The case in which we have an opposition of several intuitive possibilities and we take our stand on the basis of one of them, while the others “dispute” it? A negating: a supposing that this paper is red, and, conflicting with it, the certain belief that it is white, negating the supposition.

30 Is this supposing in the case of the negation not precisely a thinking-of, hence manifestly an act that is of the same sort as believing, even an “act-characteristic,” but obviously not mere attention? But here we are conscious of the “red” reproductively.

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\(^{85}\) Inserted later: “Could one say, then, that the ‘doxic position takings’ stand on the same footing?” — Editor’s note.

\(^{86}\) Cf. δ <i.e., No. 15j>. In the case of simple perceptual believing there is no suspending and no thinking-of.
If I doubt — more precisely, if I doubt in perception — then I can take as my basis one of the possibilities, yet not live in the possibility and leave the counterpossibility “unrealized.” Rather, I suppose it, I think of it. Is it not clear that this is not “mere attention,” but precisely a mode in its own right? And if I have a figment and merely contemplate it, not troubling myself about its nullity: Is this not a mode in its own right, parallel to the act-characteristic of the axiosis?

When several apprehensions, each with its tendencies, conflict with one another, when they are partially carried out and partially obstructed (obstructed belief-tendencies: every apprehension tendency is a belief tendency and, as unobstructed, is pure certainty; as obstructed, each is a different and, indeed, complex mode), I can immerse myself in each one of them. I can, as it were, be contained in each one and not allow the others to get a word in edgewise, so to speak. But in what way? In the contemplation of the image object belonging to this tondo by Michelangelo, do I see the white or gray youth, a body (and that means an animated body)? The image object has the peculiar characteristic of opposition. The marble-apprehension (actually, the plaster-apprehension: the marble-apprehension is already something depicted; we have a depiction of the second degree!) is indeed there in the background, latently87 there.

The characteristic of the conflict here is the characteristic of conflict through reality, and the image object stands before me as null. But it is characterized as null quite genuinely; that is to say, I carry out the consciousness of nullity in an altogether genuine way when I pass over from the consciousness of reality to the consciousness of the image object and live precisely in the “annihilation,” the “annulment,” belonging to the apprehension-tendency proper to the latter consciousness. Only then, only in this transition-consciousness, does the image object acquire the “genuine” characteristic of what is null.88 (Just as the consciousness that “it agrees,” the consciousness of89 reality, is living and is genuinely explicaded in the harmonious transition

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87 Latently. “Genuine,” nongenuine carrying out (unfolding, developed, undeveloped carrying out).
88 Affirmation, negation, doubt, and so on, are nexus-characteristics, continuously being brought about synthetically in the transition.
89 Inserted later: “affirming.” — Editor’s note.
of concordant perceptions and not in the latent background of conflicting perceptions.) What is null has its companion in what is doubtful, which, for its part, again arises only in the consciousness of transition, not in the transition from the apprehension of reality to apprehension discordant with it, but in the transition from obstructed apprehension to obstructed apprehension. In the previous case, we have an agreement of the surroundings with one of the discordantly conflicting intuitions. In this way, it turns into a harmonious intuition; the other intuition conflicts with what is confirmed as a unity belonging to [the consciousness that] “it agrees.” [The other intuition] conflicts with certainty. In the second case, we have no preference for either of the two discordant intuitions. Each one agrees with the surroundings to the same degree of “perfection.” Each one draws the same force from the medium of agreement. Each one is “reduced” to mere possibility by opposition. Here, too, I must enter into interconnections. Here, too, I can immerse myself in only one of the apprehensions, and all the rest become “latent.” And then what appears has a nongenuine characteristic of possibility, and the counterpossibilities can even be completely obscure. I have a “feeling of disagreement,” of “it could be otherwise,” and so forth.

Now, however, I not only can make the counterapprehensions latent; I can exclude them in the sense that I take no further notice of them, and, thus untroubled by the consciousness of disagreement, “look at” what appears just as it gives itself to me in this apprehension. Now, of course, I also make it appear to me when I feel the disagreement and live in it (hence let the hidden countertendencies have their say in their concealment, so to speak). I am attentive, I am turned toward. But here it is a matter of something more. Without making up my mind and without “carrying out” the taking of a position (that

90 The last sentence was later changed and the text supplemented as follows: “In the previous case of nullity, we have an agreement of the uncontested surroundings with one of the conflicting intuitions. Hence this is a peculiar occurrence: An apprehension is not simple belief but “demanded” by simple belief, in spite of counterapprehensions. The counterapprehensions are cancelled; the apprehension demanded is the actual apprehension, the harmonious apprehension, as opposed to the cancelled apprehension.” — Editor’s note.

91 We have different cases, however. Conflict and agreement in the context of coexistence, conflict and agreement in the context of the appearance of succession.
is, precisely without living in it in the consciousness of doubt or the consciousness of nullity, for example), I accept what appears. I look at it. I contemplate it. Indeed, I describe it. This implies that this is a modified consciousness that puts out of action all of the position taking that is there (hence one speaks of “abstention” in the case of voluntariness). This putting-out-of-action is not mere latency in the previous sense; that is to say, not “inauthentic,” unexplained position taking, not merely position taking that does not pass over into the required interconnections. On the contrary, it is the genuine suspension of position taking, the abstention that at the same time indicates the carrying out of an act: of an act that shelters in itself precisely abstention from position taking. I “merely present,” but take no position; and in this carrying out of an anaxiosis, I can also make assertions, carry out explications, predications, relations, and so on. All of these are anaxiontically modified acts (possibly anaxiontically modified “evidences,” which, suitably transformed, turn into — and must essentially be able to turn into — actual evidences, axiotic evidences. We must consider in what respect anaxiotic acts are also subject to criticism and norm).

Hence we observe different senses of “not carrying out.”

α) One of the senses concerns the inaxiosis: Here, in the sphere in which we are standing, according to our examples, it presents itself as “abstention” from the position takings that are on hand (abstention from decisions would, properly speaking, be something else); and this implies a separate act-characteristic relating to the substrates of these position takings. This seems to me to be quite indubitable in this case. And I also find no room here for mere attentiveness, the isolating of attention, so to speak, on the substrate, while the position taking would be suspended by not being carried out: as if the suspending signified some mere putting-out-of-play of position takings and then mere attention remained. But it becomes apparent that a modification of position taking, which carries with it a separate act-characteristic in relation to the same substrate, truly does take place here. An act-characteristic, however, that is not itself a position taking.

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92 Inserted later above “anaxiosis”: “neutralizing” [Neutralisierung]. — Editor’s note.
93 Inserted later: “(not everywhere!)” — Editor’s note.
We must consider the following closely here: If I take no notice of the nullity or doubtfulness and if I look at what appears, describe it, and so on, then in fact we have two different things: on the one hand, as I have continually said, a mode of “suspension,” a mode of not living in the negating, in the doubting; on the other hand, as a second thing, precisely the contemplating, the being related to the substrate in a new manner, in the manner of “mere presentation” as inaxiosis.\textsuperscript{94} \textsuperscript{95}

\textbf{β)} In the paragraph above, the not carrying out, the not living in the position taking, indicated a not being turned toward something in the negating, in the doubting, in and with it. And it also indicated a putting out of action in a manner that had its positive counterpart in “mere” presenting, in the inaxiosis.

Now we can also shift from living in a position taking (being turned toward something in and with the position taking) to a not carrying out, to a not living in and with the position taking, without bringing about an inaxiosis (in which we live in turn). Indeed, this is also the case when we divert our attention, when we turn toward a different object; and it is also the case when we shift from focusing on the image object to focusing on the thing made of plaster. If we live in the image object, we carry out the image-object apprehension in its characteristic of being checked; we do not carry out the apprehension of the plaster object in its characteristic of reality (of “it agrees”): And these characteristics are position takings. We are not directed toward the substrates of acts that are not carried out, and we do not

\textsuperscript{94} Important note: If an aesthetic consciousness becomes established that, according to its nature, does not have its root in doxic position takings, although such position takings are there to begin with, the aesthetic consciousness itself takes care of the suspending: There is no need at the beginning for an activity of suspension. Does not the establishing of the act of inaxiosis in relation to the substrate of a position taking \textit{eo ipso} take care of the suspension of the position taking?\textsuperscript{*} Is suspension therefore not simply the establishing of mere thinking-of, by means of which position taking, if it is there, is eo ipso ousted from the function of living in it? We cannot simultaneously live in thinking-of and in position taking.

Husserl later noted at the place marked with an *: “no.” The whole note was crossed out repeatedly; cf. the critical notes to the text, Husserliana XXIII, 684. — Editor’s note.

\textsuperscript{95} Inserted later: “(neutralizing).” — Editor’s note.
speak of inaxioses here. The acts that are not carried out are there “latently,” but no inaxioses are there. Also nothing like “abstention,” “suspension,” takes place in the “background” of latency.

Hence we have a second concept of not carrying out. <Not carrying out> in this case consists in the latency. Or perhaps better, we see that a certain latency played its role in our examples; namely, the being on hand of “hidden” apprehensions, co-position-takings. However, we also had a position taking in the act in which we lived. This position taking was connected with the hidden position takings, and it was “suspended,” along with its connections, owing to the fact that “a mere contemplating,” an inaxiosis, was related to the same substrate. We then had a carrying out of the same substrate-consciousness, but not as isolated, rather with a substitute for the position taking. The position taking was still suspended there, but it was inherent in this that we were not turned toward anything in it, while we were nevertheless turned toward its substrate. Instead of this, the inaxiosis, in and with which we were turned toward the substrate, was put in its place in the function of turning toward.

We also see that there is a great difference between the disregard that, for example, the “doubt,” the “nullity,” etc., undergo in the act that we modify into an inaxiosis — disregard that consists in the fact that position taking is ousted from the function of turning toward despite the preservation of attention aimed at the substrate — and the not carrying out that the latent act signifies. Thus I can also take pleasure in an object to which I am paying attention, though I am not turned toward [it] in the pleasure. But I can also have, as my experience, a latent act that contains a pleasure; and here we do not refer in any way to a being turned toward (being attentive to) the object. This is the case, for example, when I am speaking to someone at a social gathering about objects that are a matter of indifference to me while my consciousness is essentially determined by the presence of someone I love, whom I perhaps even “see” and “see” with pleasure, but without attention and turning toward.

96 Inserted later above “inaxioses”: “neutralizings.” — Editor’s note.
97 Inserted later above “acts”: “apprehension and position taking.” — Editor’s note.
98 Inserted later: “the latter” [dieses]. — Editor’s note.
99 Inserted later: “neutralizing.” — Editor’s note.
We must therefore take the concept of latency strictly. The feeling, the pleasure in the thing toward which we are attentively turned in some act or other (but not in the pleasure itself), is not “carried out,” but it is not for that reason latent. The difference must by all means be heeded. Just like the difference between the primary carrying out and the still carrying out, understood as the retention of [the former] in the transition to a new carrying out.

It is best if we say “carrying out” with respect to every sort of living in the act and carrying out of position taking: in and with the position taking, being-turned-toward, being-directed-toward (even in obscurity, as in the case of still carrying out). And this determines the use of the phrase “not carrying out.” On the other hand, with respect to the “abstention” or “suspension” we say precisely suspension with inaxiosis.

b) Now to this point we have treated only a limited sphere of examples. Properly speaking, only perceptions and axiosesthat are immediately combined with perceptions.

It did not occur to us to speak here of perceptual appearances pure and simple without position takings, or, respectively, of inaxioses that were not combined with the suspension of axiosest. Can inaxioses by separated from such suspension? N.B.: Here, in the perceptual sphere? Is a perceptual apprehension possible that is neither a free tending toward nor an inhibited tending toward, a pure semblance and yet not a figment . . . ? This is nonsense, of course.

It can be the case that an image does not conflict visually with anything (e.g., a stereoscopic image), that nothing is there in visual perception that either inclines one against it or inclines one in favor of it. But is this a meaningful possibility?

100 Inserted later: “(better, by means of inaxiosis).” Probably at a different time, “with” was crossed out in the original text and “neutralizing” was inserted above “inaxiosis.” — Editor’s note.

101 “It can be” to “possibility?” was changed somewhat later to: “Can it be the case that an image does not conflict visually with anything (e.g., a stereoscopic image), that nothing is there in visual perception that either inclines one against it or inclines one in favor of it — but is this a meaningful possibility?” and was supplemented as follows: “An image that conflicts with nothing? That would be a complete perception, which would be a perceptual tending-toward freely running its course to the end. Hence this is in fact nonsense.” — Editor’s note.
Now let us pass over into the sphere of reproduction or phantasy.\footnote{102} \footnote{103}
Here we have reproductions of acts with position takings and reproductions of all the occurrences that the impressional sphere furnishes.
And here we have that carrying out of reproductions that lies not only in reproducing the reproduced acts and position takings but, as it were, in carrying them out; and this [is] understood as actual engagement: the vigorous phantasying in which we “actively” phantasy, in which we perceive, judge, and so on, but only as it were. Now here we find the distinction that at one time we “actively” phantasy, actively carry out a phantasy, but live entirely in the phantasy world; and at another time, living in the actual world and living in it as an actual Ego, we are actually related to the phantasy world, actually turned toward it in actual position takings or in the inaxioses corresponding to them.
In this actual turning toward, we can behave sympathetically or antipathetically toward the substrates of the reproduced <turnings toward>, agreeing with them or rejecting them; we can take a position with respect to them in such a way that we always have something double: the impressional (namely, the sympathetic) and the reproduced turning toward or position taking. Attention, too, is double in this sense: actual [attention] — reproduced [attention]. It is indeed the mode of “living.”\footnote{104} Now, however, sympathetic position taking can certainly be absent in the case of such sympathetic behavior and in the case of the sympathetic performances of acts, of turnings toward. I — I the actual Ego — amuse myself by pursuing the play of phantasy. The phantasying amuses me, but beyond that I take no position toward what is phantasied. Above all, I take no position with respect to its being or nonbeing.

The question is: What presents itself here?\footnote{105}

\footnote{102} (more precisely, into the sphere of immediate, hence not of iconic and symbolic, reproduction.)
\footnote{103} Furthermore, it must be remarked that up to now we have indeed spoken of figment consciousness and, under it, of image-object consciousness, but not of genuine depictive consciousness (iconic consciousness).
\footnote{104} Husserl later placed a large question mark in the margin of the text of this paragraph up to this point.
\footnote{105} Cf. 4/7/1912 (marked in red) <i.e., No. 15d> and 4/10 <i.e., No. 15g>.}
Conformity or nonconformity of acts of judgment and affective acts to a foundational phantasy that has been carried out. Phantasy (including memory) can found: 1) actual position taking, 2) actual but modified position taking, 3) actual "suppositions" of position takings, modifications effected by mere "thinking".

(April 9, 1912)

Actually to carry out memories or free phantasies is one thing, and to carry out explications, collocations, comparisons, distinctions, relational acts of any kind on the basis of these phantasies that one has carried out is another thing. It is obviously something else to carry out phantasies of such acts, or especially memories of them, and again something else to carry out these acts precisely as actual acts on the basis of phantasies (which do not phantasy these comparisons, are not memories of such relational experiences and their objects, their states of affairs). Hence to make predicative judgments on the basis of phantasies, and to make judgments that bring something to predicative expression and before that to explicative and predicative unfolding, also does not mean to carry out reproductions of judgments, to carry out phantasy judgments.

This is important to note. As a parallel, one can refer to the fact that explications, collocations, relational acts grounded on an imaging consciousness are not themselves acts "in" the imaging, are not depicted acts.\[374\]

I remember my office at the University of Halle. I do an enumeration of the row of adjoining rooms. I compare their size and shape, etc. A particular accomplishment of phantasy underlies each step, but in each step a new act, which is not a reproductive act, is added.\[107\]

On the basis of a phantasy that has been carried out (even if it includes in itself nothing of memory), we can carry out a mere

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106 (The imaging consciousness \{not the image-object consciousness\} taken as image-subject consciousness, is certainly itself an act of phantasy in the widest sense.)

107 However, [when we are] unconcerned about "position takings," about axiontic characteristics, we can also describe something appearing perceptually, an image object, etc., make comparative judgments about it, and so on. And likewise in the case of memory (memories of doubt, for example: [when we are] unconcerned about the doubt).
expressing, a mere explicating, relating, conceptual apprehending, predicking. In doing so, we can have a double focus: 1) We judge in an unmodified way about what is phantasied as phantasied. We have the figment belonging to the phantasy and the figment’s correlate in view; we make it objective and declare that the correlate is fittingly expressed in this way. To take an example: What I am phantasying is “A clown that is sticking out its tongue.” The expression is a suitable expression of what is phantasied as phantasied and has a modified sense, as also when I say: “This is a clown. It is sticking out its tongue,” and so on. The sentences stand in quotation marks.

2) But I can also live in the phantasy and then simply express or accompany the executed phantasy with suitable expressions (explications, and so on), without positing the phantasy and what is phantasied as such as my object. In this case, I have carried out modifications of explications and predications, modifications that do not have the characteristic of phantasies. And these are acts actually performed on the basis of the phantasy, which itself is an act actually performed.

This would not be a phantasying [Sich-denken]. The judgment, “The clown is sticking out its tongue,” is, of course, not an actual judging but a modified judging, and quite certainly not a phantasying of judgment but an impressional judging. For to have the judgment in phantasy and to carry out a phantasy judgment are obviously different. The latter is a thinking carried out in a fully intuitive way (actual, though modified, predication), “evidently” adapted to an accomplished phantasy serving as its basis. This again is an important assertion.

Now let us see whether or not something similar is also possible for other sorts of acts — for affective acts, for example. I am living in a phantasy, and in it a jungle appears to me. A man sits on the ground and searches for bugs. And then suddenly a huge lion emerges, and the man laughs cheerfully. While I present this to myself, while this series of phantasies runs its course, I feel astonishment, perhaps even

108 Inserted later: “also about what is perceived as perceived.” — Editor’s note.
109 “actual judging” was changed somewhat later to “judgment about actuality” and supplemented as follows: “not a ‘normal’ judging relating to ‘actuality,’ ‘claiming the value of actuality.’” — Editor’s note.
110 Every actual description of a phantasy objectivity therefore belongs here, if I disregard the fact that it is employed to characterize the phantasy experience.
fear. This is not fear or astonishment in the ordinary sense. They are certainly not reproductive acts (phantasy acts), but actual acts, grounded in the actually executed phantasy. On the other hand, I do not have “actual astonishment,” “actual fear,” but modified acts. They “fit” what is phantasied, “agree” with it, in a manner similar to modified predication; and they are modified in the same sense as the latter is. This is also true in the case of modified wishes: In phantasy I picture a beautiful woman and desire her love. I do not phantasy myself and my desire; I actually feel this “desire.” But I certainly cannot “actually” desire that this woman, who does not even exist, love me. There is again a modification, and again in “adaptation” to the phantasy. I can actually and without modification desire that this woman be actual and that she belong to me in reality, and so on.

Instead of such harmoniously “suitable” act-modifications, can I also carry out unsuitable act-modifications? Thus in the example of the lion: I see the powerful yellow lion in phantasy and “think” to myself: This is a small tiger. I can also accomplish this thought intuitively: That would be to carry out a new phantasy to which the new expression is adapted, but in such a way that the old phantasy is “kept in mind.” And in the “this,” the lion of the old phantasy remains apprehended and posited; and then the “this” is “supposed” as identical with the small tiger of the new phantasy. The contradiction between the posited identity and the genuine consciousness of “difference” springs forth; or, rather, there springs forth the fact that the identity does not harmonize with the experienced conflict (the overlapping of difference). Here a consciousness that “it does not agree,” a consciousness of disbelief, necessarily arises; but it is a modified disbelief.

On the other hand, I can certainly make the supposition — even if I cannot make it harmoniously in intuition — that this large lion is a small tiger; and again this is an actual act and a modification of

111 But this means: not relating to reality but to a phantasied world.
112 (not in a desire belonging to reality).
113 I make the lion and the small tiger overlap, but I “think of” them as identical. I make the identity overlap with the given nonidentity = difference. Hence I retain a fundamental supposition, the supposition belonging to the phantasy; and on the basis of that supposition conflicts arise, which are therefore dependent conflicts.
114 Simpler: This lion is green.
judgment, only one that no longer possesses evident suitability and would still be a judgment itself!\textsuperscript{115} And the situation will be similar in the case of wishing and other acts in modification and in supposition. I suppose: I wish the lion would devour the peaceful bug collector. Assume that I phantasy the devouring, then my pity “harmonizes” with it and, before it quasi occurs, my negative wishing. But then I suppose — discordantly — positive wishing. (That I cannot have this “intuitively” means nothing else than that I cannot have it as actual wishing on the basis of phantasy intuition in the mode of matching, harmonizing: to which possible evident judgments belong.) This supposing,\textsuperscript{116} this phantasying of oneself into the wishing, is not a reproducing of a wishing of this content: For I cannot properly reproduce this at all; I can reproduce only the supposition of such a discordant wishing. One could possibly try the following:\textsuperscript{117} I phantasy another wish. On the basis of this, I grasp that A is wished for; and then I suppose in the modification of judgment that the devouring of the man is wished for. But it certainly seems obvious that this is not the situation when I think myself into — phantasy myself into — “I wished for the devouring.” In the same way, I can project myself in phantasy into an act of questioning without actually finding something questionable — indeed, when something unquestionable, possibly on the basis of a phantasy, stands before me, when this “unquestionably” harmonizes with the content of the phantasy.

We see, then, what remarkable distinctions obtain here. In the case of actual acts to be carried out on the basis of phantasy, we find the following modifications: phantasy (which in our wider linguistic usage includes every memory) can found 1) actual and unmodified\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{115} It is a modification of a supposition, and modified in the second and third degree. 1) Phantasy — retained in its modified apprehension. This is an intuitive supposition of the lowest degree. The wish then actually harmonizes with this modified intention (the first modification of the harmonizing under the supposition). And opposed to this a wish-supposition in the second modification.

\textsuperscript{116} Even this supposing is a modified act.

\textsuperscript{117} Something can overlap the “wished for,” just as something can overlap the green.

\textsuperscript{118} “and unmodified” was crossed out somewhat later, and the following was inserted at the end of the sentence: “Unmodified in an absolute sense: Believing pure and simple is taking to be actual; stating pure and simple is taking to be true. And this presupposes that the supporting positings are precisely positings of actuality. Wishing pure and simple is taking something as wished for and has a relation to actuality. And thus all acts as relating to actuality.” — Editor’s note.
position takings — an actual judging, an actual deeming likely, questioning, wishing, and so on. Hence from the beginning the phantasy must be more than “mere” phantasy; it must at least be accompanied by immediate doxic position taking (actual position taking): harmonizing with it.

2) Actual but modified position takings, harmonizing with the phantasy, adapting themselves to it “evidently.” Evident judgments then belong to it by means of slight modifications.\(^{119}\)

3) Actual, modified position takings? I must describe this more adequately as follows:\(^ {120}\) Actual “suppositions” of position takings; mere modifications “in thought.”\(^ {121}\)

Namely: In the case of 2), I actually sympathize; I carry out the position takings belonging to the judgment, the question, the wish. But the position takings are modified. Here we must say: The position takings are still actual; they are still actual judgments, wishes, and so on. But a modification, determined by the kind of foundation on which they are built, runs throughout these genera of axioses themselves. The foundation can consist in axioses; hence in the case of founded, synthetic acts, the acts that ultimately found them can be axioses or anaxioses\(^ {122}\) (here mere phantasies without sympathy). And this is not a distinction in addition to others; on the contrary, depending on the circumstances, in these ultimate foundations the position takings are omitted or join others already there. The character of all the position takings built on top of them also changes; they undergo modifications. The predicative judging — the comparing, distinguishing, relating belonging to it — is not a normal judging, not an actual judging (relating to actuality), but a quasi-judging,
a judging floating in the air, a judging that has no absolute truth as its correlate. And the situation is the same in the case of all the other sorts of position takings.

Now in contrast to this, there is the mere phantasiying of oneself into something, which is not a modified position taking; on the contrary, it is not a position taking at all. Rather, it is a modification that takes the characteristic of taking a position (of axiosis) away from the position taking and yet creates for every position taking a precisely “corresponding” modification.

But now we must also note the following: Mere thinking-of is not a thinking-of in defiance of what fits some situation; we have made use of such examples before only for the sake of contrast. Rather, thinking-of can even be intuitive and, in any case, without disagreement.

We have to distinguish between the following cases: 1) I have a mere phantasy; I carry it out and, with it as a basis, make judgments, carry out affective position takings, and so on. Or I have a memory and carry out acts of that sort on its basis. 2) I think to myself intuitively: “A lion rushes from the undergrowth, and so on.” Here I have, in a certain sense, a judgment that fits the situation, but I do not live in the making of the judgment. I carry out a mere (intuitive) thought as a “supposition.” My black desk hovers before me in memory, but I do not live in the judgment. I merely think, I suppose, that my desk is black.

Discussion of examples <The reading or making up of a fairy tale. Note: Feeling that is motivated by the perceptual state of affairs, essentially prescribed possibility of explication, judgment, and so on, in comparison with the corresponding phantasy>

A scientific treatise appears with completely new propositions and theories. I cannot form an opinion about it; I am not prepared for that. I read the propositions, I understand them, but I do not execute them as judgments. They are neither judgments on the basis of phantasy nor judgments in phantasy. Actual experiences, however, are involved; I carry out a “bare propositional presenting.”

123 Inserted later: “necessarily.” — Editor’s note.
In comparison, let us take the reading of fairy tales. In this case, I do in fact carry out phantasies; and descriptive expressions, descriptive statements, coincide with the phantasies. In reading them, I first have the expressions, which are translated into appropriate intuitions; in narrating them, I first have the presentations and then the appropriate statements, much as in the reporting of memories. In the narration of something remembered, the expressions are judgment expressions and are made as actual judgments: actual judgments about what actually has been. If I describe a mere phantasy, then judgments are there again. I carry out actual descriptions, relations, and so on, actual orderings under concepts, actual predications, but modified because they do not aim at actualities, because they bring to expression, to explication, and so on, what I am conscious of only as phantasy, as quasi-actuality. I attempted to distinguish a different judgment-modification from this one: the modification of “mere thinking-of.” In the sense of a supposing that likewise carries out intuitively or nonintuitively. Here, however, there is something that must be considered once again. I understand what I have read without making a judgment. What can that indicate, and what is it supposed to indicate? What I have read can 1) remain unintuitive. 2) [Or] it is carried out intuitively; for example, “A house stands by the roadside,” “A tower stands by the highway.” I place the phantasy-tower on the street that I have before me in memory. The phantasy formation that thus arises finds its predicative expression: It is in part normal positing, in part modified positing. (Does not something of normal positing exist at all times in the components? Such and such once was: Somewhere in the world, in space, in time, such and such did exist. If I suppose an arbitrary mathematical theorem, the single numbers are ultimately posited as mathematical actualities. Are there really such suppositions without elements of actual positing? What about the situation when I live in a pure phantasy and there are no active references to reality at all? Certainly all posittings of actuality could be absent there.)

In any case, we have here, where intuitions serve as a basis for phantasy and actual expression occurs, acts of explicating, collocating,
distinguishing, relating, etc., and, finally, all predications, though modified.\textsuperscript{126} I do not see that the intuitive thinking-of “without judging” can be twofold. It \textit{is} judging in modified form; and the modification consists in the fact that collectively “mere” phantasy, to which no sympathetic belief has taken a position, serves as the basis. The acts based on it are explications, relations, and so on, even conceptual comprehensions, a series of attendant acts of intellectual forming and, in addition, acts of specific expression: collectively, acts that are completely dependent on their foundations with respect to their “mode of belief.” If the latter are doxic certainties, then the higher formations are doxic certainties too; if they are uncertain presumptions, if they are dubitable, then each of their modifications also infects the higher formation. If every doxic mode is absent, every actual mode of sympathetic belief, then it is also absent from the whole. On the other hand, if the whole is a living act of the same generic character in every case, of the same formation form, the whole is explication, subject-positing, positing-in-relation-to, and so on, but “without a doxic mode.”

This “without” has its problems, of course: whether there is an actual \textit{without}; whether it is not a question of a modification; whether a doxic mode, perhaps a negation, is not always there, though every modification can undergo a “suspension” by means of which “mere presenting” arises. These are the main issues. Let us leave them undecided for the present.\textsuperscript{127}

Let us consider supplementary cases. Instead of having an intuition and explicating it, performing synthetic-intellectual acts (predicative acts) on its basis, it can be the case that I have statements and that these are accompanied by corresponding intuitions: Not in such a

\textsuperscript{126} Inserted somewhat later: “Someone could object to that.” — Editor’s note.

\textsuperscript{127} The text of the last paragraph was subsequently placed in square brackets; at the same time, Husserl remarked in a marginal note to the paragraph: “What is pointed out here is correct, but proves nothing. The following must be heeded: To have a mere phantasy, even if it is mixed, and actually to make \textit{fitting} statements on the basis of it (along with all of the accompanying acts) is \textit{one thing}; to produce the corresponding mere thoughts is \textit{something else}. Just as it is one thing to make an appropriate statement on the basis of a memory or equally of a perception, and something else to form the corresponding mere thoughts. Mere thinking-of comes to be from actual statements by means of a (suspension-) modification; It can, however, be there from the beginning and be there intuitively as suitable.” At the end of the bracketed paragraph Husserl noted, probably at a different time: “The main point is in the marginal note!” — Editor’s note.
way, however, that all the explications, and so on, all the steps that the “proper” explicit performance demands, are actually carried out (“genuinely” unfolded). And again it can be the case that a perfect intuition, a complete intuition, is absent as a foundation, and finally that every clear intuition is absent. Intuition can be there at first, and proper step-by-step performance can ensue; then the statement can be made and understood repeatedly and step by step without intuition. The phenomenon changes, but it keeps its character: It is either actual judgment with its doxic mode, or it is mere thought [in which] the doxic mode “is absent.”

Again, it can be the case that I have an intuition, that I hold on to it in an act of repeating it, but confront it with statements that “do not agree with it,” giving discordant expression to it. But I suspend the conflict in the sense that I pay no heed to it and do not suppose that this is the way things are; I merely think of it. I phantasy the yellow lion and “think” to myself, “This lion is green.” What kind of thinking is this? Well, we separate the thinking that is explicit and also genuine from the thinking that is explicit and not genuine (and the explicit

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128 I can nevertheless understand even nonsenscial statements, such as “This pyramid is a cone.”

129 The part of the sentence “It is either” to “is absent” was later supplemented as follows: “But looked at closely, it can be a double phenomenon or a triple phenomenon. It is either 1) actual judgment with its doxic mode; 2) actual but modified judgment with its modified doxic mode; or 3) it is mere thought: the doxic mode ‘is absent.’” Simultaneously with this supplement, Husserl inserted the following text on the margin of the next page: “Amplified in more detail: I am reading a fairy tale, for example; but although I certainly understand everything, make all the statement, I nevertheless have no clear intuitions. Here and there something flashes out; the rest remains in the dark. One will say in this case: I am living in the world of the fairy tale. Indeed I am, although I do not view it with the intuiting eye of intuitive phantasy. But the statements themselves that I am making there are expressions of phantasy and not themselves statements in phantasy. This reading and understanding of the statements corresponds, I believe, to the modified (but not genuine) judging. And this is also the case when I understand the speech of someone else without sympathetically taking a position toward his judgments. Here we have modified judging and unmodified judging side by side, but, of course, still further implications (and still others in the case of reading the fairy tale). The understanding would therefore be modified judging, just as it would be modified wishing in the case of wish propositions, and so on. But it is something else to think of [phantasy] in the sense of the supposing, in which the judging itself, the wishing itself, understood as original, as well as the modified judging, wishing, are ‘suspended.’ To give oneself up to the fairy tale, narrating or reading (hearing) it, is not the ‘I think,’ ‘I suppose,’ that it did exist once. And so it is in every instance.” — Editor’s note.
It is precisely as if I made a discordant supposition on the basis of a perception. I suppose the paper to be green; I think to myself, “The paper is green”: I experience the conflict and experience the consciousness of nullity, but do not live in it. I do not carry it out; I carry out the thinking-of. It is a modified thinking, not a modified asserting that would still be asserting. In the case of normal judicative asserting, I have belief and I live in the belief; I carry out a doxic asserting. Here, under the suspension of disbelief, I perform an act of thinking-of. (If I live in the disbelief, then, in a certain sense, I also have a modification of an assertion. For the original, unmodified assertion is the assertion made in the act of belief, in the consciousness that “it agrees”; specifically, in the double sense: [it agrees with] the underlying presentation, which would then have to undergo explication; and then there is the agreement that belongs to the presentation itself understood as the presentation that constitutes what is actual. Disbelief is an index of discordancy in one or the other of these respects, and these must be distinguished! “The expression can be false,” the statement can be unsuitable; and it can also refer suitably to what is null. The not-being-suitable belongs to mere phantasy and to mere fiction as well as to perception.)

In any event, merely thinking-of is a modification of the same universal sort everywhere, a modification that concerns the doxic character. Whether a mode of belief (or mode of understanding) is already there or not, it can be put out of action and a mere thinking-of can be initiated.

Let us again take the reading (or the making up) of a fairy tale. We have phantasies that we carry out. We perform predicating acts (together with all the acts belonging to them) as modifications of judgment. We perform other acts as well. We sympathize emotionally with the persons in the fairy tale; we rejoice and are sad; we experience fear and pity, and so on.

These are actual affective acts in which we live, with which we actually react. They are modified just as the predications are. They correspond to the predications in which we are actually “adjusted” to what is intuited in phantasy, in which we actually conform to it: not, however, to predications that are merely empty thoughts. Predications can be nongenuine insofar as they are not genuinely explicated acts carried out step by step. We read the fairy tale and have poor intuitions...
or no intuitions at all. In the same way, a feeling, an affective act can affix itself in an unexplicated way, without the full explication that would belong to it if it were “genuine.” (Its nongenuineness will already lie precisely in the fact that genuine intuition is absent.) In other respects, the feeling can be expressed, as when one says: “Unfortunately, the wolf just came, and so on”; or unspoken feelings can make themselves felt in the reading.

**Iconic phantasy**

Other examples: perceptual imagery, specifically, *iconic* imagery. I follow the performances in a stage play, or I contemplate a painting. Here the (pictorially produced) presentations, perceptions, judgments, feelings, etc., exhibited in the image are distinguished from those that are excited and actual in me, the spectator, which is similar to what happens in reproductive phantasy. The exhibiting itself is actual. Just as I carry out the reproductive phantasy, living in it, so I carry out the iconic imagining, the image consciousness, the perceptual image consciousness. Something not present (something that in other circumstances would be intuitive and even be presented in a reproduction or else in perception) is pictorialized and rendered perceptible to the senses for me in the perceptual figment. The figment masks from me the re-presenting (reproductive) presentation, coincides with it; what is re-presented slides into what is present, which turns into what is exhibiting. And again I can live in the carrying out of this exhibiting and consequently in the carrying out of this remarkable sort of re-presentation (of phantasy in the widest sense of all); and I can be conscious or not conscious of what is re-presented as “something I am acquainted with.” The acquaintance can come from the repeated carrying out of the phantasy itself (as in the case of reproductive phantasy, so in the case of *iconic* phantasy: as we do best to say). Another way of being acquainted is to know something that has already been posited as actual at some time, something that has already been perceived, with which we agree in the re-presentation.\[384\]

\[130\] We have three cases, therefore: “Consciousness once again” of something posited earlier, consciousness once again of something not posited earlier, consciousness once again with agreement with what was posited earlier.
I can actually posit what is iconically re-presented. I am conscious of it in an actual mode of belief (certainty, and so on), or this mode is absent (it can be omitted even if it was there). I have mere phantasy (mere iconic phantasy).

In both cases, further position takings can be built up: Thus, on the one hand, I describe the subject of the oil painting. I carry out explications, comparisons, and so on, actual “acts of judgment”—actual acts, though modified, since I precisely have no belief. But I can also judge about the things, human beings, and so on, belonging to iconic phantasy. I can take offense at them, be delighted with them, feel pity and fear, and so on: all of this is modified if it is mere phantasy. These acts, however, are not themselves phantasies.

The image can furnish a picture of actual events, of actual battles and of battles taken to be actual, etc., in an artistically free way; or it can just as well be a mere photograph. And again, it can be a free phantasy. No actual consciousness of reality is awakened at all; I take what is re-presented in the image to be “mere” phantasy. In that case, I do not carry out any position taking at all. It should be remarked that I obviously must not exclude a consciousness of nullity at the beginning. I am conscious of the “image” itself — the image object in which what is not present is re-presented — as null. This consciousness of nullity comes about when I turn toward the image object. Living in the iconic consciousness, I take the image neither as existing nor as nonexisting. I take it (without its becoming an object, of course) only as the exhibiting of something else: I make the latter intuitable in the image, but in no way do I posit, either positively or negatively, what I “mean” there. Every position taking is absent. To be sure, I can turn toward the image object. I can also carry out an act of disbelief, the consciousness of nullity; I can also suspend the latter in turn, and, in spite of the conflict, posit the image object. But this has nothing at all to do with the subject, of which I am conscious in the free iconic exhibiting from the beginning, without taking a position with respect to it.

Hence, even in this form of phantasy (iconic phantasy), we have simple doxic position takings in the form of sympathetic reactions that can be there or not be there; and then, in a higher stage, we have further

131 Inserted later: “in some other way.” — Editor’s note.
sympathetic acts: feelings, and so on. The activity of explication, predication, etc. — the drive of analytic synthesis, an activity that cannot be designated as sympathy but instead runs throughout all intentionalities — intersects with these.\footnote{Appendix D \textit{\textless}i.e., Appendix XLIII\textit{\textgreater}.} \footnote{Cf. below, p. 465. — Editor’s note.}

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\textit{Note.} Elsewhere I have remarked that the following is relevant here.\footnote{Appendix D \textit{\textless}i.e., Appendix XLIII\textit{\textgreater}.} If a feeling — for example, an aesthetic pleasure and the like — is motivated by the phenomenological content of an appearance, then, in a phantasy in which one is reproductively conscious of this appearance, one must be able to be reproductively conscious of the feeling. If the feeling were to accompany it necessarily, then it would also have to be there with it.

But then it is an eidetic law that if the phantasy is actually carried out, an actual feeling of the sort united with it is also motivated: If it was an aesthetic feeling that existed, then it is an aesthetic feeling that exists again now; and such a feeling is not founded in any doxic position taking. Hence it makes its appearance without modification. \footnote{Cf. below, p. 465. — Editor’s note.} If it is an existential feeling — joy, and so on — then, if the phantasy is mere phantasy, the excited joy is, of course, modified.

However, the following is also true universally: If the possibility of certain genuine explications, relations, conceptual comprehensions, of certain expressions, judgments, and so on, is prescribed by a perceptual state of affairs, then the same possibilities also belong to every corresponding phantasy. Of course, that essentially implies the following: A phantasy is possible that phantasies such and such, but an actual — even if modified — explication and predication having the same content is also possible.

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When an aesthetic consciousness is based on an intuition that is characterized doxically, on the perception of nature, and so on, the
feeling there does not have its basis in the doxic position taking: we do not live in the latter when we are comporting ourselves aesthetically. We do not live in the doxic but in the valuing intentions. This is also true in the case of memory.134

5 <h> Aesthetic consciousness <essentially connected with the distinction between the consciousness of an object as such and the object’s manner of appearing. Reflection on the manner of appearing and the aesthetic significance of the content of the object — The positing of something as existent not foundational for aesthetic consciousness — Contemplating nature aesthetically — Affinity of theoretical interest with aesthetic pleasure — Addendum: impressional aesthetic feeling in the case of impressional appearance, reproduced aesthetic feeling in the case of reproduced appearance and the actual aesthetic feeling united with it>

<probably spring, 1912>

Let us consider this more closely: We are living in an aesthetic consciousness. In it we ask no questions about the being and nonbeing of what directly appears or appears in an image. The situation may be anything as far as the being of what is presented is concerned. We can produce aesthetic consciousness on the basis of external perception. We contemplate aesthetically the objects we see or hear. We can produce such a consciousness on the basis of immediate phantasy: We contemplate aesthetically what is phantasied, perhaps quasi-perceived objects and events. Or we comport ourselves aesthetically in the fine arts; we contemplate aesthetically the objectivities exhibiting themselves in an image. Finally, we comport ourselves aesthetically in art that presents symbolically: We contemplate aesthetically objectivities presenting themselves in language or in some other symbolic way.

Depending on the circumstances, the consciousness of the object, the presenting consciousness, is doxic (belief-) consciousness or merely reproductive modification of doxic consciousness, or, more precisely, mere phantasy in the widest sense — mere phantasy: that is, no actual sympathetic (doxic) taking of a position is carried out with respect to (or in combination with) what is phantasied.

134 Cf. the continuation in Ae <i.e., No. 6h>.
We can comport ourselves perceptually, in actual experience. Things stand before us, events run their course, human beings speak to us and among themselves, and so on. We can carry out diverse explications with regard to these experienced objectivities, perform relational, predicating acts, and, in connection with this whole process, extend various position takings to the objects as experienced objects; namely, as objects of which we are conscious as actualities. We rejoice, we are sad, we wish, we harbor hopes, and so on. We can live in memory, in actually experiencing re-presentation. The objectivities stand before us as nonpresent “actualities,” hence are characterized doxically, in the manner peculiar to belief. And we can then carry out further position takings, doing so either straightforwardly or following the performance of explicating acts, relational acts, expressive acts, and so on. But this again in such a way that all position taking and all synthetic acts are directed toward the memorial actualities.

The situation is the same in the case of iconic acts: If I have the picture of a person before my eyes, I can make judgments about her character, about her mind and temperament, about her way of dressing, and so on. I take the picture precisely as the re-presentation of the person; I posit her as someone actual and judge about the actual person. I also judge about the person by means of affective predicates; I comport myself before the person as liking her, disliking her, valuing her ethically, and so on.

Finally, the same things can occur in symbolic presenting and thinking. I hear an assertion about a person: I take the assertion objectively as the truth and condemn the person’s behavior expressed in it, without having had an intuition of the behavior.

Now let us exclude the consciousness of reality: What is in question is pure simple phantasy or pure iconic phantasy or pure symbolic presenting and thinking.

Well, I can then also comport myself purely objectively; namely, I perform all of the acts in a modified way. A man stands before my eyes in phantasy; he kills another man: I react to this by taking a position of abhorrence, and the like. The act, however, is modified. Whether we then carry out the consciousness of actuality, the position taking of belief (in some mode or other), or whether we carry out bare phantasy-consciousness, full and empty phantasy-consciousness: The actual position takings, the synthetic or the simply thetic position takings...
that we thereby carry out on the basis of the one consciousness or the other, are not aesthetic position takings.

The position takings here are objective; they aim at the actually experienced or phantasied objects and remain the same as long as the objects and their objective interconnections remain the same for consciousness.

Depending on the circumstances, however, one is conscious of the same objects in different manners of appearing, different manners of presentation. Whether the object appears in this or that orientation is irrelevant for objective position taking, for the position taking directed toward the object, toward this identical object, “valuing” it. But it is not irrelevant aesthetically. Aesthetic valuation is essentially connected with the distinction between the consciousness of an object as such and the object’s manner of appearing. Every object, in being given in a consciousness, is given in a manner of appearing; and it can then be the manner of appearing that determines aesthetic comportment, one appearance inducing aesthetic pleasure, another inducing aesthetic displeasure, and so on.

The question in the particular case, then, is which manner of appearing is at stake; and this will depend, not on the isolated object, but precisely on the object in the nexus of objects in which one is conscious of it, and the manners of appearing belonging to this nexus. And “manner of appearing” signifies not only the manner of display in the case of external objects and all of the similar differences in the case of other objects, but also differences in clarity and obscurity, in immediacy and mediacy, in the mode of symbolic consciousness as pictorial symbolic consciousness and as nonpictorial symbolic consciousness, in the mode of direct phantasy intuition and of indirect pictorial intuition, and so on.

Now if the cardinal distinction between affective position takings that are thoroughly determined by the manners of appearing and those that are not at all determined by them is fixed, questions arise. First, does this distinction concern only feelings? But then we also have a looking at and positing of the object in its manner of appearing. Does that belong here? Furthermore: We not only have the feelings of aesthetic valuing but also the feelings (or quasi-feelings) awakened in us as “reactions” — fear and pity, and so on — which are co-influenced by the manner of appearing and by the feelings first
determined by this very manner of appearing. In short, there is great diversity here.

But above all there is the question: To what is the aesthetic consciousness directed? To live in it is surely to take a position, to value something aesthetically. If I read a drama, I must at least be turned toward the presented persons, actions, and so on. That certainly. But if I were to comport myself toward them as merely contemplating them and taking a position with regard to them (even if modified), this would precisely be no more than any other phantasy. But the manner of appearing is the bearer of aesthetic feeling-characteristics. If I do not reflect on the manner of appearing, I do not live in the feelings, I do not produce them. The appearance is the appearance of the object; the object is the object in the appearance. From living in the appearing I must go back to the appearance, and vice versa. And then the feeling is awakened: The object, however displeasing it may be in itself, however negatively I may value it, receives an aesthetic coloration because of its manner of appearing; and turning back to the appearance brings the original feeling to life.

But this is still not sufficient. The content of the object itself is not aesthetically insignificant. Whether or not it is an emperor, whether it is an important destiny or one that is commonplace, and so on, is not a matter of indifference. Is it a question in such cases of reminding one of emotional effects (respect, loyalty)? But it is also [a question of] something else: [Think of] every objectivity that motivates existential delight or, as phantasied, quasi-delight. In itself, this delight is not aesthetic. But the aesthetic pleasure, which depends on the manner of appearing, can combine with this delight (understood as something actual), and the whole has the character of an enhanced aesthetic delight. Still life. The fluctuation of actual delights and quasi-delights (in nature: delight in the fruit-bearing trees, delight in the fields, and so on) and sorrows and other actual position takings is again itself a principal part of truly aesthetic delight. Hence this too belongs to the “manner of appearing.” This title includes not only the manner of the presentations but all of the ways in which we are conscious of objectivities, insofar as these different ways ground one’s own particular feelings, one’s own particular position takings, which, thanks to these ways of being conscious, are then feelings about the objectivities.
We have various ways of being conscious in which an object becomes constituted, in which it is given (and quasi-given). And we have positions taken with respect to this given object. But we also have the ways of being conscious and these position takings themselves: For their part, they again determine possible position takings and feelings and other acts belonging to them. And there again position takings with respect to the objects arise, insofar as they appear in this or that manner or are somehow involved in consciousness.

Now what about the aesthetic consciousness with respect to its indifference to being and nonbeing? The portrait serves me as a representation of the person: the description of the person is indifferent to being and nonbeing. The description is the same whether the person is an actual person or an imaginary one. If I do not trouble myself about existence, if I do not carry out the positing of existence, if I do not ask about existence at all, then I live in pure re-presentation (I suspend the immediate position taking of actual belief, or perhaps some position taking opposing actual belief); and I then produce a modified actual description. This in itself is not an aesthetic act. And it is also not correct that aesthetic consciousness is directed toward what appears and what is to be described irrespective of its being and nonbeing; it is rather directed toward what appears in its respective “manner of appearing.” The manner of appearing alone is aesthetic. Now it is irrelevant for this, of course, whether or not I take the person to be an actual person, as I do when it is a question of a portrait in the proper sense. This means that in living in aesthetic consciousness I do not live in the respective positing of existence; the positing of existence does not found the aesthetic consciousness, as it does when it is a question of delight, love, and so forth. Hence the distinction between aesthetic feelings and other feelings is not constituted by the fact that aesthetic feelings are directed toward what is merely presented and the other feelings are directed toward what is taken to be actual.

If I value the consciousness of something actual aesthetically, if, for example, I contemplate nature aesthetically, then nature remains for me this determinate actuality. That I do not live in the actuality consciousness does not mean that I exclude it by shifting into a corresponding “mere presentation.” Rather, it means that I live in feelings
that are determined by nature’s manner of appearing, by this or that way of being conscious of nature. And in looking at these “subjective” modes of givenness, and in the shift from the focus on the object to this reflective focus and vice versa, I am conscious of the feelings as affective determinations of the object itself. It can thus be the case that the belief in actuality is itself aesthetically co-determining. But then the major difference must be noted: Love, delight, and so forth — object feelings (actuality feelings) — aim at objects that are actual; and the belief in existence founds the feeling. The belief in existence is not the object of the feeling; it does not contribute to the primary object of feeling as a determining moment. It is otherwise in the case of aesthetic feelings. There position takings with respect to the objects of feeling can be combined with ways of exhibiting, and the like, into a unity. The manner of appearing pleases; the way consciousness moves within a nexus of contrasting or harmonizing position takings pleases or displeases; and the object belonging to these position takings pleases or displeases only “because of this.” Thus every actuality feeling aims at an appearing object through the appearance, but the situation is totally different in the case of aesthetic feeling, which does not aim through the appearance but aims at it, and aims at the object only “for the sake of the appearance.”

Theoretical interest is related to aesthetic pleasure. The delight in knowledge — in mathematical knowledge, for example, because of the beauty of mathematical relationships, proofs, theories. The following, however, also comes into consideration. I can live in perception, in observation, and so on, as processes of cognizance-taking; and in living in them, the manners of appearing can already have excited their feelings. But I do not live in the aesthetic feeling. If I am in the aesthetic attitude, I do not abandon it when I shift into the consciousness of the actuality of nature, here and there confirming new actualities, and in my continuous glance filling with determinations the indeterminate boundaries of what is seen.

Living in feeling has a double significance. In one sense, it means turning toward: here, in aesthetic feeling, turning toward the manner of appearing, which thereby gains a distinctive mode. In the other sense, it means thematic primacy. If I contemplate nature and progressively take cognizance of it, the aesthetic consciousness can
nevertheless have thematic primacy (even though in the aesthetic consciousness I am not turned toward something in the first sense). The actuality is not the theme of my consciousness, but instead the beauty of its manner of appearing, or the actuality in the beauty of its manner of appearing. The grasping of actuality, the cognizance-taking, is not as such a thematic act. Only insofar as it carries on through the appearance series, which I taste in their aesthetic effect. In this case, the appearance series have a certain distinctiveness together with their feelings, without my constantly having to be turned toward these appearance series attentively and in affective turning toward.

Addendum \( ^{135} \)

Earlier I noted, but then excluded, the following. One could argue: If a feeling is determined by a manner of appearing, by a manner of presentation, for example, then the feeling is there impressionally if I am impressionally conscious of the manner of appearing — if, say, I am perceiving and I am perceptually conscious of the object in the aesthetically pleasing manner of appearing. If I live in a parallel reproduction, the reproduced appearance must also carry the reproduced aesthetic feeling. Now, however, the law holds that I then also experience an actual aesthetic feeling in union with it. I have not only the reproduction of a pleasure in this appearance (in the reproduced appearance), or, respectively, in the phantasy object as thus appearing, but once again an actual aesthetic pleasure in the phantasied object just as it appears in the phantasy.

However, one will say that this aesthetic pleasure is modified and belongs in the series of modified and yet actual feelings that <the> phantasy excites as parallels of feelings that <the> perception, the impression, excites.

But here \( ^{136} \) the situation certainly seems to be different. Aesthetic delight as delight in the phantasied object is modified, insofar as the

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\(^{135}\) Cf. above, p. 457f. — Editor’s note.

\(^{136}\) The text of this paragraph was crossed out by Husserl, perhaps at the time he wrote it down. — Editor’s note.
object appears in the phantasied appearance. But is the phantasy itself
not also something to be implicated in the manner of appearing? And
is not a phantasy, understood as phantasy of something appearing in a
beautiful appearance, something pleasing? This, however, is certainly
no longer aesthetic delight, but actual delight in the phantasy as the
experience of such a content. Does not a modified delight in a phantasy
splendor also pass over into an actual delight, if I take pleasure in this
modified delight? The experiencing of modified delight is itself an
actual pleasure.

<i>Outcome of the investigation up to now: We must distinguish
universally between: 1) actual position takings modified by their
phantasy foundation, and 2) the modification of all position takings
in suppositions (and) in mere thinking-of — Inquiry into how
suppositions stand in relation to other position takings —
Imagination in contrast to actual experience — Guiding thoughts for
going more deeply into these matters: Perception as doxic
act, reproductive doxic acts, completely free phantasy and
the phenomena of agreement and conflict in the unity of an
appearance or in the nexus of intentionalities — Contrast of
a perception with an illusion>

(April 12, 1912)

The outcome of my investigation of April 9, 1912, has lead me to
something new. I must now grant that it has been established that we
must distinguish universally between:

1) The modifications of position-taking acts that move on the
ground of a mere phantasy or of any arbitrarily inventive (also iconic)
phantasy: in the latter case, when the negative position taking remains
out of action. These are actual position takings, but modified by
their phantasy foundation.

2) The modifications that all position takings can undergo in sup-
positions, in mere thinking-of. Supposing has the peculiarity that it
can be established on the ground of actual position taking (modified

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137 But then also in the case of every figment consciousness itself, semblance con-
sciousness of an intuitive sort with the suspension of position taking.
138 Inserted later: “and.” — Editor’s note.
or unmodified), but equally well on the ground (basis) of the carrying
out of pure phantasies, though certainly also of phantasies that are
not pure.\textsuperscript{139} Every supposition that is contained purely in phantasy
(relates to it) is also the modification of a supposition, as in the case of
all acts. But every pure phantasy can be posited in relation to reality.
Assume that this centaur exists, and so on; in that case, I am displacing
the centaur into the nexus of reality. I phantasy [it] into \(\text{the}\) reality
(whether into perceptual reality or into memorial reality). It is a funda-
mental fact that any phantasy whatsoever can be put into any intuition
of reality whatsoever and can be joined to an intuition loaded with conflict. As soon as we have such combinations, relational position
takings, which are then no longer modified position takings, can throw bridges between what is actual and what is phantasied. I can compare
the two, distinguish them. I can value them in relation to one another.
I can also make suppositions about them in relation to one another.

3) We must now explore how suppositions stand in relation to other
position takings. Obviously, suppositions have their own peculiar po-
sition in every class of acts. Supposing, mere thinking-of, is not, in
the specific sense, the taking of a position. I had suppositions in view,
then, when I contrasted axioses and inaxioses.\textsuperscript{140} We see from the
foregoing that the modification the performance of acts undergoes when mere phantasy serves as their substratum affects axioses and
inaxioses\textsuperscript{141} in the same way. And here it must surely be seen that
the essence of mere phantasy\textsuperscript{142} cannot consist in the inaxiosis\textsuperscript{143}
in the sense now clarified. And likewise, that the difference of mere
phantasy from all forms of the reproductive consciousness of reality
(actually experiencing phantasy — phantasy that is not actually expe-
riencing) cannot consist in the supervening of position takings. Every
pure relation of actual position taking to what is merely phantasied

\textsuperscript{139} “though certainly also of phantasies that are not pure” later changed to “moreover,
in relation to [phantasies that are not pure].” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{140} The last sentence was later changed as follows: “(Did I have neutralization in
view, then, when I contrasted axioses and inaxioses??).” Probably at the same time,
Husserl noted in the margin: “Neutrality and supposition must be distinguished.” —
Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{141} “Inaxioses” later changed to “suppositions.” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{142} Inserted later: “and positionless intuition as such.” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{143} “Inaxiosis” later changed to “supposition.” — Editor’s note.
produces modified position taking. We can speak more generally of actually experiencing position taking and position taking that is not actually experiencing, and we can designate the modification in this way. Only provisionally, since there are objections to the expression.

4) Consequently, the question first of all is: What distinguishes, at the lowest level, actual experiencing\textsuperscript{145} from experiencing that is not actual? What kind of modification is it, at the lowest level, that converts a “memory” into a “mere phantasy”? (We are not thinking of possibilities of actual conversion here.)

I reach the result that mere phantasy is an ultimate and altogether original modification. Hence, according to an ideal possibility, such a modification exists for every actually experiencing\textsuperscript{146} act. But as far as I can see, only onesidedly. Actually experiencing acts are either perceptions or acts (position takings or inaxioses) of a higher level based on perceptions. Each such act has its ideal counterpart in a phantasy experience; more distinctly, in an actually experiencing phantasy, in a memory in the broadest sense and with various possible modes. Except that every actually experiencing phantasy has its counterpart in a phantasy that is not actually experiencing. In the case of perceptions, I do not see any possibility of converting actual experience into experience that is not actual.\textsuperscript{148}

Imagination in contrast to actual experience

To be sure, one must note: \textit{A mere phantasy obviously cannot turn into an actually experiencing phantasy through the}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[144] Inserted later above “actually experiencing” and “not actually experiencing”: “positional” and, respectively, “nonpositional.” — Editor’s note.
\item[145] Actual experiencing = positional intuiting, presenting.
\item[146] Inserted later above “actually experiencing”: “positional.” — Editor’s note.
\item[147] “phantasy experience; more distinctly” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
\item[148] Inserted later: “But probably only from ineptitude,” — Editor’s note.
\item[149] Inserted somewhat later: “Let us call every nonactually experiencing act in the sphere of simple intuition pure imagination (hence = pure reproductive imagination + pure perceptual imagination: the first we call phantasy in the sense of mere phantasy).” — Editor’s note.
\item[150] Inserted somewhat later above “phantasy”: “imagination.” — Editor’s note.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
supervention of a position taking. Position takings that supervene on what is phantasied (what is merely phantasied)\(^\text{151}\) — one permits this inadequate expression — again and again give rise only to modified acts, inactually experiencing acts in the wider sense, but never to an actual experiencing. Not even to the simplest actual experiencing belonging, say, to memory. Memory is not mere phantasy + position taking.\(^\text{152}\) Simple actual experiencing — and, more specifically, simple reproductive actual experiencing — is precisely something peculiar, ultimate, simple. The following is likewise something ultimate in the sphere of reproduction: simple “phantasying” as mere phantasying — which as mere phantasying, however, is not a fictional inventing in the sense of a consciousness of nullity — <stands in contrast> to simple actual experiencing. Only if we relate the phantasm to reality, suppose that it is a member of reality, does it turn into a fiction in that sense of nullity. Likewise, a perceptual imagination, an imaginative semblance that has no actual experiential tendency, such as an ordinary image figment, becomes something null only through an act of supposing.\(^\text{153}\)

5) All position takings grounded on position takings that are, without modification, actually experiencing are themselves actually experiencing,\(^\text{154}\) are themselves intentions, are themselves object-constituting; and the actual experiencing is\(^\text{155}\) believing, being certain, deeming possible, deeming likely, and so on. “Belief” is nothing more than actually experiencing intention.\(^\text{156}\)

Along a different line, belonging to every level of actual intention, of actual experiencing in the widest sense, there lies the possibility of explication, collocation, relation, expression, predication, and

\(^{151}\) Inserted somewhat later above “merely phantasied”: “merely imagined.” — Editor’s note.

\(^{152}\) Inserted somewhat later above the last sentence: “Perception [Wahrnehmung] likewise is not pure perception [Perzeption] + position taking.” — Editor’s note.

\(^{153}\) “Actual experience,” however, is not a useful expression for the unmodified acts, for the counterpart to acts of imagination in the widest sense. And “imagination” is questionable as well. Noetic — anoetic.

\(^{154}\) Inserted later: “positional.” — Editor’s note.

\(^{155}\) Inserted later: “implicite.” — Editor’s note.

\(^{156}\) Inserted later: “(Belief as judgment, however, is spontaneous grasping, relating, etc.).” — Editor’s note.
so on. All acts are precisely objectivating acts. On the other hand, objectivation in the specific sense is the spontaneity of the play of graspings, connectings, relatings, and so on, a province of forms spontaneously producing themselves for the acts that have their separate position as intellectual acts.

* * *

Now, however, we must further pursue and deepen our investigation.

**Guiding thoughts.** 1) Perception is a doxic act. What does that mean? There is a unity of “intention,” which is itself a tissue of “intentions.” Let us say, the intentions constituting physical things. These are either intentions that run their course freely, cohering harmoniously in their intentional nexus; or they are intentions that undergo inhibition, conflict. And the conflict can lie within the unity of one appearance (which has an underlying conflicting unity); or it can emerge in the further course of the nexus of perceptions: A revaluation of the earlier perception or apprehension takes place. In memory, it receives the characteristic of disagreement. With this, we already come to memory.

2) Reproductive acts, those that are also “doxic” acts, acts consciously relating to “reality,” are reproductive intentions (an especially significant expression, as it is understood here). Reproductive intentions are not reproduced intentions, of course. All possible occurrences of impression can be reproduced, if occasion should arise. Reproductive intentions, like perceptions, can agree in their interconnection. In the unity of a complex, of an “actually experiencing” phantasy, agreements can occur; and conflicts can ensue in the further course of the reproductions, say, in the series of memories. But internal disagreements can also take place: for example, I phantasy...

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157 Inserted later: “in a certain sense.” — Editor’s note.
158 Inserted later: “(object-constituting).” — Editor’s note.
159 A unity of positional and originally passive intention.
160 Inserted later above “intentions”: “positionalities.” — Editor’s note.
161 Inserted later: “= actually experiencing [intentions].” — Editor’s note.
a centaur in a remembered landscape (which I have traversed today); or I phantasy a person I know from a different context as in the landscape. Hence [there are] analogies with the phantasying of re-presentations or of pure phantasies in actually perceived surroundings, or with cases of figments. Conflict between image object and marble. Further analogous cases: combination of conflicting perceptions, mannequin/human being; or a case that I have considered too little: “double images,” each intended as the actuality of a thing but disagreeing with its background, and so on.

3) Completely free phantasy — harmonious in itself — and also memory entirely harmonious in itself and harmonious with all of the surroundings that “belong” to the intuition as well. The harmonious memory has its temporal surroundings. In continuously bringing the temporal intentions to fulfillment, everything is in agreement. Just as a harmonious perception is in agreement when I redeem the “connections of coexistence.”

But is a mere phantasy — a “free” phantasy — a figment? An actually experiencing phantasy gives the characteristic of familiarity to what is experienced. This characteristic originates from the internal reproduction with its internal nexus. A repeated phantasy also has the characteristic of familiarity. Here, however, the characteristic of familiarity belongs to the phantasy experience; it does not originate from the internal reproduction of the perception of what is phantasied, but from the internal reproduction of the perception of the phantasy.

Hence the centaur that I repeatedly phantasied is familiar in a different sense; properly speaking, it is not the centaur that is familiar, but its “phantasy image.” Again, in a different manner, a mediate characteristic of familiarity characterizes the object of empathic reproduction. Mere phantasy immediately bestows nothing of familiarity on what is phantasied. Mere phantasy is simply not an “intention” but the antithesis [Gegenstück] of intention, quasi-intention (and this must not be confused with the modification of supposing, of inactuality). And it would be noteworthy if this quasi-intention, which is not an actually experiencing intention, were only an antithesis of

162 Inserted later above “not an ‘intention’”: “not positional.” — Editor’s note.
163 “of inactuality” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
the actually experiencing reproduction. This, however, is not the case. Every genuine image, every perceptual image [perzeptives Bild], is a quasi-apprehension and obviously not an intention that has only been suppressed.

* * *

If I contrast a perception with an illusion, the distinction between “existing” and “nonexisting” comes to the fore, and the object-content characterized as “existing” — the “object” and this characteristic itself — simultaneously become prominent. Now what does it mean to say that they become prominent? What does it mean to say that I am now looking at the “object” and now at the existing? What kind of “looking at” is this? It is surely one [type of] consciousness to perceive straightforwardly and to grasp the existing object, the object pure and simple, and another [type of] consciousness to heed the “object” separately and to grasp in it the characteristic of “existing.”

It is natural to say: In looking at the object, I do not perform the act of perceiving but “merely present the object to myself”; this is the modification of belief. But I do, after all, grasp the “object” here. And I grasp the characteristic “existing” or “nonexisting,” etc., belonging to it, and perhaps state: This object is real, this object is not. Hence is it not necessarily granted that a new grasping like the act of perceiving, a new intention, is directed toward the content signified by “object” in quotation marks here — that a “reflection” is directed toward the content, toward the “object,” and that the latter becomes the subject of an axiotic predicate? I can analyze the “object,” what is meant, according to what it contains; but I can also bestow a “value” on it, by means of which all of these explicating judgments undergo valuation.

Or should we say: This grasping is from the beginning thinking-of, the directing of one’s regard merely to the content, while excluding the axiological characteristic? This directing of one’s regard is not an actual grasping, an actual act of perceiving or something analogous to it, but a quasi-grasping, just as all the explications are also quasi-explications, all the predications quasi-predications. And the peculiarity of this quasi is that then the “mark of validity,” or the
mark of invalidity, and so on, can be bestowed on all of that. From
the nonperformance of valuation or from the modified performance
I pass over into the unmodified performance; and in the coinciding,
the modified correlate receives the changed axiological characteristic
— or rather, properly speaking, first receives the axiological charac-
teristic — of “existing,” of “[being] true.”

This is not clear: I perform an act of remembering the content
A: I carry out a positing appearance. I perform an act of merely
presenting the content A; that is, I carry out a nonpositing appearance.
In both cases I am directed toward the content A and carry out the
characterizing positing or quasi-positing. On the other hand, I reflect
by making the A into the object (whereby I carry out an ideating
positing).

<\j) Simple, uninhibited perceiving as the primal doxic phenomenon in the sphere of simple intuitions; here “belief” cannot be converted into mere “thinking-of”; belief as perception in the primitive mode or also as the mode of uninhibited performance in the case of synthetic acts — The immersing of oneself in phantasy in the nexus of the multiplicity of perception as a way to the quasi-conflict of perception — Modal variations of perception itself in the consciousness of the nexus — Difficulty in carrying out the proposed interpretation in the case of phantasies> (April 12, 1912)\n
Simple perceiving does not offer itself as a stratified phenomenon
in which we could separate a phenomenon of position taking and a
phenomenon in which that toward which a position is taken be-
comes constituted. If we contrast perceiving to the consciousness

\footnote{164 “Intention” on these sheets signifies “positionality”! — as opposed to neutrality.}
\footnote{165 Inserted somewhat later: “likewise.” — Editor’s note.}
\footnote{166 Inserted somewhat later: “as, say, in the case of an affective position taking, and certainly in the case of a modalizing position taking. To be sure, if by perceiving we understand the spontaneous \textit{turning toward}, the spontaneous grasping of the object appearing in its mode of being (in “attention”), then naturally we have to distinguish — although not as a combination of two things coming together — the turning toward and the matter of the turning toward, the what of the turning toward, the grasping of being and the matter of the grasping of being.” — Editor’s note.}
belonging to a semblance, or to the consciousness belonging to the wavering, to the vacillating in perception between two apprehensions, or to the deciding in favor of one member of such a conflict of mutually cancelling apprehensions, we say to ourselves: “the same appearance,” of which we are conscious at one time in the mode of unchecked belief, at another time in the mode of doubtfulness, of nullity, and the like. However, we certainly find an essential difference in the manner in which the characteristics occur in these cases. In the case of perception, we do not have a specific distinguishable characteristic as we do in the case of uncertainty, which is “explicated” as a nexus characteristic of a specific sort, or in the case of nullity. In the latter case, something supervenes on the appearance, something that does violence to it, that revalues it, devalues it. The appearance is the same as in the case of perception, and properly speaking still has the character of what is perceptual: only altered, revalued. This is very difficult to express. One can perhaps say that the appearance as presentational appearance of such and such makes an abstract characteristic — the alteration of which can leave the essence unchanged — come to the fore in these oppositions. This abstract characteristic belongs inseparably to the essence of the appearance: except that in certain interconnections of consciousness the characteristic can undergo something — it can be contested, a decision can be made in favor of it or against it, and so on.

If the perceptual apprehension enters into such a nexus and if by chance it undergoes “inhibition” there, then it acquires the modification of its characteristic. But at the same time, something is clearly or obscurely there from which this revaluation or valuation proceeds: The modification is stamped as modification, and stamped as modification that proceeds from this or that “motive.” The perceptual

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167 Inserted somewhat later: “‘an actual thing.’” — Editor’s note.
168 Inserted somewhat later: “(the ‘matter’).” — Editor’s note.
169 Inserted somewhat later: “(positing of actuality, position).” — Editor’s note.
170 Note. The great difficulty here is to take into account, in a clear manner, the distinction between spontaneous position taking and other specific characteristics, which, in a certain way, can already belong to the phenomenon before spontaneity. And, depending on the level of spontaneity, certain other colorations also still remain, even while spontaneity is being carried out. I am already turned toward [something], but I do not take it as certain actuality; I am not entirely sure without explicitly explicating the pro and contra, and so on.
belief within simple perception, on the other hand, is not, for its part, again characterized as proceeding from something, as motivated by something, and even as the modification of something. (Is this not also expressed linguistically such that in simple believing we express judgmentally in a simple way, while [in the case of modifications, etc.] we have special and combined expressions: “is likely,” “is doubtful,” and so on?) In perceiving, something simply appears; it stands before me as existing. This does not mean that something or other motivates it as something meant as existing. In perceptual deeming likely, something stands there as presumably existing, just as it stands there as possibly existing, doubtfully existing. These combined expressions all point to the normal case of simple belief.

It easily becomes apparent that the case of original perception, of the simplest uninhibited perception, is also the fundamental case insofar as every other perceptual consciousness in its nexus presupposes belief consciousness as the ground from which all valuation and revaluation proceeds.

For that reason, we must certainly designate belief as axiosis; it is the primal axiosis to which all the others are related as inhibitions, revaluations, modifications.

The following is also connected with belief’s special position: The apprehension, the appearance, despite all the modifications, does not change its essence: it only changes its axiotic characteristic, which is not something lodged in it but a mode belonging to the apprehension intention.

Now if it is not a question of the case of an original uninhibited belief freely running its course to the end, but instead a question of one of the other cases, then it can perhaps happen that an apprehension that at first was the apprehension of a thing as sausage changes into the apprehension of the thing as marzipan. The apprehension of the thing as “sausage” is “cancelled,” devalued by its apprehension as marzipan, in favor of which I “make my decision.” I can then “suspend” the marzipan apprehension; I disregard it and contemplate the appearing sausage and immerse myself entirely in this apprehension: The “suspending” does not signify merely contemplating the sausage. If I do not suspend the marzipan apprehension, if I keep the marzipan apprehension firmly in mind, then I have the living consciousness of nullity; the sausage is cancelled. And the cancelling is carried out
actively. If, however, I do suspend [the marzipan apprehension], then in a certain sense the cancelling is suspended with it. Hence I have, as it were, the perception of a sausage: as if the counterinstance were not cancelled. But only as it were, of course. For the suspension is not an actual elimination. The cancelling is still there. I act only as if it were not there; I take no notice of it. I therefore carry out a quasi-perceiving, a peculiar consciousness possible in this nexus. I take this as sausage. I do not have an actual act of perceiving; I do not seriously believe. What is annulled remains annulled. But I do think of it. Of course, I can do the same thing when a hesitation between two possibilities presents itself. And this is the case in whatever way the doxic intention may be inhibited by such tendencies. I do not live in the inhibition; on the contrary, I suspend what inhibits and then carry out a modification of the doxic apprehension: a consciousness that is neither belief nor moderated or cancelled belief, but mere thinking-of. In spite of countertendencies, I can decide, under circumstances to be described more precisely, in favor of one side.171

Hence in the case of simple belief, here in the case of an act of simple perceiving, that is impossible.172 I cannot in this sense transform the belief that is not contested.20

But, of course, I can phantasy all kinds of things into the nexus of the perceptual multiplicity, into the nexus of the environment, surroundings, and form a unity of intuition that comprises the given

171 Somewhat later, in connection with the last sentence, the text was supplemented as follows: “Here we must add the following remarks: In spite of countertendencies, I can decide, under circumstances to be described more precisely, in favor of one side. I then believe again. I do not believe simply, but in the mode of deciding in favor of. The countercharacteristic is then suspended in another way. It is devalued, rejected as not valid, not allowed to be an axiological characteristic. We exclude these cases here. It is not supposed to be a favorable decision, a siding-with, and it is not supposed to be a question of the inhibited belief tendencies actually regaining strength by the devaluation of the counterinhibition; on the contrary, the latter remains what it was, without devaluation, without being abandoned. I merely act as if it were not operative. I abstract from it; and entering into what is cancelled, I act as if I were believing: I immerse myself in the belief. I do not believe that what is cancelled is there; I do not consider it to be actually existing. I take it as if it were existing. I merely think of it, merely present it. I can also think to myself: Assuming that the counterinstances do not exist, I cancel them by way of exception.” — Editor’s note.

172 Inserted somewhat later: “what would here be described as mere thinking-of.” — Editor’s note.
perception together with the components, belonging to the perceptual environment, that are phantasied otherwise.173 And in this way the perception, or, correlative, the being of what is perceived or its being thus, its being white paper, and so forth, can be quasi-contested.  

We can surely say that every perception as delimited perception with its own phenomenal content can be interwoven into coherent wholes in such a way that “a mere thinking-of,” a modified perceiving of precisely this content of appearance, is a priori possible. (In any case, this suffices to ground the possibility of predicative thoughts of every sort, which must finally be traced back to simple intuitions.)  

If, however, without regard to differences in clarity, we take an originally uninhibited perception just as it is in the nexus of its surroundings, which are completely harmonious with it, then we cannot convert the “belief” into mere “thinking-of” without changing the material of intuition. Free spontaneity can produce a diversity of things on the basis of the passivity of intuitions or of “presentations.” One such production, in the case of the intermixing and inhibiting of presentations, is the suspending and immersing of oneself, as quasi-believing, in one of the members. Certainly such modifications of belief cannot be established, however, when the presentation material is a single, simple harmony of intuitions.  

In other respects, the expression “taking a position” is not desirable for all of these cases. We are dealing with intuitions and their axiotic characteristics, which are there or are aimed at before all spontaneity.174 Hence let us say axiooses and anaxioses; specifically, doxic axiooses and anaxioses.175  

Simple perception,176 therefore, is really the simplest thing of all. It is the primitive doxic phenomenon in the sphere of simple intuitions; it is not the revalued, devalued phenomenon, the phenomenon depressed in value. And every “value” is either a primitive value or a modified value. Even the modification of the anaxiosis is a modification: only it is precisely no longer an axiosis. That means that it is no longer “valuing” at all, but quasi-valuing.

173 Precisely the same thing is true of simple “memory”.  
174 And is simple belief to be designated as “taking a position” and identified with the crossing out of the remaining characteristics?  
175 The last sentence seems to have been crossed out later.  
176 On the following, cf. Appendix XLVI, p. 543f. — Editor’s note.
Hence, belief here is the primitive mode in the series of phenomena belonging to the “apprehension” that we call the perceptual appearance of a thing, and so forth. Belief is nothing in addition to perception; on the contrary, it is perception in its primitive mode. If we live in a perception that has not been subject to any inhibition, then we perceive; we carry out a perception and with it a belief.

Now if we collect, explicate, and perform relational and expressive acts on the basis of perceptions, and in doing so adhere “faithfully” to the intuitional foundations, then each such total act is again “a belief”; each has the same mode as the perception serving as its basis. And here, too, belief is nothing else than the mode of unhindered performance: Perhaps it has, in addition to itself, analogous acts, which undergo the inhibition of their “intention” in a corresponding way. Each such act, embracing together perceptions in its complex, is one "objectivating consciousness" and at the same time a diverse objectivating consciousness, since the parts also “objectivate.” Generally speaking, to live is to be directed toward the object that becomes constituted; and in the case of the unhindered intention “freely running its course to the end,” the whole formation produced spontaneously here is a synthetic act in the mode of belief, a doxic collecting, relating, predicating, and so on.

But now let us also take the modal variations of perception itself, and let us take the nexus consciousness in which such variations arise. The consciousness of nullity, say. I vacillate between mannequin or human being, and then I see it: a mere mannequin! The mannequin apprehension was inhibited believing, but then the inhibition is “overcome” in the form of a decision; belief is again present in the form of the decision, of the devaluation of what was inhibiting. On the other side, the apprehension “human being” is “cancelled.” Accordingly, we have not only entirely new occurrences, but new “apprehensions” (constituting new objects), although on a higher level. What appears is provided on the one side with the value imprint “null,” on the other side with the imprint of the “yes,” of the “absolutely decided,” of the “this is true and actual,” which it would not have as an object of simple belief. Living in the consciousness of negation and of corresponding positive decision, of affirmation, I am conscious of this new objectivity. And the latter consciousness, too, can be uninhibited
or can undergo inhibition. And so I can again say: Whether this is null becomes doubtful to me or is doubtful, and even the “null” can again undergo its cancellation or affirmation. And this is universally true of modal characteristics of whatever sort. I had just decided in favor of the mannequin. But then I become fixed on some appearing moments that “speak” very powerfully, indeed overwhelmingly, “in favor of” the fact that it is certainly <not> a mannequin. I become uncertain; the “null” becomes unsteady. It becomes doubtful and is perhaps cancelled once again. We have a “double negation.”

And it is certainly connected with this that we have the same modes for the explicating and predicating judgments. First we had simple judgments about a human being, about a mannequin. Then we have judgments with modalities: again certain acts of belief, which include the probable or the possible, the doubtful. And so on. And every transition is mediated because the judgment certainties (the judgments pure and simple) change their modalities as modes of belief. First we judge, and then we become unsettled in our predicating (which is oriented according to the vacillating of the intuition). We carry out the consciousness of nullity; the predicated state of affairs, just as it is predicated there, stands before me as cancelled. We then carry out new explication and predication. We grasp this characteristic by itself, comprehend it under the concept and expression “cancelled”; that is to say, false. And we then say that S is p is false; it is not so. Or it is presumably so, etc.

This is the situation in the case of every kind of intentionality, of every consciousness. Every freshly emerging consciousness that joins a consciousness already carried out and that is founded in it constitutes a new objectivity; that is to say, it is “belief,” or a mode of belief that has arisen through inhibition. This “belief” is not some fundamental class of consciousness, but a universal mode of consciousness. Certain doxic modes and the ideal possibility of exercising certain forms of spontaneity belong to the essence of consciousness.

177 The fact that mere thinking-of is a certain modification (not an alteration) of belief is accordingly perfectly consistent with the fact that a modification in “thinking” belongs to every consciousness. Every consciousness is precisely also belief.

178 Inserted somewhat later: “in the way in which this is true, on the other hand, of judicative belief, grasping belief, relational belief, and so on.” — Editor’s note.
as such. These forms of spontaneity (we mean, of course, collecting, relating, expressing) again do not make up any fundamental classes themselves. On the contrary, they are groups of modes of consciousness that are subject to spontaneous formation but draw their content from the different genuine fundamental determinations of consciousness, from the fundamental forms of intentionality and intentional material.\footnote{The last sentence was changed and supplemented somewhat later as follows: “Certain positional modes and the ideal possibility of exercising certain forms of spontaneity belong to the essence of consciousness as such. These forms of spontaneity again make up different fundamental classes themselves (we mean, of course, on the one hand, judging: grasping, collecting, relating, together with the modalities of judgment; and, on the other hand, affective position takings and volitional position takings and their syntheses). <They > are groups of modes of consciousness that are subject to spontaneous formation but draw their content from the different fundamental determinations of consciousness, from the fundamental sorts of materials belonging to intentionality and to the intentional material.” — Editor’s note.} Therefore these are guiding ideas.

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Something else, however, matters more to us here. Reproduction creates a great difficulty for carrying out the proposed interpretation. We would have no difficulty if we only had to do with memory — memory in the broadest sense, doxic\footnote{“doxic” changed somewhat later to “positional.” — Editor’s note.} reproduction, so to speak. Here all of the occurrences belonging to the perceptual sphere return. In relation to the perceptual intention we have, as its counterpart, the reproductive intention. If the intention is uninhibited, we have memorial belief; if it is inhibited, we have memorial doubt, and so on. Thus far everything would seem to be in order.

But now pure phantasy. Surely when we voluntarily phantasy a phantasy object into a memorial environment, the situation is different from what it is in the case of a perceptual illusion. A perceptual figment\footnote{Inserted somewhat later above: “a perceptual figment”: “an illusionary object.” — Editor’s note.} is always precisely a figment; that is, it is itself something perceived. It is cancelled apprehension intention, but an apprehension
intention nonetheless. If what cancels were suitably modified, the cancellation would cease and there would be an unchecked intention. This is not the case, however, in inventive phantasy. The phantasm, of course, has its conflict with the memory. For example, the imagined centaur, which I phantasy as having encountered me on a familiar street, stands there where nothing stood, covers a portion of the remembered ground, of the remembered roadway, etc., where nothing was covered, and so on. But this conflict is different from the conflict that occurs in memory between two memorial apprehensions: the analogue of the conflict in the perceptual sphere. The inventive phantasy is not in itself an intention. Since it is not an intention, it possesses no modes of “belief”; and it is not itself a mode of belief that would be the mode belonging to memory. When memory conflicts with memory, I can convert one of the memories into a supposed account, a mere thinking-of. I then have the suspension of a counter-tendency and the phantasying: it would have been thus, or would be thus. But this is not a case of pure phantasy in which I have nothing at all to exclude, since from the beginning pure phantasy carries with it nothing of actual intention and counterintention. Naturally, all of the occurrences belonging to possible memory are also occurrences belonging to possible pure phantasy, even the act of supposing. In the case of the mere phantasy, however, everything is modified into something merely phantasied. Now all of this does not mean that the former modification, the modification of mere thinking-of, is something fundamentally different from the phantasy modification. At least both agree in one essential respect. It could be the case that every phantasy is an instance of inaxiosis and yet not every instance of inaxiosis is phantasy. Should one say that . . .

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182 This is true, however, only of illusions, not of normal image objects and objects presented pictorially, which, in a chromatic painting, surely do stand before us perceptually [perzeptiv] and yet are not cancelled. Hence [there are] also no genuine intentions here.
183 Inserted somewhat later above: “intention”: “positionally.” — Editor’s note.
184 Inserted somewhat later “positional:” — Editor’s note.
185 Inserted somewhat later above “mode of belief”: “primitive positional mode.” — Editor’s note.
186 The text breaks off here. — Editor’s note.
Revision of terminology. The distinction between impression and reproduction intersecting with the distinction between any intention whatsoever and its “modification in thought” — Doubts about using the expression “position taking” for every act not modified in thought — Homogeneous, harmonious positings or, respectively, nonpositings, and nonhomogeneous, discordant positings (imagination in memory, memorial objects in imaginary contexts) within the sphere of simple intuitions — The act of supposing not a third thing in addition to positing and nonpositing, but belonging in the realm of positing — The bringing of feelings, desires, volitions into the sphere of intuitiveness>

(April 16, 1912)

Every shift in the interpretation of the structure of intentional experiences unfortunately compels a revision in terminology.

1) We have the distinction between impression and reproduction. Phantasy was said to signify reference to the objects of reproduced intentional experiences. Hence we would have positing and nonpositing phantasy. The former: memory.

2) The distinction between any intention whatsoever and its “modification in thought” intersects with the first distinction. Should I continue to say here: positing — nonpositing? I attempted to use the expression “position taking.” But can one designate as position taking the “positing” that belongs to every single act that is not modified in thought?

ad b) There is surely an essential distinction between the simple perceptual or memorial consciousness in which one is conscious of what appears simply as present being or past being, and the taking of a position toward what appears when it is valued as beautiful and ugly,

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187 I now think that it is better to say “positional” for “positing,” while by “positing” I now understand spontaneous grasping, a phenomenon of judgment.
188 (better, positional).
189 No. a) Position taking understood as spontaneity in the sense of turning toward; b) position taking in a still narrower sense: the taking of a position toward something that already stands before me as existing or as quasi-existing.
190 “ad b)” inserted simultaneously with the marginal comment reproduced as note 189 above. — Editor’s note.
as good and bad, when it pleases or displeases. Wishing, however, is not directed toward the simple being that appears. Nonetheless, it is the taking of a position.

What about the following: What is seen or remembered excites a presumption; or a doubt, a taking to be possible, a questioning gets started in the nexus of what is perceived or reproduced? The doubt is resolved; assent, affirmation of the being or denial of the being ensues. We have different series of occurrences here:

1) the simple consciousness of being, in simple agreement;

2) the occurrence of disagreement, or the different types of such occurrences. The intentions with respect to one side have the characteristic of being disputed, of being inhibited by counterintentions.

The one side can have the characteristic of being disputed, but at the same time have the characteristic of agreement with the complex of undisputed nexus intentions and the characteristic of inclining in favor of it and agreeing with it. Hence the intentional complex divides into the complex of disputed intentions and the surrounding complex of undisputed intentions; and the former receives a new characteristic, that of “inclining in favor of it,” “speaking in favor of it,” which the other side lacks, indeed, which perhaps speaks against it. It can also be the case that both sides have their properties that speak in favor of them, and so on, from the surrounding intentions. [411]

We therefore have different characteristics — of affirmed actuality, of nullity, of possibilities (uncertainties) standing on the same footing.

Is this not something new: I decide in favor of one side; I side with it, I accept it affirmatively; I reject it negatively; I accept one side as carrying the greatest weight, as probable, and so on? Obviously.

And what about these characteristics and possible “position takings” — do they stand on the same footing? Do they share in the same generic essence of “position taking” as the “position takings” of joy or sorrow? But this seems to lie in an entirely different direction.

3) Every intentional experience that, taken as a whole, is not modified in thought is positing or destined for positing (it is precisely intention in the unmodified sense). This positing — this is what is bad about the term — is not a doing; it is a fundamental characteristic. To carry out an intentional experience in this case is to carry out
a positing and to be turned toward "what is posited." And that means that in each such consciousness we are conscious of an "object" in the mode of "belief" as existing, and the existing is a universal characteristic of the object.191

But then we have different levels.

In simple intuitive positing (in simple belief),192 whether it be in perception or memory, some real thing or other is there "in its mode of being"; and that says that it is something that is posited simply.193 We also speak of the simple characteristic of being. This characteristic (the characteristic of positedness194) becomes prominent by being contrasted with cases of nonpositing,195 with cases of intuitive phantasy understood as simple quasi-perception, or with cases of genuine image-consciousness (including cases of imagination in the widest sense, when we separate the word from reproduction and

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191 The text from "Obviously" (p. 483, 28) to "characteristic of the object" was changed and supplemented somewhat later as follows: "Obviously. This is judicative position taking. And what about the former characteristics and the latter 'position takings'—do they stand on the same footing? Obviously we have to distinguish them. Furthermore, do the latter share in the same generic essence of 'position taking' as the 'position takings' of joy or sorrow? Obviously in one sense they do. On the other hand, the affective or volitional taking of a position seems to lie in an entirely different direction from a comportment directed toward things. Hence it is necessary above all to avoid the common term.

3) Every intentional experience that, taken as a whole, is not modified in thought is positional, positing or destined for positing (it is precisely intention in the unmodified sense). This characteristic of positional positing is not a doing; it is a fundamental characteristic. To carry out an intentional experience in this case is to carry out a positional consciousness, but not to be turned toward 'what is posited.' And that means that in each such consciousness we are conscious of an 'object' in the mode of patent or latent 'belief' as existing, and the existing is a universal characteristic of the object. But this is certainly open to misinterpretation. The positional characteristic is not a position taking characteristic. However, I can be turned toward something only in a position taking, which is either judicative position taking (grasping, relating, and so on) or some other position taking. Positional properly signifies the characteristic that makes possible the simple positing that grasps its object (primitive doxic position taking). Active positing is always the grasping of something characterized as actual."

— Editor's note.

192 Inserted somewhat later: "= position taking that grasps what is intuited." — Editor's note.

193 Inserted somewhat later: "in judicative position taking, in grasping." — Editor's note.

194 "positedness" later changed to "positionality." — Editor's note.

195 Inserted later above "nonpositing"; "nonpositionality." — Editor's note.
This Grecian landscape in which I am immersing myself visually surely stands before me differently from these books on my desk, which I have before my eyes in genuine perceiving as real things. And in this contrast the existing that belongs to simple positedness is distinguished from the *quasi*-existing that belongs to nonpositedness. Both are tints infusing the total phenomenon and obviously not characteristics supervening on something that could at first exist just as it is without these characteristics. Now let us take the case of positing. If, however, disagreements then occur and the harmonious intentional nexus is converted into a discordant one, then in a way multiple characteristics arise: The object appears as possibly existing, as actually existing (indeed, [as] actual), as not existing, and so on. Likewise, it can be the case that I have grounds for believing that this painted landscape is something real. I do not then “see” it immediately in the mode of reality; rather, a new characteristic joins others already there from the indirect connections with which the imaginative consciousness is interwoven. This is to be understood as follows. What is imagined is characterized as *quasi*-existing and keeps this characteristic. But imagination can enter into unity with other experiences, forming the unity of one intentional experience. This is the case above all in the form of the possible combination of perceptions or memories with imaginings to form the unity of a mixed intuition: I phantasy something, let us say, into a memorial or perceptual environment; I imagine it there. In itself, it is and remains something imagined; in itself, it does not lay claim to be anything more: Indeed, its claims are only *quasi*-claims. Hence, properly speaking, they are not claims at all. In this nexus, however, it has undergone a certain modification; it turns into a *supposition*. If an “image” hovers before

196 We still have not straightened things out here. Do I not have two very different things, the grasping and, on the other side, the double mode of belief and quasi-belief? I grasp something actual, I grasp something fictional.

197 Seemingly we have the phenomenon, and then a supervening positing as something attached. Looked at more closely, however, at one time we have the apprehension of the object without carrying it out; at the other time [we have it] in the manner of the emerging carrying out. And in that case, we grasp and posit what exists as existing by following up the agreement and bringing about the “it agrees,” which refers to the internally harmonious carrying out. In the carrying out, what is confused and sensuous changes into something given, and in the transition to fulfillment undergoes assent, grasping in the “it agrees,” position taking.
me while I am looking at a physical thing, the image does not for that reason have any unity with the perceptions, even if it does appear “before me.” Just as a painted image — the painted landscape — properly speaking has no unity with the things outside its frame. But I can also “see it in such a way” that it does have a unity. That is, I take it as having a unity. What I am conscious of in phantasy or in imagination of whatever kind is supposed, is taken to be existing there in the midst [of what is perceived]; and this is a certain actual carrying out that phenomenally bestows a valuing characteristic, so to speak, on what is imagined: It becomes a kind of “intention,” which is then immediately attacked by the harmonious positing intentions and furnished with the characteristic of cancellation, of the not. But it can also be the case that I have a very indefinite memory that constrains me only with regard to certain general moments, which alone have the characteristic of definite positing. For example, I remember a human being: The color of the person’s hair is indefinite, and in that case I can present it arbitrarily as blond or black. Each of these suppositions is possible, then, except that the possibilities are empty ones. The situation immediately changes if I become conscious of “grounds” for one of the possibilities or the other. These then furnish new secondary characteristics, new characteristics of valuation.

If we exclude the pure nonpositings and their combinations, since everything that the sphere of positing can offer is repeated in the latter sphere in the modification of nonpositing, then, as we see, ever new occurrences, which obviously can also be modified on the higher level, arise in the sphere of intuitions, of passive intuitions before all spontaneity. And all of these occurrences have something in common. “Something appears” again and again, something is posited again and again. This must be made more distinct. If simple harmonious positing undergoes cancellation, a “positing” of the altered content is there in turn (a possible positing); a nonbeing “appears.” “It appears” means here: it is not “something posited,” but positable. The original positedness is modified, cancelled. The cancellation, however, is again something that can be seen; and what is cancelled is again “something existing,” something characterized as existing: I can

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198 Inserted somewhat later: “The position taking is then a rejection.” — Editor’s note.
199 Probably inserted somewhat later: “something positional.” — Editor’s note.
look at it. Likewise the intuitive supposition (the placing of a phan-
tasy or phantasy modification within a memory) is either uninhibited
possibility or cancelled possibility, or specially favored possibility
(likelihood), and so forth. This is again something posited.\footnote{200}

Each positing has the property that it can undergo the same possi-
bable modifications through motives deriving from its nexus. By means
of such modifications, therefore, new posittings on a higher level arise
along with the changed substrate of positing. And all of this can then
be transcribed, so to speak, into nonpositing. Consequently, the ab-

\footnote{200 Inserted somewhat later: “characterized positionally.” — Editor’s note.}

\footnote{201 Positing = positionality. Hence either actualized or actualizable. To actualize is
to shift into the mode of living, and this brings along with it a constant “it agrees.” In
this process, one is conscious of something identical as something that agrees, that
exists; and this actualizing is the positing of existence, the grasping of existence, the
lowest doxic positive “position taking.” If, in the process of coming closer, I meet
with disagreement in such a way that I violate positive position taking, then I reject
[positive position taking]: [and this is] the lowest negative position taking. And so
it is in different degrees of genuineness. Turning toward in belief, believing position
taking, is at least the beginning of such actualization or de-actualization.}
and positings in the midst of harmonious imaginings (objects of memory set into complexes of imagination), in fact, united with them. The positings (or, respectively, the nonpositings) thereby undergo certain modifications. The nonpositings penetrating into the memory and united with it into a single intuition receive the characteristic of a supposition, which makes them into a sort of “intention.” The positings set into phantasy undergo the characteristic of being depreciated; they are experienced as something imagined.

Furthermore, nonhomogeneous, promiscuous positings and unity formations (discordant formations) of positings with positings, by means of which, through positings of a simple kind, modified positings are again cancelled, and so on. And unity formations of nonpositings with nonpositings, finally of mixed positings whose nature is such that inhibiting characteristics, whether actual or nonpositing, arise.

Here we must note the following.

Every supposition of an object of imagination in posited surroundings, every supposition that can be inserted into the posited surroundings without conflict — in short, every supposition “that can freely run its course to the end” (precisely, every supposition that is not contested) — is itself once again a “believing,” a positing; namely, such supposing is identical with what we also designate as taking-to-be-possible. Possibility = conceivability; and the thinking-of — that is, this supposing, this being-able-to-think-of — is the uncontested supposing, the uninhibited supposing. And in this case we disregard all other intentional characteristics that could accrue to what is supposed (neglecting what conflicts with it). Hence supposing in this sense of an uncontested unity of intuition formed from positing and nonpositing intuitions is obviously not a third thing, something enjoying equal standing with positing and nonpositing. On the contrary, it belongs in the realm of positing. The formation produced is again an “act” (which is precisely positing) constitutive of a new objectivity called “possibility of a WPh” (the possibility, say, that on the back of this table there is a blemish that I know nothing about but that I “can represent” to myself), and so on. This possibility is different from nonexistentual possibility: Whatever I can phantasy is possible in and of itself. There lies in the possibility here the not-being-contested by

202 Inserted later: “often.” — Editor’s note.
the component belonging to the positing, the being-in-harmony in the mixed intuition.

Just as one must take the unity of the mixed intuition as a new form of intuition in which one is conscious of a new objectivity, so one must take the unity of an intuition in which there is conflict: It is not unity in the sense of agreement, but unity in the sense of disagreement; and disagreement again has its object, depending on the type of this unity. For example, one of two is possible: A or B. Or A non-B becomes constituted, the A together with the cancelled B. And so on. Here we must distinguish what is a matter of simple, unexplicated intuition from what is a matter of explication, etc.; and again, we must distinguish what is a matter of intuitive consciousness independently of the “direction of attention” from what is a matter precisely of this direction. Here we have to do with intentional complexes; and, depending on the circumstances, we can “direct our rays of attention through these or those parts [of the complex]”: which at bottom, however, is a poor image. According to circumstances, we can actively carry out the intentions in question and execute the transitions, and at the same time carry out the intentional revaluations belonging to a higher level, by means of which the simple positings (positing turnings-toward, when we expressly perform them and keep them in effect) perhaps turn into cancelled positings. In which case, if we carry out the cancelling, we have with it precisely the positional consciousness of the cancelled object, the consciousness of the object as null, and so on.203

When we grasp the doubtfulness or nullity, when we live in the doubting or negating, <obviously> a separate positing, a separate act, does not occur; on the contrary, living in the doubting or negating is the consciousness of what is null as null. I do not have to “establish” a separate “believing” on the basis of the negating or doubting. The belief is always there; I do have to produce it:204 but that is to say

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203 Inserted somewhat later: “To carry out cancelling is to be directed toward what appears as rejecting it; this is a negating position taking. However, it constitutes a new objectivity. The negating position taking itself is again a positional consciousness; I can exercise positing, I can grasp what is null as null.” — Editor’s note.

204 The text of the paragraph up to the colon was later changed as follows: “Hence when we grasp the doubtfulness or nullity as objects, a separate positing, a separate grasping act, does indeed occur; this, however, is not to live in the doubting or
that I “pay attention to” the characteristic of nullity, or to the whole unexplicated phenomenon with this characteristic. For in order to make the characteristic stand out by itself, an explication is required. I do not have to “reflect” on the “negating” (on an act-characteristic, on my negating, for example, whatever that may mean). Rather, the object of which I am conscious there does not stand before me simply, but as cancelled, and I look at the cancellation.

Hence we have before us ever new levels of “intuitions” and “intuited” objectivities. Everything takes place in the sphere of “clarity”; everything is seen. If we start from simple sensuous intuitions, from intuitions of physical things, for example, their simplicity lies in the homogeneous, undivided harmony of intentional components “blended” into one another. And when we live in the particular complex in question, an object, a thing standing out from a background of things, appears in this homogenous harmony, is posited and intuited. On higher levels, the objectivity changes. It is not a “factually existing thing,” but a nonexisting, though appearing, thing. And a nonexisting thing is itself again an appearing thing on the second level and an intuited, posited thing. Characterizations belonging to a new level, “modes,” modal variations of primal characteristics enter, and they become objective: namely, when we live in the acts in question; that is, in the posittings. Hence these are not sensuous negating. Living in them is the consciousness of nullity in the manner of rejecting, but not in the manner of the positive positing of the “not.” If I want to have the “not,” the doubtful, as my object, I have to “establish” a separate “believing” as position-taking believing on the basis of the negating or doubting. On the other hand, the belief is always there as the possibility of producing it.” — Editor’s note.

205 Inserted somewhat later: “(in the case of the spontaneity of grasping and explicating).” — Editor’s note.
206 Inserted somewhat later: “when, instead of carrying out the negating rejection, we turn ourselves in a positive way toward the negativum. What does it mean to say that every new position taking, every negating, and so on, constitutes new objectivity? According to the way in which it is originally carried out, it is itself an intention, a positionality, from which the new objectivity can be obtained by positing in a positive manner. This intention, however, can also confront us from the beginning as a set of states. Then we can do something double: We can carry out negation or we can carry out the positing of the negativity.” — Editor’s note.
207 From “namely” to “live” changed somewhat later to: “namely, not when we live in the acts in question, but in the potential posittings that are generated along with them.” — Editor’s note.
intuitions but complexes that are themselves intuitions acquired by means of transformations from sensuous intuitions: “Categorial” intuitions — is that an appropriate term? Should we say “modalized” intuitions or “modal” intuitions?\footnote{The last sentence was replaced somewhat later by the following: “They are intuitions produced, generated, by a new position taking.” — Editor’s note.}

5  Now we must take something new into consideration: explicating; synthesizing; perhaps collecting; relating; and, in addition, bringing different things under ideas: subsuming; and bringing to ideas: expressing.\footnote{= apophantic syntheses and forms.} In the cases of collecting, relating, and so on, it is a question of spontaneous forms (in the case of expressing, one cannot very well speak of spontaneity). And these are once more constitutive of objects; they are positings of a higher level, synthetic positings, which then, like all positings, again have modal variations, which again make possible for the objects of these new positings synthetic formations of the same forms, and so on.

10  Up to now we have taken our start from multiplicities of objectiv- ities, systematically comprehensible multiplicities, or, correlativey, from the acts, positings, intentions “constituting” them, which have the material of their original formation in simple sensuous intuitions.

15  To begin with, we disregard the further variations that result when we leave the sphere of “clarity” and cross over into the sphere of confusion.\footnote{“confusion” changed somewhat later to “obscurity, emptiness.” — Editor’s note.} Let us remain in the sphere of clarity, then; that is, in the sphere of intuitability and intuition in an ever more expansive sense. We take either original positings (unmodalized positings) or modalized positings. In doing so, we first of all exclude apophantic syntheses and expressions, which follow the positings. Instead of these, we introduce feelings, desires, volitions.

20  Something perceived pleases or displeases; something not perceived intuitively but supposed as changing in a determinate way stands before us as something that “would” be pleasing, delightful. Its actualness is missing; it is something reached for, desired, and so on. We must first state generally: When a feeling is grounded on a positing, let us say on a perceptual or memorial positing of a
sensuous kind (though what is said holds true universally), a new object becomes constituted along with the feeling, which is similar to what happens in the case of the modal variations of positing. But that is to say: to perform the act of feeling is to posit; specifically, to posit a new object: the posited object as affective object. More distinctly: To carry out the thing intention is to posit the thing. This is the first positing. The feeling — namely, the pleasure, the delight in the object — creates a new intention based on the thing intention, and to carry out this intention in union with the underlying apprehension intention is to be conscious of the actual object in its delightful and to posit this whole complex. Here we have two components of attention, since we have two positings, two turnings toward, one aiming at the object (the matter in question), the other at the “affective value.” But this is not perchance an explication; the duality is a unity, since the directedness toward the value is directedness toward the value of the object. The attention to the value also requires attention to the thing itself: but ancillary attention. In any case, however, I cannot be identically attentive to both, when, as usual, several intentional turnings toward are present: How attendings-to stand in relation to one another, alternate with one another, conflict with one another is a study in its own right.

The “belief” in the being of the value is obviously not a “new act” that is freshly established on this foundation. On the contrary, here as everywhere it is the “living” in the act, in the intention in question; it is the being-turned-toward something in the act.

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211 The last sentence was changed somewhat later as follows: “But that is to say: to perform the act of feeling is to produce a new positional experience and the possible positing of a new object: the affective object.” — Editor’s note.
212 Creates [an intention] — but is not one. The awakened pleasure is not an “intention,” is not a “presentation” of a higher level, but produces one, turns into one.
213 The last sentence was changed somewhat later and the text supplemented as follows: “The ‘belief’ in the being of the value is a ‘new act’ that is freshly established on this foundation; as everywhere, it is not being-turned-toward something in the act of new position taking. We can also express it as follows: Every position taking that has its basis in a presenting produces a new presenting. Feelings are not presentations, are not intuitions or nonintuitive presentations, but living productions of presentations, which, ‘after’ they are generated, hence in a species of reflection, can be treated as presentations. But what does that mean? Does it not mean that, essentially, every position taking can be executed as presenting? To be turned toward in pleasure is not to present. But the pleasure ‘bestows’ on the object the value of
If, instead of thinking of the substratum made up of positing, hence of unmodified, intentions, we think of the (nonpositing) modifications of “imagination,” then all modal variations, as well as all the other founded intentions such as feelings, are subject to the signature of “imagination.” Just as thing intuitions are certainly thing intuitions whether they are positing or not, so feelings, and more precisely the “feeling intuitions” of which we are speaking here, are certainly feeling intuitions whether positing or not. They are obviously not phantasied feelings. Of course, there are phantasied feelings too, but reproductions or nonpositing phantasies of feeling are something different from nonpositing feelings themselves. They are an “intuiting” of delightfulness, and so on, but not an “actually” being delighted or being sad. Or there is an intuiting of being desired, but not an actual being desired.

Naturally, we must distinguish this nonpositing wishing, and so on, from wishing in image. I see someone angry, wishing, etc., in reality. I can also see someone wishing in image. This positing empathizing in <the> wishing has its counterpart in the nonpositing [empathizing] belonging to the image. On the other hand, the making of a wish itself, as positing wishing, has its counterpart in the nonpositing wishing.[421]

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I do not know whether what I said on the margin of the previous page <i.e., p. 492, note 213> takes us further in any important way. What are intuitions prior to grasping, prior to turning toward what is intuited? Precisely not intuitions. Should we say potential intuitions that can be actualized? And if that happens, do we then have determinate doxic acts of the lowest level that contain no position takings except perhaps doxic ones, and in the simplest case mere turnings toward, mere grasplings?

what is pleasing — and does so necessarily — in such a way that I can live in this presenting.” — Editor’s note.

214 And this is not simply wishing in image.

215 Husserl later noted: “Cf. MA.” This indication probably refers to the text printed in the present volume as Appendix XLVIII. — Editor’s note.
Now what about position-taking acts, even doubts, the resolutions of the doubts, and so on, and then affective acts (disliking, delighting in), acts of desire and acts of volition? If they are based on simple intuitions (unmodified or modified intuitions: phantasies), they are “intuitions of a higher level,” categorial intuitions, or better: value intuitions. Why do we resist accepting this? Well, naturally, these are not doxic turnings toward. Rather, I must first take another position, and then, on the basis of any position taking whatsoever (which is suitably founded), I can establish an intuition. And universally in the case of any position taking whatsoever, I can establish a presentation in the sense of an objectivation or a judgment. Now obviously every intentional experience that is not an objectivating experience, an experience of the understanding, stands on the same footing; and this includes the sensuous consciousness along with any position-taking consciousness whatsoever: Every one of them can become the substrate of objectivations. Hence we may not say that the sensuous apprehending itself is a presenting or judging, that it undergoes its accomplishment only in objectivation, that it is already a presenting, though not carried out. On the contrary, this carrying out is that which effects objectivation and is a universal mode to which every experience is subject. Otherwise we would have to say that every intentional experience — every desiring, for example — is only a presenting that is not carried out. Hence we have as fundamental distinctions between classes: sensuousness (passivity) and the series of spontaneous activities. Sensuousness as well as understanding and reason are all “apprehensions,” are all positionalities, intentionalities.
Position takings\(^1\) (whether carried out or not carried out, whether actual or inactual in that sense) are either *impressional*, if they belong to the composition of the “lived” [erlebt] experience, the “actual” experience, or *reproductive*, if they belong to the composition of an experience reproduced in this lived experience. Instead of “impressional,” therefore, I can say “lived” position taking or “actual” position taking. If a position taking is reproduced, then, in the experience of the reproduction, a lived position taking with the same sense or not with the same sense, perhaps rejecting it, and so on, can be combined with the reproduction of the position taking.

We use the term “actual” for the object of lived position takings with respect to their positional characteristics. Hence the object of a lived believing is something actually believed, the object of a lived judging something actually judged; likewise, we speak of what is actually wished for, inquired into, and so on.

For the object of reproduced believing, wishing, etc., we use the expression “it hovers before us” as believed, wished for, and so on. (Believed “in the” reproduction, but not actually believed, etc.)

We say of the object of an actual position taking that it is valued as actually existing, as actually conditioned in such and such a way, as actually present, as actually pleasing, and so on.

We say of the object of a reproductive position taking that we are conscious of it reproductively (in the manner peculiar to phantasy, “in” phantasy) as existing, etc.

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\(^1\)“Position takings” later crossed out with a wavy line and annotated as follows: “What is called position taking.” — Editor’s note.
I remember that I intended to go on an excursion tomorrow. I take up the intention. Perhaps the memory immediately emerges in a form such that not only the intending is remembered but that the actually positing “I intend” is there as well. The two are not precisely the same: in content. For “tomorrow” was not tomorrow in the act of memory, but, let us say, “the day after tomorrow.” And the I of the “I intend” is indeed personally the same I in both cases, though precisely the I of yesterday and the I of today.

* * *

Memory
a) Characterization of internal memory
b) and characterization through the later nexus

I remember the scene at the waxworks in Berlin: How startled I was when the all-too-amiable “lady” on the staircase beckoned to me. But how, after somewhat regaining my composure, I suddenly recognized that this was a mannequin calculated to deceive me.
At present, while I am telling this, I have a clear memory. The reproduction is actually positing; namely, what is reproduced is posited. I am turned toward what is reproduced: I “carry out” this reproduction of the lady. And the “lady” has the characteristic “remembered,” as does the whole spatio-temporal physical situation: whether I had convinced myself afterwards that it was or was not an illusion, or whether I am now taking one position or another. What kind of characteristic is this “remembered”?

Now, I can certainly reflect in memory. I find the reproduced positing and appearance, and these are characterized as having been. I am seeing again, as it were. The temporal process elapses, and I meet with the appearing and the positing as if they were given. And the process has the characteristic of positing reproduction: What is now and what is earlier, belonging to “internal consciousness,” is something actual, understood precisely as the correlate of positing reproduction. Now what about the “lady” herself? She, too, certainly has the characteristic of being “remembered,” and this I find without first reflecting.

Here we can only say: Because the reproduction of the perception of the lady is unmodified [and] has the characteristic of positing, in the performing of the reproduction the “lady” herself is endowed with the characteristic of actuality, which is precisely the correlate of such positing.

Every actually positing reproduction confers on the object toward which it is turned a determinate characteristic that belongs essentially to the nature of actually positing reproduction, and belongs to it in a way in which it obviously cannot belong to other reproductions. This characteristic, however, is not the characteristic of actuality with respect to the object. The appearance of the lady, as reflection on it shows, is characterized as “actual”; that is to say, it is characterized as “actual” in quotation marks and at the same time characterized as actually reproduced, as remembered. But the reproduction of the appearance of the lady or of the perception of the lady, which, as carried out, is consciousness in the sense of the re-presenting presentation of the lady, can in addition have a new mode, the mode belonging to the actual positing of this presented woman as really having existed. Where does this mode originate? The one actuality of positing belongs to internal consciousness. We originally have the impression, the internal impressional consciousness of the experience that we call
external perception, to which sensation contents, apprehensions, the actual appearances belong. If I am now having a reproduction of this, the reproduction is an actual experience belonging to actual internal consciousness. And in performing this reproduction I have the actuality belonging to the different reproductive intentions, to those that yield the reproductive appearance (with the reproductive perceptual characteristic), as well as to those that relate to the surroundings, to the spatial, temporal, physical surroundings and their content. All of this, however, as belonging to internal consciousness.

On the other hand, we have the intentions belonging to external consciousness in internal consciousness. Let us attempt to become clear about these.

I now have, impressionally, a perceptual intention. I have the actuality of internal positing. The perceptual appearance is impressional; the internal consciousness of the having of the appearance is consciousness that actually posits. The perception, which is itself positing and appearance of, is actually posited there.

Here, in the flow of the consciousness of internal time, perception succeeds perception, fulfillment and disappointment follow; and whatever may come about in this consciousness is always internally posited. And it is itself positing, positing in different modes. In memory we can investigate this nexus. Everything is reproduced there. I have the series of internal reproductions, and each reproduction that is singled out has the characteristic of positing reproduction, which, however, according to its essence, points forward and backward to the connections in which the intentions aimed at the surroundings would be fulfilled. And then perhaps reproductions of ever new perceptions would make their appearance, but also reproductions of the disappointments of these perceptions, thanks to which the earlier perceptions would turn out to be illusory, and so on.

Assume that the latter is the case. Then, in the renewed reproduction, in the going back to the perceptual intention in memory, the intention acquires the characteristic of false perceptual intention, of annulled perceptual intention. It itself remains characterized as an actuality belonging to internal consciousness: The perceiving did exist, but the perceiving — in other words, its position taking — has proven to be invalid. It has undergone annulment in the wider nexus of experience. And if I proceed right into the now, the annulment remains
undisputed, not perchance invalidated in turn; and this is the way it remains. The perceiving posits something as actual, and the actual is annulled. It is inactual.

As far as the internal reproducing is concerned, however, it can also be the case that in going forward or going backward in the nexus of memory, I meet with the fact that what is internally reproduced, the perception that I had posited as remembered, did not thus exist; that not this appearance but a different one existed; indeed, that the whole complex did not exist.

(But are there examples of this? Let us say that I had a coherent dream. I remember the whole coherent complex. But in that case, as far as the appearances are concerned, the whole complex is actually remembered. Except that the whole objectivity is “nothing,” as becomes apparent by going back into the surrounding nexus.

How is the invalidity of a memory supposed to show itself, if not in the nexus of memories and perceptions? And can disappointment occur there without a basis? I have a false memory; I believed that this did exist at that time, that this did exist at one time in my life: Hence I have a given memory, and a conflict given with my life. Now here it can be the case that a formation produced in memory did not exist at all, cannot be made to fit into the nexus.)

We have two kinds of nexuses of intentions and fulfillments: 1) those in internal consciousness, 2) those in external consciousness.

A reproduction can be annulled as positing reproduction.

a) Internal reproduction — and taken in full concreteness every reproduction is also internal reproduction: external phantasy is at the same time a component of an internal reproduction.

The positing belonging to internal memory can be annulled in the nexus of internal memory leading up to the actual now of perception: of my perception. Perhaps nexuses of empathy can also play their part. I arrive through testimony at the conviction that I have never actually experienced this, although I do have the memory: The memorial characteristic is then stamped “deception.”

b) External reproduction: I am actually seeing the thing, the event. (The memory of the seeing is not challenged.) But the seeing itself was deceptive. The unity of the object does not carry itself on to the end in the nexus of external reproductions and of external positing
intuitions of any other sort. The external reproduction — that is, the external perception [Wahrnehmung, “true-taking”] that is intended reproductively and intended as “remembered” — was a “false-taking” [Falschnehmung]. The object becomes characterized as “null,” but in itself it stands before me as perceived and has its “actuality,” though precisely this actuality is cancelled.

I spoke of annulment, which means that positing did exist there but is cancelled; it receives the characteristic of the not. It has, accordingly, a double characteristic: an original characteristic, the characteristic of memory, and the critical characteristic, the characteristic of cancellation. The characteristic of the null does not need to be simple either. Perhaps an image emerges from memory as a “memorial image.” It suggests itself as possibly having been “actual,” but conflicts with what was remembered first. And then the latter appears as “somewhat doubtful,” as “challenged.” This again is a critical characteristic.

Now what does the primitive characteristic look like? Something is “remembered” in the mode of certainty, but it can also be remembered and stand before me from the outset as something deemed possible: It suggests itself as possibly having been, as remembered. But it does not stand before me firmly and certainly. And then one could immediately go further and say: Without the reinforcement of new memories it stands before me as doubtful or null, or shifts from certainty into doubtfulness and nullity. But are theses not precisely critical characteristics that depend on the co-awakening of obscure memories belonging to a wider circle?

We must also note that different aspects of one and the same appearance comport themselves differently: one bears (in analysis) the characteristic of being remembered simply and with certainty; another bears the characteristic of being deemed possible, but not the characteristic of being remembered with certainty. Perhaps the latter characteristic in its qualitative determinacy does not have the characteristic of being remembered at all; it is stopgap — it fills out the frame as mere possibility, as one of the things deemed possible, in addition to which other possibilities remain open. Perhaps one such possibility suggests itself with particular force. Overwhelmingly so in relation to parallel possibilities. Or perhaps a cancelling of just this characteristic occurs. What are the characteristics of the whole complex, then?
The whole is purely remembered with absolute certainty. Or it is remembered, but clouded by all kinds of things suggesting themselves as possibilities. Or the whole complex is remembered, but at some points cancelled.

Perhaps I simply have the consciousness that belongs to memory; an image hovers before me. And now a going forward in the memorial nexus occurs and then a going back to the old: let us say that these movements do not produce agreement. This can touch the memory itself. But also the object of the remembered perception. The earlier memory is changed, the image imagined differently: I had presented Mr. X as blond and with a beard. No, he certainly has no beard, trimmed on the sides, and so on. The blond hair is also not blond but light brown. The “image” can be obscure here. But it can also be clear, and then something clearly “remembered” is cancelled.

But perhaps the whole way of appearing (the appearance proper) is retained and only the apprehension is cancelled. As in the example of the mannequin.

The cases, however, are very different. 1) In the one case, the question is: What did I actually experience at that time? This concerns the experiencing, hence the memory of something internal. In the other case, the question is: 2) What can I still retain of the perception of that time? What must be cancelled, not as memory, but with respect to the perception’s positing that is posited in memory?

Must we not say: Memory is actual reproduction, positing reproduction in the broadest sense? Specifically, either reproduction that is simply (and homogeneously) positing, in which case there is certainty; or reproduction in which there is inhomogeneity. Memory always has an amount of certainty. Every memory has a connection with actual perception: What is remembered is “past,” and a domain of the positing of the past is there with the actual perception. And what is remembered is placed into this past. Memory, therefore, has its nexus and, through this nexus, a component of positing. But it also has in itself its positing apart from the nexus. I remember the walk I took a short time ago: In that case, I have a ray of positing [emanating] from the now. But the memorial image has its positing in itself. (Indeed, it could also be an expectational image. The content could be the same, but the connection to the here and now is different in that case. The halo.)
This positing can be simple; it can be certitude or deeming possible. And it can be pure certitude and certitude about something as a whole, though deeming possible with regard to its parts.

But it can also be accompanied by criticism. Certitude is cancelled; or an alien memory, which in itself is certain, intrudes. But as part of this nexus it is cancelled.

What I should like to understand are the different ways of cancelling.

1) The cancelling of the memory itself or of components of the memory: e.g., I remember having encountered Willigsen recently on my walk. And then the memory splits apart, breaks down into two unconnected memories: my recent walk is a different walk from the one on which I encountered Willigsen.

Or I have the memory of Mr. X with a beard: hence the memory of a certain way of appearing. But then I have a new memory, and it is better, clearer: X has no beard at all. And now I am disputing the way of appearing itself. It becomes modified: Indeed, I see him without a beard.

2) I retain the memory straightforwardly; it is valid for me. I have the memory simply, but the perception at that time was false. Furthermore, the perception at that time remains unchallenged. Or it is challenged and receives the value of an assumption; it becomes doubtful. What happens then with the perception, which nonetheless remains in itself a remembered perception — which in itself preserves its characteristic of being remembered? And of being certain, for at that time I believed firmly and did not vacillate at all.

Must I not say: The remembered positing remains what it is, but a new ray of positing aims at what is posited? And how does it do that? In such a way that it devalues the remembered positing. Hence it certainly has a value. Does it belong to the essence of simple memory, therefore, that as positing “of the earlier perception,” it is precisely also positing of what is posited in the earlier perception: I carry out the reproduction, I carry out the perception in the mode of the “as it were,” and that which is being “perceived” is posited? This positing belongs to the carrying out of the whole reproduction. It is positing through and through. Everything in it is characterized as

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3 Inserted later: “now it is challenged.” — Editor’s note.
existing. Only subsequent criticism can devalue what was originally valued.

Every memory, however, is subject to criticism. In conformity with its essence, it “claims” to belong to a nexus. Specifically, memory as memory claims to belong to the nexus of internal time; and the remembered perception, the remembered judgment, the remembered wish have their claims in turn. Remembered actual experiences have their claim that finds its fulfillment in the unity of actual experience, which has its way of devaluing or confirming. Remembered judgments: The judgments I may have made; this state of affairs and that state of affairs stood before me in them as true. This remains unchallenged if nothing from the nexus of internal memory speaks against it. But then a judgment, too, must be able to be confirmed; something can speak against the judgment later: new evident judgments, for example, which refer to the same state of affairs. There is such a thing as the relation of experiences, of different successive experiences (to be remembered in repeated memories), to the same object of cognition. Likewise, valuations have their modes of evaluation and devaluation.

But is not the situation different with respect to the different genera of cogitationes? Particularly with respect to the empirically experiencing acts as opposed to the valuing acts?

One could say: All empirically experiencing acts belong to the unity of nature, or they are false. Every memory of a perception is the positing of something that did exist, and what did exist is an existent in the nexus of nature, in which I am still standing now.

But what about valuations? To carry out straightforwardly a memory of a perception implies for me: This did exist at that time (as long as it remains uncontested). A memory of a judgment from that time, however, does not imply that this did exist at that time, but that I meant it at that time. I am now not at all in need of a cancellation. I am simply not judging. But what is that supposed to mean? That I am merely thinking of it? I desired such and such passionately. I now remember it. But I no longer desire it at all. It now leaves me cold.

Does it belong to the essence of a memory of something external that its object (the object that was perceived) remains posited (in

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4 Inserted later: “as [it belongs to the essence of the memory] of something internal.” — Editor’s note.
its time determination) as long as it remains uncontested, as long as no specific experiential motives annul it? On the other hand, does it belong to the essence of a memory of earlier judgments, valuations, volitions, that they do not continue to hold their own “without more ado”?

* * *

Memory

In the case of any position-taking experience, we have to distinguish:

1) The experience as experience is posited in internal consciousness. Thus, for example, I am conscious of my external perceiving, my judging, wishing, and so on, as actualities in internal time. This positing is necessary.

2) Now the experiences (the objects of the positing belonging to internal consciousness), as position-taking experiences, have their own positional moments. Thus, for example, external perception is the positing of the actuality of something physical; judgment, the positing of a state of affairs; wish, the wish positing of something desired; willing, the volitional positing of something to be done. All of these positing experiences can pass over into corresponding nonpositing experiences: within internal consciousness.

Now let us take corresponding memories.

If, for example, I remember an earlier act of perceiving, I now have a positing reproduction; specifically, I again have something double:

1) Reproductive modification of “internal perception” with its position taking. When it is precisely memory that occurs, this reproduction is positing: the internal perception with its whole content, or, in other words, also its immanent object, is posited. The latter is the external perception.

2) Reproductive modification of external perception. When we speak of the memory of physical things or events, this reproductive modification is likewise positing; it does not, however, have <to be> positing. I can remember having had the experience of perceiving,
but now “I do not believe.” I am not now conscious of the reproduction of the perceptual appearance with the same position taking, and perhaps I am conscious of it without any position taking (possibly even voluntarily). Naturally, I no longer have a memory when the first position taking is absent. It is this position taking that is essential to memory. And it can be absent while I carry out the second position taking. I can have a positing reproductive appearance of a physical thing without believing that I have perceived it: as when, on the basis of someone else’s information and descriptions, I produce a presentation for myself of something that I take to be actual.

With respect to the concept and essence of memory, we must heed seriously this duality and the circumstance that we very often use the term “memory” when both position takings are present, indeed, quite commonly in the sphere of individual intuitions. One certainly senses that there is a transference [of usage from one sphere to the other] here, and in any case it is necessary to so limit the strict concept of memory that it implies only the first position taking (positing).

I remember a proof; for example, the proof of the Pythagorean theorem. I remember not only the act of proving it but the proof itself. I remember not only my earlier process of taking cognizance of a mathematical theorem, but I also say of the theorem that I remember it. And, to go further, I also say that of the state of affairs itself: it is known to me, I remember it.5

I remember that the English defeated the Boers. (I heard of it at the time that it happened.) I remember not only my own experiences but those of others, as strange as that may sound: I remember that Franz was angry; that is to say, I saw him, I noted his anger, and now the anger itself is said to be remembered. I heard him speak. He made a statement, and I say: I remember the judgment uttered by the other.

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5 Every objectivity belonging to a cognizance-taking “remembered” in the proper sense (that is to say, to a positing reproduction belonging to internal consciousness is said to be “remembered” in an extended sense. But only [to] cognizance-taking. Obviously not [to] other modes of positing. The cognizance-taking in this case must have been a mode of positing that was certain (one must be conscious of it as that in the memory).
<EMPATHIZING WITH A JUDGMENT UNDERSTOOD AS “RE-PRESENTATION” POSSESSING DETERMINATE ACTUALITY>

<probably March-April 1912>

In empathizing with a judgment — someone makes a statement, for example — I “understand” the statement, but I need not make the judgment myself. Perhaps I have no judgment whatsoever to make in this case, and the fact that the other judges as he does need not be a motive for me at all. If it is a motive, then I have the corresponding deeming possible. If I follow him as an authority, then I have the corresponding judgment. If, on the other hand, I immerse myself purely in the sense of what is said, I just have a mere thought. (That is, if I do just immerse myself.)

On the other hand, the other person stands before me perceptually and as judging in this way. Here I will probably be able to say nothing else than that a “re-presentation” that is at one with the words I hear serves me. The re-presentation, however, is not reproductive, although it is a re-presentation, an exhibiting; hence it is not phantasy, much less “mere phantasy.” On the contrary, it has its actuality, its determinate actuality. For the case here is different from the case in which I attribute the judgment to myself in memory. The other’s judgment is his present experience: hence a present is posited through the medium of a re-presentation. (I can, after all, be conscious of the presence of “external” things through reproduction or perceptual imagination; that is, through actual perceptual imagination. But the “external” here

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1 Just as I can obtain a mere image object from every external image-consciousness, which is precisely an exhibiting consciousness, and then have a perceptual but non-positing appearing of a physical thing, so I can form here, in the re-presentation belonging to empathy, consciousness as mere thinking-of, an impressional but non-positing judging consciousness.
is something psychic, and the external signifies that a transeunt positioning is carried out.) And I posit this present in connection with the perceptual present, the perceived present of the other’s body and of our common physical surroundings. Many things, however, are still missing from the analysis here.
APPENDIX XXXIX (to No. 15d)

RECOGNIZING AGAIN, RECOGNIZING, AND MEMORY
<texts probably from the nineties>

Cognizing, recognizing, recognizing again, and memory

I. The recognizing and remembering of something individual.
A memorial image of a person close to me (my Elli) suddenly rises to the surface. I recognize it. That is to say, the image is the image of a familiar person; it is indeed a memorial image.
Memory: determinate or else indeterminate.

a) Memory of an object. The object (the correlate) is familiar to me. It is the determinate, identical object, the personally enduring object; and, in its parallel changes, the memory is the same. In recognizing the object, in remembering it, the memory nevertheless does not need to be determinate with respect to the earlier perception and the earlier perceptual nexus. The same object can be given in different perceptual connections and can have existed in different complexes of objects. I have a determinate memory. That is to say, then, that I remember a determinate nexus in which the object appeared to me and to others and was perceived. Therefore:

b) the object is not only familiar to me, but I also have a determinate memorial presentation of the former perception of the object in its connection to my Ego at that time and my surroundings at that time. Hence they have their place within the determinate nexus of memory, perhaps with precise continuation up to the present perception.

Not only the object is familiar to me, but also, in its temporal nexus, the determinate perceptual appearance or sequence of perceptions in which the object was given to me.

\[\text{\footnotesize \(^1\)“nevertheless” [\textit{doch}] later changed to “however” [\textit{aber}]. — Editor’s note.}\]

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The object can be familiar to me without my having in mind for it a definite place in time. Perhaps now this, now that occasion emerges in which I had seen the object. I then have different memorial presentations, [and I have] identification with respect to the object of the presentations (and of my Ego). However, what I designate as “the object well known to me” is not given in these memorial presentations. No determinate presentation whatsoever need emerge. The presentation has its own characteristic of familiarity (which, of course, concerns the object: the object is what is known); and this characteristic is an equivalent for the fact that memorial presentations are possible universally, that the object was once perceived. Where does this relation come from? The universal familiarity has an indeterminate relation to the same memories in which it becomes fulfilled, in which it becomes more precisely determined. It is therefore not mere association that brings the two into relationship. (The characteristic of familiarity is not the appearing of something familiar to me that refers to the species; on the contrary, it is the recognizing-once-again that refers to this definite object in individuo.)

If the memory is indeterminate, I can remember the object determinately, though the occasion on which I saw it can remain indeterminate (in whole or in part). Or the object is not completely determinate. The presentation includes indeterminacies, which, however, are perhaps not of such magnitude that I could not recognize the object as the remembered object when I find it again.

So much, then, about the recognizing and remembering of something individual. (Now [we discuss] bringing something to mind.)

II. The analogical recognizing of the object according to its similarity with objects given earlier.

α) “This thing reminds me of something, yet I do not know what. Whatever is it? I am not acquainted with the object itself, but it is similar to an object that I have seen earlier.”

β) “I have certainly seen objects of this sort”; there are objects of a similar kind (trees of a similar type) in my native country.

γ) An object A, standing before me in perception, reminds me of an object B, hovering before me in a memorial presentation. Likewise

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2 Inserted later: “certainly.” — Editor’s note.
3 Inserted later: “(while the object stands before me in perception).” — Editor’s note.
an object A, which is given to me in phantasy or in an image or in a memorial presentation, reminds me of an object B, which is given in a different presentation. The object A is similar to the object B in its general character. But this is not merely similarity, as if there were objective similarity and I would then notice it. Rather, A brings B to mind. A has a specific psychic character, and B, when its presentation makes its appearance, has a certain correlative character. The presentation of A excites a certain intention, which finds its fulfillment in B. The presentation of A presents precisely A, but in addition it points through similarity to B. And certain general features supply the foundation for the reference.

In $\alpha$, this intention was connected to A without the presentation of B having been present. In $\gamma$ both are given, B with the characteristic of what fulfills this intention. Perhaps P(A) is given first and then P(B). And in this way, through the relationship of intention and fulfillment, they acquire their correlation. Correlation that can be experienced universally rests only on such a relationship.

What about $\beta$?

Suppose that a presentation A is given. It reminds me of objects of the sort O$_A$. Now suppose that a presentation P’ of an O$_A$ is given to me simultaneously with the P(A). Obviously, I do not again simply have two presentations in juxtaposition, along with the recognition that the objects are similar or of the same genus. On the contrary, P(A) is charged with an intention that finds its fulfillment in O$_A$. What does that mean? The intention does not find its fulfillment in the present object of this genus, which is given to me through the presentation P’. A does not remind me directly of this object as this object, although in a certain sense the memory was in fact brought about and evoked by A. A brings certain universal traits to mind, brings the genus to mind; and it brings it to mind by virtue of a certain related generic dimension embedded in A (e.g., “the” larch brings to mind “the” silver fir).

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4 “Intention” here is not “presentation of”; something else is at stake. This is the relationship that connects sign and signified. The sign also brings to mind the signified, but it is also supposed to bring it to mind. It has a function. Here, however, we have a memorial relation by means of similarity, which does not belong to the sign. However, it is not an image relation either. The image not only brings to mind the original but presents it, re-presents it by means of similarity.
The intention is therefore joined to the presentation \( P(A) \) in such a way that it is fixed on the generic dimension in question. But it also does this in the other case. The intention in the present case, however, does not aim at an object determined \( \text{individually} \), but at a different generic object; and in this way it finds its fulfillment wherever the latter makes its appearance \( \text{in concreto} \). Hence the characteristic of fulfillment now adheres differently: not to \( B \) as a whole, but only to the relevant universal [aspect] in it. We are reminded of \( B \) only insofar as it is the bearer of \( O \). And if several \( B \)'s emerge, no one of them has precedence; we are reminded of \( O \)'s as \( O \)'s.

And in this way the universal intention can bring a universal intention to mind; the intentional characteristic of memory can aim at something universal that has the characteristic of what is familiar, of what is repeatedly experienced by me in individual cases.

**III. The recognizing of something universal. Universal intention (presentation).**

I cognize the silver fir, the spruce; I cognize the apple and many other trees and fruits. I have the phantasy presentation of a silver fir, for example, but not of a silver fir as a “determinate individual.” What does that mean? How can the phantasy presentation help but be the presentation of a determinate individual? Indeed, the phantasm is an individual, just like the presentation. But presentation does not need to be the presentation of a definite individual. Its intention is precisely a universal intention. In simpler cases, an abstractum may be included with respect to this universal presentational intention. For example, I present the universal “red” and have something red in phantasy. Or I perceive something red. However, I do not mean this red, but red as such.

The \( \text{universal} \) intention finds its fulfillment in every individual case that offers something abstract; that is, not in the individual object but only in the universal feature of the individual object. In meeting with repeated cases of the universal, identification takes place on the side of the universal as long as the intention is directed toward the universal: The universal is the same. The universal intentions are themselves “the same.” If I pass from one case to another, I recognize it as the same. I recognize the universal again.
The presentation [of] “an A” (always intuitive, and without [435] mediation by symbols) is again different, though intimately connected with the universal. Here the intention aims at the object in an indeterminate way, though it aims at it only insofar as it is the bearer of a universal. The universal is not meant by itself, exclusively; rather, its apprehension is subordinate to a meaning that aims at the individual — not, however, at the individual according to its individual fullness but at the individual only insofar as it is an A. Naturally, when I present “an A,” I have something determinate in my presentation; I do not, however, mean this determinate something, but precisely “an A.”

What does it mean “to recognize X as an A”? I present X, this X. In it I seize upon the universal features of A, which I grasp as universal. And in doing so, I apprehend the X as an A. Hence the X is apprehended first as this, and then in an indeterminate way as an A. And then the original and new synthesis arises (for it is not merely a succession): the same appearance as the foundation of a double apprehension and meaning, and both posited as one.

* * *

**Recognizing and apprehending**

When a new act of recognition takes place, a new apprehension often occurs along with it. So it is in the example of the bench that is oddly shaped and only later recognized as a bench in conformity with its determinations. Even when I recognize an approaching person, it may be that I first apprehend a person as my object, and then, in the continuous change of apprehension, the aspect that marks the person as my friend also comes to the fore. And then, say, the surprise of finding in the midst of these people whom I do not know someone familiar, someone dear to me (someone who, thanks to my definite feelings about him, stands out among the others).

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5 Cf. “Indeterminacy.”
One will not be able to say, however, that recognizing consists in the mere broadening of apprehension. One sees this from the following:

As in the case of a picture one must distinguish between the picture and the object depicted, so in the case of recognizing again one must distinguish between the present object and what the present object is again recognized to be. The person is recognized again as “the person himself.” A relation to an earlier appearance of the same person is inherent in this, though to an appearance different in content. I recognize him again: I still “remember” him.

Sometimes an object reminds me of something without my recognizing again what it reminds me of. It reminds me of something different though similar to it. In the other case, it reminds me of the thing itself; I had already perceived it earlier. Now one must note that this remembering of something different must by no means be such that the different thing is given in the form of a second, pictorial presentation. Even before the presentation occurs (perhaps it does not occur at all), indeterminate — indeed, determinate — remembering may be there.

This is also true in remembering, in recognizing again. It can be the case that there emerges (in image) in a memorial presentation a memory of an earlier situation in which the object was given (a memory of the situation together with the object itself, of course, and with the object receiving favored treatment). It can also be the case that such a phantasy image does not emerge — to speak more precisely, is not noticed. What we do not find, we also cannot describe. In any event, the present appearance has a new characteristic; specifically, a new act of meaning. Presentation in image means the depicted object; recognition again means the present object, but as identical with a certain identical person.

Recognizing again can have to do with the recognizing of this appearing object as identical with an object perceived on a single occasion at an earlier time, or it can also have to do with the recognizing of the same object as identical with an object perceived on a great variety of earlier occasions — as identical with “the” individual X, where the individual is the identical object that became constituted in manifold appearances that differed from one another.

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6 See sheet (p.) about this <that is, p. 510, 25ff., above>.
(Continuous experience enriches the object, although there are different syntheses. Everything relating to the object is never given to me in one synthesis.) We really must describe this process of enriching the object in the course of recognizing [it] again. The one object, which already presupposes the manifold recognition of it again.

The intentional relation is directed toward the object here before me, though to the object as the identical individual X familiar to me from the most different occasions.

This is also true when it is a question of recognizing the object as an A (as an object of a familiar sort).

* * *

Recognizing again and memory

A memory image in different phases of its duration. “The same” memory image now and earlier. With the exception of the temporal difference. Cornelius, to be sure, also wants to comprehend the recognition of identity when it is a question, not of the different phases of a duration, but of the recognition that the memory image I now have is the same as the one I had earlier.

In general, one would have to distinguish two cases here. 1) In a comprehensive memorial act: a) a memorial image endures and is recognized as identically the same in the different phases of its duration; b) “the same” memorial image appears and disappears repeatedly. 2) I have a memory now, and then I also remember that earlier — yesterday, perhaps — I had “the same” memory.

In the latter case — for example, I hear a song, and remember having heard the same song yesterday, even sung in precisely the same way, by the same voice — I have, in addition to the one memory, a memory of a memory; specifically, I recognize that both the memory A and the memory of the memory A′ have something in common: They are

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7 <Hans> Cornelius, <Psychologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft>, Leipzig, 1897, p. 28.
memories of the same object, and by means of memorial images that are alike (“precisely alike”).

An example of the first case: I remember a house, and now it disappears and now it reappears in the course of the memory. Here we have a continuous memorial consciousness; we present the same object, and perhaps do so by means of similar memorial images. If we intend the same side of the object, we continuously present it in the same way. However, it requires a new act of recognition to recognize the identity of the memorial images (if such a thing is possible). Perhaps a new act of comparison or differentiation is directed toward both of the images or toward the memories (which Cornelius does not distinguish); and then, of course, I have a memory of memory.

*  *  *

Understanding, recognizing, recognizing again

I understand the signification of a sign, of a word, of a sentence, of a series of sentences.  
I recognize a color as red, an object as a tree, a tree as a lime tree.  
I again recognize a color as the color that I recently saw on an object; I again recognize a tree as this specific tree.  

How do I “recognize” a color as red? Merely by reproducing the name? That would be Lehmann’s crude interpretation. If the recognizing is complete, that is to say, such that the name red is present, we have:

1) the sign and the disposition excited by the red;  
2) what is signified: this red;  
3) both in relation to one another; that is to say, the thing itself

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8 Understanding.  
9 Recognizing.  
10 Recognizing again,  
   a) completely, with firm memorial determinacy, with a determinate memory;  
   b) incompletely, with indeterminacy with respect to time and context, with an indeterminate memory.  
11 Husserl’s reference could not be identified. — Editor’s note.
as what the sign means, the thing itself as fulfillment, “agreement between the presentation and the thing itself” (affirmation).12

If the recognizing is incomplete — namely, incomplete in such a way that the “presentation,” that is, the re-presentation, is given imperfectly — then the name and, generally, a proper presentation (an apprehension) belonging to the symbol are absent. Nevertheless, the corresponding disposition13 is excited unconsciously, and the act of re-presentation is there. I recognize the color as the color meant in the word that is unuttered and felt as missing. Here too [there is] agreement between the imperfect “presentation” and the thing itself. Sometimes no judgment takes place; we look at the color, and it seems familiar to us. Recognizing is a delimited act, familiarity a latent psychic characteristic, which then serves us as an indirect indication of the fact that the (content or) object belongs to the domain of our knowledge.

Recognizing again

a) Complete. I recognize again the lime tree in front of the gate; as the intentions excited become fulfilled step by step, I recognize it again in and of itself. Thus every individual part is recognized in its connection with the other parts, and the total impression is recognized again in the transition to and from the parts. Finally, recognizing again can also be brought about by the expression, “our lime tree in front of the gate,” or by shifting from the familiar surroundings to the tree.

12 Here no notice is taken of the fact that the presentation in its “application to an individual case” is a universal presentation. A universal apprehension that is mediated intuitively or symbolically, or intuitively and symbolically at once.

The thing itself is recognized as the intention of the sign; that is to say, it is not the case that we judge: This is called red. For the latter contains, among other things, the complicated thought that it is the custom of human beings to use the name red or a similar name for this color. However, we do not immediately have any consciousness, any presentation whatsoever of “names,” of human beings, of speaking, and so on. Immediately we have only the symbol and feel its relation to the object.

13 What kind of disposition? The disposition for the name or the disposition for the red as I have experienced it earlier?

Naturally, the disposition with respect to the name.
Again I make a distinction depending on whether I sense an enduring feeling of familiarity while I am looking at the lime tree or whether I have delimited acts of recognizing again, although as a rule one changes into the other, or, as the case may be, both are there at once. I see the act of recognizing again only in the act of “being in agreement”; familiarity, however, is an enduring state or condition of consciousness. Familiarity is an enduring feeling that extends uniformly over the whole circle of known objects; acts of recognizing again, however, are many. I look at and see the picture of a friend. [439]

I immediately recognize him again without having to have the consciousness of identification. Surely only the feeling of familiarity is excited here. Under other circumstances, however, the picture may be a sign for the thing. My “thoughts” are turned toward the person; what pertains to him is excited in a vivid way. Hence an act of understanding that brings the image presentation into identity with the presented subject is awakened. The latter, of course, is not explicitly apprehended.

b) Incomplete. I recognize again only single moments, but the feeling of familiarity that extends over the whole serves me as a basis for the nongenuine judgment of recognition again.

Is a recognizing already present in every act of understanding? For example, I say “lion” with understanding. Here I recognize the word, but not that alone. I have a recognition of its signification; the latter, indeed, is only excited unconsciously, but it brings with it the consciousness of agreement that we also find in explicit identifications. If the significational presentation emerges explicitly, then, provided that a complete understanding was already there beforehand, a second affirmation would certainly not make its appearance. Only when it is not perfect do we find a reiterated affirmation: Yes, that’s it! If the significational content makes its appearance, the additional affirmation arises from the fact that, in self-observation, an intention, a desire, is directed toward the appearance of the content. If the content actually occurs, then, of course, it is recognized as the intended content, as the content desired, expected.
APPENDIX XL (to No. 15c and d)

CARRYING OUT — NEUTRALIZING THE CARRYING OUT
<MERELY CONTEMPLATING WHAT APPEARS IN
PERCEPTION AND IN REPRODUCTIVE MODES OF
CONSCIOUSNESS: THE SUSPENDING OF POSITION TAKING. AESTHETIC CONTEMPLATION>
<probably March-April, 1912>

1) Can I not abstain from every “belief” and every “position taking”?  
10 I perceive something. What is perceived is characterized as “existing.” I produce an illusion. What appears perceptually is characterized as null. In perceiving, I vacillate about whether what is perceived is a mannequin or a human being. “Mannequin” has the characteristic of possibility, though of possibility “contested” by the possibility of “human being,” and both “conflict.”

Can I not suspend all of these position takings? I merely contemplate what is perceived, what is illusory; I merely contemplate what appears. I look at the “mannequin” and at the “human being” just as they are given. So too in memory, in the reproductive modes of consciousness. I suspend the belief, the position taking. What is this “suspending”? What does it signify? And what is this “contemplating” supposed to be?  

The characteristics of “actuality,” possibility, and so on, have not disappeared. Can the situation be described in the following way: I

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1 Husserl uses the English term “belief.” — Translator’s note.
2 Inserted somewhat later: “More distinctly, we have the following possibilities: 1) I live in the carrying out of the intuition, whatever the doxic mode may be; I peruse what appears. 2) I can focus my attention on the ‘actual,’ the ‘null,’ and possibly assert: ‘this is actual,’ ‘this is null,’ and so on. 3) Is there yet a third possibility? The ‘abstaining’ from position taking and the mere ‘thinking of’ the object? Let us assume this third possibility is guaranteed.” — Editor’s note.
perform a new act of “merely thinking of,” which has its “content” in common with the former act?

The same thing is true of all cognitiones. We can suspend the position taking and “contemplate,” have in view, what we are thinking of just as we think of it. One will attempt to say:

2) naturally, this is not an act of perceiving in the customary sense. But is it not a new cogitatio, specifically, a cogitatio that again has an objectivity — its own specific objectivity — and a cogitatio whereby one is conscious of this objectivity in the characteristic of belief?

Hence is it not itself again a “position-taking act”?

Is it not a consciousness that gives something (namely, with respect to its own specific objectivities that it has opposite itself and that it grasps — those that we are particularly fond of as phenomenological objectivities: perceptual objectivities, propositional objectivities, essential correlates)? The grasping and contemplating of what is cogitated that stands in the cogitatio is an analogue of the perceiving, of the attentive perceiving (in every act of perceiving in the customary sense there is certainly also a contemplating and grasping; namely, of individual objects — of tones, physical things, and so on).

And the possibility of grasping, of contemplating = inspecting [Konspizierens], belongs to every possible objectivity.

I can also grasp a thought in this way.3 The act of thinking-of, however, is supposed to be the cogitatio in which the thought becomes constituted, just as the act of wishing is the cogitatio in which the wish is “intended,” or the act of phantasying is the cogitatio in which what is phantasied becomes constituted — and it makes no difference whether an act of inspecting, an attentive act that “takes” the object, that grasps it, supervenes.

But how does what is phantasied become constituted? I can, after all, grasp only what “is there.” What is phantasied is surely there only in the mode of “the phantasied as such,” and likewise what is thought (the thought) is there only as “what is thought as such.” Thinking-of, like mere phantasying, is not a “postulating” act; in other words, it contains nothing in the way of positing.

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3 The text of this and the following two paragraphs (up to p. 521, 4) was later marked out crosswise. — Editor’s note.
In any event, we must not confound: The mere “thinking-of,” “the immersing of oneself in something in thought,” and the being turned toward something, the grasping of it, which are taken as “correlate” acts.

3) But then there is the following problem: Must that mere contemplating be regarded as an attentive, inspecting act? Yet we said that we could abstain from every position taking. This certainly does not mean that, in abstaining from a judgment, for example, we extract “the” judgment (what is judged as judged or the judged state of affairs as such) and make it into the object of a positing, of a new “belief” — into the theme, say, of logical deliberation. We can “contemplate” the wish content as such, in the sense that we take precisely this objectivity and grasp it, posit it, in order to make judgments about it: But does “merely to immerse oneself in the wishing” mean to suspend the position taking of actually wishing (to abstain from the wish) and yet to be turned toward “what is wished for”? Can I not also abstain from the position taking of belief inherent in external perception and become immersed in the mere appearing and “merely contemplate” what appears as it appears, that is, peruse its appearing determinations?

This is something entirely different, however, from making the phenomenological correlates into objects and, in grasping them, positing them as objects, making them into subjects of theoretical judgments, and so on.

4) Let us consider aesthetic contemplation, which surely belongs here. In this case, “the taking of a position in relation to being or nonbeing is excluded. That is not what is at stake.” I certainly do not carry out any positing of the act-correlate either. I peruse what appears as such, what appears as it appears (which does not mean that I posit the correlate, “what appears as such”). I live in the appearing; “I carry it out.” I do not, however, carry out any position taking with respect to what appears, except perhaps the aesthetic position taking that belongs to feeling. It may be that in such cases an image serves me. It has the character of a figment, but “that is not what matters.”

It may also be the case that I contemplate nature itself, “the things that I actually see,” sensuously and aesthetically. “The positing of actuality falls outside the boundaries of the aesthetic: What matters
within its boundaries is the purely sensuous beauty, the beauty of
the appearance.”4 Problem: What presents itself here? If one says
an inactuality modification of perception, then that is a name. What
is present in that case? And then does the perception itself actually
somehow undergo something like a modification, say, into a “mere
presenting”?

We must also note that the situation here can and probably will be
such that actuality-position-taking is there in a certain sense. What
appears is constantly characterized as actual. However, I do not now
“grasp” the actuality; I do not “posit” it. I “do not live in belief”; I
do not carry out a “doxic turning toward.” Aesthetic valuing —
that I do carry out. With this valuing, I turn toward what appears;
and it only makes use, so to speak, of what appears as it appears,
but not of its actuality-characteristic. One will also say: What ap-
pears stands before me in its value-characteristic; it can even do this
without my living in the valuing, without “my being turned toward
[what appears] as valuing it.” I live, say, in the belief in its actual-
ity; I judge theoretically about its factual being in nature. Now what
appears does indeed stand before me as beautiful “by virtue of its
mode of appearance,” but I do not carry out the valuing position tak-
ing. Is it therefore a question of “abstaining from judgment” in the
ordinary sense? It is a question of the turning toward that we call
“living in the act,” or rather the “carrying out” of the act of judging,
of the act of valuing, in which case we, as judging, as valuing, are
turned toward something judged, something valued. But, of course, we
are not phenomenologists who are interested in the correlates there.
We have the difference between carrying out acts — carrying out
judgment, carrying out valuing — and not carrying out acts; namely,
not carrying out in such a way that something still appears, some-
thing is intended and has the relevant characteristics, but in “lifeless”
fashion.

The object stands before me as credible, as actually there, but I
do not believe; a belief exists “lifelessly” in consciousness. When we
normally speak of belief, however, we mean the “carrying out” in
which the characteristic of credibility belonging to the object has a
different “vivacity.”

4 See the more thorough sheets on the aesthetic attitude <No. 15h above>. 
But to what extent is *abstaining from judgment* something separate from this? Certainly I do not make the judgment (this is what they have in common), whereas I had just made it. Abstaining from judgment is subject to free choice: I voluntarily refrain from making the judgment. Normally one takes this voluntary behavior to be an intrinsic part of the essence of “abstaining from judgment” in the natural sense of the word. But this is still not sufficient. Of course, we disregard the circumstance that, while I am nonetheless making the judgment internally, I abstain from declaring my opinion, from making a statement, a predication. In that case, it can still be meant that I raise a question whether S is p, that I consider what grounds speak in favor of it, and so on — in brief, that I carry out new position takings with a view toward *grounding* or *investigating*. And in this connection, free choice serves as a basis for making the judgment itself. If this is clarified, then we can return to our starting point.

*Let us again consider aesthetic contemplation.* We carry out aesthetic position taking. We do not, however, make judgments about what appears that posit it as something real. It may, however, be characterized as real. *But then it is surely the appearing and not the judging that is “carried out” in a certain manner.* We peruse [what appears] while producing ever new appearances. What roles do the reality-characteristics play here?

Are they not, after all, excluded, precisely not taken up into the carrying out? And what is left? Is not a certain modified consciousness of the object (and surely *perceptual* consciousness?) *carried out* as the basis for the aesthetic valuing?

Likewise [in] the other case: I carry out, *reproductively*, an intuitive phantasying. It is fiction, which is not the main point: I phantasy fictively, say, a change in the facade of the Cologne Cathedral, and I value it. However, I can have from the beginning a *pure phantasy* that shelters in itself nothing in the way of doxic characteristics. This is certainly possible; and it is possible that I do not bring what is phantasyed into any relation whatsoever to the real world and hence find nothing of “fiction,” of “nullity.” In any case, I make no negative judgments. But I certainly do “*carry out*” phantasy acts, *reproductions.*

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5 Inserted later: “actual.” — Editor’s note.
In the other case above, we carried out “perceptions,” but without belief. Now reproductions. In the same way, in the judicative merely thinking-of (in the predicative merely thinking-of) we certainly do make “judgments,” but without carrying out belief; in the wishing thinking-of we make the wish, without carrying out the wishing as wishing. Here it can be the case that <the> what of the judgment is in fact characterized as true, hence that we do in fact judge (only do not make the judgment),\(^6\) that we do in fact wish — the characteristic of being wished for is there — but do not produce the wish.

However, it can also be the case that we immerse ourselves in a judgment without being convinced (without making the judgment), that we immerse ourselves in a wish, without taking something as wished for (without producing the wish). (We do not have the right expressions here.)\(^7\)

These, therefore, are the facts that we must interpret.

Once again the question here is about how matters stand with respect to the different types of carrying out. 1) Is the carrying out and not carrying out belonging to position takings essentially the same as 2) the “carrying out” belonging to acts of mere appearance when position takings are “suspended” (without any actual carrying out of position takings)? What is “not carrying out” here? Well, I am not turned toward what appears, I do not peruse it, and so on. Is it not a \([444]\) question in the other case of precisely a different “I believe,” “I do not believe,” in the sense \([of]\) “I live in the believing”?\(^8\)

Furthermore: What about the mere perusing of a perceptual appearance? What presents itself there?

Do\(^9\) we perhaps have to say: Sensation contents can be apprehended impressionally, but they can also be apprehended reproducitively. That is, apprehension intentions that are genuinely impressional can be combined with sensation contents, and these are belief intentions.

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\(^6\) I merely think to myself “2 X 2 = 4” (I “abstain from” the judgment).

\(^7\) For example, I think to myself 2 X 2 = 5; I immerse myself in the wish that someone expresses, without “sharing” in it = sympathizing.

\(^8\) Inserted somewhat later: “Well, quite obviously. Now the question is how the position takings belonging to the appearances, or possibly belonging to them, are ‘suspended.’ If I live in a pure phantasy and run through what is phantasied, I carry out the quasi-position-takings within reproduction; and the other carrying out is the act of perusing.” — Editor’s note.

\(^9\) Later the text of this paragraph was marked out crosswise. — Editor’s note.
Or the apprehension intentions can be reproductive, and these are quasi-belief intentions. I recognized long ago that this is false.

I see this house, and it is the house in its sense. I am familiar with it. But then I can so regard the appearing side as if the house were entirely different from the rear — a large, deep structure, whereas it is shallow, and so on. I then have an image-object apprehension. Just as in the panorama I see actual things from the front and I draw them into the semblance landscape, so I have at present the actual front side of the house and the front of its roof as reality, but drawn into a semblance apprehension as concrete components of a semblance house. What kind of an apprehension is this? It is a modified apprehension as opposed to the perceptual apprehension that is still there, in conflict. The original apprehension has the characteristic of actuality; the new apprehension has the characteristic of nullity: It is annulled by the “actuality” of the opposing apprehension.

In addition, let us take the following case. Suppose the house is unfamililar. I see the facade, but what belongs to it in other respects is indeterminate. Then I form a determinate presentation of the house — several presentations different from one another, “incompatible” with one another — always availing myself of the facade and keeping to the boundaries of the house apprehension. If I actually succeed in unifying the apprehension, can I say anything else than that the actual object appears to me “in person”? Except that, depending on the circumstances, it is characterized differently — as null, as open possibility (within the universal boundaries), or as something likely?

It is just as in the case of the image-object apprehension: the image object is characterized as null (only I do not carry out the negative belief, do not live in it), though, as I always said, it is characterized impressionally. Givenness in person certainly signifies intuitedness and impression. I always interpreted it in this way.

What presents itself, therefore, when I merely “contemplate” the image object, when I contemplate anything whatsoever “in person” without carrying out any position taking? Can one find anything here but the “mere” ray of turning toward, of “mere” explication, perhaps of relational apprehension, perhaps of conceptual comprehension, of mere linguistic expression? The “meres” signify that no “position taking” is carried out and that what is carried out — this turning toward or grasping, grasping as separate, relational positing (setting in relation),

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comparing, distinguishing, collecting, and whatever else — is carried out in a peculiar mode; and it was this that I had in view when I spoke of inactuality.\(^\text{10}\) It is not a question there of reproductive awareness; the acts are impressional, are really acts, but not “with belief.” But let us be somewhat more cautious. One can indeed say that the way in which I express and assert is such that my asserting is not directed toward the thing taken in belief and does not even take place in belief — namely, in the carrying out of belief in the thing, which elsewhere plays its role in statements — but that something of belief, that is, the expression “belief,” which belongs to the situation, is nevertheless there. Hence let us limit ourselves: A turning of one’s regard toward something, an act of grasping something that articulates its parts, that passes over into a chain of acts of explication, and so on, moves within the boundaries of mere appearance. “Position takings play no part”; characterizations of the object of appearance also play no part.”

Likewise it can be the case that I make some mathematical judgments or judgments of a similar kind. I can then call what corresponds to the appearance “mere judgment content.” I can now proceed once again as follows: I do not at present execute the judgment;\(^\text{11}\) instead, I “become engrossed in its mere sense,” without, however, making it into an object logically. I suspend position taking;\(^\text{12}\) I live in the mere “judgment content.”\(^\text{13}\) It can also be the case that I hear a proposition in disbelief, but instead of living in the disbelief, I immerse myself purely in the “mere proposition.”\(^\text{14}\) I suspend, abstain from, position taking.\(^\text{15}\)

But can it also be the case that I have no position at all, that I “know nothing at all about this,” that I carry out the mere understanding of

\(^{10}\) Position takings are certainly there in the background, but not carried out = we do not live in them. Mere turning toward, however, signifies that I carry out a modified act, i.e., an “inactual” judging, a thinking-of; that is, I live in it, which is compatible with the position taking in the background, which is perhaps not carried out.

\(^{11}\) Inserted later: “I do not live in it.” — Editor’s note.

\(^{12}\) Inserted later: “I push it into the background.” — Editor’s note.

\(^{13}\) Inserted later: “But is this expressed correctly? I live in the mere thinking-of the same content, which can also be judgment content.” — Editor’s note.

\(^{14}\) “immerse myself in the ‘mere proposition’” later changed to “immerse myself in the understanding of the ‘mere proposition.’” — Editor’s note.

\(^{15}\) Inserted later: “but I do carry out the mere thinking pertaining to the modification.” — Editor’s note.
the proposition, that I am merely turned toward the “predicatively formed affair complex”? It is questionable whether the analogue also presents itself in the case of sensuous appearances; specifically, in the case of perceptual appearances. Something merely hovering before me but nevertheless seen, and yet no position taking whatsoever and no characterization of its correlate.

What about affective acts? I have decided to do such and such. I run through the action, contemplate it — specifically, as something decided upon as such — without now making the decision. I push it back, abstain from it.

Must we therefore say: Every position-taking cagitatio has a modification that accrues to it through the “suspending” of the position taking. Every position taking is an “actual” carrying out, and every carrying out can be “discontinued.” One can “abstain” from it. Acts of turning toward and all forms of explication, relation, collection can then be at work either in the taking of a position or in abstaining, that is, “without” taking a position. It can also be the case that the taking of a position is “absent” and not only suspended by abstaining. The series of acts that I have described under explication, and so on, are acts in a sense different from position takings; they are not themselves position takings. Position-free consciousness is consciousness characterized as “inactuality.”

16 “merely turned toward the ‘predicatively formed affair complex’” later changed to “turned toward the ‘predicatively formed affair complex’: merely thinking about it.” — Editor’s note.

17 “accrues” later changed to “can accrue.” — Editor’s note.

18 Hence the abstention here is the pushing [of the carrying out] into the background, the withdrawing from it of its life.

19 “characterized as ‘inactuality’” changed somewhat later to “characterized as [mere] thinking-of.” — Editor’s note.
APPENDIX XLI (to No. 15e)


1) Something appearing can be characterized as actual, as null, as pleasant, and so on. I direct my attention, however, to what appears without immersing myself in one of these characteristics, without carrying out the corresponding position taking. I take no position for or against. “I merely contemplate the ‘object.’”

2) But wherever an object is “constituted,” I can likewise comport myself in a purely contemplative way; I can look at the object (the mere content) without carrying out any position taking toward it. It may then have axiontic characteristics, but they remain “dead characteristics.” Hence if a judgment is made impressionally or in the imagination, then, instead of actually judging or quasi-judging (carrying out the judgment), I can “merely look at” the predicatively formed affair complex in precisely the judgment’s conceptual formulation. I then have mere propositional thought.

Is this correct? Are not 1) and 2) completely equivalent cases? The same predicatively formed affair complex, or, rather, the same propositional content, can be characterized as actual; that is to say, as true (as judgment). Or it can be characterized as null, as possible,

1 Indeed, do “actual” and “null” stand on the same footing, if the “actual” does not express a decision but the simple positing of existence?!
2 Yes, but what does position taking signify? In the end, is simple belief not position taking?
3 A question mark was later placed in the margin next to the last sentence. — Editor’s note.
as likely — which can mean: I live in the taking of the content to be true, in the taking of it to be possible, in the taking of it to be likely. I judge, deem likely, and so on; I carry out position taking. Or I do not. I merely contemplate the predicatively formed affair complex.

If we look more closely, there are still other possibilities here. I first bring about the presumption that S might be P, and then I contemplate “S is presumably P” “without taking a position.” I contemplate the probability content without taking a position toward it. In the same way, I contemplate the possibility-content, “S is possibly P,” without taking a position. I can first take a position in disbelief against the fact that S is p. And then, on the one hand, I can contemplate the “S is p” without taking a position, but [on the other hand] I can equally contemplate the nullity of S is p.

Every position-taking consciousness (and so too every quasi-position-taking consciousness modified imaginatively, pictorially, and so on) permits this reflection; specifically, either as position-taking reflection, which posits the original substrate along with its axiontic characteristic as existing, and is therefore a doxic consciousness; or as position-free reflection, as mere looking at, as looking at the unity of the substrate and its axiontic characteristic, perhaps as mere “presentation of the predicatively formed affair complex” that S is p is the case, or that A exists, is actual in this way or that, is likely, is doubtful, is beautiful, good, and so on. This mere presentation of the predicatively formed affair complex is the mere substrate consciousness for the doxic reflection that we mentioned.

Pursuing such considerations, are we not forced into the assumption that mere thought, mere presentation, is always and everywhere the same as far as its universal essence is concerned, in the way in which belief or deeming likely, etc., are always and everywhere the same whatever the substratum on which they are based, and in the way in which position taking is everywhere the same? The universal, however, is “mere attention.” And, on the one hand, this inheres in every position taking (or quasi-position-taking) experience, though then precisely not as “mere” attention. Or it arises from such an experience owing to the fact that position taking is converted from the mode of carrying out (whether from quasi-carrying out or from impressional carrying out is a matter of indifference) into the mode of not carrying out, and only attention is carried out. Attention, however, is not differentiated, whereas position taking is differentiated.
APPENDIX XLII (to No. 15f)

JUDGMENTS ON THE BASIS OF REPRESENTING PHANTASY AND PARALLEL JUDGMENTS ON THE BASIS OF IMAGES

<probably around 1911/12>

If I phantasy the market tower, then it stands before me from a certain side, in this or that appearance, at such and such a distance, and so on. Hence I am there too; the percipient subject and the subject’s standpoint, my appearance, my perceiving, are co-phantasied.

On the other hand, if I “produce a presentation” of Achilles and the like,\(^1\) I present ancient or mythological Greece. And, of course, I necessarily present it together with myself: with myself as wandering about in this setting and observing it. However, in willing to produce for myself a mere presentation of these mythical figures or ancient landscapes, I do not mean myself to be there too. I do not phantasy that I was there at the battle of Marathon, although I must have been there in order to be able to have had this view (which I phantasy). Now the presentation is obviously an image presentation: things may have appeared in this way or must have appeared in a similar way; that is, for anyone who might have seen them. Hence my seeing or quasi-seeing is the image representative of any seeing; and I myself — my phantasy Ego in this phantasy world as bearer of this quasi-seeing (and I can immediately phantasy only my quasi-seeing and my Ego) — am the representative of any person.

Judgments on the basis of representing phantasy-images

If I make judgments about ancient Greece, and so forth, on the basis of such “presentations that I produce for myself,” hence of

\(^1\) Produce for myself a presentation of antiquity, of persons from classical antiquity, etc.
representing images, then it must be observed first of all that these images are supposed to be images of realities that did exist. The image consciousness is therefore a positing consciousness. Now one can say that the judgments as adapted to the representing phantasy-appearances have, on the one hand, the characteristic of judgments that I make, the I phantasied into “ancient Greece,” the I phantasied into this phantasy world: I am there, as it were, and there I make the judgments. And, on the other hand, these judgments are again representatives of judgments belonging to anyone at all who would actually have been able to experience all of this and who would have been able to judge about it in this way.

But am I not judging now? And does not the judgment, the statement, apply to the Greek past presented in image?

Of course I am judging now. But what does that mean? I produce a statement that accommodates itself to these representing phantasies and posittings, and accommodates itself to them in such a way that it is taken to fit what is thus pictorially posited. Now the question is whether something other than a phantasy judgment, which represents a possible judgment in the manner of depiction, presents itself here. But what does the “representative of a possible judgment” signify? And what, prior to that, does the “representative of appearances understood as appearances possible in that past era” signify?

Can I say anything other than the following: that phantasies with the characteristic of positing representation (of representation in image) are carried out, and that there exist determinate possibilities of connection and harmonious fulfillment with respect to these propositions, which are formed in such and such a way with respect to their content — possibilities that yield an ordering of the temporal series of the represented figments and a connecting [of them] into the coherent whole of the one nature that becomes constituted through perception, memory, and through indirect analogizing by virtue of the reports of others, and so on?

And the judgments adapt themselves to these analogizing posittings. In this adaptation, they are predications that are appropriate expressions of what is posited there; and they are valid if the nexus of experience makes them or the harmonious posittings possible, thus confirming them. The judgments belong to what is posited. The acts of judgment are essentially one with the events to be objectivated.
and are combined with the present experiences of the person who is judging. But what they state — their what, the state of affairs — is related to what is represented. In adapting themselves to the representing acts, to the image consciousness, the acts of judgment do so in such a way that the image appearance, which is an appearance that is present as it were (hence not an actually present appearance), is quasi-intended; and through it the image object is intended as a quasi-object. The latter is “described” (with respect to the aspects that are supposed to have the pictorial, representing character). The describing is a quasi-describing. Naturally it has modified characteristics. And thus we in fact have a representing judgment. Just as the phantasy object is not itself a posited object but an object through which we intuit depictively what is posited; and just as, correspondingly, the phantasiyng of the object is not an intuiting that apprehends and exhibits the object itself (not an act of perceiving, but also not a consciousness of something again, not a remembering), but an analogizing, depicting intuiting: so the state of affairs that the judgment immediately grasps in the depicting phantasy is the exhibiting of the depicted state of affairs. The categorial formations that are carried out on the basis of this depiction have depictive characteristics, exhibiting characteristics — accordingly, a depictive function is also involved in the judgment. But as the simple positing in image posits what is depicted, so the judicative positing posits the state of affairs related to what is depicted. The meaning, the judicative meaning, is that three hundred brave men died as heroes at Thermopylae. Hence we must surely say: The judgment about these brave men is not itself a depictive judgment, but here, where it is based on a substratum of images, it is performed through the medium of a depictive judicative positing.

Let us consider judgments that are made on the basis of impressional images. I contemplate the photograph of a zeppelin and confirm on its basis certain of the zeppelin’s striking features. Here we again have pictorial exhibiting and, indeed, positing. My description moves in the image space, in this image world. It possesses the character of judgment with respect to the depicted subject. But it expresses above all the image subject (only with respect to the exhibiting moments, of course; the color is not included, and so on). Here we again have a certain mediateness. For I have a quasi-positing, a quasi-judging,
which adjusts itself to the given appearance, but which is only mediating, representing judicative consciousness with respect to what is genuinely related to the pictorially exhibited state of affairs.

Hence I speak everywhere here — and surely not without legitimacy — of the pictorial presentation of a state of affairs, of the phantasy of a state of affairs, and therefore no less legitimately of the perception of a state of affairs.²

A simple perception, categorial articulation, properly performed: perception of the state of affairs;

a simple mere phantasy, categorial articulation, properly performed: mere phantasy of the state of affairs;

an image presentation, a positing in image (whether impressional or not) <categorial articulation, properly performed:> pictorial presentation of the state of affairs.

² But loosely, to be sure.
APPENDIX XLIII (to No. 15g)

<MIXTURE OF REALITY AND IMAGINATION IN THE CASES OF IMMEDIATE AND ICONIC PHANTASY (FAIRY TALE, THEATER, PORTRAIT), AND THE DIFFERENT STATEMENTS DETERMINED BY THEIR FOUNDATION AND BY THEIR DOXIC NEXUS-CHARACTERISTICS AS ACTUAL ACTS>

<probably spring 1912>

I must differentiate more precisely the possible cases in immediate as well as in iconic phantasy.

I. 1) I can have a memorial intuition. 2) I can have a fairy-tale intuition, but in such a way that the fairy tale mixes reality and imagination, as when it is said, for example: Once upon a time there lived a knight in Strasbourg, and so on. This is certainly the way it is in the case of most fairy tales. Here, therefore, the consciousness of nullity obtains.

II. We have a pure phantasy in whose nexus nothing at all in the way of actual reality occurs. To be sure, the “once upon a time there was” and the whole manner of speaking of the past already conceals an indeterminate positing of reality. Hence the question is first of all whether one can really eliminate everything of that kind and remove every relation to actuality.

This is also true in the case of iconic phantasy. Wallenstein is represented. But I know that what is represented is not a representation of historical facts, but a mixture of reality and imagination. It is otherwise in the case of an actual portrait. The explications, relational acts, predications, when they are carried out on the basis of such intuitions, acquire their value from their real or imaginary components as well as from their nullity components, and so on. If I describe what is remembered (or what someone else has reported to me and I have accepted as reality), or if I describe a portrait, and the like, my judgments, my statements, are normal ones: they are “predications
about what is real.” To make unqualified statements means to make such statements. When a relation to fiction is not expressly or obviously present, everyone understands statements in this sense. Still more precisely:¹ If I perform acts of this sort on the basis of a memorial certainty, of a belief in the narrower sense, then I have normal statements. If I am uncertain, if I merely deem something likely without having made up my mind, then I do not say that it was so, that it is so, but rather that I deem it likely, or that I believe that I remember it, or that it suggests itself as possible to me. In that case, I am again stating what is certain.

In the case of a picture that suggests to me a character trait that is not indicated with certainty, I carry out the respective component apprehension in a conjectural way: That might be an evil man, and the like. He seems to have a small hand (the representation is not clear in this respect). Just as I say in the case of vague memory: It seems to me as if he had a small hand, etc. The statements that I make here are again certain themselves, though they are not expressions of what [simply] appears, but of what appears together with its mode of uncertainty, presumed likelihood, and so forth.

I must, however, distinguish different statements here: The whole intuition is valid for me; it is memory. But it has its obscurities; it is constituted in such a way that I can make definite statements only about what it definitely offers, while for the rest I can only make indefinite statements. With respect to the indefiniteness, however, the situation can be such that, purely on the basis of this memory, different possibilities certainly remain open, though one of them is specially favored as probable. Just as when I accept the picture as a faithful image.

However, I can also have a presumption of likelihood that indeed enjoys support in what is presented, but is not grounded exclusively by the presentation itself.

But then I can also have the case in which I have a relatively clear memory, and yet one that is contested, whether by other continuities of experience or by the reports of other people. Or I have a picture and see

¹ Probably somewhat later, the last sentence was changed and supplemented as follows: “When a relation to fiction is not obviously present, everyone understands statements in this sense. For example, we converse about spirits in a magic show. But then the statements are enthymemes.” — Editor’s note.
the objectivity displayed in a definite way. However, I have intuitions of the object from another quarter, on the basis of which I say that the image is poor. The hand appears to be small, but he has large hands. The painter gives to the face something almost closed, but the man has an absolutely clear, open character, and so on. Here, therefore, we have: 1) statements that explicate what is intuited according to what is presented in it — what is presented in it as “indubitably” certain, what is open in it as possible, what is presented in it as not entirely certain but as probably existing in this way; 2) statements that do not refer to what is presented as such, but to what is presented as brought into connection with the rest of my experience.

But also 1’) statements that, in the case of the accomplishing and conflicting accomplishing of intuitions, whether of intuitions that are characterized doxically in themselves or of intuitions that are not, follow the unity of one intuition and leave the conflicting intuitions out of consideration. Finally, statements that concern an appearance that has no characteristics of actuality at all.

Now no matter how I may make statements, they are actual acts. Whether I have pure phantasy of some sort or inventive phantasy mixed with memory, or pure memory, and so on, the statement is always determined by its foundation and by its doxic nexus-characteristics. What we call judgment pure and simple is here a distinctive case; namely, the case in which the explication, relation, predication is directed toward what is characterized as “actual.” And this characteristic of actuality also enters into the judgment. Moreover, the “actual” can also be grouped together with the “likely,” the “certain,” the “doubtful,” and so forth. That is to say, if the appearance, the intuition itself, is an intuition carried out in the characteristic of simple belief — if, therefore, the appearing objectivity stands before me as existing — then the explicative, descriptive statement is a judgment pure and simple. If an objectivity appears but is contested, if it stands before me as doubtfully existing, then the judgment describing it is not a judgment pure and simple. Instead, we have the judgment: it is doubtful whether such and such exists here. Or also the judgment: this appearance is the appearance of such and such, etc. But the case of certainty is always preeminent, and the other doxic modifications by no means stand on the same footing with that case.
Judgment: This is the title for acts in the specific sense, for position takings understood as spontaneities, and, more precisely, for judgment spontaneities. Indeed, the simplest grasping belongs here as the spontaneity of “turning toward in belief,” and then, further, the play of grasplings that are based on grasping, the grasping of parts in the whole, the relational attributing, and so on. Then the occurrences of selective deciding for and against. It must also be mentioned that the spontaneous rejecting, specifically, the simple, nonrelational rejecting, corresponds to the spontaneous grasping, although its basis is different from what it is in the case of simple positing.

The judgment-spontaneities presuppose receptivities (sequences of states); and “before” the spontaneous grasping, a received [zuständlich] “belief” is already there, as well as received occurrences that ground the “genuine,” “explicit” (more specifically, “intuitive”) carrying out of the spontaneities. The spontaneity does not simply “invigorate,” as if it produced nothing constitutively. It does produce something new. It constitutes new objectivities step by step; it is what is genuinely axiotic. But there extends throughout all intentional experiences, receptive [zuständlich] and spontaneous, the distinction between actuality and inactuality: positional (not positing, but making positing possible) and nonpositional (quasi).
APPENDIX XLIV (to No. 15g)

PROBLEM: CAN SOMETHING PERCEIVED ENTER INTO THE NEXUS OF SOMETHING PHANTASIED? HOW CAN ACTUALITY AND PHANTASY BE COMBINED?

PHANTASYPING IN PERCEPTION, AND SO ON

A phantasied wish that is at the same time an actual wish presents itself. I phantasy that my student Neuhaus is sitting with me and that I express to him my wish that he once again revise the introduction to his work. But I am also actually wishing that now. The wish belongs to the phantasied event as part of it. The phantasied wish is a part; the phantasy of the wish, in turn, is a part of the total phantasy of the event.

How can the actual wish simultaneously be part of a phantasied event? Is a phantasy of the wish there in addition to the actual wish, or is the actual wish simultaneously a component of the phantasy of the event, which includes the phantasied wish?

We can pose the question in connection with every experience. Let us take a perception. Can I actually be perceiving and phantasy the perception in a phantasied nexus?

If we take the related problem, in which phantasy switches back and forth with mere “thought,” then the following is certain: I can actually be perceiving and at the same time put what is perceived into a nexus of [mere] thought different from a perceived nexus. And in this way I can also put the perception itself (which I now make into the object of an “internal” perception) into a nexus of [mere] thought. I think to myself that as a young student I might at some time have arrived in Göttingen, come up this street and stood before this house (this perceived house, this house that is now actually perceived), and said: How fortunate the person is who lives in a house like this, and so on. In doing this, I would have been perceiving the house (the object of perception here), etc.

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I can also depict the house in phantasy, and now I actually do it.\textsuperscript{1} However, I can \textit{depict} the phantasy only \textit{up to the point at which this house comes in}. While I am now actually perceiving the house, I \textit{cannot have a complete phantasy in which this perception of the house, exactly as I am having it, functions as a component}. A tension exists there, a mutual exclusion. For example, I must turn my glance away: Naturally, while I am perceiving, I can daydream, dream with my eyes open. The phantasy images belong to another world, and in a way the perceptual world is swallowed up. Now the perceptual world does not actually disappear, but I “live” in the phantasy world, not in the perceptual world: I can even make comparisons, although I \textit{cannot simultaneously} have a perceptual image and a phantasy image with genuine clarity. One devours the other, so to speak: but they do this successively and, in a certain sense, to be sure, together as well. I am now vividly phantasying a book, perhaps the book by Chamfort with the colorful jacket, and I look through the phantasm at this piece of paper: then something like a phantom of the book remains and immediately disappears. But phantasy and perception are by no means united. I cannot bring the perception itself into the phantasy; “mere thought” dominates in the phantasy.

And in the same way I can have a wish phantasied in the phantasied occurrence. However, this phantasied wish will have to be a second thing, not identical with an actual wish on hand once again during the phantasying. What is actual is supplanted by phantasy and vice versa. And yet in a way both are there in a relationship of coinciding identity.

\textsuperscript{1} Though as follows: I now represent to myself a frightful, colossal devil with horns, who rips this house apart, and a gigantic fist that smashes the house like a little box. Or I phantasy how my finger lies on this surface. These are, of course, only phantoms, but they are nevertheless phantasies. And they do not hold their own; they conflict with the perception. But they nevertheless combine and create something, a phantasy modification of what is perceived. Hence, to be sure, \textit{false}.\textsuperscript{2}
<MIXTURE OF PHANTASY AND ACTUALLY EXPERIENCED REALITY — DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PHANTASY OF WHAT IS PURELY IMMANENT AND THE PHANTASY OF NATURAL EVENTS>

<probably around 1912>

An important theme for my analyses is the mixture of phantasy and actually experienced reality, as well as the distinction between the phantasy of what is purely immanent and the phantasy of natural events, and so on. For example, I represent a thrown stone smashing a house. A stone as big as a fist. Let us leave all predication out of play. The state of affairs is represented intuitively as a unitary event. The house in this case can be the house that stands over against me perceptually, but it can also be a house invented arbitrarily in phantasy. And likewise in the case of the stone; it can be this stone right here, and so on. In each case, I have more than pure, that is, free, phantasy. A moment of experiential positing is involved in the stone inventively phantasied: It is a stone, a physical thing belonging to the genus of natural objects with which we are all acquainted, without, of course, our thinking in any way of the genus or of all of us who are acquainted with it.

One will be able to say here that in representing the stone [in phantasy] I represent a physical thing; specifically, a thing with certain determinations, internal and external, among which there are also certain effective determinations, that is, capabilities. The physical-thing apperception, and specifically the stone apperception, accomplishes this. For that purpose, I do not need to carry out any empirical positing. But the analysis must go further. The question is precisely: How do I represent these capabilities? Surely in such a way that there

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1 The text simply says “vis-a-vis.” — Translator's note.
belongs to them the possibility of certain explicating presentations corresponding to the apperception in question. And this means: If the same thing were given under certain circumstances $C$, it would comport itself in such and such a way; if it <were given> under other circumstances $C'$, it would comport itself differently, and in a way to be described determinately in the particular case.

And this pertains to every representation of a physical thing. A physical thing is what it is only in a nature that encompasses it; and here we have a universal relativism of real connections that prescribe rules for the nature of the thing in question, inasmuch as it is supposed to be the thing apprehended with this determination and that. Now if I represent the stone, which is always represented in only a vague way (intuitively represented, say, only with respect to aspects of this or that form and fullness of color, and so forth), in relation to the house, specifically, as knocking it over, then I have a conflict. The nature of the stone includes the capability of producing such and such effects and not the capability of knocking over the house. A phantasy of a physical thing, the phantasy of the being and the being-related of a physical thing to other physical things, is therefore something entirely different and original in contrast to the phantasy of a mere sound, of a mere color, of a mere aroma. Even if I take a geometric formation, a “geometric solid” (a sensuously filled space), I have a system of possibilities prescribed. I am led into a system of motivations that belong to the essence of such a “transcendent thing.” And all the more in connection with a physical thing and physical events: Here I have an empirical “essence,” a determinate nature proper to the physical thing and physical events.

As soon as I represent a color or a pure sound, I certainly also have a system of possibilities prescribed for the events in which such things are supposed to be able to participate. But in these cases, it is a question of mere temporal duration and, on the other side, of immanent a priori changes, which are prescribed in the essence of the genus.

If, however, I let a physical thing change and occur in the nexus of an event, I have something entirely different. The physical thing is a spatial thing; this belongs to its a priori essence. It is subject without exception to ontological determinations and laws. But as a determinate thing, it has its empirical nature, which is bound by empirical laws that codetermine its individuality as the individuality that I mean there.
APPENDIX XLVI (to No. 15j, p. 477, 27 - p. 478, 21)

<THE QUESTION OF APPREHENSION IN THE CASE OF SENSUOUS INTUITIONS — THE QUESTION OF SPONTANEOUS GRASPING, EXPLICATION, SYNTHESIS>

<probably April, 1912>

All of this is correct, but we need a clearer distinction between what is a question of apprehension, inhibited and uninhibited, and what is a question of spontaneous graspings and syntheses of grasping. Things are so complicated precisely because every step of spontaneity again generates new “apprehension,” and that means that it constitutes new objectivity. Originally we had sensuous intuitions; that is, we assumed positional intuitions. They turned into spontaneous intuitions through the spontaneity of grasping and then, going further, through the spontaneities of progressive explicating, relating, connecting: All of the latter are acts of the same generic sort as grasping. The intuitions were sensuous apprehensions; specifically, they were able to be uninhibited apprehensions, harmonious in themselves and in their apprehensional surroundings. This is receptive belief, pertaining to what is apprehended: changing by means of turning toward, which is grasping here, into simple positing of actuality, into simple grasping of actuality. But if the apprehensions are inhibited, if they are apprehensions inhibited by other apprehensions, then we have altered and complicated phenomena. The total phenomenon, like its part, is itself again positional; and different possibilities of spontaneous turning toward, of acts that spontaneously turn toward something, of simple and — by virtue of complexity — synthetic acts, offer themselves. Again, grasplings can be performed that are “objectivating” acts of the lowest level, or explicating and relating grasplings that are grounded on grasplings, or rejections grounded on grasplings, or even simple rejections, and so on. In the widest sense, this is the attitude or focus of objectivation (± activities of judgment). But all of this yields new intentional
experiences constituting new objectivities, and it yields new positional experiences. Hence this again furnishes the possibility of new graspings and a new play of similar activities of judging. Inasmuch as they unitarily constitute an objectivity, all positional experiences, however complex they are, admit of the essential possibility of one ray that grasps the objectivity. On the other hand, perhaps they are turnings toward aimed at intentional objectivities that are not the total objectivities they constitute; and the turnings toward are spontaneous act performances that are not performances of acts of grasping. For example, a unitary “rejection” of something, a unitary “deciding” in favor of something. But then each such act, for its part, is certainly again constitutive of an objectivity and admits of a transmutation into a corresponding grasping and explication of its objectivity: hence into an act of judging.

The possibility of modalizations corresponds to every positional experience, yielding new positional experiences, and so on. Every positional experience, taken simply, is said to be positional with respect to the objectivity that it newly and completely “constitutes.” In this respect, it is, so to speak, hidden positing (that is, hidden grasping, potentiality for grasping); actual belief is actual grasping and actual explication and synthesis. Positionality, however, is an essential characteristic that conceals in itself the ideal possibility of a “corresponding” belief, of a belief that actually posits. To positionality there corresponds its modification, apositionality. To all doxic acts, then, quasi-doxic acts correspond: the apositional modifications of positional doxic acts. Modal variants, which, of course, are new positionalities, belong to positionality. And to these variants there correspond new doxic acts and also modal variants of these acts: the doxic modes. And again connected with this is the fact that every taking of a position that is not a belief has its modalities (it is, of course, positional), and that certain modalities of judgment correspond to these modalities: the possibility of a judicative inferring and explicating and of carrying out the modalities of judgment.
The modalities of positionality must not be confused with the modalities of judgment and the modalities of all other position takings — position as hidden belief, hidden reason.

Accordingly, the following seems to me to be correct:

1) Intentional experiences are either purely receptive or they are "acts"; that is, spontaneous position takings, which, however, themselves presuppose receptive intentional experiences.

2) All intentional experiences are either positional or apositional (quasi-positional). Positionality is an essential mode of intentional experiences. It also amounts to latent belief. For belief (originally in Hume and Mill) was supposed to express something belonging to the phenomenon independently of turning toward or not turning toward. Positionality is not belief in the proper sense. For this whole concept is the fundamental characteristic of a certain fundamental class of position takings.

3) This positional mode has the essential peculiarity of being able to undergo certain modifications — the modal modifications — which, even before all spontaneity, modify the experience in a determinate way independently of its other content. These modalities of positionality are not to be confused with the modalities of judgment, which point back to them, and likewise with the modalities of all other position takings that can be turned into modalities of judgment. For the rest, every modal variation again yields a positionality.

4) These modalizations can also be expressed in the following way: Every positional experience can undergo "inhibition," interruption by other experiences, even if they are obscure; it can undergo conflicting overlapping with them, annulment. Each can undergo an increase
in strength coming from its experiential nexus, and so on. Intentional experiences are precisely intentions in the play of intentions and counterintentions. Here, however, intention does not signify the spontaneity of position taking.

5) In these ways, therefore, the marvelous constitution of consciousness, the marvelous primacy of judicative reason, must become clear. And the primacy of judicative reason, which lies in the fact that every other reason can be “converted” into it, must also become clear, as well as this complicated intermingling of “apprehension,” which again and again expands into a new apprehension, that is, [a new] position, which in turn becomes a position again, in the course of which we must distinguish between position and content. And this marvel, that position is hidden belief, hidden reason [must become clear].

1 Cf. for this, and for everything further, the three sheets MA at the very beginning <cf. Appendix XLVIII.>. 
I. The grasping of a sensuously appearing object, the turning toward it in belief, the turning away from it in disbelief, the turning against it. For example, to reject, to disavow an illusion as illusion. On the other hand, to recognize reality. To grasp a part of the object or a property of the object, to grant a property to the object or to disallow it (to take a position against it). In doubt, not to decide; then, after removing the motive for the doubt, to decide in favor of one of the alternatives. To decide against the other alternative, and so on.

What is the status of simple actual experiencing, of simple perceiving, etc., in relation to the above? Such experiencing is certainly not recognizing or disallowing, and so on. Here we have passive agreement and, if occasion should arise, disagreement.

But to the essence of experiences that “simply” intuit (or perhaps present in some other way) there belongs the ideal possibility of certain spontaneities: to be able to judge spontaneously in such and such a way. Judgment is the spontaneity of grasping, of positing, of relational positing, and so on. However, positing here does not signify a sensuous, receptive characteristic, but precisely spontaneity.

This, however, is something new; it enriches the phenomenon. The phenomenon that is animated by spontaneity then changes into mere receptivity again. Moreover, spontaneous formations spring up that, once complete, can themselves again function as substrates for spontaneities, just as sensuous appearances formerly functioned as substrates for the initial spontaneities.

Now all of these formations are, of course, subject to the law governing all experiences: that intentional experiences without exception

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APPENDIX XLVIII

POSITION TAKINGS AS SPONTANEITIES

(Easter vacation, 1912)\(^1\)

\(^1\) Extremely important as a bulwark against the many great errors I have committed in these months of March-April, 1912.
can be either unmodified or modified (I said “actual” — “inactual”; I also said “positing” — “nonpositing,” all bad names!), and, intersecting with this division, also impressional or reproductive, and so on. All spontaneities of judgment that have their basis in “positing” acts (substrate acts) are themselves “positing” in turn. And these are “actual” position takings (and not quasi-position-takings).

II. Feelings and tendencies also belong to sensuousness. They are not spontaneities, and consequently not position takings in the genuine sense. They are founded sensuous experiences and are distinguished from the simplest sensuousness, that of the first and genuine “actual experience.” — However, spontaneities do belong to these in turn.

Possible judgments, therefore position takings of the first principal class, belong to every intentional experience, hence to primary actual experiences as well as to higher formations; and explication, etc., leads to affective predicates here. The food tastes (good). The fragrance of the rose is magnificent. However, does there not correspond to the feeling of pleasantness a positive affective turning toward, a corresponding affective turning away from other feelings: pleasure and displeasure, to which choice and decision then also belong, just as they belong to the spontaneities of belief? If we speak of [something as] good and beautiful, spontaneities of turning toward already inhere in what we say. These new spontaneities obviously have an affinity with the judicative spontaneities, with their positivity and negativity, and so on. On the other hand, they are obviously of a different sort. They too generate new intentional experiences, together with which new objects become “constituted.” But that implies that they can supply foundations for judgments that explicate, etc. Just as the judicative spontaneities constitute the new predicates “true” and “false,” and likewise constitute the modal predicates “doubtful,” “possible,” “impossible,” etc., so the affective spontaneities constitute the new predicates “good” and “bad,” and so on.

To live in the act of affective position taking (pleasure — displeasure) is to be actively [vollziehend] turned toward something in feeling...

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2 Inserted later: “positional — neutral.” — Editor’s note.
3 Inserted above “actual”: “not neutral.” — Editor’s note.
4 Inserted later: “as spontaneous.” — Editor’s note.
5 “‘true’ and ‘false’” later changed to “‘existing’ and ‘nonexisting.'” — Editor’s note.
(affective affirmation\(^6\)) or to be turned away from something (affective negation), which corresponds to being turned toward something spontaneously in judging (judging positively) or to being turned away from something (judicatively rejecting, disavowing). Hence, this is to live in the judging (the spontaneous position taking).

But all of this, to my mind, does not work very well together.\(^7\) How do the spontaneities of collecting, of relating, and of whatever else may belong here stand in relation to the spontaneities of affirming and denying? We have the spontaneities of grasping a single particular, of grasping an ensemble, of grasping a part, of relating (as well as spontaneities of accepting and, in accepting, of positing, and so on; however, these do not belong here). But we are not speaking of affirming and denying in these cases.\(^8\) Or should we say that all of these are modes within harmonious positing?\(^9\) And then discord occurs, and, in addition, the spontaneities of deciding in favor of and deciding against, of assent and refusal. Every simple positing can be converted spontaneously into a spontaneous acceptance: corresponding to simple grasping.\(^10\) A spontaneous refusal, and so on, corresponds to every simple grasping of a cancellation.

Does the analogy actually hold, then? Feeling as pleasure or displeasure is positivity and negativity from the start. Or should we say that from the start every grasping and every harmonious synthesis is spontaneous judicative positivity that has its counterpart in refusal, which, of course, has its presuppositions in the phenomena that serve as its basis. Judicative negation is certainly not a decision-against in connection with a choice. I do not always need to choose. And for that reason positive judgment is not decision in favor of something either. Rather, that belongs within the particular phenomena of judicial choice. Hence we may not speak of affirmative and negative judging, but of positive and rejecting judging, of grasping and refusing, renouncing. And the grasping is either simple grasping or synthetic grasping (positive judging in different synthetic stages).

\(^6\) “affirmation” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.

\(^7\) The last sentence was later crossed out. — Editor’s note.

\(^8\) Inserted later: “Naturally, since this is a higher level.” — Editor’s note.

\(^9\) Inserted later: “Of course!” — Editor’s note.

\(^10\) “corresponding to simple grasping” was later crossed out and the following remark appended: “this is obscure.” — Editor’s note.
The analogue is also valid for feeling.\textsuperscript{11}

Now we said that every \textit{judgment} in any of these synthetic formations is always an “intentional” experience. It constitutes an objectivity. What does that mean? The simplest judgment is simple grasping: the simplest spontaneity coming out of a \textit{receptivity} as its source (presentation precedes turning toward). Each new stage is spontaneously positing, synthetically grounded on or connected to positing; and each whole of synthetic positing is again \textit{the unity of a “belief,”} which as a positing phenomenon I often designated badly as actuality \textit{[Aktualität].} And it is inherent in this that the phenomenon is a unity that again turns into the substrate of a direct grasping and, accordingly, can turn into the starting point of new judgment-syntheses. And among these, there are explications and predications that concern the synthetic object, as there are in the case of any simple positing. And, in addition, every judgment can be converted into an assertion about the “being” of the state of affairs, into an assertion about the truth of what is judged as judged (judgment in the logical sense).

What about \textit{feeling} and affective syntheses? They too are “intentional experiences”; with their affective spontaneities, they too constitute objectivities. And this also means that objectivities can be drawn from them; that is to say, through the attitude or focusing of affective turning toward and turning away from.\textsuperscript{12} And I can pass from the affective synthesis that I carry out, however it may appear, into an attitude or focus of grasping and \textit{judging} synthetically: I grasp agreeableness and disagreeableness, agreeableness because of this or that, and so on. I direct my attention to the “content” of the affective act, to the object that it estimates as something valuable, and to the specific character of the object’s value “meant” in the act. The grasping here is \textit{paying attention}. Every \textit{simple} grasping of an object presented straightforwardly or of an object already constituted synthetically is \textit{paying attention}.

Hence one must \textit{distinguish}: genuine position taking, understood as \textit{turning toward}, from intentional experience as such.

\textsuperscript{11} Inserted later: “But feeling, moreover, possesses in itself differences of positivity and negativity!” — Editor’s note.

\textsuperscript{12} Inserted later: “(of positive and negative affective thesis),” — Editor’s note.
Every experience is 1) *positional* (positing)\(^{13}\) or *nonpositional*, which means that even before the status of turning toward or attentively grasping the object, the experience is of a kind that predestines it for judicative grasping (spontaneous doxic turning toward, spontaneous *belief*). Or for the opposite: for merely thoughtful grasping, for modification.

This is closely related to the distinction between impression and reproduction, but does not coincide with it.

2) Intentional experiences are position taking or not position taking.

We confine ourselves to positional experiences. *Position takings* are positional experiences that, in the broadest sense, produce a valuation; a position taking is either doxic or affective position taking or, in the broadest sense, practical position taking.\(^{14}\)

3)\(^{15}\) All intentional experiences constitute objects. However, we term intentional experiences “*objectivating*” only insofar as something objective is grasped in them. In that case, simple graspings and synthetic graspings, in short, *judgments*, form the class of objectivating experiences in the preeminent sense.\(^{16}\)

4) An objectivating position taking (at least one) underlies every *position taking* that is not objectivating (we now take, in addition, *quasi-*position-takings).

5) Every intentional experience that is not objectivating can become the basis for judgments that explicate the objectivity constituted in it and bring out the axionic predicates constituted specifically by the kind of intentionality.

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\(^{13}\) “(positing)” was crossed out somewhat later and the following remark was placed in the margin: “‘Positing’ [setzend] is an expression that indicates the act of positing [das Setzen], therefore spontaneity! For that reason, this expression is not useful for expressing the universal *belief* belonging to unmodified experiences prior to grasping. Hence I now say ‘positional’ [positional].” — Editor’s note.

\(^{14}\) Inserted later: “(always understood as spontaneity).” — Editor’s note.

\(^{15}\) Objectivating acts.

\(^{16}\) Inserted somewhat later: “Hence we call only *spontaneous* acts ‘objectivating.’ To be precise, only the simple graspings of objects, ‘the graspings of objects as named,’ are objectivating acts in the strict sense. The syntheses formed from such acts are precisely synthetic formations produced purely from objectivations. These formations, of course, can again be converted into actual objectivations by means of a turning toward (nominalization). But a unity of turning toward is there, and a ‘judgment’ essentially allied with simple objectivation.” — Editor’s note.
6) One would have to say in advance: Among founded position takings, the higher have a dominating role, the lower an ancillary role.

7) Without exception, sensuous intuitions and sensuous presentations are not objectivating acts; and this is also true of sensuous feelings and sensuous tendencies, and thus of the whole complex of sensuousness — as long as no ray of “attention” shines a light into them and converts them into grasplings.

8) Attention and turning toward must be distinguished, although attention is interwoven with every turning toward. Attention is simple grasping (and every object that is synthetically produced, synthetically constituted, hence every object whatsoever, permits a simple grasping). Attention is therefore an objectifying turning toward, and in an extended sense we are attentive to every object of an objectivation (“consciousness of objects” is a poor expression for this).

10 Turning toward is the more universal. For we are turned toward not only in objectivating but also in feeling and willing, in every sort of spontaneity (position taking).

9) We are not turned toward in “position takings that are not carried out,” but that signifies that every spontaneity sinks back into passivity. And thus (so to speak) a secondary sensuousness can form. Such a secondary sensuousness can also “rise to the surface” and then become converted into the corresponding activity again. Confused judging, feeling, willing. Mixtures of genuine and nongenuine position takings (of carrying out and not carrying out).

25 Yet I had already essentially discovered all of these things long ago, and it is quite remarkable, almost incredible, that I have tortured myself over them for an entire month now and that I had completely forgotten about them.

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17 Inserted later: “always the already spontaneous position takings.” — Editor’s note.
18 Inserted later: “(in the strict sense).” — Editor’s note.
19 Inserted somewhat later: “The shift from confused sensuous consciousness to consciousness that carries out, to consciousness that enters into agreement (that in explanation produces [the] “it agrees”), is the grasping position taking. The position taking belonging to belief, to acceptance.” — Editor’s note.
20 Inserted later above “turning toward”: “= position taking.” — Editor’s note.
21 “Objectivation” later changed to: “Synthesis of objectivation.” — Editor’s note.
22 Compare what was carefully thought out in Yo concerning attention, attention as contemplating, as living in the substrate. <Cf. the critical notes to Husserliana XXIII, p. 676f.>
I take nonpositing acts as the foundation of a modalization. An example might be if I were to place a phantasy, perhaps a fragment of a world of memory, into a different and nonpositing phantasy (a mere phantasy) in a discordant way. In what is the discordancy supposed to consist? Well, I phantasy to myself a conflict, an illusion. I then have two reproductions combined with each other and fighting against each other, and these are *eo ipso* the phantasy of something conflicting. But what gives priority to one side, what produces a modalizing cancellation here?

I make a supposition in phantasy. I take one side as my basis. I phantasy a world, a land of centaurs: The absence of positing is *quasi*-positing, modified positing. I stick to the latter. And then I phantasy that I see an object, that I vacillate over whether the object is a mannequin or a human being, that it then becomes apparent that it is a mannequin, and so on. The first phantasy gives me the phantasy world, the second constitutes reality placed discordantly into the phantasy world and “supposed” in relation to its *quasi*-positing.

What the first *quasi*-positing—that is, *quasi*-world-apprehension and *quasi*-world-thinking — “leaves open,” the second *quasi*-positing can illustrate as possibility. What it does not leave open, the second can bring in as nullity, as something that undergoes cancellation by the foundational *quasi*-positing. Hence we must always note that the modification in imagination, the not positing, signifies much the same as *quasi*-positing. Now what about the difference between reproduction and nonreproduction? In the aesthetic image, I have posited — *quasi*-posited — a world, an *image world*, as a first world. In the case of an inventive reproductive phantasy, I can produce the first world at my pleasure, although that is not always the case. Suddenly — I know
not how — a phantasy world is there and perhaps forces itself upon me, without for that reason being taken as reality. On the other hand, as an artist, I form the seeming world, the image world, by means of color, and so on, even if indirectly. I induce the semblance, so to speak, without becoming the victim of an illusion. I can introduce a conflict into the image world by painting an object in the picture as an ambiguous image within the unitary image world; I then have doubt in the image. Or rather, the image is afflicted with doubtfulness, although perhaps the doubt can be resolved, to the extent that the motive for its resolution lies in the image itself. The modalities are modified here: The doubt is a modified doubt, the nullity a modified nullity. Immersing myself in the image consciousness, carrying it out, I actually doubt, actually reject, in the sense in which I actually see, actually intuit, what is depicted. And the doubtfulness and nullity are also intuited, given; they are quasi-posed.

The situation is the same in the case of feelings: The miserably tormented person in the picture awakens my compassion. I actually have a feeling of compassion, just as I actually have a thing intuition, indeed, a thing perception. But it is a modified feeling. The ill person in the image is pitiable; he is the “poor” sick person. Being wretched belongs to him just as the illness belongs to him, just as these clothes seen in the picture belong to him, and so on. These are modifications of positing. They concern only this dimension. The “perception” (perception) [die “Wahrnehmung” (Perzeption)] is otherwise like any perception [Wahrnehmung], the feeling otherwise like any feeling. Like any feeling, it helps to constitute something about the subject matter that pertains to it “intuitively.”

But by what means are the modalizations and feelings that are exhibited in the picture or reproductively presented distinguished from those in question here?

The awakening of the daughter of Jairus. Christ, who has compassion. If I merely phantasy the presentation of someone who is sick and I feel compassion, the compassion is not something exhibited as the sickness is, as the sick person’s clothes are, and so on. Hence I certainly may not place my compassion on a level with the intuition of the clothes. The compassion of Christ: that belongs to the picture.

In the same way, if a sad situation hovers before me in phantasy, then either the grief belongs to the phantasy, namely, when I project
myself into the nexus of the phantasy and do so as one who is grieving (I stand and grieve, for example, at the bier of someone presented in phantasy as deceased); or if I do not phantasy myself and my grief into the sad situation but instead phantasy someone else who is grieving, then it is his grief that is phantasied; or, finally, I do not phantasy any grief whatsoever, but actually “sense” grief on the basis of the presentation. In this last case, I can say: Supposing this were reality, it would be sad. Here I make a hypothetical statement, an assumption, and this assumption founds the “it would be sad.” I can do this with any such modification, with the picture, and so on.

Now we must take the following into consideration: What distinguishes the case of image presentation from the case of phantasy (reproduction) is that the former, when we restrict ourselves to the image object, is precisely perception [Perzeption], while the latter is reproduction, which means that it has a modification of its own that the former lacks: in addition to the modification of positing, it has the reproductive modification, which colors it through and through.

Image consciousness and <consciousness> that depicts symbolically

We must note further that the parallelization of image consciousness and phantasy consciousness must be correctly understood. Simple reproduction, let us say the “nonpositing” (quasi-positing) reproduction, has its counterpart in simple perception [Perzeption], and [467] more precisely in the quasi-positing perception. Now in most cases an empty presentation combines therewith (in depiction), perhaps passing over into a reproductive presentation that fulfills the empty presentation.

Now I have not sufficiently taken into account here that this symbolizing function is by no means unconditionally necessary for the possibility of an “image” consciousness. When we see a picture with excellent color, we can immerse ourselves visually and live in what is perceptually exhibited in such a way that we no longer live in a symbolizing consciousness at all, are not affected by any symbolizing

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1 But see p.11 <i.e., below, p. 560, 19ff.>
consciousness. Symbolizing consciousness simply does not need to be there. When image and subject matter consciously separate, when the consciousness of depiction must be awakened because a discrepancy occurs between the image and its subject matter, image object and image subject are then set apart, and we can look purely at the image object instead of living in the image subject. Hence by eliminating all symbolization and, on the other side, by cutting off every unification with the positing perception [Wahrnehmung] of the “image’s surroundings,” we obtain a pure positionless perception [Perzeption].

To be sure, I can also “project” myself into the image “in phantasy.” But that can only mean that I extend the image space over me and over the space of my surroundings, and, excluding the real things that I see, assimilate myself into the image, whereby I exclude my actuality. I then turn into the modified I, the nonpositing I. My participation is then the participation of a spectator in the picture (the participation belongs to the image object), not of a sympathetic spectator standing before the picture.

It is also true that I can have a world belonging to phantasy hover before me. Moreover, since this world presupposes a center of apprehension at which I continually place myself, I will have in general and perhaps even necessarily a place in the phantasy world as phantasied Ego, quasi-seeing the phantasy world from the phantasied Ego’s standpoint. But then we have precisely two Egos, the Ego of the phantasy world and the actual Ego, to which the act of reproducing belongs. And likewise we have the duality of Ego-experiences, those that belong to the phantasy Ego — now meagerly, now vitally and in abundance — and those that belong to the phantasizing Ego. Just as in the case of the perceptual quasi-positing belonging to perceptual [perzeptiven] intuition (image intuition).

Now how are the Ego-experiences (my Ego-experiences) in the picture, in the phantasy, related to the Ego-experiences I have in front of the picture, in front of the phantasy; that is, to the actual

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2 Husserl sometimes uses *Wahrnehmung* and its derivatives in contrast to *Perzeption* and its derivatives to indicate the difference between ordinary perceptual experience with its belief in empirical reality (*Wahrnehmung*) and the unique kind of perception involved in the experience of an image (*Perzeption*). — Translator’s note.

3 Since the sensuous appearance *eo ipso* presupposes an Ego-standpoint, I am somehow always in the picture as picture-Ego.
Ego-experiences that belong to me as the one engaging in pictorial presenting, as the one phantasying? There are difficulties here. To begin with, certain cases must be distinguished. In phantasying, I often project myself into the phantasy world in such a way that I phantasy myself as someone else. If I call to mind my childhood, I see myself as a child; some image of my corporeal existence as a child plays a part, thrusts itself forward, and becomes the bearer of my experiences. But along with this, of course, I also have a direct Ego-consciousness to which my corporeal existence belongs in direct and familiar form, in which I presently find myself in living reality as having a body. Let us therefore exclude the indirect presentation of the body with accompanying mental empathy, which is related at the beginning to genuine, direct self-presentation.

We must treat the case of experiences of empathy later on and by themselves. Hence the question is the following: what distinguishes the phantasy consciousness of the Ego from the image consciousness of the Ego, and how are both distinguished from the actual, positing Ego-consciousness?

More clearly: We have a perceptual [perzeptives] Ego-consciousness and a reproductive Ego-consciousness; we have an actual (positing) Ego-consciousness and a nonpositing Ego-consciousness.

The memorial consciousness, the Ego in the memory, is reproducitively positing along with all of its experiences. When I take the image not as an illustration but as something imagined, the Ego in the image (I live entirely in the image, say, of the little daughter of Jairus, and am part of it) is a perceptual [perzeptives], though not a positing, Ego.

Now if I am actually living in the phantasy, then I can say nothing other than the following: Just as the appearances of phantasy things are reproducitively modified appearances, and in the case of nonpositing phantasy are nonpositing appearances, so too the Ego-experiences and everything that belongs to the Ego as phantasy Ego are reproductive experiences and nonpositing experiences.

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4 Compare to this, for example, Husserliana XIII, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Erster Teil, Nr. 10 (1914 oder 1915); Husserliana XIV, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Zweiter Teil, Beilage XXIV (around 1920). — Editor’s note.
In memory, there is only the difference in positing. In the case of perception \([\text{Wahrnehmung}]\), of the “I am perceiving and living in the perceptual world, actually comporting myself toward it in such and such a way,” the perception is precisely actual perception; and one is aware of it in internal consciousness as posited, just as it itself posits what is perceived. Hence we have the positing belonging to internal consciousness and the positing belonging to perception understood as an experience that perceives something. And in the same way, all of the Ego’s experiences are occurrences actually posited in internal consciousness. Except that we do not exercise reflection and “do not have to carry out” the positing. In the case of actual comportment toward what appears in an image, the comportment belongs precisely to the actual (self-positing) Ego. In the case of actual comportment toward the phantasy world, the actual pity, etc., again belongs to the actual Ego; it is posited internally, just as the act of phantasying, as an experience, is posited internally. Phantasy as phantasy is something posited, but it is not something positing. The positing of phantasy belongs to internal consciousness: which is internal perception \([\text{innere Perzeption}]\), or, rather, internal perception in the sense of “taking as true” \([\text{innere Wahrnehmung}]\).

The matter is more complicated in the case of the imagining of the Ego in the image, since here the Ego is perceived Ego. But then one will immediately say: The perceiving, nonpositing experience that we call image consciousness is, of course, itself something posited in internal consciousness. Hence the experience in which one is perceptually conscious of the Ego in a nonpositing way as a member of the image world is, for its part, also a posited experience.

The modified act of perceiving \([\text{Perzipieren}]\), which is there said to be nonpositing (an act of quasi-perceiving), is the counterpart of the unmodified act of perceiving \([\text{Perzipieren}]\), of the positing perceiving, the perceiving \([\text{Wahrnehmung}]\) that is positing with respect to its object, the external object. On the other hand, the act of perceiving is something posited in internal consciousness. The modified quasi-positing referring to an external object is, for its part, also something posited in internal consciousness.

But that is also true of the consciousness of the Ego. If I find myself as something actual in the world I am perceiving, then I have a perception of myself; specifically, a positing perception \([\text{Perzipieren}]\),
a taking as true [Wahrnehmung]. And this perceiving of the Ego (of this member of reality) is not an internal consciousness; rather, it is something of which there is internal consciousness: this perceiving, this self-perceiving, is an experience, and as such something posited in internal consciousness. So, too, the act of self-imagining, the act of imagining oneself in the image world, is an experience and something posited in internal consciousness.

Hence, by being posited in internal consciousness, the self-perceiving is obviously not eo ipso a positing of itself as reality, as one might think.

Now what about “I take delight in,” “I am disturbed,” and so on? I, the self-perceived Ego, possess all of the experiences that have undergone their positing by means of internal consciousness. I actually experience; I perceive (I have the perceptual experience); I phantasy (I have the phantasy experience); I am glad about what is perceived; finally, I (understood as actual Ego) take delight in what is phantasied: The latter means that I have modified delight, that this modification of delight belongs to my actual Ego. In the same way, as spectator of the painting, I feel sympathy with the misery exhibited pictorially: I have modified (“nonpositing”) sympathy. The modified feeling is something posited in internal consciousness and, as such, is an experience belonging to the actually posited Ego. Even the experience of self-perception (strange to say) is related to the Ego, the self-perceived Ego: I carry out self-perception. The relation of the Ego to an object through an intentional experience must not be confused with the relation of the intentional experience itself to its object.

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The experience of being delighted, of perceiving, and so on, is something posited in internal consciousness. If it is delight in something merely phantasied, then it is positionless (better: nonpositing) delight: the positing that belongs to this positionless (nonpositing) delight as internal experience does not turn the delight into a positing delight. One must not confuse the positing that the delight itself exercises — and this is equally true of the quasi-positing that it quasi-exercises — with the positing that the delight undergoes and that the
internal consciousness exercises. Hence we will have to be clearer [471] and say: not positing delight, but posited delight.

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If a delight (or sorrow) is directed toward a mere image object, then it is nonpositing delight. But what is the situation if I place myself as delighting (and sorrowing) into the image, if I imagine myself in it, so to speak? What distinguishes the nonpositing delight (or sorrow) in the two cases (in the case of facing the image — in the case of imagining myself in the image)? In both cases, the nonpositing delight is internally perceived, just as the image perceptions are internally (impressionally) perceived. The nonpositing delight and equally the content of the nonpositing image experiences therefore continually belong to the actual Ego. In the one case, however, the nonpositing delight itself synthesizes with the image consciousness and belongs to its composition; in the other case, it does not. In the first case, a delight is exhibited in the nonpositing delight, just as a person who is ill is exhibited in the nonpositing appearance of a person who is ill. In the other case, I have a nonpositing delight, but nothing exhibits itself in it.

Image consciousness once again

The question is what that can mean. How we interpret image consciousness now becomes crucial. Must we not say: “Exhibiting” [Darstellung] belongs to the essence of image consciousness; image consciousness is not simply perceptual consciousness, and, in any event, not a perceptual consciousness that is combined additionally with a reproductive consciousness (namely, a phantasy consciousness)? That is not correct. Image consciousness has implicated in it “sensation contents” that one can find in it, that one can grasp in it, and doubtlessly it has this in common with perceptual

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5 Cf. 8<i.e., above, p. 555, 18ff.>
6 “Das ist nicht richtig.” Husserl seems to mean here that it would not be correct to say that image consciousness is simply perceptual consciousness, etc. — Translator’s note.
consciousness. However, if we focus our attention strictly on the image appearances in which these trees, these human beings, and so on, appear as image trees, image human beings, we find, as we do in the case of reproductive phantasy, that the appearances are obviously not merely perceiving appearances. On the contrary, they are imagining appearances: that is to say, the sensation content in the appearance exhibits something, and the appearance itself exhibits appearance. The apprehension is not simply apprehension, but the exhibiting of apprehension. On the other hand, it is not the case that we actually find something double here, an exhibiting apprehension and an exhibited apprehension. Rather, we have one apprehension, only it is modified; we have one modified appearance, or, to state it more adequately, a modification of appearance whose essence it is to exhibit (to “present”) appearance. But can we not take the sensation as sensation and, furthermore, the apprehension as nonexhibiting apprehension: can we not execute a change of consciousness that therefore carries out the apprehension as perceptual [perzeptive] apprehension?

Consequently, do we not have to retract what we just said, and distinguish here: 1) the perceptual apprehension together with the perceptual sensation content; 2) the imaginative apprehension together with the imaginative sensation content? Must we not say in addition: The perceptual apprehension has the characteristic of a figment; an “image object,” a semblance, appears in it perceptually, “annulled” or characterized as null by the nexus of perceptual belief.

But then the question is whether this apprehension is an actual or a possible experience, whether it is an actual experience, but not an experience “carried out” in the strict sense. We are not turned toward

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7 Somewhat later the last sentence was changed as follows: “On the other hand, we must ask whether we actually do find something double here, an exhibiting apprehension and an exhibited apprehension; or do we have only one — though modified — apprehension, a modification of appearance whose essence it is to exhibit (‘present’) appearance?”

8 The last sentence, following the colon, was changed and supplemented somewhat later as follows: “The perceptual apprehension has the characteristic of a fictive apprehension, if we suppose it brought into the nexus of actual, unmodified perception. An ‘image object’ appears in it perceptually, which, in the case of the supposition above, appears characterized as null by the nexus of perceptual belief.” — Editor’s note.

9 Inserted somewhat later: “obviously the latter.” — Editor’s note.
the semblance object,\textsuperscript{10} though it does appear. The other possibility is\textsuperscript{11} this: It does not appear, but the image consciousness is such that I can convert the imagining into a semblance perception.\textsuperscript{12} These are important questions.

The distinctions I have been studying here, though perhaps I have not yet given them a perfectly accurate interpretation, ought not confuse us. We can understand by \textit{image object} the actually perceived (or perceptible)\textsuperscript{13} object as opposed to the object exhibited. If we look more closely, however, we have distinctions in connection with images. My example of Raphael’s theological painting:\textsuperscript{14} The little grey cherubs, the small female figure — I called these little figures image objects. What is exhibited, the subject, is the form of a sublime woman, and so on. If we look more closely, however, the following view of the situation offers itself: The little figures are indeed exhibited\textsuperscript{15} objects. Contemplating the quite small photographic bust of Malvine, I certainly must not take what I intuit there to be an “illusion.” A thing appears in photographic colors and as very small, but it is surely something exhibited.\textsuperscript{16} It is not something perceived;\textsuperscript{17} it is not characterized as an illusion. But, of course, I would not want to say in a case like this that the true subject of the image is exhibited.

\textsuperscript{10}“Semblance object” [\textit{Scheinobjekt}] changed somewhat later to “Image object” [\textit{Bildobjekt}]. — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{11}“Is” changed somewhat later to “would be.” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{12}“Semblance perception” changed somewhat later to “\textit{quasi}-perception.” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{13}“(or perceptible)” crossed out somewhat later. — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{14}Cf. above No.1, §21. — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{15}“exhibited” changed somewhat later to “merely presented”; at the same time, the sentence was supplemented as follows: “(these are not \textit{illusions} [\textit{Scheine}]; that is, not semblances [\textit{Scheine}] appearing in a positing but modally degraded perception).” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{16}“Exhibited” changed somewhat later to “merely presented.” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{17}“something perceived” changed somewhat later to “something posited perceptually.” — Editor’s note.
in the same sense in which the image object is exhibited on the lower level.\textsuperscript{18}

Let us also take the case in which I have a relatively “perfect” image in color. The perfection can mean many things. Here we want to focus our attention on one perfection: In the image I “see” a person, a landscape, such that the whole image appearance in all of its appearing components exhibits the subject. Here the form presents form, the color presents color, indeed, “the same” color: for my consciousness, of course. I see the subject in “what appears”: hence this contrasts with the previous examples, in which I see the figures as white or grey and the latter colors are not exhibitings of corresponding colors belonging to the subject. Nothing of the subject displays itself in the grey of the photograph. But the grey object does appear. Can I then say that the grey exhibits a grey, that what appears is something exhibited, that an exhibiting \textless is \textgreater there that “exhibits” the little grey figure?\textsuperscript{19} Must I not rather say that I can imagine that I am pictorially conscious of such an object, but that there is no pictorial consciousness of it? That, instead, I have a perceptual appearance that is not characterized as an illusion, since it is not a positing appearance but an appearance that from the beginning is modified (nonpositing)?\textsuperscript{20} And that it only becomes an illusion when it is an unmodified apprehension inhibited by other unmodified appearances, and that this is the case with respect to all of its moments or to certain bearers of “exhibitings”?\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{In summary}, therefore: 1) We must separate the apprehension of an image object and the consciousness of a perceptual illusion.\textsuperscript{22} The former is nonpositing, the latter positing.

\textsuperscript{18} The last sentence was changed and the text supplemented somewhat later as follows: “But, of course, I would like to say that the true subject of the image is merely presented in the same sense in which the image object is presented on the lower level. A distinction must be drawn between mere presenting and ‘exhibiting.’” — Editor’s note.

\textsuperscript{19} The last sentence was changed somewhat later as follows: “Now I cannot say that the grey exhibits a grey; that what appears is something exhibited; no exhibiting is there that ‘exhibits’ the little grey figure.” — Editor’s note.

\textsuperscript{20} “Is” through “(nonpositing)” changed somewhat later to “is nonpositing.” — Editor’s note.

\textsuperscript{21} Inserted somewhat later: “Hence, in the manner of a supposition it obtains the characteristic of nullity.” — Editor’s note.

\textsuperscript{22} Inserted later: “(something null).” — Editor’s note.
2) In union with the image-object apprehension we have the exhibiting; specifically, what is exhibited can be exhibited in the appearing image object according to the entire content of its appearance or only according to a part of it. In the exhibiting, the appearance of the image subject also exhibits itself in the image-object appearance, and again “perfectly” or “imperfectly” (according to all of its components or not according to all of them).

3) The exhibiting is often a reproductive phantasy combined with the nonpositing perceptual appearance (belonging to the image object) or with an empty presentation corresponding to such a reproductive phantasy. An empty presentation can (or must?) also be connected with an exhibiting; and then, if relating by means of resemblance takes place, we have a symbolization, an analogizing sign presentation. Such an external relating to something remembered can also occur: What appears in image is identified with something presented (obscurely or clearly) in a determinate memorial nexus. In that case, the presentation is perhaps a positing exhibiting from the beginning.

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The exhibiting, which is tied there to a nonpositing perceptual appearance, and the symbolic and specifically signitive consciousness, which either is combined with exhibiting or, apart from exhibiting, is tied to a (positing or nonpositing) perceptual appearance, are carried over into the province of reproduction: We then have depiction and symbolization in phantasy.

Now exhibiting as exhibiting has certain things in common with reproduction.

4) We must note that image consciousness can be either positing or nonpositing. The subject is posited. It is given as existing, however, only by a shift into a nexus of actual experience. This points to the fact that the possibility of a shift into presentive intuition essentially belongs to every exhibiting. We will probably have to say that intentions aimed in that direction are involved in the exhibiting, just as possible shifts in perceptual connections are involved in every perception, and

23 “Then” was changed somewhat later to “in this respect.” — Editor’s note.
we have to take corresponding “intentions” aimed at possible fulfillment to be an intrinsic part of the perception. Hence the question — What is essentially involved in image consciousness as “intention” in relation to possible fulfillment? — is a cardinal point.

5) I said that exhibiting has a community of essence with reproduction: namely, precisely the fact that we have in every component of the exhibiting (of the genuine exhibiting) a reference to “something corresponding.”

It also strikes us that we again find precisely the distinction between genuine and nongenuine exhibiting in phantasy, understood as genuine and nongenuine reproduction (e.g., memory: In the “memory image,” we distinguish what is memory proper and what is only stopgap).

We must therefore universalize the concept of phantasy (let us say, the concept of re-presentation). There are two fundamental forms of re-presentation:

1) reproductive re-presentation;
2) perceptual re-presentation, that is, re-presentation in image, in pictorial exhibiting. Since reproductive modifications correspond to every experience, the perceptual re-presentation then also passes into reproductive re-presentation; pictorializing re-presentation grows into phantasy re-presentation (or into memory).

One must separate these modifications from those that convert positing into nonpositing. (Intersection of the two kinds of distinction). Furthermore, one must not confuse nonpositing perceptions with experiences that exhibit something in image: with re-presentations, therefore.

* * *

Exhibiting of feelings in the image as moods
(not as personal feelings)

30 A landscape awakens a mood. A picture of a landscape presents a landscape in a mood: In looking at the image, I do not need actually to get into the mood. Such exhibited moods, feelings, and so on, do not
presuppose a co-exhibiting of the spectator, although the spectator goes into action in his own way. More precisely, I, with this mood, certainly do not belong in the picture. Should I say: I, not as an empirical human being, but “purely as the correlate of the mood”?

The mood is a quasi-positing act that bestows on the landscape the ontic mood. The landscape is a landscape exhibited with this ontic characteristic. The mood exhibits itself in my quasi-mood. In my quasi-being-in-a-mood, I am conscious of the mood of the landscape (as of a quasi-mood); and my quasi-being-in-a-mood exhibits to me the mood of the landscape. Artworks everywhere not only exhibit things and not only exhibit persons who have feelings, thoughts, and so on; they also exhibit various moods, thoughts, etc., such that we must say: These are characteristics of exhibited things and are themselves exhibited characteristics; and, on the other hand, they do not belong to exhibited persons as their experiences, thoughts, and so on.

We can also say: If I see a landscape in perception and if it makes me melancholic, I do not need to think of myself. The landscape itself is there in a certain mood-property. If I delight in a human being standing before me, then he stands before me as delightful. Hence the objects have their characteristics precisely by virtue of the positing acts related to them, and eo ipso. This can be reproduced (phantasied), but it can also be exhibited pictorially. And then it is not difficult to determine precisely what such phantasying and pictorial exhibiting require.

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24 This sentence was crossed out somewhat later. — Editor’s note.
25 This must be stated much better.
26 Added later: “No persons at all need be exhibited.” — Editor’s note.
The “quality” of sensuous appearances occurs in reproduction as modified, along with the modification of the mere appearances themselves. The reproduction, however, can be of the type “mere phantasy” or of the type “memory.” In mere phantasy, I have modification that is not qualified by any “actual” unmodified quality.

Now this is not without difficulty. In memory I am supposed to have, on the one hand, re-presentation, reproduction, hence re-presented qualified appearance, re-presentational modification of perception. On the other hand, if what is now re-presented is accepted by me as existing (whether as now existing, whether as having existed), do I then “agree”? Do I carry out a “positing” that agrees?

But what would that mean, if the quality is precisely the “quality” of a thing? I can agree with a judgment by judging in unison with someone else whose judgment I have heard, and by judging in the consciousness of agreement. But perhaps I can now perceive, and then become conscious of agreement with an earlier perceiving and yet not be conscious of the earlier perceiving, hence have a memorial reproduction, and, without even perceiving, perform an act that agrees [with the earlier perceiving]?

Is there anything left to say here other than the following: The reproductive modifications that stand in contrast to perception are precisely of different types? One type consists in modified appearances (with modified qualities) that themselves have the character of qualitative appearances, of “actual,” “real” appearances. The reproductive modifications of the other type are opposed to the former as inactual, as mere phantasy, matching them precisely but lacking actuality: empty
phantoms of appearances, quasi-appearances, a kind of modification that differs entirely from the modification that converts presentation into re-presentation. (Everything else [is] a matter of connections according to eidetic law, such as relations to the *hic et nunc*.)

Now what about the situation in which I remember an earlier perception but now no longer “believe”? For example, I remember the time in the waxworks when at first I perceived and then subsequently discovered the deception. While I am recollecting in the present, however, the mannequin does not stand before me as a past reality. We have a “disqualified” memory in such cases rather than a memory pure and simple. If we become absorbed in the memorial consciousness, then the mannequin-human being, the “human being,” is there as having been. The qualified appearance has the characteristic of disagreement, however, which points to the further course of memory in which the quality undergoes “annulment”; that is, the quality does not pass over into nothing, into no quality. On the contrary, the qualified appearance undergoes its annulment in a conflict with another qualified appearance that mixes with it; and, correlative, the being-past of the first appearance experiences its “not,” its cancellation. The one appearance remains undisturbed. It preserves its past as it was, its uncancelled quality; it stands firm. The other appearance has the cancelled quality. A cancelled quality is a modifying qualification, a secondary qualification, and it is on hand here originarily. The appearance with cancelled quality presupposes this connection. On the other hand, the memory of the original appearance that is not yet qualified as cancelled does not include the characteristic of disagreement, of confusion, that occurs “in consequence” of the further course of “empirical experience.” A modification: this points to a nexus of cancellation. Each such disqualifying of something remembered presupposes that some nexus of appearances “makes itself felt.”
ON IMAGINATION <THE PHENOMENA OF THE OVERLAPPING AND MIXING OF INTUITIONS IN RELATION TO THE GROUND OF ACTUAL EXPERIENCE OR IMAGINATION ON WHICH THE PLAY OF INTUITIONS OCCURS — IMAGE APPREHENSION AS IMAGINATION; ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FIGMENT AND IMAGE> <probably spring 1912 or somewhat later>

The phenomena of the overlapping and mixing of intuitions, and the experiences of agreement, conflict, and the modes of position taking belonging to them, must be studied in detail, since otherwise one easily goes astray.

At the outset, the main question is about the situation with respect to the ultimate "ground" on which the play of intuitions occurs: whether the ground is that of reality, hence whether we move in a nexus of intuitions that are actual experiences, ultimately, simple actual experiences, or whether we move on the ground of imagination (of quasi-actual experience; memory, of course, belongs to actual experience).

In the case of a negation, of a tendency of actual experience cancelled by conflict with harmonious experience, we can, of course, exercise "suspension," and placing ourselves on the ground of what is cancelled, make from it a ground of phantasy, of imagination. This quite certainly requires suspension. (It is not a question of supposition, for supposing, assuming, is a setting of something imagined into the nexus of reality and is a matter of supposing or assuming whether the nexus agrees or conflicts with it.) Is it at all universally possible to suspend "position takings," let us say, the characteristics of being that are unmodified here, by virtue of the fact that, while holding onto

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1 ""'position takings,' let us say” later crossed out. — Editor's note.
the content of the appearance, one thinks now of its agreement with its surroundings, now of its disagreement with them, and then shifts to “mere imagining” of the same content?

All of this must be considered.

We must note, however, the importance of the obvious distinction between:

1) The group of cases exemplified by the example of the mannequin/human being. Here we have unmodified apprehension tendencies, belief tendencies fighting with belief tendencies.

2) The image apprehensions, specifically the ordinary aesthetic image apprehensions (not the wax-figure apprehensions and similar “disappointments”). We cannot say of these that real belief tendencies struggle with belief tendencies: The image-apprehension tendencies are not apprehension tendencies exactly like the apprehension tendencies pertaining to ordinary things. Rather, the situation is just like that in which I vivaciously project something into reality from phantasy. The difference consists only in the fact that the “phantasy image” is a reproductive image, the seen image a perceptual image. Both are cases of imagination. This must never be forgotten and is absolutely certain. I was entirely correct when I sought again and again to take image apprehension as imagining. It is imagining. The image turns into something null only through a connection with reality. As soon as I take it in this connection (or take it as having this connection; for example, take the image subject, where the frame begins, in spatial relation to real space, and so on) — as soon as I thus suppose it — it turns into something null. The following is the difference between figment and image: the genuine figment (the wax figure) directly appears in the unity of reality, while the image does not genuinely “appear” in that unity but in its own space, which in itself has no direct relation to real space. The genuine figment, or let us rather say the genuine illusion, such as the wax figure in the wax museum or the panorama image that “disappoints” us, is the appearance of a thing; specifically, the appearance of reality. The consciousness of reality can be inhibited by conflict with another consciousness of reality, but it is consciousness of reality. The illusory thing [Scheinding] stands

2 Inserted later: “positing appearance.” — Editor’s note.

3 Inserted later: “positing.” — Editor’s note.
before me in the nexus of these physical things belonging to my surroundings, in the same space, as a thing like them, and as real as they are. The wax figure has real hair, real clothes. Everything — or almost everything — that belongs to it and appears and genuinely appears, appears with as much reality as it does in the case of other things. Only when I examine it carefully do the differences, the vacillating, and so on, emerge.

In the case of the normal image, but certainly also in the case of an *image object* decisively distinguished from its image subject, I have no consciousness of reality at all, not even an “inhibited” consciousness. I have no inclination whatsoever to take the image object as real; I merely take it as that which is hovering before me. I take it in a manner similar to that in which I take a reproductive phantasy image that I project — quite vivaciously, perhaps — into reality, in which case it also hides actual things, even if in a peculiar way. The phantasy image “appears,” then, among things and in the same space, and yet not in the manner of something real. Thus does the figment appear — without having the characteristic of reality, without “laying claim” to reality, a claim that would only have to be cancelled.

If the reality tendency were to be abolished in the case of an illusory that at first presents itself as reality and raises claims that are rejected, if the characteristic of positing were to disappear, then we would also no longer have a consciousness of nullity, which is indeed a positing consciousness, and it would not be an “illusion” that stands before me. If, squinting through a combination of appropriate “images,” I see a pyramid hovering freely in empty space, then in general I will see it without any tendency to take it as real. From the beginning, I will see it as a mere “image,” and yet not as an image in the genuine sense. I am not conscious of the pyramid as something hovering before me “imaginatively”; that is, I am not conscious of it as something exhibited. It would not be an imagined and yet perceived phantom.

But the question is whether, when a perceptual conflict of experiential intentions comes to an *unhesitating resolution* by means of a

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4 Inserted later: “(no positing consciousness, but quasi-positing instead).” — Editor’s note.
5 The text of this paragraph was crossed out somewhat later and the following note made in the margin: “explained better later.” — Editor’s note.
completely certain and clear decision in favor of one of the sides, there
does not immediately and necessarily also ensue, with the cancella-
tion of the other apprehension, a conversion into a “mere” imagining.⁶
If we transplant ourselves into it, then we are no longer carrying out
an experiential consciousness but a “mere” imagining⁷ that stands
before me as null, just as everything phantasied stands before me as
null: that is to say, if we suppose it to be real, then this supposition is
immediately annulled. The supposition is not mere imagination, but
a mode of reality.

The sense of what was crossed out above: In general, the stereo-
scopic pyramid will not appear as something null and will not appear
as a degraded “intention,” as a phenomenon of positing; rather, it will
appear as something that merely hovers before me: without posit-
ing. On the other hand, perceptual [perzeptives] consciousness that is
not positing, as one sees there, is still not image consciousness: We
do not have the consciousness of something exhibited, of something
appearing in an image. Exhibiting is an “imagining,” though not a
reproducing.

* * *

How matters stand with respect to the separation of image object
and image subject will depend very much on a correct analysis of
image consciousness. I can constitute the image object and “see” it as
an object in ordinary space. On the other hand, the subject in genuine
internal image consciousness is certainly not intended reproductively,
but “seen.” It is imagined, but imagined perceptually. I can shift to a
reproductive imagining: in the case of the portrait, to a memory of
the person I know. But then I have a second consciousness. The cases
are indeed different, depending on whether the exhibiting is more or
less complete, on whether the image contains more or less of what

⁶ “Imagining” changed somewhat later to “perception without positing.” — Editor’s note.
⁷ Somewhat later, “a ‘mere’ imagining” was changed and supplemented as follows: “a
‘mere,’ that is to say, nonpositing consciousness of something hovering before me,
whose object [stands before me] first through supposing, more precisely, through
positing.” — Editor’s note.
does not genuinely depict. If I look at the photograph, I can say: “The [482] image appears” there, thirty centimeters in front of me at this definite position in space. But do I properly see the image object itself in that position? And not rather the physical image thing that causes the appearing? Of what sort is this seeing?

And above all, one must show decisively that I am not merely conscious of the subject reproductively, but that I also grasp it as exhibiting itself *in* the image object, hence imaginatively, though perceptually. One will ask whether and in which cases reproduction is combined with perception: Thus, for example, when I see this landscape presented in color, whether a reproductive consciousness accompanies it, as is certainly the case in the portrait of a person I know.
APPENDIX LI

MEDITATION: ON THE POSSIBILITY OF VIEWING MERE IMAGINING AS PERCEPTUAL POSITING
“ENTIRELY ANNULLED”

<probably spring 1912 or somewhat later>

We have to distinguish the following occurrences: A concrete thing-apprehension “overlaps” with a second concrete thing-apprehension in perfect otherness. For example, I have the unity of the wall here, in my act of perceiving. But the perceived unity is interrupted, as far as perception is concerned, by the perceptual unity of the picture of the landscape. Here I have: 1) the harmonious intention belonging to the perception in which I see the wall, and some part of the wall is “concealed” by the picture. What is concealed is co-apprehended in an empty manner and harmoniously co-posited. 2) The perception of the image landscape. I also “see as it were” only a part of the image landscape, precisely the part defined by the frame; the rest is also co-posited, though only co-quasi-posited.

We have two spaces with different fillings that “overlap,” and the things involved have nothing in common. That means that the situation is not what it is in the opposing case of an illusion: in the case of the mannequin/human being, for example. In that case, the mannequin has clothes, hair, which would also be the clothes and hair of the human being. Determinate properties held in common are perhaps also present in the form of the superficial properties of the hands, cheeks, and so on. What about the case of a bust? Here, to be sure, the superficial forms, but no concrete parts, no concrete physical aspects of the thing, are partially held in common. Otherwise, the situation would be what it is in the case of the panorama, and there would again be an illusion.

1) Two apprehensions can overlap or conceal each other in such a way that identical partial apprehensions (and full thing...
-apprehensions) are held in common, such that if one of the apprehensions is an actual apprehension intention, it confers, in the manner of actual apprehension intentions, co-positing on the apprehensions combined with it. Positing then disagrees with positing. We have a ground of positing that bestows positing on what is combined. And what is combined are two very different things that overlap and, in overlapping, are different; and that is annulment. The co-positing of different overlapping things is the mutual inhibiting of positing.

2) On the other hand, when a perceptual apprehension (and its composition ascribed to co-perception) conceals a perceptual apprehension-intention with the power of positing, but does not itself have the inflow and power of positing by combining with the posited apprehension complex, it is not inhibited positing (since it possesses nothing of positing at all); it is pure nothing, pure “imagining.” Apprehension that overlaps, but is not positing: an empty semblance, but not one that is illusory in the customary sense. It is not “annulled,” not a counterpossibility, and so on.

But how can I posit unity here? On the one hand, I carry out the normal perception, executing it, afterwards as well as before, as positing. And at the same time (or while holding on to the first perception as I make the transition), I “attempt” to posit the image apprehension as an image-object apprehension, hence in its overlapping with the wall apprehension. But does this not mean that I phantasy myself into a positing? And does not the problem recur in this phantasying into?

The question is whether we must not say the following:

1) There is a positing that is annulled entirely. Namely, in itself each perception would be positing, but we have a field of uncontested perception; that is, of perception that does not overlap with another perception. Then there is combined with this field a sphere in which “conflicting” perceptions,¹ incompatible with one another and having nothing concrete in common, overlap. One perception obtains power from its connection with the former field, the other does not. The latter perception then becomes nonpositing, for every overlapping of incompatible intentions annuls the power of positing in them. They are like ±. There remains, then, only the abundance of power coming from without, which is for the benefit of one, not of the other.

¹ “Perceptions” later changed to “apprehensions.” — Editor’s note.
But when incompatible apprehensions have concrete parts in common, as they do in the case of perceptual doubt, they are also cancelled in themselves to the extent that they conflict with one another. What they have in common, however, is not affected by this cancellation (the mannequin’s clothes, etc.). And at the same time, what is not held in common acquires connective power by means of its unity with what is held in common and also gains connections and connective power with respect to its wider surroundings. Here, then, we have a case in which a complete annulment does not ensue; on the contrary, one intention can only be contested by another.

Hence what is capable of complete annulment would be what is not positing; above all, in the perceptual sphere.

But then the question is what this condition of being annulled signifies. It is, to be sure, supposed to be something other than being contested. And we do, after all, already have a world of positing through which the annulment results. One might say that perhaps something with which something else “overlaps” and that has no modes of positing whatsoever appears in the manner of positing in the “normal” posited world; and conversely, that if something is supposed to appear that has no modes of positing at all, it must overlap with something posited (without having anything in common with it).

We would therefore have the phenomenon of overlapping: not the ordinary concealing of the things of intuition that appear as spatially different, belonging to different parts of space. On the contrary, different things appear in the same space, two things appearing in the identical or partially identical space.

Now might one ask: Cannot something other than the perceptual world overlap that world as a whole? Specifically, the whole visual space is filled by an illusion, which is then “annulled” — by what?

Well, by the posited world of tactile space.

Moreover, one could say: The whole world belonging to a “mere phantasy” in which I am living is an infinite spatial world that is entirely annulled by the real world of which I am conscious, even if in the background, and which is posited. The absence of positing is always annulledness. But what about the world of memory? Is not the

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2 Inserted later: “in such a way that one part of space would have to be covered twice.” — Editor’s note.
memorial space annulled by the perceptual space? The orientations are indeed precisely the same. This awakens the thought that just as in the visual overlapping of thing appearances, “space” is the form through which what is annulled obtains new positing by means of forms of connection, so time is the form by means of which what at first is entirely annulled acquires the possibility of positing and acceptance.

Perceptual annulledness acquires positing in the form of exhibiting: this is a “re-presentation” of something that belongs to an entirely different context. This is also true in the case of “memory.” What appears reproductively re-presents “something that has been.” But in the case of a “picture,” of course, we have a physical thing present that has the function of awakening intersubjectively the same image again and again. In memory’s case, the physical thing is absent. Could we therefore freely hallucinate? Would we have phantasies if we did? Provided, that is, that the real world remains conspicuous through its general positing, while the hallucinations would be annulled. Would it be conceivable that free phantasy and memory make their appearance in full sensuous vitality?

Is a view feasible that denies any essential distinction between phantasy (reproduction) and perception? Do all of the distinctions finally dissolve into modes of clarity and into distinctions between actual positing (that is, free and primary intention) and being annulled by positing (by simple primary apprehensions)? To go further, do they dissolve into distinctions between primary positing and secondary positings that arise from certain forms of connection with primary positing? But what is the reference to “forms of connection” supposed to signify? The formation, in stages, of apprehensions of a higher level, which are themselves again positing apprehensions but which contain in themselves nonpositing (annulled) apprehensions as foundations and elements. The tasks presenting themselves here are enormous. However, our description must at first proceed from what is directly given and can be brought to light, and then must attempt to produce further clarifications by analyzing what is given into its elements and by going back to its connections. And one will have to accept all of this as the guiding problem.

One first comes upon the distinction between positing and non-positing in the domain of simple appearances. And then, in connection
with nonpositing, one finds in some cases the condition of “being annulled,” the phenomenon of concealment, and so on. Then, in the cases of memory and phantasy, one says to oneself: If I intuit a phantasy objectivity, I intuit a spatial world with its determinate orientation. But I can simultaneously direct my regard toward the perceived spatial world with its orientation. If I do the one, the other disappears: And the disappearing is not a mere becoming obscure but a being pressed down into an “empty” presentation. Space is intuitable only once [at a given time]. Such matters surely make us think. Intuition of space “conceals” intuition of space. And so on. But what about the stream of actual positing? It is the stream of actual apprehension intentions, which again and again organize themselves into new apprehension intentions and bestow connective power on everything that is inserted into them, and, of course, leave nothing outside themselves. For nothing is isolated: What gives itself in isolation as a phantasy in fact conceals something in reality. But a phantasy tone outside memory or outside a phantasy world? Is something isolated in that way not conceivable? But then is anything at all that is isolated conceivable in the nexus of consciousness?

How do matters stand, in that case, with positing and nonpositing in their widest scope?
ON THE THEORY OF IMAGE CONSCIOUSNESS AND FIGMENT CONSCIOUSNESS

<a>a</a> Image intuition <fixing its limits over against the consciousness of illusion>

The image.

In the case of a photograph: The spatiality (as in the case of a relief) is only an approximate, imperfect, analogical spatiality. This points to the fact that the motivations belonging to the constitution of its spatiality are anomalous. This is certainly true with respect to the ocular-motor unity and especially with respect to double images, etc., and even with respect to revolving and turning, in short, with respect to changes in orientation.

The “image” is apprehended spatially. I have a spatial exhibiting, but a conflict presents itself between the required and the actual sensations of orientation. Over and above that, however, there is also a conflict of the image space with actual space; namely, the one ousts the other from intuition. On the other hand, the image space is not truly posited in actual space; in other words, the actual positing of the presence of the one is not reduced to nullity by the actual positing of the presence of the other.

The image is not an illusion. The illusory object with its illusory space (the mirror image, for example) presents itself as reality, and in the consciousness of the illusion possesses annulled reality; that is, nullity. The image does not have the characteristic of nullity. I can suppose it to be null at any time; I can say that it is nothing, that it is a mere image. Then I suppose the image to be real, and this supposition is annulled by perceptual reality. The question is therefore whether

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1 Also on the theory of the relationship between pictorial symbolic consciousness and signification symbolic consciousness.
2 We must, however, distinguish between the larger or smaller plastic form of the image object and the anomaly inherent in it that the true plastic form of the image subject is supposed to be presented by a "plastic form that is too small"; that is, by whatever the plastic form of the image object may be.
the image perception is a “qualityless” perception or whether, like phantasy, it has no actual quality.

What about the case of the bust? Here the spatiality is perfect. It is at the same time the spatiality of the actual thing made from plaster. Here in fact we have two intuitions “permeating one another” and in a certain way “conflicting” with one another — and yet conflicting in only a loose sense.

Again, we do not have an illusion. A wax figure in the waxworks is an illusion (perfection of execution presupposed, of course). Here two perceptions, or, correlatively, two perceptual objects, quarrel, each of which is posited or, respectively, has its positing quality, the one the quality of being convincing, the other the quality of striking one as strange.

In the case of the bust, however, we have only one perception (the perception of the plaster thing), and the other element is a mere “image” intuition. Namely, if I see in the physical thing before me an image head, then there belongs to the spatial figure a flesh color, and thus other determinations that “coincide” with the determinations of the plaster thing, but in such a way that they are in “conflict” with the latter, are in the relation of being otherwise. And these determinations are absolutely unperceived, are emptily presented, obscure (for I can only bring the flesh color to intuition by presenting the head to myself again, and then entirely in phantasy). I cannot hold on to the space as actually seen and color it differently. I can at most form a phantasy and make it overlap with what is given perceptually, as when I think of this paper as black or of its color as changed. There is, however, a difference between what is “genuinely” perceived and what is “not genuinely” perceived. I can live in the image consciousness of this Madonna by Michelangelo, and I then “feel” through the flesh and the inner life, while I do not at the same time see a color. And universally I cannot have the visible visibly. Add to this deviations from the “natural” size, at least in general, unless the head actually presents itself in its natural size.

We have anomalous appearances; that is, we have appearances that resemble other “normal” appearances, which are appearances of something else. And what resembles is presented in something resembling it. There can be full appearances insofar as they are constitutive of actual objects, as in the case of the bust; or there can be appearances,
such as the photographic image, which are anomalous insofar as they
do not constitute objects. A little grey figure appears, but the ap-
pearance does not belong to any perceptual object (not to the pho-
tograph as a paper card, and so on). Indeed, even if I wanted to, I
3 could by no means just push aside the appearance belonging to the
image object and then see only the lines and shadows on the card.
At most I could do this with respect to particular spots that I pick
out. It is otherwise, no doubt, when I contemplate a child’s drawing.
[But] this is hardly possible when I see a body drawn with good “plas-
tic” form: Only when I pick out a single detail — a single line, say
— and abstract it from the rest, do I “see” it on the paper. In the case
of a relief, we have a perceived spatiality that belongs to the coin,
to the thing made of plaster, and so on. The image spatiality, which
is precisely an image, presents itself in the perceived spatiality; the
appearance that I have is a coin on which a “white head” appears. I
have the head-appearance; and this has, as its spatiality, the spatiality
of the relief belonging to the coin, and no other spatiality. The coin’s
head is white, and the image object makes the head appear as white.
The “white,” however, does not belong to the exhibiting, to that in
which the subject exhibits itself: unlike the spatiality and unlike the
mental expression, which are indicated in the traits of the spatiality,
of the figure. In the case of the bust, a white head appears under all
circumstances; the image appearance is pushed back only when I say
to myself that this is a thing made from plaster. I never genuinely see
an ordinary plaster thing but always a white head, though I see the
latter in “conflict” with the white plaster thing.

In the case of the photograph, I always find the appearance of
a human being, etc., though I perceive a piece of paper insofar as
I produce an apprehension by means of the sense of touch [or an
apprehension] with respect to my surroundings by means of the sense
of sight, and so on. A “conflict” presents itself, since I continually
have the appearance belonging to the image object. Even if I do not
immerse myself in it.

Differences present themselves in these examples insofar as the
spatiality of the image object coincides with the spatiality of the phys-
ical image thing in the one case, while in the other case it does not.
But then there is the further difference that perhaps the spatiality of
the image object and the spatiality of the image subject can coincide
as well, as in the case of the bust’s head, which has a human being’s natural size. Moreover, there is the difference that the spatiality of actual perception (in the case of the relief), which enters into the spatiality of the image object, can merely resemble the spatiality of the image subject. Likewise in the case of the photographic image, the spatiality of the subject is analogous to the appearing (here perceptual [perzeptiven] does not = perceptual [wahrnehmungsmassigen]) spatiality.3

Colors can also enter into the analogizing. And there is even more in drama: it goes much further. Human beings, living human beings, analogize, depict human beings without illusion; the space of the stage with its sets, and so on, analogizes actual space — in which case, however, the stage perspective analogizes the dissimilar natural perspective, etc.

Now what must we single out as essential to the image?

We have to distinguish the physical image thing, the image object, and the image subject. The latter need not appear; and if it does appear, we have a phantasy or memory. When we have a perceptual image (not an image presentation in phantasy), the appearance of the physical image thing is the appearance of a physical thing, a perceptual appearance. And it is a filled perception: The thing is there as something present “in person.” But the thing appearance is not normal in every respect. It is involved in “conflict” with another appearance that partially inhibits it: the image-object appearance. The image-object appearance is perceptual [perzeptiv]: insofar as it has the sensation’s sensuousness, which undergoes apprehension. It is not, however, a perceptual appearance [wahrnehmungser-scheinung]: It lacks “belief”; it lacks the characteristic of reality. [490] Hence there is no conflict between claimed reality and reality that is firmly established, or between two claims to reality, as in the case of an illusion; and there cannot be, since the image-object appearance is not a “normal” thing-appearance. But what does normality signify? [For an appearance not to be a normal thing-appearance means] nothing else than that it is of a type that cannot support the positing

3 Note. It is important to discuss the following: Rest or change appears in the image. In the ordinary resting image, which depicts by means of an unchanging image object, a movement might appear — a rider galloping away in a painting, for example. In the mutoscope, however, an image object that is itself moving appears; and in that case movement is presented by means of movement, and so on.
of reality. And this signifies, in the case of things, that insertion into nature, or into a nature whose possibility is measured according to the knowledge of nature (according to the style of the intuition of nature), would conflict with the latter. What can be a real physical thing intuition (better: what, as a thing, is supposed to be able to stand before me in perception as real) can be a human being, but not a human being who is white like plaster, and so on. Human beings can look very different from one another, but the idea “human being” prescribes certain possibilities for perception: a human being is something that has a certain look in perception. This signifies a certain type, which possesses as a possibility its positing characteristic. We can thus say: It is a perceptual appearance; specifically, an appearance of a human being. What belongs to it and is apprehended or co-apprehended — human interiority, the human form, and so on — requires, presentationally, certain further moments, and moments that conflict with the actual perceptual presentation (say, of color, etc.). Hence one can say: Perceptual tendencies are indeed present, but they are mutually annulled in themselves. The image object is a figment, but not an illusory figment, since it is not — as in the case of an illusion — something harmonious in itself that is annulled by the surrounding reality (or, correlatively, in the positing in which something harmonious conflicts with something harmonious).

In the case of the play, it certainly seems to be otherwise: Here, indeed, the individual image objects — “king,” “villain,” “hero,” and so on — exist harmoniously in themselves. They are, however, members of an enveloping pictoriality, of a total image object from an image world that runs its course on the stage, in artificial sets, etc. What was said, then, applies to this whole. It is annulled intrinsically and not only by being in conflict with the space of the theater, etc. It is not a panorama picture. Stage, sets, prompter, and so on, serve to realize the intrinsic annulment. They are necessary in order to bring a conflict into the image object itself, which makes it appear in itself as a figment. But permeation by the image thing also contributes to that end. The same perceptual sensations are assigned to the image-thing apprehension, but an illusionary conflict requiring the mutual positing of the whole of what appears does not come about. On the contrary, only the turning of one’s regard from what is perceptually given to the figment interpenetrating with it takes place.
Accordingly, the image figment is a nullity of a unique type. It is an appearance with the characteristic of annulled positing, but an appearance annulled in itself; that is, an appearance that contains in itself positing components that have been annulled and are being annulled. We must note, however, the difference between the taking of a position and the characteristic of nullity. I do not take a position with respect to something that suggests itself as possibly real; it can be that I am visually absorbed and immersed in the photograph or semblance image in such a way that it “takes on” life and I feel the tendency to shift to positing, which, however, is immediately “nullified.” But does the object for that reason suggest itself as possibly real, and is it negated?

<b>) Image and orientation of the image object. Image substrate and the appropriate image. Symbolic contents in every image presentation

If I turn a photograph from its “normal position” onto its right or left side, a manifold of appearances arises; specifically: 1) the manifold of appearances of the framed physical thing, of the cardboard, of the physical image thing; 2) a manifold of image-object appearances. But here we must note the following. While manifold 1) is constitutive of the object: “physical image thing,” which shows itself in the manifold as an identical object from different sides, in different orientations, manifold 2) is of an entirely different sort: The photograph as a physical thing has a “normal position” in which the image object that belongs to it shows itself. That is, the image thing has a function, is the bearer of an obligation: it is supposed to be held in such and such a way, perceived in this orientation, and then an image-object appearance that is the normal appearance belongs to it. It is a kind of sign relationship that obtains here; that is, a kind of relationship that signifies and indicates. The physical thing has a “signification,” and this signification lies in the “image”; namely, in that one image object that appears in a specific orientation of the physical image thing.

We must note in this connection that when the image is turned from its “normal position,” an image-object presentation appears as long
as the image surface is still seen, but that all of these presentations are not appearances of the image object, which is, as it were, “what is meant” in the normal position of the image: the image object for which the photograph is the substrate here.

5 It would perhaps be useful to fix terminologically the relationship that presents itself here. The physical image thing is the substrate, the image substrate for an image in the specific sense; it is the appropriate instigator of the appearance of a specific image, which is precisely the appearance of this image. It is not the appropriate instigator of other image appearances; that is, of those in the anomalous position, which for their part have a relation to appearances of the normal image as distortions of the legitimate image — appearances that, corresponding to the turning of the substrate to the side, are transition phases of tendencies toward the normal turning of the image substrate, toward putting it in the right position. At the same time, we are pointed through them toward the normal image, which, however, is intended only in a symbolical-analogical way. What particularly matters here is that all of the distortions are precisely not appearances of the image object. Their continuous unity in their running off does indeed make an object appear, but it is an image object changing in the way in which a continuous distortion usually makes a changing object of distortion appear (when, for example, something drawn on a rubber sheet “changes” when the sheet is stretched). The changing little image-figure, however, is not the image object for which the photograph is the substrate. The appearance of a resting, unchanged thing that appears in the normal and constantly enduring position of the photograph is “meant,” excited in the appropriate way.

<30>c> Ad image appearance <“To make a presentation of something for oneself according to a description.” Inquiry into the relationship of image and conflict>

Depiction of a thing, but also depiction of an event. The latter in the form of adequate depiction, so to speak, or of depiction that is in some measure adequate or inadequate. Specifically, the depiction of
an event cinematically and the depiction of an event in the form of a painting: a painted leap, a painted run. What about depiction in such cases? Yet here one must first ask how matters stand with respect to perception. Is this the perception of a leap serving as an image for a leap? And to what extent is this the perception of a leap (only perceptual appearance, of course; that which makes possible the full perception is annulled)? This is something to ponder.

“To make a presentation of something for oneself according to a description”—to make a presentation of an antediluvian monster on the authority of its skeleton, and the like. We must analyze this precisely: On the one hand, we have a conceptual presentation, a verbal presentation; on the other hand, we have an intuitive presentation “matching it.” The appearance in the intuitive presentation, however, is an “image.” It only “presents” something to me; it sketches an analogue, an image. More precisely, an image of the thing itself, which, beyond the features specifically fulfilling the description (the thoughts), is still indefinite. (The description, of course, contains indefinite components; and to the extent that these are in question, the image offers nothing that genuinely analogizes. One would certainly have to distinguish between what genuinely <analogizes> and what does not in the case of each image.)

Question: Conflict belongs to the essence of a perceptual image. Conflict also belongs to the essence of a phantasy image occurring in memory. But not to the essence of every single image? Examples! I make an image for myself of an East African lion according to a description of it. The phantasy image, of course, does not conflict with anything. It is, to be sure, genuinely an image only with respect to such and such features. And the remaining features do indeed also exist in the image intuitively, although not re-presentationally in the proper sense. I certainly do not have in addition a second presentation that would give something in this respect, and so on.

Hence, only when an image consciousness is grounded in a perceptual nexus (when a perception stands precisely in a perceptual nexus but is not inserted into it harmoniously), or likewise when an image consciousness is inserted into a memorial nexus, do we have image consciousness connected with conflict: all of which would have to be grasped with more precision.
I must be on guard against generalizing improperly: as if image and conflict were necessarily connected. One must also take note of what is essentially a matter of appearance and what is a matter of “positing.” But this will soon be determined and settled more precisely.\(^4\)

\(^4\) The last sentence perhaps refers to the text reproduced in No. 17a. — Editor’s note.
APPENDIX LII

<IMPOSSIBILITY OF PAINTING A SENSATION CONTENT (COLOR, SOUND, ETC.) (ON A REMARK BY W. SCHAPP): CONSCIOUSNESS OF ABSOLUTE GIVENNESS LEAVES NO ROOM FOR CONFLICT>

<probably 1910>

Schapp makes an interesting incidental remark: One cannot, in strictness, paint a color (a color as color, to speak more precisely). One cannot paint a sensation content, the tone in itself, and so on. A color that is perfectly like a second color is not in itself an “image” of the latter. Why not? That is Schapp’s question. I sought to show in my analyses that a hidden consciousness of nullity, so to speak, belongs essentially to image consciousness. Where there is no figment, there is also no image. In every case of genuine depiction, I can become explicitly conscious of a conflict; one “apprehension” conflicts with another and is annulled by it. But something purely “immanent,” as a sensuous content is, cannot function as an image, since the consciousness of adequate givenness leaves no room for conflict with another consciousness that gives something.

In the same way, of course, no feeling in itself can “depict” another feeling, no judgment in itself can “depict” another judgment. We are referring here not to just any analogizing but always to a “depicting,” to a “simulating.” It is not opposed to this depicting that a color I am now sensing (or an object’s color I am now seeing) can be the image of a color I sensed yesterday, that by means of a present feeling, willing, and so on, I can analogize a different feeling that existed earlier or a feeling belonging to another human being. This, of course, is not

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1 Cf. W. Schapp, Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung, 1910, p. 41f. A copy of this work is located in Husserl’s private library at the Husserl Archives in Leuven under the signature BP 218 and shows traces of Husserl’s reading. — Editor’s note.
an image consciousness like that belonging to “fiction” (to genuine
depiction, to likeness): And it was the latter that we were referring to
above.

This still has to be analyzed. An $\alpha$ that is given here and now in the
given nexus serves as the analogue for a different $\alpha$, $\alpha' = \alpha$, $\alpha' \sim \alpha$,
in a different nexus, which is new or perfectly like the original one.

Of course, there are exhibiting images of the colors of a physical
thing, of the thing’s sensuous determinations. This continually hap-
pens in painting. And there are also tactile images (it is not the statue
or the wax figure, but the actor who depicts in the tactile mode for
the person born blind who touches him). Spoken words are likewise
images in the play. Hence sounds [are images] of sounds, just as utter-
ances manifesting mental life [are images] of utterances manifesting
mental life.
APPENDIX LIII
<PERCEIVING IN THE IMAGING CONSCIOUSNESS, PERCEIVING IN THE MIRROR IMAGE>
<p><em>probably 1912 or somewhat later</em></p>

5 I spoke frequently of image apperception. Can one also speak of a pictorial perceiving, of a perceiving in image, in imaging consciousness?

Perceiving in a mirror image would come into consideration here (whether it is a question of a mirror that distorts, of a colored mirror, and so on). Certainly the mirroring apprehending would have to be investigated with greater precision in its relation to ordinary depictive apprehending.

In any case, I can “perceive” by means of the mirror; e.g., I look at what is behind me in the mirror and I see it as it appears there — in the mirror. And so on. The image is not the thing, though in the image I do perceive the thing. I not only believe that what is imaged exists, but that it is united with the image, which is its “reflection.” Moreover, I can also intuit it analogously, according to its appearance in the image.

20 The “image,” the appearing object itself, however, does not exist; it is a figment. The thing itself, therefore, is not co-posited as something real connected with something appearing. On the other hand, the image is not entirely without reality here. It has the reality of something “reflective” that refers back to the thing being reflected in it.
In the understanding of the description of an object familiar to us — of a landscape, and so on — a framework conceived in general terms is furnished by means of concepts. This framework is supposed to be filled out by intuition according to the sense of the description. A presentation of an object unfamiliar to the reader, an intuition of it, is supposed to be sketched. However, what can only be sketched essentially and in fact is an intuitive presentation that corresponds to the conceptual framework and is given in consciousness in order that it be a faithful “image” of the object according to what was described. What goes beyond the boundaries of the framework is an indeterminate representant, and thus the whole of what is presented as presented (the presentation) is a resemblance representant of what is meant. It is, of course, a different sort of image presentation from the image presentation that occurs by means of a physical image together with an image object, etc. And yet it is an image.

1 Addition to the theory of image presentation.
A poem, a picture. The description of the work.

I already know that it is an aesthetic work, an aesthetic formation. The description grasps the work conceptually, but the description is the expression of something intuitable and is to be redeemed by intuition. The description is supposed to produce an intuition in the reader. But there are many descriptions of the same work, and that would be desirable if all of them not only corresponded to the work but could secure the identical intuition (re-presenting intuition) of the work. But so it is again in the case of every description of something that can be intuited concretely — a landscape, a human being, a city.

The “images” that are produced by the intuitive understanding of the description can be many and various, and not at all in accord with one another as aspects of an object. Only the universal, which the description “covers,” belongs to the object itself. The universal, however, is a mere framework that is filled out by a filling that remains vague and is not looked upon as definitely belonging to the re-presented object itself. It is analogous to the way in which, in the case of an image re-presentation, we distinguish between what is attributed to the depicted object and what is stopgap. Must we therefore say: The description furnishes an image of the object? But that is obviously not the case. It is not an image in the ordinary sense. We “see” the image subject “in” the image object. An image subject is re-presented in the present image object; on the second level, an image subject is re-presented in the re-presented image object. Here again, to be sure, the described object is re-presented in the translation of the descriptive language back into intuition (a re-presenting intuition), but certainly in a different way. In what way?
We can say: In the case of ordinary depiction, an image object is something presented by means of a physical image thing, which is there from the first. Here the physical image thing is missing. Here something actual is not re-presented in something else that is actual. To be sure, I do posit what is described as actual, but in a way similar to that in which I posit something remembered as actual. In the case of what is remembered, I also have the distinction between the genuine components of memory and what serves as stopgap.

We must still work this out more clearly and in more detail. All such relationships are important.

The following must be worked out: In image consciousness itself we have a relation to the subject and to what in the image object corresponds to or does not correspond to the subject. Whether the image is a faithful image or not, whether the portrait is a good portrait or not, is an entirely different relation.
<ON THE THEORY OF INTUITIONS AND THEIR MODES>  [498]
<texts probably from 1918>

<a>) Consciousness that gives something and phantasy; acts in
which there is consciousness of individuals.

<Contents:>

The concrete individual regarded noetically.
Looked at more closely, however, a theory of intuitions and their modes.

The intuitions of concrete individuals.
Perception and the present (the concrete present, with its primal present, its just past, [and] what is coming), retention, protention.
Recollection in its indirectness of intentionality. Anticipation. Neutrality as opposed to positionality. Reproductive and perceptual phantasy. The figment as object (possibility, which, of course, is not the same). Identity of the “what” of something phantasied and of something positional. The relations of coinciding, in contrast to the distinction between reality and figment (possibility), as nonsensible.

p. 609, 30ff. The unreality of the figment not to be confused with the negatum of actual experience (a modality of actual experience — within positionality). Relation between the world of actual experience and invented worlds and nonworlds.
Possible alteration of the experiential attitude, by means of which what is actually experienced becomes converted into something quasi-experienced (one cannot say into figments here) (figures in a landscape). p. 614f.

Every individual has its concrete essence or has in itself a concrete content (also called its individual essence), which is the particularization of the individual’s universal. This individual essence once more exists as an individual. It differs from every other individual essence that we call its repetition: The concrete individual is an individual essence in an individual difference (the τόδε τι), which is different for each individual and is therefore a determination that is not
repeatable, not specifiable. To that state belong, first of all, temporal location, and, secondly, spatial location for spatial objects. Every determination stands under universal concepts; and insofar as we speak of temporal location, a universal essence under which the location falls determines us. Every determination is, of course, specifiable in that sense. However, the universal “location” erases all differences belonging to the determinate location; the determinate location no longer enters into a species as something preserving itself within it, in the way in which, for example, an individual’s ultimate determinate color, understood as its lowest specific difference, can be specified precisely as something individually repeatable. Hence what is distinctive about the individual differentia lies in this: that the genus “time-point, time-duration,” in brief, the genera of the temporal as temporal (and then mediately the genera of the spatial as well), are capable of individual differentiation.

We therefore have a certain distinction between “content” (concrete content, individual essence) and form. Form here is the individualizing determination that is predicable of the object but is not a “property,” not a predicate to which an essential moment corresponds.

Consciousness that “gives” something
(that gives something itself)

Now if we refer the object to consciousness, then, as far as a concrete individual is concerned, the consciousness can be a consciousness that gives something. It gives the concrete individual; that is, it gives the content in the form of individuality. It gives the content. It does not merely have the content as an object of consciousness in just any way; on the contrary, it has it as given. And the “intuitiveness of consciousness” says something quite like that. Every consciousness that gives an individual is intuitive, but not every intuitive consciousness of an individual gives an individual in reality; it can be giving and quasi-giving. In the latter case, it seems that we can say: It can be giving with respect to the content but not with respect to the form.

1 We call components of the concrete essence essential moments of the individual.  
2 “gives something” later changed to “gives something itself.” — Editor’s note.  
3 “gives an individual” later changed to “gives an individual itself.” — Editor’s note.
But that statement is false. The individual essence is quasi-given in the act of phantasying. However, the concrete essence as eidos can be drawn from it, though it is given in eidetic seeing.

“Perception” (in the strict sense, as related to an individual)

Let us consider the matter. A consciousness of an individual that gives the individual can, in the first place, be a consciousness that gives it originarily. This originality of giving is accomplished in perception. An individual is perceived in the strict sense when one is conscious of it in the originary mode, in the mode of actuality “in person,” or, more precisely, of primal actuality “in person,” which is called the present. However, without prejudice to the mode of consciousness of givenness in person and in actuality, there can also be consciousness of the individual such that it simply lies in the original perceptual horizon, “still” lies in it, or lies in it as “yet to come.” That is to say, it is given retentionally as just having been perceived, as something that was just given immediately but in its flowing is still sinking into the past; or it is given protentionally as something that in its flowing is just now approaching, as something that is just about to be given immediately.

But instead of this perceptual givenness (which has its correlate in the “in person” and in the original temporal modalities or modalities of actuality — the modalities of the present and of the “just now” on both sides, or, taking them all together, of the present in an expanded sense), the givenness can also be reproductive givenness and can be understood as such.

“Actual experience,” “reproductive actual experience,” “recollection, anticipation” [501]

If we include new modes, then the wider concept of actual experience — of perceptual or reproductive experience — arises for

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4 Actuality [Wirklichkeit] = being actual [wirklich Se i n].
5 Retention and protention classified with perception.
us. Hence the recollective consciousness, which gives something re-
productively, newly joins what is already there. The correlate of this
consciousness is the recollected present together with its “just now”
given once again, the individual as past in the strict sense, charac-
terized as no longer present, as no longer a living now or just now
(hence as no longer the present understood in the expanded sense), but
instead as completely over with, completely finished and only con-
sidered “once again.” Then, on the other side, we have anticipation
(commonly also called “expectation,” although the expression is too
wide and does not extend to intuitive acts only, though this is also true
of the terms “recollection” and “anticipation”). Anticipation relates to
what is future in the strict sense; namely, to what is not characterized
in the sense of anticipatory consciousness as a process of coming into
being that is grasped as it actually occurs (in the living status of what
is just now coming), but is nevertheless characterized as coming into
being in the future. We understand all of these acts to be intuiting acts.
The intuiting belongs to the act of giving in our specific sense. We do
not have just any consciousness of the individual; on the contrary, the
individual stands, as it were, “right before our eyes.” It offers itself
with an intuitive fullness. But this says nothing else than that there
is consciousness of the “content” of the object not only as there is in
any other consciousness of the individual, but that the content stands
before us “itself,” is set down before us, presented6 in a special sense.
And this “itself” does not exactly signify the “itself” of being given
“in person.” In perception we are conscious of the perceived object
with the characteristic of being “actual.” However, what is perceived
as perceived, the “content of the perception,” is nothing self-sufficient,
as if the characteristic “actual” could be pasted to it and detached from
it.7 What is given perceptually is the correlate of perception, and such
a correlate is, precisely, given actuality. Hence actuality is what is
universal with respect to the correlate of perception.8 But now we say
that the same thing that is perceived there can also be the content of

image-object consciousness. If we compare the latter with the percep-
tual consciousness, the correlates in a certain sense coincide: We say

6 “originally” inserted later before “presented.” — Editor’s note.
7 Husserl later placed a large question mark next to the last sentence. — Editor’s note.
8 Actuality? The It-itself as subjective characteristic.
that there is consciousness of the same “content” in the image-object consciousness as there is in the perception — specifically, perceptual (not imaginative) content — only with a different characteristic. Perhaps we can say: there is consciousness of it as annulled actuality. If I attempt to take up my old conception again, this could be interpreted as a consciousness in which a perception is annulled by a perception, the former “defeated” in conflict with the latter, which “holds its own.” Through this process, what is perceived has the characteristic of nullity. We disregard the fact that the figment, in addition, still functions as presenting depictively by virtue of a presentation that symbolizes something pictorially.

Accordingly, we could interpret recollection as follows: It is a “reproduction” that confers on what is reproduced the original characteristic of givenness once again, of what is remembered; and this characteristic is the characteristic of something that has been actual. The actuality is a modification of the perceptually constituted actuality taken simply or of present actuality. More precisely, this “having been actual” is not a simple, fulfilled having been actual that is the correlate of retention, but a mediate mode of having been actual pointing back intentionally to a continuous sequence of memories that terminates in the retentional field of actual perception and that — in the case of the realization of these memories — would be fulfilled in that field. In unqualified recollection, we have reproduction. In reproduction, we have as correlate what is reproduced as reproduced, i.e., what is remembered, with the characteristic of actuality, which quite certainly does belong here but which is without actual fulfillment in its intentionality, although the present perception as final terminus of the intentionality is [an actual] experience.\footnote{We must formulate this more distinctly. Recollection, understood as intuitive recollection, is consciousness of the past objectivity itself and consequently fulfilling. This fulfillment, however, is fulfillment at a distance. It is similar to the case in which, in the sphere of external perception (of the spatial world), the distant thing is the appearance of the thing itself, what is seen at a distance is seen itself and yet seen in a mere appearance of itself. Missing, therefore, is the concept of the appearance of something itself, of the grasping of something itself through appearances, in contrast to the grasping of something itself that would no longer be a grasping through appearances. Of course, in the external sphere there are, without exception, only appearances. And thus the recollection of something external is doubly mediate.} Everything recollected has an intentional relation to the actual present: but the intention is in
general unfulfilled, and this means that it is not “intuitive,” not given as realized. And so the re-presented actuality, as far as its content is concerned, is indeed intuitive. The actuality itself, however, is not intuitive; that is, the actuality pure and simple or the present is not actually re-presented: the present that is or was originally given in perception. This would have to be understood as follows: The past is actually intuited as a past present if I trace the recollection back through the chain of recollections to its final terminus, to the flowing present, which now exists. Do I have no intuition otherwise? I have an intuition of the content and I have the memorial characteristic of having been actual in relation to the actual present — to that extent, surely, I have something of fulfillment, though not actual fulfillment. Mediating fulfillments are absent in the case of the indirectness of the intention.

In recollection, in spite of the characteristic of reproduction, what is remembered stands before our eyes itself; it is not perchance something else there in person (as in the case of depicting) and of which we are conscious as the representant of something resembling it, of something presenting itself in it. And it also stands before our eyes in the sense of the “objectivity itself,” insofar as it is not meant through an emptiness and can first be brought close to us out of this distance in consciousness; that is, can be made intuitive.

However, as we have already said, intuiting acts relating to an individual are still not, for that reason, acts that actually give something; on the contrary, it is only actually experiencing acts that do that. “The act of intuiting” (the act of presenting in the narrower sense, which, of course, earlier remained unrecognized in such a narrower sense, since one had overlooked the empty consciousness) refers to the content; the content is given, which signifies that it is intuited. Moreover, this content and the content of a phantasied individual can be taken to be the same: For a phantasied individual can have precisely the same content, only intended and intuited “in the manner peculiar to phantasy.” Phantasying, however, is not actual experiencing; an individual phantasied is not an individual given. And inasmuch as the phantasy

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10 “actually” was inserted above the line, though probably at the time the text was originally written, and the following was also noted on the margin: “only actually experiencing acts are acts that actually give something.” — Editor’s note.
content can be explicated and described as indeed precisely the same, though as the content of a phantasy individual it is not an “actual” content, to speak of the “givenness” of the content in phantasy is also to use the word in a modificational way.11

Perceptual and reproductive phantasy as “actual” phantasy experience. Pure phantasy

But now let us proceed more systematically. Acts that “merely” present something stand opposed to acts that actually experience something. This simply means that the former are not actually experiencing acts but quasi-experiencing acts. Since merely presenting acts can be combined with actually experiencing acts or with other acts that posit actuality (which similarly lack the modification of the “merely,” of the “quasi”), we take pure cases of merely presenting acts. If we call them phantasying acts (or, with respect to the “positing of actuality,” neutralized acts), then we have to distinguish perceptual from reproductive phantasies, both therefore thought of as pure, without admixture of actual experiences that would confer on them a relation to reality (hence, say, to a definite time, to a definite place). The image-object consciousness, which is the foundation of every mediate intuiting of the kind that we call depictive consciousness, intuiting “in” the image, is an example of a perceptual phantasy.12 Every phantasy that is called phantasy in the ordinary sense is an example of a reproductive phantasy. On the other hand, every memory, that is, every unmodified reproduction (unmodified because it does not transform what is reproduced, which is brought about once again in the mode of memory, into something quasi-actual), is not classified with phantasy in the ordinary sense (as unfortunately often happens). In phantasy we are not unqualifiedly conscious of an intuited object as

11 All of this is wrong. “Intuiting” is a universal title for positional and neutral acts that make us conscious of an individual in a fulfilled way. They are either “actually” intuiting acts or “quasi”-intuiting acts, and in both cases content is formed. But in one case we are conscious of the individual as something actual, in the other case as a figment. In both, however, the same concrete essence can be obtained by means of “ideation.”
12 Cf. the seven pages on perceptual phantasy and artistic “image” consciousness <No. 18b, that is>.
actual, as present, past, and so on; on the contrary, we are conscious of it together with its content “as if” it were present. For us it is actuality “as if.”

The “as it were” of reproduction and the “as if” of phantasy

What is intuited in phantasy is not simply given “as it were,” as happens in a reproduction, although it can also be given in that way and is given in that way, as in every case of reproductive phantasy. Rather, a totally different “as it were” makes its appearance here. We can also say that we are not actually experiencing something but that we have phantasied ourselves into an act of experiencing in such a way that we feel as if we were actually experiencing. And correlative, corresponding to this as-if experiencing, a concrete individual stands before our eyes as determined in such and such a way in content, but only in the as-if. In lively intuition we “behold” centaurs, water nymphs, etc.; they stand before us, depart, present themselves from this side and that, sing and dance, and so on. All, however, in the mode of the “as-if”; and this mode saturates all of the temporal modes and with them also the content, which is content only in temporal modes. We say correctly, and yet again incorrectly: In mere phantasy we do not believe. In phantasy we do not carry out any positing, any taking to be existing; that is, any taking to be actual. It is correct that we do not carry out such positing, but it would be incorrect to say that consciousness of being is not to be found here in any sense. On the contrary, it is to be found in every sense in which it occurs in and characterizes actual experience, “except” that every sense and every form of this consciousness of being characterizing actual experience has, so to speak, been emasculated, has taken on the impotent form of the as-if, of “phantasy.” Here, however, we must note that the traditional use of the term “positing” (“position,” “thesis”), which we have taken over into the phenomenological domain with abundant pertinent phenomenological clarifications, signifies no action of the Ego, no positing doing emanating from the Ego; and for that reason we also may not speak of carrying out.\(^13\) All of the acts that we have contrasted

\(^{13}\) This is pregivenness, which, however, rests on the continuing acceptance of earlier positing.
here can be performed in the mode of active positing, or they can be completely passive: Passive perception, for example, gives us the concrete individual in its actuality, whether or not we grasp the individual, whether or not we have surrendered to it in an activity of turning toward and of actual positing. And the same is true of phantasy as well. Phantasy, too, can have modalities of accomplishment or can also not have them. The figment stands before our eyes as a figment, with all of the relevant modes of actuality — the living present, the living just past, the finished and settled past, the future, and whatever else we may distinguish there — but everything precisely as fiction, as phantasy.  

And something similar is true of perceptual phantasy. Thus the image in a painting stands before us as actuality “in person” (in the image of the madonna as an actually seen image, for example, the madonna herself is represented, though without regard to this relation of representation). For that reason, we say flatly: the image is perceived. Then the talk of perception refers to mere perceptual intuitiveness, whose correlate is the appearing “in person.” The image also stands before us as present actuality. But this present and this actuality are just actuality as if; the image only hovers before us perceptually. What is intuited in phantasies is the individual content, which can be exactly the same as the content that is intuited in actual empirical experiences.  

But how can we say the same content, since actual experiences and corresponding quasi-experiences (or phantasies) surely do not piece themselves together from two components: the components of intuition, understood as the components giving the content, and the components of the positing of actuality, which would have to give the form. Content and form are certainly not only inseparably combined, but the content of actual experiences is what it is only in its mode of actuality, just as the phantasy content is what it is only in its mode of quasi-actuality. The one content is the concrete individual of which one is conscious as present, for example; the other is the concrete individual of which one is conscious as fictively present.  

14 This is misleading. If phantasy and actual experience really coincided, it would be the concrete individual (with its temporal location) [that we would have, not the individual content]. For transcendent objects, however, this is only an Idea!  

15 Again, this is misleading. I am confusing the temporal form and the form of fiction here, and the reason for this is that in the transcendent sphere no phantasy is possible.
exists, has factual being; the latter does not exist, is merely fiction. Accordingly, we say that a phantasied individual is nothing, nothing actual, not an individual. For, stated simply, a concrete individual is an actual individual and actually exists in this or that mode of actuality.

On the other hand, it is evident that what is phantasied is, in its own way, something positable, a “this,” hence a substrate of possible descriptions, of possible true judgments. It is that which “hovers before us” in phantasy; it exists as a figment. Another expression for it is simply: It is a pure possibility, whereas actuality (something characterized as actuality in consciousness) is actually experienced. The possibility is not an actuality and the actuality itself is not a possibility, although we can say that it contains such a possibility in itself. We merely need to neutralize the positing, to think of it as neutralized.

But what does it mean that in both cases a concrete individual is presented and that what is actually experienced and what is phantasied can be “the same”?

Speaking from the noetic standpoint, it obviously signifies that actual experience and phantasy can coincide in a synthesis that we call the consciousness of equality, and that in principle a possible phantasy also corresponds to every actual experience (according to an ideal possibility), and conversely: a correspondence, however, that is itself again defined by the possibility of the coinciding of equals.

And if we look at the correlates, it is inherent in them that a possibility (of which we are conscious in phantasies) “corresponds” to every actuality (of which we are conscious in some actual experience or other), and that the corresponding correlates coincide as “equivalent.” Therefore, to state this in another important form: equality, and hence every relation of coinciding, has the property that it is indifferent to the distinction between actuality and possibility. What is equivalent can be something actual and something possible.

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16 The figment as object (yet is it correct to identify figment and possibility?).
17 We must therefore start from this and make clear the realizable sense of this idea of perfect correspondence.
This does not mean that we could cut out or abstract (which is also a cutting out, if we understand by abstraction a picking out that considers something all by itself) a piece from a concrete individual taken purely and simply, from a reality, and then that we could find something similar in a fiction, in an unreality. In the fiction we find something phantasied through and through, and in an actual experience we find only what is actual. However, we never find anything at all [in the fiction] that would be exchangeable with an actually experienced component, that would be an actual repetition of it. Hence our earlier reference to repetition becomes modified with the shift into phantasy. The equality of actuality and actuality is actual repetition, but the equality of actuality and mere possibility is certainly equality. We could even say that it places an actual individuation of an essence in relation to a possible individuation, and both agree in the essence. In focusing on examples (which, for their part, are indifferent to the distinction between actual experience and phantasy), the same essence as “something universal” can be drawn from both through eidetic seeing (and, in this sense, abstraction). In other respects, the phantasied individual “exists” in the sense of phantasy; and its content is a content of presentation in the sense of a phantasy content, its present or extra-present actuality a phantasy actuality. Just as, on the other side, the individual belonging to actual experience exists in the sense of actual experience, and so on. However, taking the being on both sides in the pertinent sense, an equality, which is an equality between unmodified and modified being, definitely obtains with respect to what exists on both sides (what is actual on the side of actual experience — on the other side, the phantasy actuality {or existent}); and the “modification” must be derived precisely from the sense of phantasy.

We must also notice here\(^\text{18}\) that “inactuality” in the sense of a figment must not be confused with the negation of actuality that confronts us in a negatively experiencing act (the *negatum* belonging to actual experience). In the latter, one actual experience comes into conflict with another actual experience, and one then remains firm while the other undergoes the negative experiential mode of cancellation.

\(^{18}\) This is also *the theme* for the wider investigation of the next several pages, up to 19 <that is, up to the end of No. 18>. 
whose correlate is the actually experienced nullity, modalized in its temporal aspect, of course, as not present or not past, not future, and so on.

**Whether there is a completely pure phantasy**

5 Nevertheless, we must immediately add that this interpretation is also subject to serious objections, which caused me to vacillate again and again in deciding what the correct interpretation is here. We can also express the objections in the following form: It is *doubtful whether there is such a thing as a completely pure phantasy*, hence a phantasy outside all connection with acts of actual experience. In the realm of actual experience, every experience is bound into a nexus of actual experience and not simply bound into the total flow of consciousness. Every phantasy is also inserted into the latter, and the question is whether this insertion does not necessarily involve the figment’s having a relation to reality and having its cancellation in this relation: which, of course, would explain why, as a matter of course, we are in the habit of identifying fiction and nullity. In addition, one could point to the fact that we are also involved in every phantasy as the spectator, so to speak; that we are thereby always already constituted as human beings in our experiential world, beyond which phantasy may indeed soar, though perhaps necessarily in such a way that it somewhere clashes with the reality of experience. In fact, if we focus our attention on the phantasies that ordinarily occur to us, they are not pure phantasies but phantasies “into,” phantasying a figment into a portion of intuitively experienced reality or even of obscurely posited reality.

**Perceptual figments and their connection, in conflict, with the real world of actual experience**

Moreover, it is clear with respect to the *perceptual figments* (and this drives in the same direction) that they always have the characteristic of cancelled realities. The “image” has its image space, but

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19 “serious” was later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
this perceptual space somewhere borders on the real space with the realities belonging to immediate perception (the edge of the image belonging to the painting hanging on the wall indicates such congruences, for example). The unseen part of the space belonging to the image conflicts with parts of the space of actual experience; and from this the image itself receives its condition of being contested, and, in the presence of the “firmness” of what is actually experienced, its nullity. Of course, we also have various figments that in themselves are certainly mixtures. The king on the stage is indeed an actual human being with actual garments — except that in reality, of course, the king is Herr actor so-and-so and not king, his robe is a part of the theatrical wardrobe and not a coronation robe, and so on.

Alleged connection between reproductive figments and the world of actual experience. Alleged conflict and cancellation

This is also true in the case of reproductive phantasies. Examined more closely, I find, for example, that the centaur that I am just now phantasying has as hindquarters a part of a horse that I have recently seen, that the face of the water nymph that hovers before me is, as it were, the very image of a person with whom I am well acquainted, and so on. Do all “ideas,” as Hume believed, ultimately “derive” from impressions — specifically, in the sense in which “derive” is understood phenomenologically? Are all ideas therefore given in themselves as transformed reproductions and mixtures of transformed reproductions? That is, in forms of transformation that are themselves reproductive forms and therefore have the characteristic of actual experience, except that everything here is overturned by conflict? Namely, everything is overturned with regard to its simple actuality, and in that respect is cancelled?

Counterarguments

Nevertheless, I cannot reconcile myself to this view. I believe above all that one should not admit questions of genesis here, even questions of purely phenomenological genesis, and that one must restrict oneself to the phenomena themselves. However, one must divide the
latter, and the modalities of performance should not be allowed to show themselves indifferently. One will have to distinguish between cases of actual conflict, as in theatrical presentations, and cases of potential conflict that depend on intentions aimed at one’s surroundings, intentions that belong to the intuitive object but that must first be “unfolded” in order to lead to actual conflicts. The picture on the wall gives a perceptual figment, as if I were looking through a window. If I say that in reality the wall is not broken through and that behind the wall there is another room and not the space of the figment with its objects, then I am already unfolding the intentional horizons that belong to the actually seen wall and to the painting as a physical thing hanging on the wall, and so on, just as on the other side I am unfolding the intentional horizons belonging to the image space, which is no longer intuitively given but intended mediately in the intentions aimed at the surroundings. In order actually to conflict, the intentions aimed at the surroundings must first display a vitality, must first wriggle free, and this is a special case.

Passive conflict and cancellation and active negation

Hence this actualizing is not, in general, necessary. Only when a conflicting double apperception already presents itself in connection with an intuited object, as in the case of mannequins — of inanimate mannequins but also of animate ones (as actors are) — and of a plaster statue that represents a human being, and so on, does a passive cancellation present itself from the beginning, which, however, is activated when we immerse ourselves in the plaster thing and then in the human being, grasping it, and, with the grasping, vivifying and unfolding its intentions.

Suppose that we immerse ourselves in what is intuited, specifically, in one of the contending apperceptions, hence in the apperception of the “king” in the theatrical performance, without entering into the other apperception and without forming, in the transition, the consciousness of conflict (just as in the transition from immersion in one of two similar things to immersion in the other, we can have “sensuous similarity” given to us without producing the consciousness of coinciding pertaining to similarity, understood as the consciousness of unity). Now if we do that, the negation of actuality, the active
rejection, the active cancellation, is missing on the side of the actively apperceived object, while nonetheless within the boundaries of passivity we are not conscious of the intuited object in a normal perception: But that implies that the carrying out of the apperception “inhibits” the second apprehension, which is supported by the same sensuous data. In this inhibiting, however, it is characterized noematically. The positing that belongs essentially to the uninhibited apprehension, that is, the characteristic of uninhibited actuality (which signifies a privation), is cut off by a countercharacteristic. But how is that possible, since we do not carry out any negation and do not enter into the counterconsciousness that would be necessary for that purpose? This is the point at which we must not succumb to the temptation of the interpretation we put forward above as so obvious. The passive characteristic of uninhibited actuality, the characteristic of actual experience, is, of course, cut off by the passive characteristic of being cancelled; and hence it would indeed be impossible to see how the mere carrying out of the one apperception should not already give rise to a consciousness of the object in the characteristic of nullity. This characteristic makes its appearance here in its first stage as inhibited actuality. This leads, in the transition to the other apperception while one holds on to what is given in the first apperception, to the actualized givenness of the conflict and to the transition to actual nullity (from the condition of being merely inhibited or contested), if the actualization of the other apperception leads to its confirmation in the unfolding of its intentions and in its fulfillment in its nexus. The latter apperception, to be sure, also gives its object at first as contested; its consciousness of actuality also has its inhibition. But looking at it precisely, a great difference nonetheless exists: The intentions of the one apperception have their nexus, in which they are able to run their course without inhibition; when we immerse ourselves in these intentions themselves (and disregard the counterapperception), they are in harmony. And even without any immersion, in mere passivity they belong to an intentional nexus that supports all of their components and confers on them harmony and immediate or mediate fulfillment.

In the counterapperception, on the other hand, we have a portion of the intentional nexus that lacks this advantage, that intuitively is in harmony in itself (as in the case of the image object), that therefore in itself brings intentions to fulfillment and in turn brings to fulfillment new intentions inhering in the initial fulfillment, but that then comes
to a boundary at which further intentions reach into the sphere of the second apperception. This sphere, with respect to intention and fulfillment (also with respect to obscure reproductive intention and obscure nonintuitive agreement with further such reproductions), is completely closed within itself and does not tolerate reaching into it: the one apperception therefore brings along with it unbroken believing; that is, an unbroken consciousness of actuality (as harmonious agreement of intentional components). And this consciousness of actuality is not genuinely contested by the consciousness belonging to the other apperception, but is only “annoyed” by it with its infringement. [The first apprehension] is not the contested but the contesting apprehension; it offers the harmoniously intended real thing — that is, the real thing of actual experience taken simply, which is established as a fact and furnishes the basis for the contesting, the rejecting of the other object. The latter object itself has the characteristic of modified, cancelled actuality. The sense, then, in which the interpretation of the doubting, of the deeming possible, of the deeming likely (with respect to what is chiefly deemed to be possible) would have to ensue hardly needs explanation. The harmonious fulfilling of the intentions (and even, so to speak, the fulfilling — namely, the confirming — in what is nonintuitive) does not need to be a pure fulfilling; unresolved countertensions can be left over in these interconnections, and so on.

Change from the attitude of actual experience into the attitude of perceptual phantasy

If we come back again to the carrying out of one of the apperceptions, and especially of the inhibited apperception, we would not get beyond an accomplished — even if not completely unfolded — consciousness of nullity, beyond the stage of inhibited or checked actuality, if a new attitude were not possible that did not permit the contesting experience to win acceptance, did not let it get a word in edgewise, so to speak, and accordingly would also not allow what the characteristic of inhibiting indicates. The change of attitude, then, is precisely the shift from actual experience, or, as the case may be, from the negation of actual experience, into phantasy, into the peculiar
consciousness of the as-if, which, as one can no doubt say, is only made easy by the inhibiting that presents itself here. We submit to what appears as if it were reality. Perhaps one can say that precisely the same thing is not altogether impossible even in the case of uninterrupted and uninhibited actual experience — as when we contemplate a beautiful landscape aesthetically, and the landscape and even all of the human beings, houses, and villages that we see in our experience of it are “accepted” by us as if they were mere figures in a painted landscape.20 We are, of course, actually experiencing, but we are not in the attitude of actual experience; we do not actually join in the experiential positing. The reality changes into reality-as-if for us, changes into “play”; the objects turn into aesthetic semblance: into mere — though perceptual — phantasy objects. Here the pleasurable feeling that the aspects of the objects of actual experience excite, aspects which, turned toward active pleasure, make up a part of aesthetic contemplation, seems to have a motivating power, or at least seems to facilitate the phantasy attitude, which itself also belongs to the aesthetic, even when it is precisely actual experience that is the starting point.

But I believe that there are also, and in abundance, passive phantasies, phantasies not carried out. Phantasies as reproductive phantasies come to mind suddenly and are only subsequently activated, without the necessity of a change in attitude starting from an unmodified reproduction, in the way in which in the aesthetic cases discussed above the starting point was an unmodified perception, that is, a perceptual experience. I believe that there are very probably pure phantasies that are not contested reproductions (no matter how they are “derived” from reproductions) and that have their original property in the fact that they indicate concrete parts of the coherent harmony of the reproductive apperceptions, but with horizons that are completely indeterminate, and that accordingly cannot be unfolded at all. Here the apperception stands in the “air,” and in that fact will probably possess the motive to be performed from the start in the as-if.

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20 But one will not speak of figments in this case.
Art is the realm of phantasy that has been given form, of perceptual or reproductive phantasy that has been given form, of intuitive phantasy, but also, in part, of nonintuitive phantasy. It cannot be said that art must necessarily move within the sphere of intuitiveness. Earlier I believed that it belonged to the essence of fine art to present in an image, and I understood this presenting to be depicting. Looked at more closely, however, this is not correct. In the case of a theatrical performance, we live in a world of perceptual phantasy; we “have” images” within the cohesive unity of one image, but we do not for that reason have depictions. If Wallenstein or Richard III is presented on stage, depictive presentations are surely involved, although the extent to which this depictiveness has an aesthetic function itself is a question we will have to consider. Certainly depictiveness is not the primary concern; rather, it is a matter of imaging in the sense of perceptual phantasy understood as immediate imagination. In the case of a domestic comedy or drama, depiction is obviously omitted; and the same is true of stories, even when they begin with “once upon a time,” as fairy tales commonly do. They are intuitive or partially intuitive reproductions of what is past that are offered to us specifically in the mode of the phantasy of the past and, on occasion, in the mode of completely pure phantasy, as in the fairy tales of Hoffmannsthal.

In order to work the matter out in still more detail in the case of drama, we speak of theatrical presentation and perhaps even call it imaging presentation. The actors produce an image, the image of a tragic event, each actor producing the image of a character in the play, and so on. But here “image of” does not signify depiction of. And the following must be distinguished from the image in this case: The actor’s presentation is not a presentation in the sense in which we say of an image object that an image subject is presented in it. Neither the actor nor the image that is his performance for us is an image object in which another object, an actual or even fictive image subject, is depicted. (The performance of the actor here means the production
of an “image” by means of his real actions, and among these are
his movements, his change of expression, his external “appearance,”
which is his production). An actual depicting presents itself in the
case of a portrait, which, moreover, can just as well be the portrait
of an imaginary person as of an actual person. And furthermore, the
depictiveness here may itself fall into the aesthetic consciousness as
aesthetic. But when a play is presented, no consciousness of depiction
whatsoever needs to be excited, and what then appears is a pure per-
ceptual figment. We live in neutrality; we do not carry out any actual
posing at all with respect to what is intuited. Everything that occurs
there, everything there in the way of things and persons, everything
said and done there, and so on — all of this has the characteristic of
the as-if. The living human beings, the actors, the real things called
“scenes,” actual furniture, actual curtains, etc., “present”; they serve
to transplant us into the artistic illusion. If we use the term “illusion”
[Illusion] for every case in which a perceptual phantasy is “excited”
by actual things, or, let us rather say, produced on the background
of perceptions and possibly of other actual experiences of real things
— specifically, in such a way that in them the artistic object presents
itself — then we have to do with illusions. But what characterizes
this “presentation,” then? In the case of an illusion in the ordinary
sense, understood as a “semblance” [Schein] to which we “succumb,”
a perception is performed that in the identifying transition into other
perceptions or into reproductive actual experiences passes over into
another perception that stands in conflict with the original percep-
tion, which is then characterized as illusory. The other perception
coincides with the original perception through the partial identity of
[some] perceptual moments, though conflicting with it with respect
to others, in such a way that the intermingling of two incompatible
perceptual objects that are perceptible <only> alternately results. In
this situation, one object preserves its experiential thesis by means of
confirmation from actual experiences of its surroundings. The other
object, the illusory object, has modified its original thesis in the mode
of cancellation, and had to modify it (the cancellation [was] originally
motivated). In the case of the theatrical presentation, the play — this
section of an illusory world — appears, but we do not begin with a
normal perception. We do not begin with the thesis of the reality of
what appears perceptually. On the other hand, conflict exists here too,
only conflict that is there from the beginning and does not become constituted through new experiences later on: We “know” that what is happening here is play acting, that these pasteboard scenes and canvas screens are not actual trees, and so on. In a certain inactive (passive) manner, everything that is “seen” here has the characteristic of what is null, of what is cancelled, or, better, of what is annulled with respect to its reality. But we (who are not children) do not carry out any cancellation understood as active negation, any more than we actively carry out the consciousness of reality belonging to actual experience in which the actors and “presenting” things are given to us as actual. Hence the situation is not what it is in the case of an illusion, in which we place ourselves on the ground of actual experience and take sides with what is experienced against what is illusory, which we actively negate, cancel. And we must also note that we do not alternate intuitively between reality and illusion in such a way that one of the intuited things in the alternating is, so to speak, concealed for precisely as long as the other is actually intuited (which is what happens in every conflict within the sphere of intuition). Rather, without alternating, we have from the beginning only the artistic “image”; and what is real that functions as presentation, what is actually experienced without modification, is continuously concealed — concealed, though there is consciousness of it, only consciousness of it nonintuitively and in the peculiar fashion that the word “concealment” suggests in this case.

In this way, from the beginning we take as our basis “illusion,” “semblance,” which elsewhere and from other sources, which do not interest us here, is characterized for us as “aesthetic” semblance. In other words, we take phantasy intuition as our basis. But not at all simply in such a way that in intuiting we favor only one of the members of the conflict — specifically, the cancelled member — and that we abstain from active cancellation, just as we abstain, on the other side, from active positing of the concealed experiential realities and of the whole nexus of further experiential realities that extend beyond the rostrum through the orchestra into the audience, etc., and that are there for us constantly, and, with respect to their unconcealed part, even there perceptually. That we perform none of these positive and negative positings of reality does not imply that we do not carry out any positings at all. On the contrary, we perceive in an active way, we judge in an active way, we carry out expectations, we hope and fear,
we grieve and are moved to joy, we love and hate, and so on. But all of this “in” phantasy, in the mode of the as-if. In what way, then, do the people acting their parts — and, we can just as well say, the things acting their parts — present the artistic quasi-realities? From the point of view of the production, of the theatrical aims and their accomplishment, we can say: As “experience” teaches (the experience, of course, is not merely simple experience), certain things show themselves to be suited to excite a double apperception; specifically, a double perceptual apperception. Their perceptual appearances, or those belonging to certain circumstances favorable in this respect, easily change into other perceptual modes of appearance, and do so in such a way that the stock of what is genuinely perceived is common, or almost entirely common, to both perceptions entering into the conflict-unity, while the stock of what is not genuinely perceived (of what is coperceived) on both sides is the ground for the conflict-relationship. And these things are then offered under such circumstances to perception or to the perceptual consciousness of conflict, and are supposed to cause us, in shifting to a mere phantasy, to place ourselves on the ground of the cancelled perception, hence to inaugurate a purely perceptual phantasy. We understand this aim and go to the theater in order to satisfy it, and thereby to share in aesthetic enjoyment. Now irrespective of production and intentions, the factual situation here is precisely the following: While the perceptual conflict is being experienced, a carrying out of one side [of the conflict] in the sense of perceptual phantasy (fiction) takes place. The figment, however, presents itself in that sense in the real thing, when the latter offers, under given circumstances in its “genuine” perceptual “appearance,” precisely that which is “genuinely perceived” in the figment. But, of course, this is only reflection and a putting into relation of the two attitudes and their data.

In the fictionalizing experience, or in the attitude in which we live in the “image” world, we have not carried out anything belonging to the real world of actual experience, and specifically of the experience of the realities serving for presentation; this world, for us, is not a posited but a suspended world. This concerns even the pieces of furniture, which are just as much actual pieces of furniture as they are figments in the image world. They are not images of figments. In the attitude of the spectator living in the play, they are not actual pieces of
furniture that the spectator could use; on the contrary, they are pieces of furniture in the room of the president, and so forth — phantasy furniture, therefore. Hence even they are “semblance” and have their conflict with actual reality, to which the actual pieces of furniture belong. For pieces of furniture are objects of use and, standing in the room, have their express function as objects of use. The room, however, is a figment presented by means of conflict; the use to which the furnishings are subject and for which they are there is annulled by conflict. It is use presented in the figment, which is use for the persons who belong to the figment, who sit on the furnishings, and so on — in which case the sitting is not actual sitting but phantasy sitting, although the actor does also actually sit (which, however, only means that he performs all the movements, that he has the feelings in his muscles, that the corresponding physiological processes run their course in the muscles — all of which, however, surely does not amount to “taking a seat”). But at no point does representation occur here in the sense of depiction; that is, the consciousness in which a perceptual figment makes known another object, “means” it depictively, whether the object is an actual object or a fictive object itself.

In this way, then, art truly offers us an infinite wealth of perceptual fictions; specifically, of purely perceptual fictions and of purely reproductive fictions as well.

The phantasies here are not freely produced by us (the creative artist alone has freedom here and exercises it only in union with aesthetic ideals). Rather, they have their objectivity; they are prescribed for us, forced upon us in a way analogous to that in which the things belonging to reality are forced upon us as things to which we must submit. In an analogous way — yet naturally not in quite the same way.

The reproductive phantasies of narrative art are also forced upon us. In the previous case they are forced upon us by the succession of perceptions emerging in continuous conflict with actual experience, and in the present case by the succession of spoken or written words. Looked at precisely, we also have here a peculiar sort of empirical phantasy-modification; namely, with respect to signs, which are either actual signs — signs understood as actually existing, belonging to the

21 “phantasies” here seems to mean “perceptual fictions.” — Translator’s note.
real world and not to a phantasy world, although not experienced as things, thus experienced as, so to speak, psychophysical sign-objects, as sign-objects bearing cultural signification in the cultural world — or sign-fictions, signs as if. Printed words are also involved in conflict when they are used artistically. They present themselves simply as words; this is their “experiential” apperception. But this apperception is cancelled, for in fact in the world of actual experience they are printed black figures — printed, say, on paper — with significations that naturally carry a cancellation in the nexus of actual experience and, in spite of this cancellation, are taken as quasi-significations in the phantasy-image attitude.

At all times a stock of experiential realities on hand in the world of actual experience, and therefore binding, serves, by means of its mode of givenness, as binding necessity, in connection with which the understanding of the artistic intention that we wish to follow (hence submitting to someone else’s empirically posited intention) also plays its role.

The novel, the play, in its determinate image stock and image nexus, has intersubjective “existence” insofar as everyone who brings the “presenting” experienced objects to appearance under suitable circumstances, who produces conflicts that are not dependent on accidental subjectivity, and who freely follows the artistic intention, and so on, brings and must bring the same novel, the same concrete part of a phantasied life, of a phantasied destiny, etc., to quasi-experience.

Accordingly, descriptive statements, judgments about the characters, about their expected development, and so on, have a kind of objective truth, even though they refer to fictions. They are not themselves judgments that belong to the phantasied poetic subject, judgments that are made in him: for it is we who judge and not, prescriptively, the poet. But although we — we actual human beings — judge, the judgments are certainly not normal judgments. They refer to the persons, to the actions, as if; they express above all what we expect in the fictionalizing attitude, hence what is carried out by us as expectation in the as-if. And if we describe the course of action, the character of the personalities, their motives, and so on, then we live entirely in phantasy and do not merely repeat them, do not merely reproduce them. Rather, we explicate their sense in the as-if. We follow the indicated motivations in the as-if; fulfill the intentions; extract what, in
the inwardness that we do not actually quasi-experience intuitively, is living and effective in the way of thoughts, feelings, of dark, hidden motives, and so on. All of this in the as-if, and we give expression to it in statements that therefore also above all have the character of the as-if. And yet they have a certain truth that goes beyond the mere expression of the reproduced figment, of the actually given figment. Thus there is a struggle here that does not merely concern the reliability of memory, but persists when one calls upon the artwork itself and uses it as a measure of objectivity in the manner of a return to repeated actual experience of the same thing. If one of the fictitious persons judges about objects, persons, relationships also belong to the artistic image figment, then this judgment is indeed a figment itself, but nonetheless has its truth and falsity. The fictitious person can judge truly and falsely about what is to come in the fictitious happenings; can have suspicions and draw conclusions, rationally or irrationally, about what is to come and also about what is past. Not all of the judgments the fictitious person makes about matters of fact can be verified on the basis of the course of the image actions and facts, inasmuch as the image world is a world of which only a segment is given in quasi-experiences. But all judgments of matters of fact that find in this segment adequate grounds of verification can be evaluated as truths and falsities: apart from the eidetic judgments, which have no need of the quasi-fact of this world and have their verifiable truth and falsity irrespective of it — precisely on the basis of fictions, even if not of those belonging to this world. The latter are bound, the former free and, as free, attachable to the real world as well as to every possible world. But all of the judgments in question here are quasi-judgments; and we can also add: quasi-truths and quasi-falsities. Of these, the eidetic are freely convertible into actual truths; factual truths are not freely convertible into actual factual truths. On the other hand, these are convertible into hypothetical truths related to hypothetically posited objectivities of actual experiences, of actual phantasying acts. I say convertible: For the one who is phantasying lives in the fiction; that is, he lives in the carrying out of the quasi-experiences, the quasi-judgments, and so on. And to the extent that he does that, he posits neither the actually experienced reality nor himself, and does not mix the two together or does not allow the one to become null in the other. And he also
does not make hypotheses as if something else would also be actual in addition to the reality that exists, or hypotheses that this or that part of actual reality — indeed, actual reality in its entirety — would not exist and that merely what is invented would exist, in connection with which he nevertheless preserves himself as actual reality. The *quasi*-judgments are modifications of actual judgments. However, they are still “position takings,” only precisely counterparts of other position takings. In their modification they have norms of correctness and falsity. All logical laws and also all normative laws apply to them: *Logic* does not privilege the given reality; it relates to every possible reality. It expresses laws that hold for every possible act of judgment, and this is only a variant of the positions presented above. Of course, we must understand this correctly.

From the actual Ego — for which every person who judges can suppose his own Ego — a realm of actual real and possible *experience* emanates. And this possibility does not signify phantasy possibility, but (as we cannot explain in more detail here) experience predelineated within certain boundaries of an actual experience, anchored in it, or, in the case of the realization of the possibility, motivated by the experience united with it, by the nexus of fulfillment belonging to the experience.

Or the actual Ego has a *de facto* world as the correlate of its actual experience and of the horizons predelineating all possible experience. This world is intuitively given in part, and in part is not yet determinate but something to be determined in the motivated advance of actual experience. This world is *one* world; and it is one and the same world for everyone who experiences, who is the object of experience in this world understood as the surrounding world of the Ego presupposed at the beginning, and who belongs to it bodily and can be mentally followed and understood by means of empathetic experience.

With respect to the *realm of fiction* at the cognizing subject’s disposal, it is not, so to speak, a realm with a geography and an established constitution. Rather, every reproductive fictive inventing is *free*, and fictions can be connected, just as *quasi*-experiences can join harmoniously to form the unity of one experience with the correlate of an invented world partially intuited in these experiences. On the other hand, they can also be entirely unconnected, can be so arranged in relation to one another that they neither agree nor conflict with one
another, since any common ground that unifying fictions would have
to establish is missing. Or they can indeed be concordant, but indeter-
minate with respect to their open horizons; and then the “constraint”
of actual experience, which would be determining and for which only
fiction — something freely variable within essential forms conform-
ing to law — would be able to act as a substitute here, is missing.

Accordingly, the realm of actual experience, which is linked to the
reality of the cognizing subject and its empirical experiences, is a
single and fixed realm. The phantasy worlds, on the other hand, are
infinitely many. They are a multiplicity, not entirely disordered and not
entirely ordered — hence, all in all, disordered — of infinitely many
possible worlds, each of which presents the idea of the correlate of a
harmonious and determined order of fictions that are combined into a
unity analogously to the way in which actual things are combined in
the real world. This idea, however, does indeed have its formal bound-
aries, but it lacks the determinacy of predelineation in the joining of
fictions to fictions within these boundaries (the idea of a nature as
such). Every factual truth in the simple, unmodified sense, hence ev-
ery experiential truth that has its basis in actual empirical experience,
is decided \(a \text{ priori}\); that is, before actual experience. Every indeter-
m minacy in the factual domain is determinable before all determining
experience, therefore determinable \(a \text{ priori}\). This implies that the cog-
nizing subject can decide it only \(a \text{ posteriori}\), on the basis of actual
experiences; he knows, however, that in the world, the real world,
nothing remains open in itself, that everything, individually, is com-
pletely determined in itself. The world behind the most distant stars
that we have reached in our experience to this point is unknown, but
it is actually cognizable. It is determined in itself; and experiences
are possible — and not possible merely in the sense of fictions —
which lead us into this objective world, this world that exists in itself.
It is otherwise with respect to a world installed in fiction. Within the
boundaries set by the coherent unity of empirical experiences, there
is objective truth as \(\text{quasi}\)-truth, which is nevertheless binding truth.
However, it extends only as far as the coherent fiction has produced
predelineation (eidetically and according to the logic of experience)
by means of what is actually brought to intuition and by means of
what is implied in it according to logical \(\text{laws}\). Beyond this, every
statement is completely indefinite. To the questions — What will the
phantasied centaur eat in the phantasy morning? With whom will he pass the time or do battle? — there are no answers. The assertions that I might arbitrarily offer as answers are neither true nor false. I do not decide the question if, afterwards, I invent the answer that he will consume a goat: Had I phantasied from the beginning that he will consume a goat in harmonious continuation of my fictions, the “truth” would have been predelineated. Afterwards, however, I can just as well phantasy one possibility as its opposite, and only when the statements suppose eidetic discordancies are they false in advance. Judgments concerning what is essential are not changed by fiction, as we have already said. Of course, nothing is changed in what we have said by the fact that we also have fictions, such as the artistic, that restrict us. The free artistic fiction and the formation produced in the real world by means of the connection of fictions creates a predelineation for the one contemplating art. But it extends only as far as the artist has tied his unitary forms to such predelineations; beyond that, everything is again an empty possibility that can be shaped by phantasies chosen at will with any sense one likes. The perception as such determines nothing. One sees this in the fact that we would not live with one another in a pure phantasy world and that obviously nothing at all would change in what has been said if we had the same immediate freedom of perceptual phantasy as we do of reproductive phantasy: hence if we could hallucinate at will.
APPENDIX LVI

WHETHER ONE COULD SPEAK OF THE SAME OBJECT THAT AT ONE TIME IS ACTUAL AND AT ANOTHER TIME DOES NOT EXIST, OF THE SAME OBJECT THAT EXISTS NOW BUT COULD JUST AS WELL EXIST AND HAVE ITS BEGINNING AND ENDING AT ANY OTHER TIME — FIGMENT AND POSSIBILITY — A PRIORI LAWS CONCERNING ACTUAL EXPERIENCES AND PHANTASIES

<probably 1918>

Imagine that the same event that is now occurring happened yesterday. Think of the event as pushed back to any earlier temporal position whatsoever. What is it that is identical here? In what way is there something identical in space? A new concept of content as opposed to form (understood as spatial location) — which can remain identical in movement. Or: “The same” objects in different spatial locations (scil., perfect likeness). Relationship of two contents determined by temporal location and spatial location. “The same” objects in phantasy and reality, and with different temporal modalities. Interpretation of this identity. No identity between something positional and a phantasy object. A priori laws concerning actual experiences (relating to the time of what is experienced) with respect to their occurrence in one subjectivity and in several. Repeatable actual experiences. A priori laws with respect to phantasies: independent phantasies, and so on.

Intuitions that actually experience something are intuitions that give something individual, as we said. They are, we went on to say, intuitions with respect to the content of the object. But they are

1 Inserted later: “<p>13 ff.,” i.e., p. 600, 24ff. in No. 18a. — Editor’s note.
nevertheless called intuitions of objects (individuals). And in that case, is what is there called content not, properly speaking, the object itself?

Thus let us say quite universally:2 The object that exists here and that I am now perceiving, the event that is now taking place, could also have existed or taken place yesterday and could have been given to me in memory now or could exist for me in expectation as happening tomorrow. Hence the same object not only in different temporal modalities but as actual at different times, in which case what is meant is not that the same object would endure throughout these different times. Thus I even say that it could have been that my existence and life might have fallen into a time a thousand years in the future. Every object can be given and is given in different temporal modalities. I expect an event. I presently see it and have it, and afterwards it is past; I have it in memory. In these cases there belong to the identical object as the identical reality its content and its temporal location (its time), and the object is given only in changing temporal modes or modes of actuality. But let us imagine, in conformity with our foregoing discussions, “the same” object removed to different times. Is the same object not the “content,” then? In this shifting, it is as if we were moving the object across the continuum of time; indeed, in this mode of consideration nothing stands in the way of thinking of this “shifting” as performed continuously. This is not quite how matters stand with respect to spatiality. Just as temporal location belongs to every object without exception, absolute [spatial] location also belongs to the spatial object. The spatial location, however, does not belong to the object considered independently and is not permanently affixed to it as a determinate location; on the contrary, it belongs to it as a spatial location only in combination with a temporal location.

The object has an absolute temporal location; that is to say, it extends through time in its process of becoming. And this whole extended section of becoming in all of its time points is firmly determined with respect to its location, and hence as a whole complex is immovable in the totality of time. But as far as the spatial location is concerned, it is not a fixed segment, a finite or infinite piece cut out [526]

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2 The content of the object = the “object,” which can be thought of as identical in different, separate temporal durations = the concrete essence [das konkrete Wesen].
from the form of the totality of space; rather, the spatial location, as absolute form positionally determined in all of its points, is a determinate segment of space only with respect to each time-point of the duration. In the object’s process of becoming, this segment, under the title of “motion,” can change. It then assumes an ever new location in space. The spatial location of the object is therefore a function of the absolute temporal location, and a clearly determined function of it. Of course, we at least have the analogy, in so far as the idea of constancy designates a new concept of content as opposed to “form” (namely, spatial location).³ In mere motion, the content persists in identity or the object remains the same; only the location changes. Two equivalent objects in different spatial locations have the same “content.” In “change,” the object (“the same” object) becomes other, hence a different object. Therefore the otherness here relates to the content in the second sense, which confronts us in the case of spatial objects. The content of the object pure and simple, understood as the content of the concrete individual, the content determined with respect to temporal location, is the concrete essence [Wesen]. And this encompasses the content in the second sense, that is, the essence determined with respect to its location in space during the time of the object (the extended temporal location in the different points of its location), whether this spatial essence remains identically the same or changes: the qualified spatial form. (Which for its part is again distinguished by form and content: spatial form, or, more distinctly, geometrical corporeality and the quale spread over it — its qualification, as we also say.)

Under the fiction of a one-dimensional space, we can delineate as follows the way in which the two contents are united:

\[ \text{aa’ [is] the spatial extension.} \]

³ The content of the object = something objectively identical in mere motion, the phoronomic essence [das phoronomische Wesen], so to speak.
the black ink [is] the qualification
the filled-in black square [is] the concrete essence \([Wesen]\) individualized.

In the case of change, we would have:

5 But this is not yet correct. The one-dimensional space has two sides, and in each time-point the spatial extent can certainly be seized upon and picked out from time at one’s pleasure. Time, however, is not a determinate line either; rather, all horizontals are the same single continuity of time. Hence:

10 If I say that the same object that now exists is conceivable [as existing] in any time, that it could begin, continue, and end in any time as completely the same; if I say that the same object that now hovers before me as a figment could now be a real object (and could then exist in any time) and that these things — this earth and star, etc. — which exist in reality do not need to exist, that it is possible for them to be precisely the same, only in fiction, only as possibilities — then it might seem that we could designate the identical “content of presentation,” the concrete essence that is the identical essence in these oppositions, precisely as “object.” What is designated as object here, however, seems to be indifferent to all modalities of actuality and phantasy, to all temporal modes and temporal locations, to being and nonbeing. But if one must then say that “object” is equivalent to what is identical in actual experiences and in corresponding phantasies, then it is surely an essence, something universal.

\[4\] In print, the heavy line from \(a\) to \(b\) on the “time”-axis. — Editor’s note.
The answer to this will probably have to run as follows: We speak of an individual object when we are in the actually experiencing (or quasi-experiencing {phantasying}) attitude, and this attitude indicates that we are performing acts that continually mean "the same thing." These acts coincide with one another harmoniously and are governed throughout by the intentional tendency toward fulfillment. Hence they tend to coincide with actually experiencing (or quasi-experiencing) acts and to be fulfilled by them. The concrete individual is, indeed, the constitutional correlate of these acts. We therefore speak of the same object when, in the unity of one consciousness, we shift from acts to acts in which identifying coinciding takes place. This is the case when we shift from one experience to another experience of the same concrete individual, in the sense that the content belonging to what is experienced in the one case coincides with the content of what is experienced in the other; and the temporal location of what is experienced in both cases (perhaps along with the spatial location) also coincides. The same object today and yesterday, here and there, signifies that the times also coincide. Of course, the one content offers a past in memory as its memorial time, the other offers the present as its perceptual time, or perhaps a different past as its memorial time. Here, however, it belongs to the content of the sense of the actually experiencing acts\(^5\) that what is experienced at a particular time extends on beyond its actually given time and that the total time, in part actually given and in part co-given in the experiences (co-posited and available for further givenness), is identical in both cases.

And this would carry over to phantasy as well, if "in phantasy" — in two distinct, ordered phantasies — we were to phantasy the same object as the same concrete individual: for example, if we were to present the same phantasy house in today’s phantasy and in yesterday’s phantasy. Here, therefore, the same object is not merely the same content, but the same content in and with its locational determination.

If we take an actually experienced object together with one that is quasi-experienced, then perhaps we meet with coinciding again. Both may coincide with regard to the whole essence or content and even

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\(^5\) Which we had not taken into consideration at all up to now!
with regard to the temporal modalities, and yet we have reality on one side and fiction on the other. On one side, a concrete individual simply in the sense of “what is real”; on the other side, a concrete individual in fiction, in the sense of fiction. With respect to the acts that give them, a different attitude corresponds to each individual. I can identify an individual in each attitude: Hence I can even say in phantasy that this phantasy individual and that phantasy individual are the same. The identity is a quasi-identity, and yet not a falsely attributed one. It is a true identity, only again the truth is “truth” in modification: All concepts of reality receive this modifying delineation within the realm of phantasy.

On the other hand, the possibility of full identification with regard to content and temporal location (and spatial location) is absent in the case of a synthesis of actual experience and phantasy. While the presentational contents can coincide perfectly, I cannot identify the temporal locations; that is, when pure phantasy and actual experience are involved. Only when I have mixed acts is it otherwise, but then the figments have a temporal determination that is posited as identical with an actual temporal determination. And in that case, of course, as far as the figments are concerned, there is conflict with what is actually experienced.

Following all of this, must we not say:

In the strict sense, it is out of the question that a phantasy object might be identical with the object of an actual experience — in the way in which, on the other hand, we can very well have strict identity between a perceptual object and a memorial object (in which case the perceived duration and the memorial duration are arranged in a unity of duration belonging to the same object, and consequently a unity-giving experience that brings the object in this whole duration to unitary experience must be possible). In the same way, it is quite possible that two phantasies phantasy the same object, which is then possible in the form that they are repetitions of “one” phantasy; that is, that they give intuitively the same object together with the same stretch of its duration — we must write the “same object” in quotation marks and place everything without exception in quotation marks, even the reality, the factual existence that is merely a given “possibility.” Furthermore, it is clear that in the strict sense we can “transplant” ourselves into a time we choose at will only in the sense that, on the one hand, we keep firmly in mind our factual existence
and accordingly also our surrounding world, which is posited together with our factual existence, and that, on the other hand, we combine with this the hypothetical positing (the supposing) of our existence, say, a thousand years from now, which evidently can be maintained only if we suppose ourselves to endure throughout these thousand years: It conflicts with this if we let ourselves first enter into the world in a thousand years and regard this entrance as the beginning of our existence as such. We therefore make a conflicting supposition — which is actually a possibility — that in a thousand years an object would exist that would agree completely with a present object as far as its content is concerned. For single sensuous objects, objects intuitable by the senses, this possibility is guaranteed a priori. Whether it is also a possibility for persons with regard to their psychic lives is not to be decided here.

Hence we cannot legitimately speak of the same object that at one time exists (is something actual) and at another time does not exist, of the same object that now exists but could just as well have its factual existence and the beginning and ending of its existence in any other time whatsoever.

“The same” expresses in careless fashion every coinciding in the unity of a consciousness of coinciding . . . . A real object and a figment can have nothing in common in the genuine sense; that is, nothing identically in common as part, as moment. They can stand in a relationship of coinciding, but even here a difference obtains, depending on whether the equality is equality between the objects pure and simple. We then have, for each object, an actual moment, an actual part, an actual piece that is equivalent. While in other respects we have a relationship between what is actual and what is merely possible, in the latter case we put ourselves in the attitude of the as-if.

Figment and possibility

But if the figment is not something real, it nonetheless exists as a possibility. By changing our attitude, we obtain from phantasy something positable in the genuine sense as existing ([or as] not existing, not being there): We actually posit; we do not live in the as-if and are not subjects in the as-if of a quasi-experience. On the contrary, we live
as actual subjects, perhaps have before us the real world and carry out an actual grasping, actually meet with something: not the centaurs, but the possibility of the centaurs. This possibility is given on the basis of phantasy, but obviously not posited as the content of this phantasy, as if we were reflecting and in the reflecting positing the phantasy experiencing (as something factually existing in immanent time).

We can return repeatedly to the same centaur as possibility, just as we can repeatedly phantasy the same thing while remaining in the attitude of phantasy, and can also have what is phantasied in separate phantasies identified as the same. Here it is presupposed that each new phantasy already possesses in itself the relating back in memory to what is phantasied in the earlier phantasies (in the form of quasi-known objects). The process of moving about in the unity of a phantasy world constantly presupposes such references backward. To be sure, with respect to this moving about, the phantasy world lacks the stable objectivity of the course of future quasi-experience and of the world fixed in conformity with laws that would extend into the future and would determine [it] unambiguously, transcending the actually given and remembered phantasy world (in its identified unification).

Expressed differently: the future is freely phantasiable within the laws belonging to the style of the object — nature, for example. The actual future belonging to the real world is not freely alterable. It can only be changed “mechanically”; physically, it is subject to fixed laws, and so on.

The reflection has become confused, since it is apparent that a distinction, without which one cannot carry out such reflections clearly, has not been taken into consideration: the distinction between immanent and transcendent objects.

Namely, if two (separate) perceptions are said to give the same object, then they must give the object inadequately; that is, according to different stretches of its duration. Hence it must be perceptions of something transcendent that are at stake, in which case one must distinguish between what is genuinely given and what is not genuinely given with respect to the object. Furthermore, the object as substrate and the filled duration are not taken into consideration. The content

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6 To 23ff. <i.e., p.632, 22f.>. 
of the object is always understood as filled duration (and other extension). We then have the question: What plays a role as substrate? There also comes into consideration the distinction between, on the one hand, the continuity of the filled schemata (the phantom in the unity of its changes in time), or of the one object (the substrate) that belongs to it, and, on the other hand, the unity of a substance with substantial, physical properties.

We must therefore apprehend the problems more precisely, and above all as delimited in such a way that we have actual evidence and exclude everything that remains unclarified.

Let us therefore simply take filled durations and phantoms. Let us take the duration as delimited and let us understand by actual experience an intuition that makes the whole filled duration intuited. Let us understand the same thing by a phantasy. The content is then the concrete essence belonging to the filled duration. At one time, this content is experienced as the living present (in its continuous becoming from beginning to end); at another time, a content that is perfectly like it is given as past, and so on.

We then have to lay down a priori laws. For example, and above all: We can have any number of perceptions that are perfectly alike, perceptions of an equivalent content or perceptions of an identical concrete essence. However, as a matter of principle, two perceptions cannot bring an identical individual object to givenness, hence an object with identical temporal location, with identical duration.

Furthermore, two immanent perceptions (that is, two separate immanent perceptions) cannot perceive one [and the same] immanent object; and an immanent object cannot continue to endure unperceived and come to perception through several separate perceptions aimed at stretches of its total duration.

On the other hand, two transcendent perceptions can be perceptions of one and the same object, although, if they are perceptions belonging to one and the same Ego, they cannot both perceive this object in the same present or cannot perceive it in such a way that the filled durations given to the perceptions have the same absolute temporal location. Multiple perceptions of an object aimed at the same concrete part of its duration are perceptions belonging to multiple subjects.

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7 Cf. the formulations <p. 636, 11ff.>.
However, it pertains \textit{a priori} to two perceptions belonging to one and the same Ego and to one and the same transcendent object that each of the perceptions gives the object with respect to a different part of its duration and that no one of the perceptions gives it with regard to its whole duration. 

Perceptions belonging to one and the same Ego that perceive the same transcendent individual are possible only in succession, if they are actually supposed to experience the same concrete essence (or, in other words, the same concrete part of the content) of the transcendent individual.

One can also state the law mentioned above\textsuperscript{8} as follows: \textit{A priori}, a perception can make its appearance \textit{only once} in each Ego’s stream of consciousness; specifically, in each immanent time-point. Simultaneous perceptions are only possible as perceptions belonging to different persons, who, in perceiving, refer to one and the same transcendent thing in a transcendent world and time to which they themselves belong as psycho-physical “human beings,” as animate beings, who converse with one another.

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\textit{Memories} alone are repeatable experiences, understood as experiences of the same (immanent or transcendent) object in the very same duration. Indeed, every memory is repeatable.

Memories in the immanent sphere can only be memories of the past and future. It belongs to the essence of memory that what is remembered has a location in relation to the actual present. Something immanent that is simultaneous with the present is itself actually present, is immanently perceived. In the transcendent sphere, there are memories of the present, though thanks to the fact that a memory of the past furnishes an object in the manner in which it was experienced in a past time. This object is posited as enduring into the present; hence it has a duration that was unperceived. However, there is an unperceived duration (an unperceived present) only for transcendent objects.

\textsuperscript{8} See <p. 635, 25–29>.
A phantasy is either the immediate phantasy modification of a perception, the phantasy of the present; or it is the phantasy of the past or future. In the latter case, it is the phantasy modification of a memory. A memory is possible only in a nexus of consciousness that implies a present given originally: the memory itself is an originally present act. A phantasy modification of a memory is possible only in a phantasy nexus that implies a phantasy consciousness of the present as given quasi-originarily. And this is equally true of recollections and anticipations (expectations).

Thus it is in the sphere of intuitiveness: The analogue holds good implicite for the sphere of nonintuitive presenting, for the possibility of unfolding nonintuitive presenting in fulfilling or quasi-fulfilling intuitions.

Two phantasies can make their appearance in succession in the same consciousness without any relation to one another, and yet have contents that are perfectly alike. Objectively speaking, they are repetitions in relation to one another. For consciousness itself, however, the one phantasy is a repetition of the other, and the new phantasy is merely the repetition of the earlier phantasy with its earlier phantasy object. Hence it is renewed phantasy of the same object, if it has the characteristic of a phantasy recollection of a figment, or, as the case may be, the characteristic of a phantasy that is combined with a collective consciousness (even if nonintuitive) of having quasi-perceived earlier.

A perception of something transcendent that has an object given with respect to a part of its duration implies a horizon consciousness that relates to the earlier duration or leads back to it through connections of actual experience. Repeated phantasy can then relate to the same object (as figment) only when it possesses in itself horizons of relation to something antecedent. This relation must have the characteristic of a quasi-memory. For here there are no predelineated actual experiences and no confirmations prescribed in the quasi-experiential flow.
APPENDIX LVII

PHANTASY <TAKING AS ITS BASIS ACTUAL EXPERIENCE OR PHANTASY; THE WORLD OF ACTUAL EXPERIENCE — THE WORLDS OF PHANTASY>

<probably 1917>

1) Transformation of the reality given by actual experience (perception, memory) by means of a phantasy that works its way into [the actual experience].

2) Pure phantasy, emergence of a quasi-actual physical objectivity with its space, its time, its indeterminate world horizon, and its own horizons of indeterminacy in the things themselves.

   a) Free transformation of the “quasi-presented physical things” in the sense of harmonious quasi-fulfillment of their horizons, to which belong possibilities of change and then again also of constancy, which run their course harmoniously. The involuntary course of such harmonious transformations (or further developments), or also the phantasy that fashions its objects voluntarily, understood as the fashioning of a world in the manner peculiar to phantasy or as fashioning within the idea of a unitary world.

   b) Transformation of the quasi-presented physical things,¹ a word that refers, of course, to voluntary creation. But to start with, let us again take the case of the involuntary. By itself, a physical thing, quasi-presented in such and such a way in its mode of appearance, and in thus presenting itself determined as existing in such and such a way, changes into another thing with “conflicting” properties. What kind of conflict is this? Let us compare case 1).

   In 1), every phantasying into something actual, every transforming within the mode of phantasy of what is given and intuited in actual

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¹ Inserted later: “by means of sudden change.” — Editor’s note.
experience, leads to a consciousness of conflict. What is presented in the manner of phantasy is “null.” One will attempt to distinguish here: α) the overlapping and concealing of what is actually experienced by what is phantasied, understood as what is quasi-experienced, and conversely; β) the actual “thesis” of experience as the peculiarity making up the positionality of such experience, [which] enters into a relationship with the neutrality that makes up the characteristic of phantasy. But does that immediately yield a “conflict”? A contradiction that pits what is actually experienced against what is imagined? Here there are surely a number of things that we must clarify.

I have this yellow house given in actual experience. I “imagine” it as blue. I present it to myself as uniformly blue: The blue covers up the yellow of which I am conscious in actual experience. As existing, however, the yellow raises a protest against the house’s being blue, which is added and superimposed, which has no motivation in actual experience and which undergoes cancellation if I suppose it to exist in unity with the other determinations of the thing.

Is not the following inherent in this? I can take actual experience as my basis; I can accept what is actually experienced, what “exists,” grasp it and hold it fast as existing. The blue that I then phantasy, as taken into the actually experienced thing, has the characteristic of something conflicting with the actually experienced property of yellow and, in this conflict, the characteristic of “something annulled.”

But how? Surely in such a way that something like an “attempt to posit as existing,” “to suppose the house to be blue,” presents itself, and that this supposed existent is cancelled as a consequence of overlapping with the “corresponding” yellow existent coinciding with it. Here I take actual experience as my basis. I “produce experiential belief.”

I grasp what offers itself to me as actuality and hold fast to what is actual as actual.

Can I take phantasy as my basis without taking actual experience as my basis? I imagine the house and all the world as “blue,” as if seen through blue glass. Of course, when I begin, when I imagine “the”

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2 “Thematically” inserted later above “I can.” — Editor’s note.
3 Inserted later: “Hypothetical supposition in conflict with what is given in actual experience.” — Editor’s note.
world, and so on, I have a contradiction with actually experienced reality. But I abandon the realm of reality; I live entirely in the intuition of the blue world and submit to it. This is now a quasi-reality; and what I take from the real world itself receives the characteristic of what is phantasied, of the as-if, because I take as my basis what I have phantasied and accept it as quasi-real. I do not at this point have an accomplished consciousness of nullity; the consciousness of nullity is only a gateway into pure phantasy consciousness (or into the modification of experiential consciousness in phantasy, in which case, if occasion should arise, all of the horizons of actual experience, inasmuch as they are not themselves in question, are taken over into the as-if world). Every consideration of possibilities, every constitution of possibilities understood as connected to actual experience or as completely free of it, is free of the consciousness of conflict with realities, which would be there immediately if I were to retain reality as my basis. To take phantasy as one’s basis, to accept and hold fast to a quasi-reality as quasi-real again yields possibilities of conflicts, of overlayings, of image inhibitions, and of cancellations in phantasy; namely, on the basis that one has given to oneself. Everything said before is carried over to the basis of the as-if. We then have infinitely many free possibilities of phantasies, which are now in agreement, now in conflict with one another — alternately being annulled, announcing themselves as null in the as-if, when one member or another is taken as ground.

Now, of course, there is an important distinction. The world of actual experience: This designates a limitless system of actual experiences with experiential horizons that must again be explicated by means of actual experiences. Moreover, it designates a fixed system, constantly expanding automatically, though in a prescribed way.

Within this system there is only a small sphere of freedom, delimited in a manner specific to it, and accordingly only a small sphere of voluntary alterability: in the physical sphere, the animate organism and corporeal activities; in the psychophysical sphere, the sphere of free psychic acts.

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4 Inserted later above the line: “This is a change in thematic attitude.” — Editor’s note.
The worlds of phantasy, however, are absolutely free worlds, and every phantasied thing posits a phantasy world in the mode of the \textit{quasi-}: But the phantasy world’s horizon of indeterminacy is not a horizon that could be explicated by means of an analysis based on determinate actual experience. Every \textit{quasi-explicating} is a new and free phantasying-in, although it is phantasying in a harmonious manner. What is peculiar to phantasy is its \textit{optional character}. And therefore, speaking ideally, its unconditioned arbitrariness.

While the horizon of a perception has, in general, an extensive predelineation by means of fillings provided by memories and expectations that are determined or perhaps corrected in the course of actual experience, in the \textit{quasi}-perception that we are here calling phantasy we have no such predelineation by means of \textit{quasi}-experiences with fixed content and fixed theses.

To take a \textit{quasi-reality} as one’s basis in phantasy — for example, a centaur that \textit{quasi} lives and exists — means to accept the \textit{quasi}-reality and to keep it firmly in mind and to restrict the optional character of further phantasying by means of a constant \textit{intention aimed at harmony}. It means, therefore, to \textit{create} precisely a world that can be a harmonious world for this centaur. As soon as I accept the centaur as a \textit{quasi-reality} and keep it firmly in mind, I have also posited along with it a space, a time, a surrounding world in which it exists, which belongs to it as an indeterminate horizon. This horizon, however, is not such that it could be determined in only one way, that it could actually and unambiguously make up one world. If a subject actually sees a physical thing, the world in which he sees it is also indeterminate for him. Apart from the small visual field of the moment, the world surrounding the thing is determinable in infinitely many ways. In itself, however, it is one world, a single unambiguously determined world. Empirical experience prescribes this world itself, and empirical experience binds it in the way in which it is bound itself. The world is not a matter of option and free choice.

The \textit{quasi-world} of the \textit{quasi}-experienced centaur is also indeterminate in infinitely many ways; to that extent, it is precisely like the real world beyond my actual experience. But what alone can more precisely determine this \textit{quasi-world} — the phantasy that determines it more closely (that \textit{quasi-determines} it in more detail) — is unrestricted. It is free, and restricted only inasmuch as it must correspond
to the essential style of a world horizon; that is, inasmuch as it must come together harmoniously and constitute the unity of the thing and the unitary connections among such unities. This is possible in infinitely many ways and at one’s pleasure. Each new step limits and in turn opens up unrestricted possibilities in the same style. On the other hand, the arbitrariness always also consists in the fact that the person phantasying can not only go on shaping freely on the basis of a quasi-fixed beginning, but can also creatively reshape, can create ever new worlds, and can re-create a given world with the sense of disagreement with a previously fashioned world, although the re-created world appropriates fundamental parts and unities from the previously fashioned world. The peculiar phenomenon here is this re-creation in conflict, which is similar to the situation in which a painter makes up his mind to reshape his image: in conflict with what it was formerly and what it was formerly meant to be.
APPENDIX LVIII
ON THE THEORY OF DEPICTION: FIGMENTS AS IDEAL
OBJECTS. ALSO ON THE THEORY OF THE OBJECTS OF
AESTHETIC VALUATION. <APPEARANCES AS OBJECTS>
<probably 1917>

Image objects (depictive images) and their modes of appearance. The little figure as depictive image in its fixed mode of appearance, which presents itself as a “picture.” This is what happens in the case of an engraving. In the case of a little sculptural figure, we have the fixed system of modes of appearance belonging to the corresponding phantom; specifically, the system of modes of visual appearance. The phantom is an unchanging, continuously given phantom, even though the image object may “be” a changing image object. Nevertheless, I would have to say beforehand that even in the case of the photograph or of the engraving, and thus in the case of any depictive image, we must take heed that not only the depictive image and its subject must be distinguished, but also, with regard to the depictive image, the relevant image object itself, its phantom, and the modes of appearance belonging to the phantom.

It pertains to an image that the depictive image, understood as image object, has a “being” that persists and abides. This persisting, this remaining unchanged, does not mean that the image object is unchanging; indeed, it can be a cinematographic depictive image. And finally, if a small sculptural figure represents a runner, then the image object is precisely a small green runner — in one phase of his race, of course, just as a bust or a full-figure sculpture of a Demosthenes may present him in a single phase: “He has just completed his oration, or he is just about to begin his oration, or he is speaking.” Disregarding the subject, we have to consider how the image object itself is meant in conformity with its sense: [Is it meant] precisely as an orator in the midst of his oration? But is that not the subject? And is the image
object not a small human being orating, and so on? In any case, this is the one thing that is given as a persisting phantom (a resting or changing phantom; — by the way, not only the phantom functions in cinema, but also a course of phenomenal causality, hence full physis- 
cal). But we must notice that the modes of givenness, the modes of appearance, are firmly shut off, no matter how they may run over into continuations by means of phantasy: as when I let myself be drawn into the phantasying of the running or of the orating, and so on. But what kind of persisting being, identical being, is it that belongs to the depictive image, to the image object that appears in such and such a way, as well as to the subject that gives itself as such in the image object? If I let a cinematographic presentation run off repeatedly, then (in relation to the subject) the image object in the How of its modes of appearance and each of these modes of appearance itself is given as identically the same image object or as identically the same mode of appearance. This is also true, of course, when I make a piano piece play for me several times on a mechanical apparatus. Finally, this is the case as well when I hear repeated performances of Don Carlos in the theater. But it is true of every “resting” image too. As often as I look at the little sculptural figure, the image object is the same, and each of its modes of appearance is the same. The runner and all of his modes of appearance: The thing made from bronze is physically unchanged and endures objectively in time. The runner belongs to another time and to another space. He is a figment. But the phase of time to which he belongs is “presented” as detached and does not abide in time and is not a really enduring phase. On the contrary, it is precisely only a phase, and the same phase again and again, however often I look at it. And likewise every mode of appearance belongs to a perceptual phase and is also, however often I contemplate it, constantly the same; and accordingly, the depicted phase as depicted is constantly the same as well. It is like recollective re-presentation in which, as often as I return recollectively to the same past and to the same phase of the past, I find the same phase again and again, numerically identical. But I also posit it as having been and as identically the same, and I likewise posit each mode of appearance as a mode of appearance that has been. But do we also have a memory image here? On the contrary, here in the case of depiction we have quasi-positing rather than positing. If, on the other hand, we
posit the depictive image and its modes of appearance as depictive, this is not a memorial positing and not a positing of anything represented, but a positing of the figment. Figments are ideal objectivities graspable through a change in focus. But naturally they are not a species!

Ideal objects, figments, etc., as values

Enjoying something in its originary givenness — I contemplate a plastic figure, intuit in the depictive image the prototype appearing through it, but only as it presents itself in the image. The aesthetic delight is directed toward what presents itself as it presents itself in such a depictive image, giving itself in a definite mode of appearance. Aesthetic delight therefore concerns what is presented only with respect to the moments (and the How of the moments) presented in the presenting depictive images, and it is concerned with these only to the extent to which and in the way in which they are presented. I therefore run through the system of appearances of the depicting figment, and in them I look at the How of the presenting depiction. I delight in the “imitation,” in the “presentation.” (This is valuing that determines. Just as in actual experiencing and in judging I attend to the being of an object in a way that determines it, so I attend to its value-being.)

Is it the case that I am not interested in existence here? To what extent am I not interested in it? I am not interested in the existence of what is presented per se. But I am interested in the existence of the ideal presentation of what is presented, in which case the positing of the existence of what is presented, if it occurs at all, plays no role in the consciousness of its value.

Thus with respect to every possible objectivity, we can, on the one hand, value the objectivity itself as actually existing (as presumably existing, and so on) or value its modes of appearance — or we can value it as appearing in such and such a way, apart from its actuality. If we do that, what kind of additional modifications come into consideration? I am not interested in the actual object — my intention, therefore, is not directed toward the object’s fulfillment from every point of view, toward that which it is in each and every respect and as a whole, like an intention aimed at cognition. Hence it is not directed
toward the whole of nature in which this physical thing forces itself upon me in its being. The mode of appearance itself (the oriented schema in its mode of givenness) does not come into consideration psychologically and individually in its momentary cognitional function. The “beautiful” object, this mountain as seen from this specific location, always has its identical beauty as long as it offers precisely “this prospect.” And as often as I go and look at it from there, I have the same prospect aesthetically. The same “image.” This “image” is an ideal object (obviously not something real enduring in time). The mountain offers this image continuously, but the image itself is not something that endures.

In the case of external perceptions, we must consider precisely what kind of being the modes of appearance of the momentary phantoms (which have their existence as states of the physical thing) possess.

The oriented phantoms also have their existence, their being, in the nexus of subjective time; and their modes of appearance as momentary adumbrations themselves again have their individual being in their presentational stratum (related to the constitution of the mere phantom), hence in their apprehension as adumbration and as functioning for the constitution of the phantom, just like every stage in the constitution of physical things by means of objectivities belonging to a lower level. Everything here has individual existence in its stratum and is constituted as having individual existence, although of course it makes no sense to place the objectivities of the lower level into objective nature. As for such objectivities, they are only indirectly naturalizable; namely, as the respective “contents” of the subject-acts in question, of the relevant perceptions or “possible” perceptions. As objects of possible perceptions, they have their objectivity independently of momentary actual givenness. Their being is not their momentary being-perceived, and this despite their “mere subjectivity.” The modes of appearance that actually exist “in themselves” for each actual subject (in addition to those modes of appearance that different actual subjects actually have given) are distinguished, then, from those that a subject phantasied at one’s pleasure would have to have (or a subject that is indeterminate with respect to its actuality, actuality that, however, would be related to and would be tied to the given space and given time, hence the given world and, accordingly, actual subjects prominent in it).
If, however, an aesthetic valuation is directed toward a thing given at a particular time, then this “being” of the modes of appearance, and consequently their attachment to actual subjects (and to subjects projected into the world by phantasy), and mediately to natural space and natural time and the natural world itself, are entirely beside the point: for this reason, the object of the beauty-evaluation would not change if the actual object were to turn into a semblance object and consequently the actual mode of appearance into an inactual mode of appearance (hence one not existing in its stratum of being either).

We would then nevertheless have something beautiful that exists, a mere figment, an “image”: which is precisely an ideal object and not a ‘real’ object (in which case we comprehend the actual modes of appearance themselves under the title of what is real). It must be observed here that the beauty-value in question does not lie in the mode of appearance that I am having impressionally and that I enjoy while I am having it. Enjoyed value is not value itself, which can exist without being enjoyed. Hence the value remains for me even if I no longer have the respective semblance; if I can reproduce the semblance through memory or fiction, then I have it again, enjoy it again, although the re-presentation may not produce its full givenness. But if the re-presentation is fully intuitive, it does indeed produce something perfectly like it, and it does not matter that it is re-presentation. The situation, therefore, is similar to what it is in the case of grasping a species, although it is certainly evident that modes of appearance are not species. Also connected with this is the fact that, if I can repeatedly have a semblance impressionally (the stereoscope), the beauty and the beautiful, the value, are identically the same and not individual in the sense of something real (as if the stereoscopic figment and its modes of appearance were something enduring in time). How the given duration functions there is surely not difficult to clarify. Every mode of appearance — of a rest or of a change — can be made to endure and can become aesthetic in this duration: But then the duration belongs to ideality.
APPENDIX LIX

ON THE THEORY OF ART <THE GIVEN WORLD AND TIME AS FULLY DETERMINATE — “ONCE UPON A TIME,” SOMEWHERE, AT SOME TIME OR OTHER: ALL ART MOVING BETWEEN THESE TWO EXTREMES — REALISTIC ART AND IDEALISTIC ART>
<probably 1916 or 1918>

On the aesthetic (art)

Artist, “poet,” seer, prophet, leader, narrator, bard.

The writer of fiction places formations within the indefinite horizon that the given world and given time have for everyone, defining it, filling it out.

The reader, the writer, in a world and time. Two extremes:

a) The given world and time can be as fully determinate as our surrounding world is for us now (not the actual world). For example, the Berlin of today, as determinate as it is for us and even for the Berliners themselves.

b) The case at the opposite extreme: Once upon a time, somewhere, in some fable land, in some time, in some world with entirely different animal beings, even different natural laws, and so on.

All art moves between these two extremes.

A) Image art: presenting in an image, depicting, mediating through image consciousness.

B) Art that is purely a matter of phantasy, producing phantasy formations in the modification of pure neutrality. At least producing no concrete depictive image. The “once upon a time” is still related to the actual now and the world, and conflict with it can indicate an imagery that nevertheless does not constitute a visible image object. Music. Playful phantasy.
Realistic art (fiction, painting, sculpture). Let us limit ourselves to realistic fiction: Schnitzler.¹

Within the indefinite horizon belonging to a given world and time, more concretely, belonging to a given city, Vienna, a series of events is clearly phantasied and presented in a vital way — not described, but represented in such a way that we witness a situation, a life’s destiny, and so forth, in the as-if, as if we were present. We are “spectators as it were”; we are present, as it were, in the society. Description of this “witnessing,” of this being a spectator that belongs to every presentation occurring by means of word and image. In descriptions of “strange” countries — countries that we do not know — we are also present: But here the traveler who is doing the describing is co-posited, and we have the consciousness of following and understanding him, and of transplanting ourselves into his portrayal. In the case of fiction, the writer is not the one describing, not the actual witness who is to be understood. It is the work of fiction, not its author, that we follow and understand. These are peculiar relationships, which we must grasp scientifically. Do they necessarily produce depiction? Does image consciousness therefore belong to every fiction? Are the spoken words, the describing words or the words of the persons represented, image words?

Portrayal and self-presentation of human beings through their speech. Self-presentation through speech and through the description of their actions.

The intent of realism: To present landscapes, human beings, human communities, destinies, and the interweavings of destinies, in the fullest possible “characteristic” concreteness, as if we were seeing them, and, within a fixed frame, witnessing everything related to them in the richest possible fullness and in the substance of their being according to their innermost, though intuitive, motivations. What is characteristic. Characterizing a situation in a time and the time itself, the level of culture, the sort of life and life-form of this quarter of the globe, of this city, and so on. The Berlin of Fontane, the Vienna of Schnitzler. It is the same as when a purely contemplative interest in

¹ Arthur Schnitzler (1862-1931), Austrian dramatist and novelist. — Translator's note.
reality and in what is characteristic and typical of a given slice of the world guides us. A characteristic Black Forest farm, a Black Forest landscape, and so on.

These portrayals can be wonderful art. Delight in the intuition of the concrete, which is illuminated in its motivations, in its typically representing kind, and delight in the art of making this transparent to us. Θεωρία in the original sense. Delight in seeing that understands; correlatively, the theoretical interest, delight in seeing-in, in the understanding of the concrete type that belongs to a time as a characteristic part. Artistic empiricism or positivism.

There is no talk of beauty here. But the beautiful can make its appearance simultaneously as attractiveness. Parallels with biography and historical characterization (individual characterization) of a time, of the people belonging to it, and so on. Such characterization is part of scientific cognition. Nothing is made up there; on the contrary, everything is described. Realistic art is also a sort of biography of a time, of the strata of a time. It portrays through characteristic “images.” It constructs fictions in which characteristic types belonging to the time present themselves. It is art, not science, though in its own way it does mediate knowledge. It produces formations in the manner peculiar to phantasy, and as types with respect to times and world epochs.

Delight in the intuitively produced formation, which yields understanding and the circumspection of judicious insight. To this belongs “the matter of factness” of the situation, the restriction by time, by the real.

Idealistic fiction. The idealistic author does not merely see facts and types belonging to regions of the empirical world and empirical life; he sees ideas and ideals, and, in seeing them, values them and sets them forth as values.

The realist, too, can portray the fact that human beings have ideals and can be guided by them, or that a stratum of humanity, a class, is defined in practice by means of ideas. But he has a positivistic focus. The typical fact interests him. The empirical type, like any other. The idealistic author, however, has a normative focus. He presents value types in concrete images, or he “embodies” values in characters, and the values battle against disvalues in real quasi-situations. And
he not only presents values and the conflict of good and evil; he wants to kindle the love of the good in our souls: without moralizing or preaching. He transfigures the love in the medium of beauty.

Philocallistic art is opposed above all to realistic art understood as philocharacteristic, philopositivistic art. [Philocallistic art is concerned with] the beautiful, not [with] what is characteristic as such. All art is “aesthetic”; it is delight in what is seen in concreto. But not all art is callistic. And not all callistic art is, in addition, idealistic, normative, portraying the ideal and transfiguring it through beauty.

In a still higher stage, art can also be philosophical, metaphysical, elevating one to the idea of the good, to the deity through beauty, to the deepest world-ground, uniting one with it.

To see the world of ideas in the real world with its real set of types, to substitute for the real set of types an ideal set of types that is imperfectly realized in the real set of types, yet strives forward and battles upward through them to the divine.
APPENDIX LX

<Objectivation of Figments and of Artistic Figments as Works of Art. Empathy and the Objectivation of Cultural Objects>

<Probably 1926>

Nature (reality taken universally, even animals as realities) — here we do not think of any distinctive cognizing subject as point of reference: Any subject at all can be the cognizing subject. Turned toward nature and investigating it in self-forgetfulness, I can conceive of any particular subject as erased (from the community of those experiencing); I myself am replaceable by any other subject whatsoever.

In contrast to this stand not only personality and communities of persons of every sort, but also "subjective" values and works of every kind; namely, values and works that in their intrinsic sense point back to definite subjects and groups of subjects. The axiological and practical "being," as genuine being, can indeed be grasped as valuable by any rational subject who has at its disposal the value material to be judged: But surely it is agreed that positing a value means the same as simultaneously positing subjects who, in valuing, constitute the value — presupposing only that the value is not itself a subject: Otherwise we have posited a subject anyway. This is obvious in the case of works. In the case of art values, image values, works of fiction, and so on, abstracting from the fact that they are works, we are referred to their beautiful appearance and with it to human beings who sense, even if the latter are not determined further.

Yet there is certainly need for closer consideration here.¹

¹ In what follows, the work of art is discussed only as the product of objectivating fiction and as the creation of an embodiment of figments. The embodiment produces an unreasonable demand that everyone (who can follow and understand) accept what is subsequently phantasied as "the same" figment that the artist has produced with a view to such acceptance.
Hence the objectivity of the beauty of an artistic formation, apart from its value as a work. The beautiful content of the work (in literature, say, a phantasy creation of an ideal humanity offering itself in verbal form): What is the objective being-beautiful of this beautiful something? A phantasy personality, say, is quasi-given in image, described, sketched by someone quasi-speaking: the personality can be identified in repeated acts, grasped as the same in the repeated reading of books (which as “exemplars of the work” are different individuals). In phantasy, I identify what is quasi-given; I posit it as the same. But the produced formation is actually the same, and the value of its beauty is the same. The same beautiful formation is not what is phantasied as such, understood as the correlate of momentary phantasying. Also not an abstracted universal essence abstracted from individual cases, not a universal that has an extension. I continually mean the phantasied theme as the same, or, respectively, the mode of appearance as the same. The verbal sound of the poem is the same as what is poetically composed itself, the situation presented therein in the How of its mental presentation. Whether different persons read it in different timbres, present it in different subjective phantasies, its internal reading, its external reciting, and so on, reproduces only the sound that belongs to the poem itself. Of course, in the case of a poem by Schiller, it is also not Schiller’s accent, his Schwabian accent, that is meant; or in the case of a poem by Goethe, not Goethe’s Frankfurt accent, and so on. The poem in its linguistic body, just like the poem in its “spiritual” content, is obviously an idea that, in being read, becomes actualized more or less perfectly, and, for the rest, in ways that are, ideally, infinitely various. The poem is an individual, “objective” idea. The idea has its temporality; namely, the temporality of its origination by the artist, specifically, in the verbal expression, which alone makes something ideal accessible and identifiable intersubjectively.  

We would perhaps have to discuss beforehand the distinction between the individual subject’s phantasying and phantasying in community, the objectivating turning: accepting what is phantasied in positional reality as objective figment, voluntarily retained in identity (perhaps then shaped further in the “continuation of phantasy”).

2 To be considered: Objectivation that fixes something for me: Embodiment makes possible figments as formed with primal vitality into perceptual images (plastic art, art in the form of images available to sensuous perception). Also literary works of
Consequently, each such objective idea — and specifically, each idea that in union with an expression is supposed to be something beautiful in itself, something full of objective value — is, objectively, a work.

In any phantasying whatsoever, we have something phantasied; living in the phantasy, we have a phantasied reality. As actual subjects, however, we have a “phantasy” in the ontic sense as something identifiable as an individual, as something the selfsame that can be repeated: e.g., a “figment” as an objectivity, as this same water sprite that I might phantasy repeatedly. The water sprite is not real, but this phantasy water sprite is something identifiable as this phantasy water sprite in the repetition of phantasy intuitions. We do not merely carry out several phantasies of contents that are quite alike. On the contrary, we “repeatedly” posit what is phantasied as one and the same; we mean the same phantasied something. It is one and the same possibility of a factual being, one and the same specimen of a factual being as-if, to which we return in later recollections as often as we choose, reaching back and seizing it after we have no longer been “thinking about it.” Hence I can recall “the” water sprite that I phantasied yesterday; I can have phantasy objects that accompany me as identical (understood as ideas of something individual) throughout my whole life.

Nevertheless, we need a careful analysis of the essence of these “positionless” objects belonging to the region of the figment. The positing of an object is positing in abiding acceptance. A taking up again of the acceptance instituted earlier is inherent in the repetition, if the repetition is supposed to be the consciousness — hence the positing — of the same figment as object. But here it is the normal case of continuing acceptance understood as “retention.” Just as in phantasying we have unitary quasi-retention, and in repetition — in the attitude of phantasy as neutrality — continuous quasi-retention, so too we have it in the redirection of our objectivating focus toward the figment. However, if we return to positional living, we do not yet exercise that “unconscious” habitual retention that there signifies continuing acceptance. Recollection of earlier phantasying and of art for me — now followed and understood through empathy and accepted at first without further ado; then, coming about later, inhibition, criticism, the rejection of their value.
something phantasied is not, without more ado, a taking up again, a participating — it is that only if we have posited the figment for ourselves from the start as an abiding object, have voluntarily created it, made it for that purpose; or, what is the same, if we have posited it in abiding validity as something that is supposed to be accepted by us as individually the same. This does imply, however, that we can take up and carry on again old phantasying that belongs to the past. This yields particular syntheses, “interconnections,” the identity of an invented world in contrast to other possible worlds.

Must we not say: When separate successive perceptions with contents that are perfectly alike make their appearance in one consciousness (which is only possible in the mode of memory of the earlier cases), they ground a consciousness of the same thing that has been perceived several times? Of course, complete likeness of the content meant includes the horizons as well. This is also the case in phantasy. This can be applied to the content of the artwork. It is a formation produced by phantasy and is something phantasied with the same mode of appearance, and it is abidingly posited as that in stable acceptance — as figment, as object: In this self-identity it is actually something beautiful. What is identified by me, posited by me as an abidingly accepted object, can also be posited as an object intersubjectively: The ideally identical figment as an object is then an intersubjective object, something existing ideally and intersubjectively, which we can all claim as our own through the really objective being of the work in its physical embodiment. Ultimately, therefore, we are led back to the creative subject, who intends and creates the figment to be an abiding object, and who, furthermore, produces a physical thing that awakens the spiritual ideal object in a fixed way for everyone who can understand, and points to it with the sense of something abiding, which is supposed to become an internal acquisition and an internal possession. Hence the demand that everyone posit the figment as an object.

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3 The text of this paragraph was later crossed out. —Editor’s note.
Pure possibilities <becoming constituted exclusively by means of phantasying quasi-experience — Possibility as object, as the same possibility graspable repeatedly and with evidence in repeated quasi-experiencing — That phantasy, properly speaking, cannot reproduce any individual as an individual>

Phantasy consciousness is a modified consciousness. By that we understand a consciousness in which one is aware of something objective as if it were being actually experienced or had been actually experienced, etc., even though it is not really being actually experienced, not being perceived, not being remembered, and so on. One is conscious of what is phantasied “as if [it were] existing.”

What is phantasied is quasi-experienced as such and such, as “something existent” having a certain sense. This sense can be more or less determined and open. In passive phantasying, it can be determined more closely “by itself” with respect to its intrinsic content or sense; or it can also be determined more closely with respect to its individual setting, with respect to its connections with what is simultaneous with it, with what precedes it, and with what follows it. However, it can be the case that what is phantasied veers from its sense and falls into another sense, that sense-moments become modified one into another, though not in the manner of the change that belongs to the unity of one sense. This is to be understood as follows: If, let us say, a phantasy formation emerges, “expanding” by itself in such and such a way, then, in phantasying, I can transfer what is quasi-experienced into the unitary content (with its horizons of indeterminacy) that first offers itself. While I now have in the ongoing quasi-experiencing what is quasi-experienced grasped as what possesses this sense, a partially new sense-content introduces itself, paints over and displaces the contents that had prevailed up to now. The determination red passes over into the determination blue, turns into blue, without my believing this to be an objective and quasi-experienced change. I was focused, say, on the unchanging red. In the same way, someone is experienced (in phantasy) as blond and then
brown introduces itself, [or] someone is experienced as blue-eyed and then becomes brown-eyed: not an “actually experienced” change. If I were to keep the object with its old sense firmly in mind, a conflict, an incompatibility, and so on, would then spring up. The characteristic of phantasying, however, is such that something quasi-experienced together with its sense can be discarded; or its sense can be partially discarded and another sense, a modified sense, admitted in its place, perhaps voluntarily substituted for it.

On the other hand, I can grasp something phantasied as this thing; I can keep it firmly in mind in its identity. And in part by accepting the change in content that offers itself passively as “actually experienced” change or as actually experienced closer determination, in part by voluntarily determining it more closely by fashioning and changing it at will, I can prescribe for it the content of its being thus and of its development in the ongoing quasi-experience. If, in doing so,

I follow a course such that in connection with all of this free choice in passive letting go and active fashioning, a synthesis of unity or a coinciding of identity results — hence one and the same object is quasi-experienced in a harmony of sense — I am thereby constructing a “possible object.” I can also say: If I posit something emerging emptily or intuitively (more of less clearly) as “this,” and as a “this” possessing a sense to be fashioned further or refashioned by me voluntarily, and if I posit it in the manner of something quasi-experienced, of something that identifies itself by means of quasi-experience, then I “conceive” a possibility. And I construct it, I make it come to givenness, if I construct a synthetic experiential unity in the mode of phantasy in which every voluntary fashioning of sense has occurred and continues to occur in such a way that a unity of filled harmonious sense, and in the unity of quasi-perceptual synthesis a unity of the experienced object with its harmonious sense, becomes constituted.

What hovers before someone in the attitude of phantasying dreaming “as” something experienced, and above all as something harmoniously perceived, the actual object dreamt of (the reality dreamt of), is, in the attitude of someone living consciously in the actual present, something actual itself; namely, a pure possibility “actually experienced,” grasped, by him. In dreaming, the dreaming Ego is lost in the dream; it becomes the Ego in the dream, the quasi-subject of the quasi-experience. In waking consciousness, however, the waking Ego
in the proper circumstances is confirmed as phantasying Ego. It does not lose itself in the dream. As waking Ego, it brings about a shift into dreaming and carries out an actual positing, an actual ego cogito, in which it grasps what is quasi-experienced as quasi-experienced, and in a voluntary fashioning of sense and in a uniformly intuitive phantasy-fashioning fulfilling it, constructs, in the form of a unitary quasi-experience, an individual quasi-object. As long as this object is phantasied in an identical sense and in the fulfillment of the identical sense in quasi-experience, just so long does the actual Ego have one and the same possibility, one and the same possible object originally given, “actually experienced,” as possible.

A possibility is posited when anything at all with such and such a sense is posited as something that can be realized by phantasy intuition as harmoniously experienceable with that sense. The experience “in” phantasy is itself a possible experience.

A pure possibility would be a possibility in which no individual reality is co-posited as actual; a pure possibility is therefore anything objective that becomes constituted exclusively by phantasying quasi-experience.

A possibility is an object. It can be repeatedly recognized as the same, experienced as the same. It is implied in this that something quasi-experienced can be quasi-experienced in a second quasi-experience as a quasi-existing object with the same sense or as quasi the same, and this itself can be confirmed evidentially. To this corresponds the possibility of a synthetic phantasy in which the Ego, quasi-experiencing this and then that in phantasy, becomes convinced in a synthesis of quasi-memory [that it is aware of] the same “object.”

But is this quasi-synthesis in phantasy presupposed by the actual synthesis belonging to what confirms the identical possibility? The actual Ego confirms the actual identity of two possibilities; it confirms the possible identity of two possibilities on the basis of the former phantasied synthesis. To begin with, these are not the same. But how are they related to each other? Is there an equivalence?

Let us consider the following: A possibility can be grasped as the same repeatedly and with evidence, can be constituted as the same possibility with the same sense in repeated quasi-experiencing.

For example, I can repeatedly phantasy a centaur as the same centaur, as exactly the same individually, in the same extent of time
(phantasied extent of time). Similarly, just as I can repeatedly represent a perception as the same (in repeated clear recollections), so I can repeat a \textit{quasi}-perception. That would mean: I can reproduce the first phantasy of the centaur and in this recollection again accept the earlier \textit{quasi}-perception, hence posit afresh its \textit{quasi}-object as the same object and with the same sense precisely as remembered, if the memory is concrete. Thus I again take up the earlier possibility as the same and determine it more closely, perhaps at will in a harmonious voluntary shaping of its sense within its identity.

However, from any given possibility I can also fashion new possibilities. Reflecting back, I can determine that this or that should not be meant in this way, but differently; and I can make the fulfilling \textit{quasi}-perception follow in conformity with each changed sense, and so create from one possibility several. Of course, these possibilities would be “incompatible” with one another, which implies that the coinciding in such transformations preserves something self-identical with respect to which the varied determinations would give rise to evident conflict, to evident mutual annulment, if all of them were supposed together — hence if, while keeping the object firmly in mind,

I were to suppose it now in one way, now in another way, and then in all of these ways at once.

If, therefore, I can recognize a possibility as the same only by taking it up again, by recollecting it (which includes a recollection of the phantasy), then naturally the truth of this identity depends on the reliability of the recollection.

It is also clear that this possibility, as this possibility, is subjective. It is the possibility whose sense I myself have shaped and perhaps shaped still further, and which preserves its identity only in this chain of possible recollections.

If by means of fancies and the free delineation of sense, I now form for myself a possibility A, then, ideally speaking, I can have “precisely the same possibility” again at another time. But is it actually the same if the second formation is not a precise recollection of the first? Or is it not merely one that is like it? It may be that in forming A the second time, I remember in addition that I had earlier fashioned a like formation with a like object. But then I certainly cannot say without more ado that this is the same individual possibility. Only if I arbitrarily will to see the first in the second again — but that is to say,
only if I give to the second phantasy the significance of a recollection of the first — can I say: Both give me the same possibility.

If I imagine to myself that someone else is forming the equivalent possibility, I also cannot without further ado suppose the identity as far as he is concerned, even if he found out that I have a like possibility given to me. The individual identity must have possibilities of legitimation.

Here we must note something different. The object of perception in its original sense is originally built up in a perception. If the perception is an immanent one, the object is built up in a fully determinate sense.

In this case, the immanent connection to past and present functions as individuating.

What about a “quasi-perception”? Certainly the phantasy possibility is necessarily indeterminate as far as the degree of clarity and obscurity is concerned. In the process of clarification, the sense itself becomes more closely determined. In phantasy understood as re-presentation of different gradations of clarity, I necessarily have a distance from the object itself and from the quasi-perception proper that I am building up quasi-originally; and thus the phantasied object is indeterminate with regard to the sense that is quasi building itself up, unlike [the situation in] recollection, which has athetic intention settled in advance. Here, therefore, the intuitive sense itself is fluid. It is determined firmly only with respect to what is universal — such as color, red, and so on — which in this case is not a universal that is thought of, a conceptual universal, but a form of variability. With respect to the quasi-individual itself, the phantasied individual, no determinate differentia are fixed and none can be fixed down to the ultimate differentia. It is open. And if, in repetition, I obtain greater clarity with richer content, I may admit it as valid, but I would also have done so if the repetition had inserted a different content. In the case of the repetition that is memory, I certainly cannot say that just the new difference, the more determinate difference, would be meant. So too in the case of the possible filling-in of new determinations that were formerly open.

Add to this that an actual perception is not only [the perception of] something perceived with this and that sense-content, but also contains in itself an individual temporal determination that makes the perceived individual a member of the realm of individuals. By an
eidetic law, it belongs to what is now, not only that it can show itself again and again as individually the same in any number of recollective syntheses, but that it has a place in the filled time corresponding to the structure of time consciousness. Even what is quasi-experienced has its temporal horizon, but this horizon is indeterminate and can be filled out by phantasy in whatever way one pleases. Each such filling-out would assign to the individual a different individual determination. Two recollections, both perfectly alike in content, perhaps have inexplicit and “indeterminate” horizons. They can be explicated, however, and their determination is prescribed. It then becomes apparent a priori that they cannot admit of completely the same fulfillment; and if they recall the same thing, what is recollected [in each recollection] has a different mode of the past. Phantasies perfectly alike in content have a temporal indeterminacy that does not allow one to determine whether they re-present [their contents] as simultaneous or as not simultaneous, whether they re-present the same thing or different things. They are analogous to recollections that are perfectly alike but whose horizon is unexplicated, and they are constituted as if they were recollections whose horizons could not be explicated at all — which, of course, is absurd. But as in recollection I see a present flash before me in the mode “again” and yet know what present it is only by means of its horizon and the horizon’s explication, and therefore know whether two recollections perfectly alike in content, considered individually, re-present the same thing or different things, so in the case of like phantasies I have presents flashing before me as re-presented presents, but no determination of what presents they are. Every past and possible past or possible non-re-presented present looks perfectly alike in the presence of contents that are perfectly alike.

Is this not significant for the original constitution of time consciousness? Can one still say that the primal impression as primal impression established the individual time-point? Does not the primal impression do this within a complex whole by virtue of fulfilling the protention? This leads to difficulties. Primal impression certainly

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1 This indeterminacy, which can be filled out as one pleases, is essentially different from the indeterminacy within the frame of actual experience, of positional consciousness.
does establish originally; it is the primal source of individuality and is itself primally individual. However, it is what it is as something non-self-sufficient in the stream and as conceivable only in its place. But then what about a phantasy understood as the re-presentation (of a present)? It gives a possible present but not an actual present, and accordingly not an individual present. This is indeed noteworthy. A concrete individual cannot, properly speaking, be phantasied fully and completely. As a matter of essential necessity, every individual possibility is radically indeterminate; and the indeterminacy is not a perfect quasi-determinability, not even one in phantasy. This, however, is the counterpart of the fact that every perceptual reality has the parallel property that it is what it is only in the temporal nexus and thus carries in itself the infinity of life or is carried by that life, which as past is settled but as future moves forward as endlessly explicable and bestows on the individual temporal being, although it now no longer exists, an ever new temporal determination.

An individual datum can never return as absolutely the same, although likeness is possible. An individual datum occurs at its place in life, and this is not meaningless for the datum itself. This characteristic of actually existing, which is what first of all makes something concrete and individual, cannot be invented; and if a phantasy represents something as present life, it brings about quasi-intuitions, but quasi-intuitions of the surroundings with an indeterminate horizon in such a way that this horizon functions only as an index for whatever possibilities one chooses for the filling of the form of time constitution.

Accordingly, phantasy cannot properly speaking reproduce any individual as an individual; it gives “something” that can be fashioned in the form of an individual and that becomes intuitive only with respect to its sense content, which is indeterminate as far as individuality is concerned. It is very difficult, however, to describe the situation with full clarity and to find concepts for it. I acquire an individual possibility when I imagine an actually experienced individual as transformed in phantasy.

Hence a pure possibility that has nothing individual fixed elsewhere and in advance by an actual experience serving as its basis is never the possibility of a firmly determinate individual. Rather, it has the form: something with this and that intuitive content.
Whether or not reproductive data, intuitive re-presentations, essentially have something fluid [about them]. The process of cognizance-taking in recollection — The idea of actuality and of positionally unmodified consciousness; in contrast to this, consciousness modified in the manner peculiar to phantasy and the question of the constitutional effect of phantasy. The role of free supposition for the constitution of the possibility of an object and the fulfillment of this supposition apart from memory. The “as-if” modification has its constitutional reason, the correlate of which is: pure possibility — Indeterminacy in phantasy and becoming determined, becoming more closely determined, becoming determined as otherwise in phantasy — The being of phantasy objectivities [as] “actually experienceable” being>

Possibilities — specifically, pure possibilities of something individual (though [this is also true of] of individual possibilities of whatever sort) — are fluid. For example, the possibility of a house, of a tree. They are not evidently identifiable in the way in which individual realities are. Must we not say with greater universality that reproductive data, intuitive re-presentations, essentially have something fluid [about them]? And that even when we take recollections, we have the problem of how we are supposed to speak of the intuiting of an identical object, perhaps even of the unchanging object of a memory, in the fluctuation and flow and change of the “memory image” (disregarding the vanishing of the image, though in that case, too, change in the form of rapidly fading away and dying, and of emerging once again out of obscurity with an increase in “clarity,” also plays its role)?

Here an unmodified “intention,” a belief, runs through the consciousness of the object in the given “situation of consciousness”; and this belief runs “through” the intuitive image and image moments that “represent,” “act as a substitute for,” the corresponding moments of the object (those that are to be given in reproduction). The intention becomes fulfilled as a striving toward the reproduced object “itself” when I attain to a change of image (or to a changed image moment) in the consciousness of the “object itself.” The image moment can present the object itself more or less perfectly in consciousness. It may be the case that the “distance” momentarily “disappears,” that it is “very small,” that I am conscious of the “nearly,” of the “almost
exactly.” But often I am conscious of the wholly “otherwise,” of the “very different.”

It may be that a memory image emerges as recollective intuition in conformity with an antecedent Ego-intention that aims at it, an empty directedness-toward proceeding from the Ego. It may also be that it emerges “passively” as something coming to mind, as the result of a passive and merely associative motivation without the “Ego’s participation,” without the moment of active aiming. The image coming to mind affects me; I turn toward it. The belief that has turned into secondary sensuousness, which becomes activated in the turning toward, is already implicit in the coming to mind prior to the turning toward. An “intention” therefore aims at the object. If, however, the object is now given with the consciousness of a distance — given “obscurely,” or, when I am “perusing it hastily,” perhaps even given as different from what it “presents” itself as being here — the intention can change into an aiming intention directed toward the object itself (or the It-itself of the moment in question); that is, either merely toward greater “nearness,” merely toward greater clarity, or toward the production of the objectivity itself, which, however, in being produced, can still have degrees of clarity. For we must make the latter distinction. A man is presented with a blond beard, but I am doubtful whether he actually has a blond beard. Indeed, I already “know” that this is a false representation. I want to bring the true color to sight. On the other hand, I can already have the true color, but the image can still be obscure.

The object itself is a possible target in this case. Specifically, we must say: 1) Every object of memory is an already “familiar” object; that is, the cognizance-taking of an object in memory is characterized as “re”-recollection, as repetition of a cognizance-taking that was carried out earlier. 2) Yet this needs to be restricted. This concerns the recollection of an active seeing, hence the “I have seen that (examined it).” Nevertheless, it may be that in my reexamining I observe something in particular that I did not consider earlier and did not notice originaliter. It is seen again in the mode of a passive re-appearance, but now for the first time “it” affects me in this respect (in the mode of re-appearing), and now I consider it for the first time. On the other hand, it is also possible that something that I never considered now re-appears, perhaps as the background object of something that was
heeded; that its re-affecting now turns into “affecting in memory,” into active memorial affecting; and that examining in recollection is the consequence.

3) However, depending on the circumstances, the cognizance-taking in recollection in these modes is characterized either as cognizance-taking (of the object with respect to the recollected aspect, etc.) in the full, adequate sense, or as cognizance-taking that is “imperfect,” obscure, or approximate or even erroneous. The intention aimed at taking cognizance can therefore assume the form of a striving toward perfect execution of the re-cognizing (or of the cognizance-taking “in” memory). Hence an essential mediacy that belongs to the essence of recollection as a system of possibilities is inherent in this.

We must, however, distinguish further complicated modes here.

To begin with: We assume that whatever the nature of the “memory image” may be, the consciousness is certainly consciousness of the object as this individual object. Specifically, it is consciousness directed “immediately” toward the object in a definite way. In a certain sense, an empty intention is a mediate intention, inasmuch as it annexes the object “itself” to consciousness, as it were, only in an intuitive fulfillment. On the other hand, in another and perfectly good sense it is immediate; that is, if we call a consciousness “immediate” that is not aimed at its object through a mediating consciousness and hence does not first require mediate fulfillments, which do not at all need to be intuitive, in order to reach the object itself. Thus a person can be presented to me by her suddenly appearing name, though she herself not only may not be given intuitively, but at the moment I may not have any determinate presentation of her whatsoever. I can also have, nonintuitionally, an entirely determinate presentation. I then possess the name intuitively (let us say, an acoustic presentation), and together with it the fulfillment of the nominal intention in an empty presentation having a determinate sense. Then the image, and in the image the person herself, can also emerge. If, therefore, the intention is an immediate intention, the consciousness of “distance” (the consciousness of gradually changing obscurity or the consciousness of

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2 Inserted later: “second.” — Editor’s note.
3 Inserted later: “in discretely posited steps.” — Editor’s note.
the object’s being different from what the image itself displays it as being) implies that I have precisely an “image” in the sense that I have an object hovering before me in imagination. And very much as in the case of a depiction, I have the object itself presented determinately through the image, although concealed by the image or bearing a resemblance only at a distance. But I do not, for that reason, have the object in a second intuitive act of presenting. Coinciding presupposes that the appearing image is not completely alien to the concealed objectivity itself. In the example of presentation by means of a name, it may be that the awakened image first presents itself as the image of the person named, since previously I was not already directed determinately toward the named object, while the name nevertheless pulls the depicted person near associatively and motivationally, and gives itself as that which is named. But then I take notice, namely because the one named, by virtue of the motivation that belongs to the name in this nexus of consciousness, presents herself as the one meant and demanded in this nexus. And I see that the name has drawn me by association into other motivational circumstances in which the name would demand the person emerging in the image. I thus note the permutation.

I can also explicate in this way the associative motives that would bring into an image immediately presenting itself as the image of A (of the A that now lies in my direct, determinate memory intention) unsuitable traits that conflict with the A that is meant and, in the absence of resembling presentation, conceal it. Furthermore, this concealing can appear clearly or obscurely. The differences in obscurity belong in another dimension, and change in clarity is not change in the sense of the object.

Even after studying recollections so extensively, we are still not finished with them. Adequate recollections present themselves as a species of perceptions. On the one hand, they are recollections, recognizings of something familiar, renewals of old knowledge. On the other hand, they are “perceptions” of temporal being that may be repeated. They make it given in itself, in its very being, and again and again as the same temporal being, only in a changing mode of orientation of the past. The originary perception (the now-perception),

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4 “Image” later changed to “memory image.” — Editor’s note.
which gives the object in the mode of the present, is a perception of something individual only because it gives what is perceived in one of the modes of orientation that belong essentially to the being actual of the individual; specifically, in the primary mode, from which all the other modes issue: which can itself become evident only in chains of recollection (which are directed toward the subjective modes of experiencing or toward the correlative modes of orientation). Every recollection is just as much a perception of the temporal object as the original perception of the same object in its presence is.

Of course, the perception of abiding objects belonging to nature, in comparison with the perception of transitory temporal objects and especially of immanent objects, is something distinct. An object belonging to nature, abiding in change and persisting even after the perception, is nevertheless perceivable again, as it was also perceivable without having been perceived. Here there is perception as originary being-given in the mode of the present, and moreover as repeated perceiving — and perceiving capable of being repeated as often as one chooses — of the same object, and of the same object in different presents and in different memory series, each of which makes the temporal position of the present objectively identifiable. Recollection also belongs to the constitution of identical objective temporal positions, but perception belongs to the constitution of an object’s persisting duration, of its continuing on into an objective future, and so on.

With the idea of actuality we stand in the system of thetically unmodified intentionality, in the intentionality of doxa, of belief. Belief is not something appended to presentations, not a feeling associating itself with them, not a way of being affected, now present, now absent, attending such presentations; on the contrary, it is the unmodified consciousness itself. It is subject to laws of reason; that is, to the essential laws of the intuitive fulfillment of unmodified consciousness, or, correlatively, to the essential laws of the positing of objects as identities of unbroken confirmation that can “exist” in themselves in contrast to the changing (unmodified) consciousness. The constitution of existing objects belonging to an existing world is the work of reason.

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5 Husserl uses the English term here. — Translator’s note.
Whether phantasy objects are "possible objects"

If we consider the consciousness that is modified "in the manner of phantasy," it is characteristic of this consciousness, in contrast to unmodified consciousness, that it is not capable of any constitutive productions, at least not directly: There are no phantasy objects — understood as existing objects. There are no existing phantasy worlds.

One will then say: Phantasy objects are possible objects, phantasy worlds are possible worlds. But what phantasy presents to me, in the manner of a fancy, for example, needs a free supposition in order to have a fixed directedness toward an "objectivity" understood as the possibility of a determinate object; and the fulfillment of this supposition in the form of closer determination is in need of a free act of determining, of choosing what will fulfill it, by means of which the objectivity then receives delineation, though with new indeterminacies that again are freely fulfilled. The freedom is limited insofar as essential laws of possible quasi-fulfillment are inherent here within the boundaries of the unity of an identical possible objectivity understood as intentional and still indeterminate.

But we need to reflect carefully here. Determining the essence of phantasy is a great problem. If I produce the "supposition," the voluntary positing of the being of what is phantasied (which does not have to be intuitive), this supposition becomes actualized, fulfilled, in the occurrence of a corresponding intuition, just as it does in the case of memory, and yet in an entirely different way. In memory, the intention aimed at the objectivity itself becomes fulfilled in a "believed" objectivity itself, in an objectivity that presents itself as intrinsically real; and to the extent that it possesses a sense that remains unfulfilled, the intention continues and becomes fulfilled in ever new actuality. Here I am in a nexus of "actuality" that I do not "make up," that I do not imagine (as actuality), but "find." Only the act of setting out toward the objectivity itself is subject to my freedom. If I do set out, the possible paths are predelineated — hence, in the case of physical objectivities, the realization in memory of kinestheses that either claim...

6 But I can certainly live passively in phantasy, give myself up to it, and, quasi-experiencing, watch what is taking place in the phantasy landscape, for example. I can also imagine that "in the phantasy" I am actively engaging in cognizing, in cognizance-taking — but with everything subject to freedom.
to be the very “repetition” of actually effected kinestheses, and thus make their appearance in this mode of “actual” motivations, or do not make that claim but then have the characteristic of “real possibilities.” As a system of real possibilities, of real capabilities, the kinesthetic system has a mode of being and the supposition a corresponding characteristic that limits freedom. With regard to motivations and what is motivated, we therefore exist in a system of belief. The suppositions are also limited by beliefs or have the characteristic of modalities of belief, and hence are beliefs themselves.

Pure phantasy neutralizes, modifies all belief; it does not modalize it in such a way that it turns it into a new belief in a modalized being. But must one not put it differently here? Phantasy surely constitutes “ideal,” “pure” possibilities. What presents itself is the following: To the extent that belief is still there, the phantasy attitude “sets itself free” from it. It takes the actual belief “as if” it were belief; the being actual turns into being-as-if (as if it were reality). Even the supposition with respect to all of its motivations turns into a supposition-as-if. But how then do I obtain clarification of the positing of pure possibility, which is nevertheless an actual positing, a belief? The modification of the as-if is a separate dimension of modifications that stands in contrast to all modalities of belief (or, correlatively, modalities of being) that are unmodified in this respect. And this modification, like every other, is consciousness-of and has its constitutive reason. Its correlate is pure possibility. This means that the “being-as-if” can itself be something meant and actual. To carry out an as-if modification is itself again an act of believing, in which what is believed is the as-if. And the latter can perhaps be given evidently; that is, come to be given itself, originally.

In every “reproduction,” I have a double focus or attitude as a possibility: Either I live “in” the reproduction, and then I perceive as it were, conceive, feel as it were. I live in the past in memory, and in so doing I become aware of the memory. I live in the “as it were,” in the “as-if.” Or I take up my position in the now and am the actual subject and bear a relationship in my actual consciousness to what is reproduced, which from the point of view of the now is characterized as something reproduced, as something past (as a past present, as a represented present, but not as a presented actual present, as a modified present).
It belongs to every reproduction to be “modification,” and what is modified is an “as-if.” In the case of pure phantasy, what is reproduced does not have the characteristic of simply existing (in a mode of existence), but of “something existing” in the “as-if,” which has an entirely different meaning.

Here too I have the double focus: Living in pure phantasy, I am the pure phantasy subject and the pure phantasy Ego, which has given to it a phantasy present, a phantasy past, and so on. Or I am the presently actual Ego that “phantasies” the present, past, etc., existent.

And what exists purely and simply in the mode of the phantasy-as-if, what is actually phantasied, what is actually being given in advance in its phantasy modalities — this is what is possible, the existing possibility. And it itself is given as that in the intuitive phantasy; and adequate and inadequate itself-givenness, and so on, belong to it.

Indeterminacy in phantasy and becoming determined, becoming determined as something different, in phantasy

If we suppose that sensuous phantasy data (phantasms) run off in clear determinacy like kinesthetic data running off in a firmly ordered manner and data of sensation running off along with them in fixed co-ordination, and if we suppose that everything is just as it is “in reality,” would not a phantasy world of things thereby become newly constituted, and would it then be a phantasy world at all? Would it not be a real world and a world that presents itself as real? But is that not nonsense? And why is it nonsense?

If, in perceiving, I experience an A — a hyletic datum, for example — as present reality, an A' cannot coincide with it. But if I experience an apperceived object apperceptively, if I experience a physical thing, for example, a conflict can occur between two apprehensions. They can coincide by overlapping, one can shift into the other, be displaced, and in the process the being actual of one of them annuls the being actual of the other. The system of reality is a system of belief, and all belief — ultimately, the certainty of belief — is motivated. Anticipation together with indeterminate horizons is constantly

7 Inserted later: “in the wider sense, an ‘as it were.’ ” — Editor’s note.
present, but all closer determination comes about through actual experience in company with belief firmly motivated in the given nexus.

What I have given as existing in belief I can “imagine as otherwise.” I can phantasy it as if it were otherwise. I can suppose, assume hypothetically, that it is otherwise. The supposition is then a free, “voluntary” supposition, and is abrogated as null by actual experience.

If I have a mere phantasy, however, I am conscious of what is phantasied only as if it were actual. I can pass over into a phantasy conflicting with it. I keep A firmly in mind and, in conflict, phantasy it as something different, as if it were A’. But it is in my power to choose whether I surrender the being of A and hold onto A’, or vice versa. A’ is excluded only if I hold on to A, and conversely. If I have an open horizon in the case of A, then, while I keep A firmly in mind as existing, as enduring (in the as-if), every closer determination of what is indeterminate (and not merely of what is determinate but not yet phantasied intuitively) is “optional,” “arbitrary.”

If α comes to mind as a closer determination adapting itself to A, then, freely changing α within a certain range of variability, I can “equally well” choose any such variation as a closer determination. And depending on how I choose, the new horizons then presenting themselves and demanded by the A-form change.

Thus I can freely phantasy the “given world.” I can freely phantasy the world, understood as the actually experienced world with open horizons, with regard to what is still unknown. I can depict it at my pleasure in its further course, but also with respect to what is unknown in its course already experienced up to now. But however much I am restricted by the form of nature and the apperception of nature, I have freedom at each step; at each step I can choose. If I do choose, I sketch out a new horizon (the universal horizon belonging to the form “physical reality” becomes specified), but I can only advance by means of a new voluntary choice in infinitum.

However, this is also true and involves even greater freedom if I exclude all restriction coming from belief and limit myself only by the universal: Let there be a thing with this content A as my arbitrarily chosen starting point, in connection with which I obviously would not have to comprehend the universality conceptually.

What about the being actual of a pure possibility, therefore? Possibilities are “voluntary” phantasy objects. The phantasying Ego is not
limited to a reality by belief. It takes the “reality” occurring to it in phantasy “as if” it were reality, and, accepting it, freely and voluntarily chooses to bind itself to the horizon belonging to the “sense” of this reality.\(^8\) It freely chooses the fulfillment of this horizon, performs *quasi*-fulfillings within the limits of the sense of the acceptance, sticking to them and *quasi*-confirming them, producing particularizations that determine them more closely. It freely sketches thereby a new sense for the same phantasy object and delineates it further in free choice, freely fashioning it. In the course of this, the free formation has the continual sense of something “existing in itself” (in the as-if), of an “object,” as if it were something existing on its own and determining the act that presents it, as if it were actually experienced, as if the experience determined the object more closely, as if the object on its own demanded this closer determination, and so on.

This phantasy formation being produced in pervasive, freely chosen fashioning — in the phantasying attitude in which I am absorbed in phantasy and in which, as phantasy Ego, I am “experiencing” in phantasy as if I were actually experiencing this “reality” — is precisely phantasy (ontically understood), reality-as-if. If, however, I become rooted in focusing on what is actual in the now, then an actual constitutive performance is brought about in my actual phantasy experiences (in the actual accepting and sticking with what has come to mind in phantasy, in the actual *quasi*-fulfillment of the empty intentions, in the actual *quasi* closer-determination of the empty horizons). What now actually lies within my view as “reality” is the phantasied object understood as the phantasy identity in its phantasied determinations, which endure harmoniously in the manner peculiar to phantasy. I have, of course, continuously chosen freely and have in this way produced the harmonious unity “in” phantasy, but even in this freedom I am limited. I constantly have a choice, but it is precisely a choice. If I decide for one thing, many others are excluded. And what is identical, the synthesis of images that go together to form the unity of something that is continuously identical with itself throughout (something appearing in harmonious *quasi*-appearances) is — as synthesis — by no means in my power to choose. I am bound

\(^8\) The “accepting,” however, can also be passive and have the characteristic of submitting to something, but everything that occurs there <...>.
by an eidetic law, and I bring this eidetic law to givenness in universal thinking on the basis of reflection on the appearances and their unity, and on the consciousness constituting them.

The being belonging to phantasy objectivities is therefore “experienceable” being; phantasy objectivities are capable of being actually experienced as phantasy objectivities. Inasmuch as an empty intention is directed toward such productions in an indefiniteness that allows many different free choices and many different fulfilling phantasy-intuitions to emerge, what is actually produced is called a phantasy possibility, something showing the possibility of what was emptily intended in advance.9 Hence the phantasy productions that placed the unity of a quasi-objectivity, the unity of a phantasy object, intuitively before our eyes as actual phantasy objects, we also call possibilities (actually existing possibilities), “imagined” [“gedachte”] realities.10 Things supposed in the manner of phantasy, though supposed non-intuitively and then also indeterminately, are possibilities if they can be transformed synthetically into intuitive phantasy formations and verified by suitably chosen phantasy productions.

Indefinite horizons belong as a matter of essential necessity to every individual object, whether with respect to its temporal connections or with respect to the particular determinations in which it is meant. An object is possible in itself inasmuch as it is capable of being presented intuitively, and an object phantasied is possible inasmuch as it is capable of being phantasied freely and intuitively. Depending on its context, it then has in addition open contextual determinations. Every object phantasied directly and simply is possible (capable of being presented intuitively, in the manner of phantasy). Every object presented indirectly and in multiple ways by means of predicates must show its possibility.

Possibilities can be thought of emptily, can be symbolized, can be “actually experienced” as given themselves. They can be intended as not existing, as doubtfully existing, presumably existing, and so on. Possibility as compatibility, as synthetic possibility, possibility of

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9 This possibility is the customary modification of a doxic certainty.
10 The last sentence was later changed as follows: “Hence every phantasy production that placed the unity of a quasi-objectivity, the unity of a phantasy object, intuitively before our eyes as an actual phantasy object, we also call a possibility (an actually existing possibility), an ‘imagined’ reality. — Editor’s note.
something that is $\alpha$ and $\beta$ at once. Here $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are both determining, both “predicates.” A predicate is something identical that can be identical in many possibilities, that can be identical in the “manifold,” that can occur identically in variable and freely chosen possibilities, and that can determine the concretum.\footnote{Freely to choose possibility, possible reality, phantasied being-certain. Assume that happened. 1) Suppose that a mountain existed here — in conflict with the motivations belonging to the horizon, or not in conflict with them. The free choice pertaining to the supposition [is] limited, and each “possibility” has a moment of positing; One of the possibilities will come about. 2) Imagine that a mountain existed in pure possibility — then there is nothing limiting. If I phantasy a mountain in a phantasied plain, the supposition is a possibility belonging to another level: The supposition is itself a phantasy supposition; the hypothesis, a phantasy hypothesis. From the point of view of the now, however, [there is] a voluntary and completely free determination of the plain and a dependent determination limited only by this free choice.}

The whole reflection up to this point is anything but adequate. To what extent are possibilities identifiable objects and to what extent do they have an intersubjective objectivity?

What about the domain of possibilities that belong to the form, “something”? An $a$, an $a$ and $b$.\footnote{Freely to choose possibility, possible reality, phantasied being-certain. Assume that happened. 1) Suppose that a mountain existed here — in conflict with the motivations belonging to the horizon, or not in conflict with them. The free choice pertaining to the supposition [is] limited, and each “possibility” has a moment of positing; One of the possibilities will come about. 2) Imagine that a mountain existed in pure possibility — then there is nothing limiting. If I phantasy a mountain in a phantasied plain, the supposition is a possibility belonging to another level: The supposition is itself a phantasy supposition; the hypothesis, a phantasy hypothesis. From the point of view of the now, however, [there is] a voluntary and completely free determination of the plain and a dependent determination limited only by this free choice.}
APPENDIX LXI

FIGMENTS AS OBJECTS, AS EXISTENT

<probably 1922/23>

Have I already established in these manuscripts that the focus on the as-if when I am lost in phantasy, the focus on pure possibilities, and, finally, the focus on figments must be distinguished?

Phantasy is indeed constitution “as if.” However, as soon as I reflect as the one who I am, and am no longer removed from the present (this is different from my removal into the past while the present remains accepted); as soon as I, as actual Ego, simultaneously make the shift in this transition into an actually experiencing positing, namely, into the positing of what is phantasied, the positing of the object as if — I no longer have phantasy in the first sense, but precisely actual experience, and what I experience is a figment.

Figments therefore form a separate region of objects that is the as-if counterpart of the world and of all possible worlds. Figments, however, exist only as correlates of my phantasy and are transcendent and lasting objects only on account of the power to choose that belongs to my positing and to my accepting. I require a decision or a certain act of the will in order to accept in the future what I formerly phantasied.¹

¹ Husserl noted on the margin: “Cf. my explanations of figments as objects in the fine arts.” The allusion presumably refers to the sketch reproduced above as Appendix LVIII; on this subject, cf. also Appendix LX. — Editor’s note.
APPENDIX LXII

ACTUAL ORIGINARY CONSTITUTION — ACTUALITY;
QUASI-CONSTITUTION AS ACTUAL CONSTITUTION OF
POSSIBILITIES

<probably around 1918>

Impression: perception, memory — imagination: imagination of perception, imagination of memory. Constitution of objectivities in perception and in “impression” of whatever kind: impressional constitution = actual constitution. With the institution of an objective sense, a line of harmony and disagreement is instituted. As “actual” institution, the harmony is “actually” conscious, “actually” motivated — everything has the characteristic of impression. Belief [as] consciousness of harmony; unbelief as consciousness of what conflicts with the harmony and is annulled by it, and so on. These are “actual” occurrences; specifically, impressional occurrences.

All such kinds of things “in” imagination, understood as imaginative modification, as imagining. — The supposition of something imagined, the voluntary holding on to a harmonious sense belonging to phantasy, to a phantasy object and to lines of harmony = positioning of “pure” possibilities, of free phantasy possibilities. Grasping of ideal universalities, of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, and so on. The activity that constitutes and brings about objectivities. Phantasy, too, is consciousness and therefore constitutes, but [what it constitutes are] pure possibilities, immanent or transcendent. But transcendent possibilities in the free fashioning of further harmonies or disagreements. Infinitely many possible realities, which are incompatible with one another, and so on.
APPENDIX LXIII


A pure possibility is inconceivable, except as the correlate of a phantasying subject who fashions possibilities out of its phantasying, of a subject who has the possibility in question hovering before it as something quasi-experienced, and, in this quasi-experience, as something passing itself off harmoniously as quasi-existing. However, it is inherent in this that the phantasying subject has “hovering before it” a phantasied subject who is phantasied as actually experiencing and, in its experience, as bringing what is possible to givenness in its being.

This seems to lead to an infinite regress. For is not precisely the same thing again true of the phantasied subject? However, we must distinguish between what is objective, understood as something constituted, and the subjectivity constituting it. And then between phantasy as the modification of subjectivity, and specifically as the modification of the constituting subjective configurations (which, moreover, are not constituted objects and are not thematic objects), and, correlative, as the modification of the constituted objectivity. Phantasying is a modifying intentionality (a counterpart of every original intentionality, of every intentionality that is “impressional” intentionality in contrast to phantasying). More precisely, the “consciousness of the internal” has [567]
its counterpart in a phantasying of the internal in which a modified moment of subjectivity “hovers before one” as a possible moment of subjectivity, and in it an objectivity becomes “quasi”-constituted as a possible objectivity. Every phantasied objectivity (objective, pure possibility) points back to a quasi-constituting consciousness together with an Ego belonging to the consciousness, and at the same time to a phantasying subject, which is an actual subject with actual experiencing to which the phantasying itself belongs. The being of a possibility taken as a possibility does not point back to any definite actual subject, since the same possibility can be grasped by different actual subjects, as when any actual subject who lives through corresponding equivalent configurations constituting the possibility (and, in doing so, carries out phantasies in a corresponding way) thereby possesses the possibility as the same possibility, and is able to recognize that every possible subject who would phantasy\(^1\) in that way would recognize identically the same possibility.

Nevertheless, one must be rather cautious even here.\(^2\) If I phantasy myself into all possible subjects and in this way fashion the system of my Ego possibilities, or the system of possible subjects coinciding individually, then, properly speaking, it would make no sense to say that the individual centaur that I now have in view as a phantasied individuality is the same as the centaur that I, as another Ego, would phantasy in a perfectly similar way. But likewise it also makes no sense to say that an “individual” centaur that one subject invents and that another subject invents is the same when both subjects produce fictions that are completely alike (I see that the appeal to the system of coinciding individuals is useless). Hence\(^3\) an individual possibility — more distinctly, a possible determinate fact — is indeterminate insofar as it is not identifiable by different imagining subjects. In its determinacy as an individual possibility, therefore, it points back to a de facto subject. And if it itself is related only to a possible subject, then this possible subject again has this indeterminacy.

\(^1\) Inserted somewhat later: “and suppose [a] possibility in the same sense.” — Editor’s note.

\(^2\) Said in advance, one could run into confusion if one took phantasies, without further ado, to be possibilities.

\(^3\) Inserted somewhat later: “if we identify possibility and phantasy, we would have to say.” — Editor’s note.
Hence I present a centaur to myself, and someone else presents a centaur to himself that is perfectly like it: We cannot present individually the same centaur. But can we not agree, can we not intend to present the same centaur? In a certain sense, we undoubtedly can. But what presents itself then? We present to ourselves that we are both in a common world “in which this same centaur makes its appearance”; that is, we phantasy our factual common surrounding world and with it ourselves as different, and in the nexus of this phantasying we include phantasies of a centaur that are perfectly alike. Then there also belongs to the domain of the total phantasy the co-phantasied motivation, in consequence of which the centaur phantasied as the same by me and by someone else (by subjects who are themselves phantasied as different) is experienceable — in the phantasy, I repeat. Then, through synthetic connection to the de facto subjectivity belonging to both of us, we have a connection in incompatibility with our factually constituted world, an individually determined intersubjective phantasy along with an individually determined world imagined by this phantasy; and in this world we have, among other phantasied objects, the same centaur as object, as something identical intersubjectively.

Phantasies belonging to a single subject and intersubjective phantasies

What we learn here is the following. There are intersubjective actual experiences, understood as experiences that each of the subjects involved produces in such a way that each experiences the others as countersubjects within the frame of its own actual experience. At the same time each subject then posits something else that is experienced or experienceable as identical by the experienced other, but vice versa also posits the other as someone who can and perhaps must behave in the same way. And just as in such intersubjective experiences — actual and possible — [the subjects involved posit] objective or intersubjectively experienceable objectivities, there are, I say, in the same way intersubjective phantasies and intersubjective phantasy objects understood as the corresponding phantasy modifications related to actual phantasying subjects. When subjects engage in phantasy but
do not phantasy intersubjectively (establish “objective” phantasies in their freedom), their phantasy objects are then restricted to their isolated individual subjectivity.4

Now proceeding further, one could say: These considerations have great logical significance. What is inherent in the sense of “an A as such” when A is something factual, though something factual thought of in pure possibility? What belongs to the pure extension of the concept of an individual? Thus, for example, a centaur, just any possible centaur. Should we say: A centaur that I am phantasying and a centaur perfectly like it that someone else is phantasying (and not as something intersubjectively identical through the voluntary union of the two) are two different possible centaurs? But if I peruse hastily the extension [of the concept] of this example, understood as a pure extension, it does not occur to me to focus on the respective subjective individualizing differences. If I re-present to myself a solitary centaur, I do not mean “it” as a centaur represented just by me. Should we say that the single instance of a pure extension (of an extension of pure individual possibilities), the single particular taken as an example, <is> itself already something universal, something identical, which, for its part, has an extension of pure possibility? But if we shift to the supposition of existence, if we conceive of some subject or other as the subject of the hypothesis: an A exists or this phantasied A taken as an example exists, it is evident that the shift from the phantasy centaur to the centaur supposed as existing requires a synthesis between phantasy and the domain of factual existence given by the supposing subject and its surrounding world.

*Is the supposing of something harmoniously phantasied to be understood as the consciousness of possibility?*

What I phantasy and what someone else phantasies, or what I phantasy at another time in a perfectly similar way — in a pure phantasy, of course — are not two possibilities but two phantasies. What is purely phantasied is purely subjective, bound not only to the subject but also,

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4 What is phantasied intersubjectively as identical, like what is phantasied by the individual subject, is not something existing in itself that could exist independently of the phantasying subjectivity.
I would have to add, to its experiences. It is nothing more than the immanent noema of the intentional (modified) experience, and here not something ideally identical but again and again something new, only perfectly alike. We must therefore distinguish what is phantasied from the pure ideal possibility to be drawn from it and from any perfectly similar phantasied objects (“phantasies”) whatsoever. What is possible is possibly existent. It can exist; I can “imagine” (make the supposition) that it exists. I can shift at any time from mere phantasying into an act of supposing. But in doing so — this belongs precisely to the sense of supposing — I necessarily apply what is phantasied to my sphere of being (the sphere of what is unmodified, my sphere of belief). And as soon as I do suppose, I no longer have any distinctions between my phantasying now and my phantasying later, or between my phantasying and someone else’s <phantasying>. For just as a belief that I “repeat” posits something identical (if the relation to what is believed is a relation to precisely the same believed something, to the same fact “well established for me”), so the “repeated” supposition (on the basis of different phantasies) yields the same supposition, the possibility yields the same possibility.

Hence what is phantasied is absolutely subjective and not something in itself; possibilities however, do exist in themselves. Suppositions are not phantasies but “impressions” brought about on the basis of phantasies.

It was correctly stated at the outset, however, that possibilities point back to actual subjects: namely, the possibilities of an individual. But must I not distinguish possibilities as essences, as universalities that can be apprehended intuitively? All phantasies that are alike, that is, all like phantasy intuitions, phantasy experiences that become quasi-fulfilled in phantasy, give me the same essence; specifically, the same concrete essence.

Each such essence has a range of “individual possibilities.” That means that the closest individuation of an essence is a phantasy of something individual; that is, of something hovering before me.

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5 The last two sentences were changed and supplemented a little later as follows: “But is it correct, as was said at the outset, that possibilities — namely, possibilities of an individual — point back to actual subjects? Or not only to subjects thought of as actual? Furthermore, must I not distinguish possibilities as essences, as universalities that can be apprehended intuitively?” — Editor’s note.
hic et nunc that I can identify in the phantasy attitude only in repetition — not actually, but in holding on to the same thing hovering before me in phantasy, or in phantasying myself as the same consistently believing person. But then I can suppose that what hovers before me exists — in the nexus of my real factual existence, of course — and in that case I have a possibility. And in the same way, I can conceive of some other subject who supposes this in the realm of his facts. In each case, then, assuming that the sense of the supposition is identically conceived, there would be the same possibility. Hence an actual subject is certainly not co-possited, though it is thought of in a pure supposition.
<a) The living of an act in the epoché, an act of phantasying —
Living in positions, giving acceptance. Double epoché or neutrality>

Let us juxtapose the following: 1) I perform the epoché and the living of an act in the epoché — specifically, say, I phantasy, and I live in the phantasy as a phantasying Ego, as an Ego actively engaging in phantasy. 2) I live in positions. I am awake and active in Ego-acts in which something is accepted by me: I give acceptance to something new, I direct myself toward something already given (actualizing its prior acceptance and appropriating it to myself), and so on.

Hence in the latter attitude, the attitude of positional living, I always have something existent, something valuable, something that certainly exists, something that is simply there or is put forth as a lasting positum, valid in the future, generated by means of my theoretical and other activity, etc. I express this, I describe it.

In the neutral attitude, I find and I describe what I “have” there: phantasy occurrences, neutral occurrences of whatever sort, everything in the mode of the as-if. And thus all of the descriptions also have a modified sense.

In the first case, I can turn my regard away from what is straightforwardly given and toward the object — the house, for example — in the How of its manner of appearing, in the How of its attentional modes, as what is noticed primarily or secondarily, as what is grasped in one’s primary or secondary grip, and the like.

In the case of neutrality, I can likewise turn my regard toward the phantasy house in the How of its manner of appearing, in the How of its attentional modes — but everything will be “in phantasy,” in neutrality. Furthermore — and this is particularly important:

a) I phantasy, I live in the phantasy world.

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1 What is most universal about the “epoché” as act-abstraction in relation to the idea of neutrality.
2 “Specifically” later changed to “or.” — Editor’s note.
b) I change attitude. Instead of describing something while living in phantasy — describing it as if I were experiencing it, as if I were thinking, valuing, willing it — I describe the phantasy image, the phantasy processes in an actual positional description. Also in an abiding epoché. An ascertaining, a grasping, an actual grasping and perhaps an entirely evident grasping now lies before the description. The acts are now positional. For example: a) I contemplate a theory in the epoché — I can ponder over it as if I believed it, but I have, of course, inhibited every belief. It is a pondering as if; and so it is, when, in this attitude, I express myself as follows: These, therefore, are the premises, this and that is going on, etc. Thus everything has the sign of the as-if. b) I can, however, ascertain and state with actual evidence: This theory as pure “thought,” as a totality and formation of propositions — which I do not have or posit believingly — has such and such a structure. As thought, it possesses existence and evident existence for me, just like the phantasy image that I pick out and describe in evident truth as the “content” of my phantasy.

What kind of change is this? I am not now performing neutral acts as an Ego lost in phantasy and generally in the as-if. Rather, in the change of attitude I put these quasi-performances out of action. And I do so in the following way: In contrast to the Ego lost to itself, which is the subject of phantasy perceptions, phantasy judgments, valuations, and so on, and the subject of all the phantasy objects becoming constituted in them, I establish a positional Ego. Before, I was not properly awake; I was dreaming. And I was a dreaming Ego who, as the subject of quasi-perceptions, and so forth, simultaneously phantasied a dreamt Ego and was “engaged” in an activity that was entirely dreamt. Now I am aware of myself as a subject belonging to the positional present, a subject who looks at the mental experiences of dreaming and at the dreamt objects, the phantasied objects. Now I am conscious of the dreaming. However, it may be that I do not consider reflectively the phantasying experiences I am now actually having and the structure of these experiences, but reflect instead on the “dream images,” which, of course, are contents of the experiences and which, as I am convinced, are inseparable from them. The dream images are now exhibited to me, experienced by me, in a certain manner; they are directly apprehended

3 Pure thoughts.
objects, the dream images of my present dreaming life. Naturally they are apprehensible only if I first of all dream as straightforwardly lost to myself and removed from the present, and then as reflecting Ego belonging to the present raise myself above myself as the Ego lost to itself. Then, in the directing of my regard — that is, in the positional directedness of my “perception” toward what is dreamed — I find the images as objects, as actually existing objects: in the actuality of this category of being called “phantasy images.” Just as in every grasping of “semblances” as objects (but not as nullities), or of “thoughts” as objects, etc., taken from the “as-if.”

Hence we have a double epoché or neutrality here. 1) In one case, there is the epoché that belongs to the phantasy as phantasy or to the neutral consciousness as neutral (perhaps produced by an active epoché). And then 2) there is another epoché, which is related to the quasi-acts that as dreaming Ego I quasi perform. This epoché belongs to the change in attitude brought about by the establishing of a positional Ego over the neutral Ego and to the grasping of the “images.” Now it is not a question of an abstention from actual positions with respect to the dreamt objects; they are by all means dreamt objects. At present I am precisely not supposed to be dreaming, lost to myself, not supposed to be quasi-performing such and such perceptions, judgments, and so on, making it seem to me as if these objects were there, as if they were changing in this way and that. On the contrary, as nonparticipating onlooker I am supposed to contemplate and fix what offers itself in this living-as-if just as it offers itself. I can also say: As onlooker, I now stand above the dreaming Ego that formerly had forgotten itself entirely and that was quasi-active in its dreaming, but [I stand above it] as nonparticipating spectator, as the positional Ego, the Ego that witnesses the dreaming and the dream itself.

Now, by way of contrast, let us take, instead of the case of neutrality, the case of positionality; specifically, in such a way that I, as the subject of my positional life, am supposed to exhibit intentional objects as intended, the judgments judged at any particular time, the inferential interconnections of antecedents and consequents reached in the process of inferring, etc., as my ‘immanent’ judgment-contents, and so on.

In simply living positionally, in judging, valuing, and so forth, I am in a certain sense an Ego lost to itself, “unconscious,” lost in the
objects, states of affairs, universalities of theory, values, ends. What I then have are just the objects pure and simple, etc. I then carry out reflection; I establish a second positional Ego that does not take part in any position in relation to what I posited while lost to myself, but contemplates, grasps, what is posited there without appropriating it to itself as something it accepts. Here I need only one epoché in order to acquire the intentional objects as intentional: for example, the perceptual images, the bare theoretical thoughts as pure intentional contents of the act of theorizing.4

10 The present positional acts of reflection in turn have their “intentional objects as intended”; to acquire them I would have to establish a new reflective Ego, which exercises a new epoché, and so on. When I already have neutral acts from the beginning, I need a second neutrality with respect to the intentional contents of the acts. For example:

15 A stereoscopic, cinematographic semblance stands before me. 1) At first I lose myself in as-if contemplation; I contemplate the events as if they were actually happening. This is neutrality consciousness (phantasying). 2) Taking a position, I posit the semblance image as reality, as “what is seen” in this quasi-seeing. I establish a second Ego, which does not take part in the quasi-believing, in the quasi-occurring, but contemplates it and the “noema,” the “image” in it, reflectively.

I believe that by and large the Ideas correctly set forth the distinction between neutrality modification and positionality, although the exposition would have to be worked out in more detail and with greater emphasis and clarity.5

30 “Phantasy” is already related to the sphere of reproduction in Aristotle. To be sure, the linguistic usage at present is not entirely univocal. If one says “this is a phantasy landscape” while looking at what

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4 Inserted later: “But we must think this over.” — Editor’s note.
is exhibited in a painting, this can be understood to mean that the artist has formed a “phantasy presentation” and then exhibited it in the picture “in” real colors, etc. Still, the depiction is also a re-presentation, and consequently one could include every re-presentation, even every indication of what is not present. “Mere” phantasy signifies, then, that no “actual” performing of an act takes place — “mere presentation.” But matters no doubt become more complicated in the case of the “image object,” which, appearing as present “in person,” can nevertheless also be designated as “fiction,” though one must no longer speak of a re-presentation in this case. Indeed, it is presentation [Präsentation]. Here, too, the “positing,” the believing in something, is “missing.” The terms “phantasy” and “fiction” therefore have two significational directions: 1) One is directed toward reproduction (and re-presentation of whatever kind), and in that case every memory is also called a phantasy (just as in Hume memory figures among the “ideas” and not the impressions). 2) The other is directed toward the mode of performing, in which case one can speak of perceptual fiction, and then the memory is not a fiction, not a phantasy. (In Hume, this tendency makes itself felt in his theory of memory, in that subsequently he does speak of impressions of memory.)

The latter tendency also makes itself felt in Brentano’s theory of judgment and in his theory of acts of every sort in his assertion of the fundamental principle that every act is a “presentation” [Vorstellung] or has a presentation at its foundation. Presentation (perceptual presentation, phantasy presentation) is a consciousness in which I am aware of the presented objectivity without belief — without, I would say, any position at all, even a valuing or volitional position. In the Logical Investigations I have already pointed out and fully incorporated into the inquiry the fact that every act, however complex, is an act unity. Thus, for example, an act as judgment is one belief that, as a complete act, has a unitary “object.” And then this underlying presentation would have to include in itself all the differences between being and nonbeing, and not only affirmation and denial but also all modalities: which, as modalities actually accomplished, are surely matter for the judicative performance itself. Examined closely, this presentation as underlying act is an invention, just like the recognition or rejection that, as supervening psychic moment, is supposed

6 “Moment” later changed to “act-moment.” — Editor’s note.
to make the judgment. This “presentation” can indeed be obtained from the judgment at any time — by abstaining from judging in the sense of inhibiting the belief. This is not, however, the removal of a qualitative psychic moment; on the contrary, it is a modification of the whole act. And what arises is the neutrality modification, which is also what is characteristic of reproductive “phantasy” and of every fiction.

Now there is a difference, of course, depending on whether a positional experience — originally positional or modalized — is neutralized for the first time by means of the epoché, or whether a neutral experience arises at the beginning that does not give us the possibility of any position at all; that is, similarly to the way in which every position allows the possibility of a neutrality brought about at will. Position with respect to something “presented” in neutrality at our pleasure does not lie within our power. Whether beings of a human sort live on Sirius — I am now thinking of this when I say it, but I am not in a position to “assert anything” about it, to have a belief about it. I can say neither “yes” nor “no.”

I would therefore say: Neutrality can be motivated in different ways. [577]

It can make its appearance as “something that comes to mind,” as “image-object consciousness” in a picture, as the free play of reproductions mixing with one another and thereby cancelling each other’s positions, but also as voluntary abstention from every position. The word phantasy is applied only to the latter cases, since in common parlance the word designates a mental doing that does not serve the purpose of reaching any decisions about the world of which one is conscious. Or better: it designates a mental doing that has the characteristic of disinterestedness — that does not relate to any thematic sphere with respect to which positions are taken and which is supposed to deliver up themes for ever new positions in cognizance-taking, in theoretical judging, in valuation and volition. In natural life, however, abstentions from positions always have the significance of serving for the production of positions. Thus in cognition: There is a stopping, a “pondering over the sense,” in which every taking

7 Inserted later: “purely.” — Editor’s note.
8 Inserted later: “natural.” — Editor’s note.
9 Inserted later: “ever new.” — Editor’s note.
of a position, every belief, every position of questionable direction is “withdrawn”: but only in order to be able to bring about new and possibly better positions. Phantasy is the realm of purposelessness, of play. In addition, unthematic and prethematic occurrences are to be included in it. In their case, the situation is not what it is in the case of play, in which quasi-purposes, quasi-valuations, and so on, are produced in quasi-volitions, and the Ego as phantasying Ego has its kind of activity. On the contrary, here “phantasies are already emerging” prethematically, in the background; fancies are taking shape that from the beginning have no positionality and, on the other hand, of course, no purposive function. Afterwards they can certainly take on some thematic functions with respect to aesthetic, philosophical, or other purposes, but in themselves they are “play,” in a loose sense, to be sure. The play can also proceed passively in thematic, “waking” consciousness (I abandon myself to the phantasies); or it can be subject to rules — for example, aesthetic rules. The fashioning of the image is then phantasy, but the aesthetic thematizing is not phantasy, and so on.

Phenomenologically, therefore, there are very different forms of neutrality consciousness. Every motivation, every psychic total situation that stimulates neutrality, also gives to the neutrality a characteristic. The suppression of a positionality, understood as abstention, is a characteristic, just as the playfulness of “free” phantasy is. On the other hand, it is precisely the neutrality that must be marked out as that which is fundamentally and essentially common to all the forms and connects them.

Intentional experiences are either positional experiences or neutral experiences; mixed experiences. On the theory of “perceptual figments” in the Ideas.

Intentional experiences are either positional experiences or phantasy experiences in the extended sense, or better, neutral experiences. Neutral experiences accept nothing in actual validity but only in as-if

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10 Inserted later: “things coming to mind.” — Editor’s note.
11 “Certainly” (schen) changed later into “very probably.” — Editor’s note.
Validity. Positional experiences are experiences of consciousness in which the Ego accepts something, in which a belief is involved. Neutral belief, and specifically phantasy belief, is not actual belief but just an immersing of oneself in phantasy, a phantasying into, as if one were believing. [To engage in phantasy belief] is to present in some way or other something believed without believing it oneself. This is true whether or not the experiences have the form of carrying out that belongs to the thematic act, to the cogito. The acts-as-if correspond to the actual acts as their counterparts. Purely neutral acts, purely imagining acts as pure phantasy, are free from all positionality with respect to what is phantasied; and pure postionality is likewise free from all phantasy (in the sense of pure phantasy). Phantasy in the normal sense is neutral re-presentation, re-presenting “objectivation in phantasy” [Vorstellung].

There are, however, mixed experiences, and they are very common. Such mixed experiences can be positional, and, particularly as acts, actually bring about a position, and yet include phantasies in themselves. And they can be phantasies and yet include positions in themselves. Every phantasy consciousness, hence every pure phantasy consciousness as well, can be converted into a positional act, its objective sense changed, of course, in the case of a pure phantasy of the usual kind. Otherwise, indeed, nothing could be asserted about phantasies; they could not be described: I mean the figments, the quasi-objects that are phantasied in them as such. In particular, let it be pointed out that pure phantasy is the consciousness in which pure possibilities, understood as things given themselves, are included and from which they can be taken. If, in phantasying, I perform a coherent act of harmoniously intuitive phantasying (of phantasying as if I were harmoniously perceiving), I thereby construct an object-as-if in the manner of an original quasi-perceptual as-if-giving of the object itself. And this object-as-if is originally given here in this mode and is nothing else in the grasping coming from the Ego (which is an actual and not a modified grasping); and this object is the pure possibility. The possibility is what is positable “by means of” phantasy activity. I must pass from the attitude of phantasying into the attitude of

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12 Which is therefore seen in an evidence-as-if.
13 I judge evidentially — as onlooker, I say: What is judged in evidence is, as judged,
activity (of positionality). In doing so, I carry out, with respect to what is phantasied as phantasied, the taking of a position, the grasping of being, which is based on the synthesis of consistent phantasy.

Furthermore: We have a combination of position and quasi-position in cases in which we phantasy as otherwise what is given positionally. This is entirely distinct from what we have in the shift that every intuitive and consistently harmonious phantasy into a consciousness of possibility.

In this way, figments too can be made from perceptual objects. As objects of actual experience, perceptual objects are given positionally. But they are phantasied as otherwise — which always presupposes that the residue of a position still enters into the mixture in addition to what has been “covered up” by means of the phantasying as otherwise. A supposition can then be derived (a hypothesis) from the simple position, from the simple *positum*; a “supposing that it were thus” can be derived from the fiction (from what *quasi*-exists, phantasied as different). In this case, the shape of the perceptual object (to take this as an example) can still be posited perceptually while the object’s color, phantasied as different, is just mere fiction, although it “covers up” the seen color; and the supposition is already fundamentally implied in that. The concrete formation produced is then phantasy, fiction, an object-as-if, although components of the object have the characteristic of being given “in person.”

Finally, it can even happen that a figment really appears in the manner of something given in person, in an appearance in person, in reality. But do I say this as nonparticipating onlooker? No. I assert reality as a participating (reflective) onlooker, not as a nonparticipating one.

In phantasy (in *quasi*-evidence). In reflecting, but in *quasi*-judging along with it, I say that this is a possibility. I am then in an orientation in which, advancing in the evidential synthesis, I would say: The possibility is the same.

In contrast to a positional doing, I can appear on the horizon as reflective Ego and, *taking part* in the positions, judge about the objectivities belonging to the positions or comport myself in relation to them in some other way. To this state belongs the judging pertaining to reflection: What I encounter there is reality, something evidently existing. Likewise in phantasy: the act of judging belonging to reflection: What I phantasy there is a possibility, an evident possibility, something *quasi*-existing in an evident manner. Here, therefore, I am not a nonparticipant; I join in the judging-as-if.

The nonparticipating onlooker does not have to assert any realities and possibilities with respect to the actual and *quasi*-data belonging to the Ego underneath. What he asserts in this respect are “realities” and “possibilities” in quotation marks.
precisely the sense in which a perceptual object appears, and yet is nevertheless a figment. This is the case when I contemplate a semblance object as if it were the object depicted in the semblance (a perceptual semblance such as a stereoscopic image or an image object belonging to a picture). However much experience speaks against it, however much the actually present perceptual context speaks against it, I phantasy it precisely as existing. And this means that while I preserve the semblance image, *implicite* I phantasy as otherwise what speaks against it. In precisely this way, the semblance image acquires a harmonious experiential horizon in place of the one that was discordant with it; and it is then that I phantasy it as if it were existing. Now it is phantasied — and yet, on the other hand, it is nonetheless something given in person with respect to those of its features that appear precisely in the manner of perception. It is not, for that reason, a perception that is at stake. If what is given is taken with its horizon and in its horizon, and if this horizon is fiction, then what “genuinely” appears is also fiction. Anticipations are also involved in the horizon, and all of these anticipations are co-affected and converted into fictive anticipations as well. Hence the theory in the *Ideas* is correct that there are “perceptual figments,” but naturally they do not arise by means of a “leaving undecided,” by means of a suspension of position taking in the manner of an abstention. On the contrary, perceptual figments come about by means of an entirely different sort of supplanting of actual positions — by phantasying something as different, by the supposing and setting of phantasies into and over the positions.

How is it that when I doubt, when I have a conflict given and I close my eyes to what speaks in favor of one side or speaks against the other, I do not allow what thus speaks to gain acceptance? In a certain sense, I also do this when I phantasy something as different; in the act of covering over, what is covered is something positional. I do not allow the latter to win acceptance; I inhibit this

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14 The old horizon is deprived of acceptance and negated, covered up, in the as-if.
15 Abstaining presupposes an actual position that is specifically inhibited. A phantasy, however, is not characterized in this way. Hence it cannot be brought into its “old state” again by annulling the operation. But this certainly does not exclude the fact that at its core the “as-if” might be identical on both sides. And this was surely the view of the *Ideas*. 
acceptance and pursue only the one stratum as if it existed. If I give acceptance to one possibility and to what speaks for it positively, and deprive the other possibility of acceptance, is not a phantasy thereby produced? But here I surely have a pervasive positionality: I accept what speaks in favor of this possibility. I just make myself blind, so to speak, to the other possibility; I cover up my eyes. If, however, I phantasy an object as different, if I phantasy the red I am seeing as turned into green, nothing speaks in favor of this green. On the other side, I do not abandon the former position; I do not disregard it. I do, however, adulterate it, since it is not independent of what has been suppressed (by what has been put in its place fictionally). The red existent has turned into the green existent, and it is phantasied, not seriously posited, as that: This touches the whole object. I can, of course, practice abstention with respect to “possibility,” with respect to speaking-in-favor of; and then I can obtain a mere “phantasy,” an as-if.

The as-if thinking of oneself into something (the carrying out of a consciousness of possibility) and phantasying. Voluntary abstention in contrast to the positional attitude. The depicting act directed thematically either toward what is depicted or toward the aesthetic aspect; limited synthetic unity in the case of the aesthetic object, its horizon different from the horizon of the thing pure and simple.

Falling into doubt — leaving undecided. A matter is called into question. I ponder over it, and yet I have no belief, no position at all. When I ponder over the “matter in question” — a perceptual state of affairs or a memorial state of affairs or a theory — I surely “carry out” judgments, perceptions, memories, but in the mode of the as-if. Is this not essentially how it is in phantasy, except that in phantasy — [582]

taking the word in the usual sense — it is not the case that an actual position exists beforehand and then “abstention” produces the change into the “as-if”?

But I, the present Ego, still do not participate. I am only affected. — On the other hand, if it is a question of the phenomena of continuing acceptance coming from an original instituting, then, if no inhibition
has made its appearance, my “old Ego” does participate and I am still
the same. What does that mean? It means precisely that I do not have
a mere phantasy but a “memory.” It is not an alien demand, but from
the beginning an acceptance in the mode of a demand on my Ego,
on the performing subject, to activate it again as an acceptance. It is
a self-demand, a demand coming from one’s own consistency, from
one’s own habituality.

Only when inconsistencies enter into these continuing acceptances,
into the habitualities and apperceptions originating from primal insti-
tutings, is my activity also inhibited with respect to its positions. And
then the “memory” is also no longer memory pure and simple, but
memory modalized in its background character. And then the activat-
ing of memories conflicting with one another and modalized in the
conflict is an activating that is modified with respect to its positions.

And then what about the question whether there is phantasy here?
As long as the conflict is not settled, I do not have mere phantasy as
a member, although I do not have perception or memory as mem-
ers either (perception as apperception is itself a particular sort of
“memory”). I do indeed have suppositions, possibilities, demands. I
have modifications of memory along with modified positional char-
acteristics (modalities of certainty). If I “put” myself into one of the
possibilities, actualizing it, then I do not actually believe; I act as if I
were believing. The act itself is altogether like the corresponding per-
ceptual act, but it is a perceptual-act-as-if — hence a “phantasizing of
oneself into something,” an as-if thinking of oneself into something.
And yet it is not mere phantasy. Indeed, it is a thinking of oneself
into something, the imagining of something that, just as one imag-
ines it there, is something in favor of which something speaks; and
this makes one disposed to assent to it, actually to carry it out. If I
were to imagine what speaks against it as absent, as modified in such
a way that it no longer speaks against it, I would phantasy differently
and fashion a fictitious acceptance, and then I would believe.

To that extent, therefore, the as-if, such as every memorial as-if, is
closely related to phantasy (to mere phantasy), and yet is different.

It is not “mere” phantasy, not pure phantasy. But perhaps a sort of
transforming fiction is nevertheless present when I carry out the for-
mer “abstraction,” which I can do at any time. On the other hand, the
carrying out of a consciousness of possibility is not a phantasying or
even an assuming. It is, however, the “presentation” of a certainty, but of a certainty that is modified in character. It is an intentionality of a higher level. Being is involved in being-possible, but what is possible is the possibility of a being. Striving after certainty or after a decision runs throughout the consciousness of the inhibition of certainty: producing simple acceptance, giving acceptance to the being once again, or denying, cancelling, acceptance. Every primal act of position (certainty) terminates in what is posited in it and is the abiding acquisition of a positum: of something accepted without restriction.

Every modalized act is the passage of a striving toward decision and finally toward a positive positum, toward an unmodalized positum. On a higher level: the striving of reason and the terminating in grounded truth; or empirically, the striving toward an infinite telos, an idea.

If my interest is not directed toward something existent, then how is it directed? We have the phenomenon: I perform an act that is characterized as the inhibition of the tendency toward certainty, as the consciousness of questionability, as the consciousness of what is null (in favor of which the apperception speaks, but which is annulled by other acceptances); or perhaps I perform an act that is just the consciousness that “I cannot perform an act, I am debarred from certainty,” and so on.

The cutting off (in the form of voluntary abstention, of a voluntary cutting off of interest) of the striving that aims at progressive cognizance and knowledge or at progressive aesthetic valuation is something entirely different. It lies in the establishment of a different direction of interest: toward taking a “semblance” as a “semblance,” a formation produced stereoscopically as a stereoscopic formation, an image object as an image object, and so on.

I produce no belief, I take no position, I am not interested in being, and consequently I am also not interested in being-likely, being-questionable, being-probable, and being-null. This must be stipulated: I as Ego, as subject of genuine “acts” — positional acts, acts of interest — have in certain respects no interest. I comport myself without interest, whether with or without voluntarily inhibiting my interest and turning it in a different direction. As when, instead of being interested in the object pure and simple, I am interested in the intentional object-in-its-How. I am interested in “this” lustrous, graphite-toned stereoscopic pyramid just as it is there before me as a “perceptual
image.” I take cognizance of “it,” not of the pyramid pure and simple, but instead of the image object, of this little figure, and so on. Is it the same thing of which I say in a change of attitude: It is a mere semblance, It is null? But it surely exists, and I take cognizance of it, describe it, and so on. The descriptions can be absolutely evident, and so it is wherever I have a meaning, something meant, in the act of meaning, and describe it. In every meaning, there lies something given itself toward which I direct my immediate regard: what is meant. I perceive it, whereas in general I do not perceive what is meant taken simply. And if it is a question of perception, of an “external” perception, the thing is not even inherent in the perception: It does not need to exist.

It is not the “perceptual image” as such, the memorial image as such — the intentional object as such — that is a semblance, but instead what is perceived, what is remembered, and so on, taken purely and simply, which, in the course of perceptions of the same thing, of memories of the same thing, is posited as precisely the same and posited in an unmodified manner. If I turn my interest toward the image, toward what is perceived as perceived, what is remembered as remembered, what is thought as thought, I have “inhibited” the positing of what is identical. That is, I do not perform the latter thematic act but posit thematically something subjective, a noema. Except that I can have the insight that as often as I perform an act directed positionally toward this thing, this past event, this theory, I can certainly carry out a “reflection” and then see that the noema would be “inherent” in the act; indeed, that it was inherent in my regard, but that the regard did not aim as a grasping regard at the noema, but at the thing as something identical belonging to a synthesis. Here, to be more precise, one must say: Just as by means of the modification that belongs to phantasying I obtain the phantasy objectivity as something positable and describable, so by means of the modification belonging universally to abstention I obtain something positable by the onlooker, the intentional object as intentional, the meant object as meant. If, in

16 The perceptual object as mere “image” and not just in a subjective How, and yet as “image.” Likewise a judgment as mere thought, a theory as mere formation — perhaps as that, but also in the How of its clarity, evidence, etc. All of that without producing a position, without “actually” believing, judging, and so on.
17 Do not forget the onlooker!
a positional attitude, I consider how this thing would appear in the continuing course of possible experience and what would belong to it, then this is a supposition of real possibility, and of real possibility with respect to this object as something identical in every sort of possible experience. In the shift in interest brought about by abstention and by looking on, I find the possibly existing thing itself as a noema belonging to the synthetic infinity of experience. Just as [there is] a particular noema for every partial experience and synthesis, so [there is] a noema for universal thinking. To grasp the noema is to be conscious of the object and the open horizon of its determinations in a modified manner, in the manner of abstention; in other words, it is to have what otherwise can assume the form of thematizing performance without a thematizing performance.

I can voluntarily annul the performance of my positional act and thereby alter the direction of my thematizing. And to alter my thematizing direction is to inhibit the thematizing performance (the positional performance) belonging to the old direction. Is the having of an image object, perhaps the contemplation of it, therefore a perceptual phantasy? No.18 When I become the onlooker, a “perception” comes into existence; specifically, the perception of a “perceptual image.” But as far as the depicted object is concerned, it is in every case a re-presented object, though re-presented as “exhibiting” itself in the image, whether according to all of its distinctive traits or to some of them. My depicting act is then either a thematizing act directed toward what is depicted, or I am focused aesthetically. And however much I may be convinced that what is depicted exists and has such and such properties perhaps known to me in other ways, in the aesthetic attitude this occurs outside thematizing, positional performance. The subject may be a person who, beyond the immediately presented physical traits, awakens still other traits, traits of mental character. And as belonging to the aesthetic content as an open horizon, I have a whole history of the personality and what the person is capable of achieving.

18 “No” was changed somewhat later to “yes” and the text was supplemented as follows: “To turn toward the image object and to contemplate it is to take it as if it existed. A ‘perception’ — just as in phantasying intuitively and inhibiting the thematizing (positional) quasi-performing of the phantasy acts, I find the ‘phantasy image’ and have it given itself as the phantasy of a perceptual image.” — Editor’s note.
and destined to achieve “in the future.” Synthetic identifications are therefore awakened here and perhaps “carried out.” And yet there is a change in position here. Aesthetically, I am not interested in reality, not focused on reality. I can contemplate a picture of Bismarck and learn much from it about his character. But then this is not an aesthetic contemplation. That the image is Bismarck can also be aesthetically significant, insofar as it simultaneously awakens for me the horizon of a personality on which the artist may count. But even if a part of the focus on being may also do service [aesthetically], it is nevertheless not the same as [the focus on being] in other cases; a change in theme presents itself. What serves us aesthetically, moreover, would have the function of awakening only certain moments and horizons, and of doing so in universality. Everything else, without exception, would be wholly excluded from the horizon of the theme. And if it were a mere phantasy with a like content, hence if what is depicted were not given as existing at all, nothing would be changed aesthetically. But the thematic change does touch the phantasy in precisely its own way. For if, in the case of an image that from the beginning I did not take to be a depiction of anything real — if I were to wander, say, through a depicted centaur-landscape in my phantasy (holding it in mind as if it existed), and if I were to phantasy it continuously as harmonious, as though I intended and meant to grasp it cognitively — then that would not be an aesthetic focus but the focus of fiction and the fiction of a cognizing. The aesthetic interest aims at the presented object in the How of its presentedness, without interest in its existence itself and in its quasi-existence. In the case of the beautiful landscape that I am actually seeing, [my aesthetic interest aims] at the landscape presenting itself from here, from this entrance to the valley, just as it presents itself.

Now in whatever way I am conscious of the presented object, it does, after all, appear; and contemplating it in the change of its modes of appearance, I identify it and even have a unity that I mean, only not as an identical unity in the infinity of possible experiences, as if I were aiming at the thing as existing, [or] in the case of a depiction, at the thing depicted. When I know that it is an artistic fiction and that the fiction does not exist at all, this does not disturb me. Its connection with the realm of my natural being belonging to the real world just does not interest me: the extent to which what I see there...
accommodates itself harmoniously and synthetically to the universal synthesis of possible experience does not interest me. Nor does it interest me to what extent the identification, the continuous positing of being, can be continued in the further course of the experience in question and to what extent the positing of what is synthesized goes on being accepted and being confirmed. Only what “appears as it appears,” which comes to harmonious unity in this presentation, interests me.

Must I not say: The standpoint and aesthetic focus prescribes for me how far I should continue the identification — not beyond the “image.” And that is to say that my apperception of the aesthetic object does indeed also have its anticipatory belief and is a doxic unity, but the horizon, the multiplicity, is different from what it is in the case of the thing pure and simple. In the latter case, I have given in advance the world in which I bodily stand and of which I have a portion in perception as my surrounding world; and beyond that already given portion, I have the horizon of possible experience. All of this is accepted and determines my belief. My thing-belief, the positing of the object pure and simple, is unconditioned positing; it posits the whole horizon that the apprehension brings with it. But my aesthetic belief, the belief pertaining to the aesthetic object, restricts me to the series of optical appearances that I obtain from this position, from the entrance to the valley, and to the unity optically constituted in the series as something identifiable and cognizable by itself. The infinite horizon beyond this, with all of its attendant syntheses accessible to me immediately and mediately (producible my me), is cut off, inasmuch as it is not the horizon of thematic acceptance that I am now carrying out. This restricted synthetic unity, in just the way in which it is intuited there, is my aesthetic object. And it may even belong to this How that the unity still carries with it the former infinite horizon (it is precisely a landscape), an undisclosed horizon bordered with vague essential prefigurings, which in this vagueness touches

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19 This, however, is a misleading description, although there is something good in it. The first thing is: I have the modification of a positional depiction or positional free phantasy, objectivated by means of an expression. I do not carry out the positings and quasi-positings, but after the epoché I do carry out new positings of the now positable intentional object.

20 But having become positable as “noema” in the modification of the epoché.
my emotions. But I am not supposed to have the vague prefigurings as the thematic horizon of my cognition; that is, what is unknown is here not part of what I now grasp thematically and take cognizance of as existing. Rather, what pertains to it is only that it is this unity of appearances and, as this unity, belongs in a horizon of the unknown that encompasses the unity. This unity in the How of its givenness, of its intuitive givenness and of its givenness through the unknown horizon as unknown, is my theme.

In the case of depiction, what is depicted in the How of its being depicted determines the boundary of what appears insofar as it appears — here, that is, the boundary of what is depictively presented in the How of its presentedness. Just as in a narrative, a novel, and the like. I can go beyond the narrative to the extent that I become more deeply engrossed, elucidating what is narrated as such, the landscape, the persons, and so on: But my phantasy is not free in this further development (obviously it is not free with respect to the style of agreement with the prefigurings). On the contrary, I am bound — the unity of the appearances as presented appearances must always be what is narrated as such and nothing else. Otherwise I am engaging in further fictional invention and am not living in the fictional work of the artist.

*e) Ego-acts — passively occurring experiences; Ego-acts as positional and neutral; a phantasy (a re-presentation) corresponding idealiter to every experience>*

21 I. Ego-acts, activities of consciousness directed from the Ego as pole (the Ego center) toward the intentional objectivity — in contrast to the intentional experiences that occur passively and do not emanate as Ego activities from the Ego center. They have a certain polarization in that they, or, rather, their passive “meanings,” their posita, and still more precisely, the substrates of these, as object poles “affect” the Ego pole engaging in other activity.

This marks, therefore, the first sort of radical modification running throughout the whole of conscious life. An act can change into a

21 Thematizing acts.
corresponding passivity, and conversely. An object that stands over against me in the act can turn into a background object as foreign to the Ego, an object not given to me but already given. In addition, there are intermediate modalities; the initial point of the act — the Ego’s regard turns upon the object — the still-having-in-one’s-grip, and so on.

II. Thematizing Ego-acts break down into acts of interest, thetic and aesthetic acts, positional acts — apositional, neutral, disinterested acts. Generally: Intentional experiences are either positional acts or neutral acts. Neutral in the strict sense; willing-not-to-be-interested (active abstaining from interest). The following is characteristic of Ego-acts: The Ego carries out a positing; it brings to acceptance, produces an acceptance, by originally acquiring something valid, something existing for it, something existing with value, something existing as a duty. In neutral acts, there is nothing that is valid for the Ego; on the contrary, with respect to validity what is given to the Ego “is left undecided.” Its doing, therefore, is a leaving undecided. The having left undecided, the “being without the taking of a position,” is a modification of positional acts. Abstaining in the ordinary sense of the word is practiced deliberately. Every positional act can be converted voluntarily into an act-abstention, into a neutral act.

III. Speaking idealiter, every experience has as its counterpart a phantasy (a re-presentation) corresponding to it. To every position there corresponds a phantasy position, a position-as-if; to every abstention, to every “parenthesized” position a corresponding phantasy, that is, an abstention-as-if. Phantasy, therefore, is normally connected with re-presentation.

Abstention is not the omitting of a position taking; it is, instead, a modification. On the interpretation of image objects and of the many semblances that certainly are not seen as deceptions and the like but are seen nonetheless (rainbows, blue sky, etc.): During the consciousness of the image, during the aesthetic contemplation

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22 “ichfremden,” later changed to “äussern” [external]. — Editor’s note.
23 Actively not interested.
24 Positional-neutral.
25 Just like phantasy re-presentation.
of the image in its absence of interest in being and nonbeing, one is not quasi-thematically\textsuperscript{26} conscious of the image object as something null in its background (even though it is in conflict with its surroundings). And so, too, when I look at it, it is not seen as a deception; rather, it is seen “without” any doxic “taking of a position.” Here it depends on the total motivation that I exercise “abstention,”\textsuperscript{27} that I do not have judgments but a mere “thought,” that I do not have something existing or not existing, something simply not seen, a thing pure and simple or a thing illusion, but instead a “visual image,” a pure appearing\textsuperscript{28} as if, and so on. We say mere thought when we do not quasi-produce the judgment sense in judging, and, on the strength of that, apprehend it thematically. The judgment as a thought and not as an actual judged state of affairs is the theme of a new attitude. This is also true of the image subject or of what is characterized as such, what is named as such, when we are precisely not interested in its being or nonbeing.

This mere image, the mere thought (no doubt also a decision that I inhibit in order to think it over again), although they are essentially related to them, are not reproductive phantasy modifications, but precisely “abstentions.” They convert acts of interest into acts that instead exercise inhibited interest, though a differently oriented interest can be the motive; disinterestedness, therefore, can be the means for other interests. To clear up a thought for oneself, to make it distinct, and so on, before deciding = to be neutral. And what is neutral is the thought, the modification of the judgment.

\textsuperscript{26}“quasi-thematically” later changed to “(passive modification).” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{27}Inserted later: “Neutrality in the widest sense.” — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{28}“Pure appearing” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
5 The expression “neutrality modification” is suitable for the change in thematizing interest but not for phantasy. Phantasy must be broadened to include perceptual and reproductive phantasy; every experience without exception has its as-if modification. And to every theme corresponds its as-if theme.1

10 This does not merely concern acts as thematizing forms of living (impression and idea). On the other side: In living and in relation to the passivity of doxic, axiological, and practical life (passive apperceptions, passive affective behavior, strivings, realizations), directedness from the Ego toward unities of passive synthesis can emerge, as well as the making of judgments and judgment modalities, the carrying out of axiological and practical position takings. And to these acts correspond acts-as-if, modifications of “phantasy.” To acts, to phenomena of “interest,” there belong the specific modifications of their performance, among them the phenomena of habitual acceptance and phenomena of abstention, of putting the acceptance out of play, and finally of putting a whole thematic “field” out of play, the whole thematic universe of continuing acceptance.

Contemplating a landscape, a theory, aesthetically, contemplating thoughts only in order to appreciate their aesthetic character without taking a position with regard to them — in such cases, two attitudes can pass over into one another: aesthetic contemplation requires the exclusion of theoretical interest, the theoretical attitude must yield

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1 The last two sentences were crossed out, quite probably just after they were written, and Husserl noted on the margin: “Indeed, is there perceptual phantasy?!” — Editor’s note.
to the aesthetic. But I can return to the aesthetic attitude; I can contemplate reality as if it were a “picture,” or, rather, enter into the attitude of reality-as-if: in order, instead of living in the attitude of positing-being-as-if, to pass again from there into abstention from the attitude or focus on being and into the directing of my regard to the manner of givenness. What is essential for the aesthetic attitude, therefore, is not phantasy, but the focusing on what interests me aesthetically, the objectivity in its How.

1) Positional acts and semblance acts, phantasy acts, quasi-positional acts. Real life and phantasy life. Are all phantasy acts re-presenting acts?

2) Thematic variations of acts understood as position takings belonging to the Ego, or as the Ego’s “objectivating” performances by means of which it creates for itself object-domains, worlds, and thereby ever new domains for its further performing. Objectivating <is>, in the widest sense, objectifying. An object is each and every thing that exists for the Ego, is accepted by the Ego, is abidingly the Ego’s own. Unfortunately, one cannot say: The Ego creates for itself its own-ness [Eigen-schaften].

Can I not hold in consciousness a semblance object that obviously does not exist, and simultaneously consider it fictionally as if it did exist? In that case, I do not consider what appears merely as something appearing, as a noema, which now presents itself and cannot be cancelled as that; rather, I consider it precisely as if it were existing. My actual experience certainly speaks against it, but what speaks against it I phantasy as different, and thus I phantasy a harmony into which what is given perceptually fits synthetically. I then have a perceptual phantasy, a phantasy that is not pure re-presentation; on the contrary, I have the phantasied object in the mode of givenness “in person,” and yet as phantasied. It is a figment. The situation here is not the same as it is in the case of objects of actual experience whose seen traits I phantasy as different; the object then is not something

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2 Hence I phantasy the reality as different; I phantasy a picture in which “this reality” would be presented.

3 The text of this paragraph was crossed out diagonally, probably shortly after it was written. — Editor’s note.
simply appearing in person and yet a figment. For if it is red and I have phantasied it differently as green, then precisely this green that belongs to it is not given in person. To be sure, its shape and its other appearing traits do belong to it as given in person.
APPENDIX LXV

PHANTASIES AND RE-PRESENTATIONS
<p><i>&lt;probably toward the middle of the twenties&gt;</i></p>

The empty horizons of perception and possible perceptions.

5   The subject-presentation of something depicted.
   The image figment as a semblance, though as phantasy and not as something null.
   The coinciding of an image figment and what is depicted (perhaps something fictitious).

10  The putting-out-of-play (and intentional epoché) by means of which a conflicting appearance is put beyond conflict, the perception cancelling it put out of play, out of effect. But the semblance is not for that reason something real; on the contrary, it is a quasi-reality. How does that come about? Putting something out of play does not make it disappear completely; it is not a genuine epoché. Being out of play occurs just because I restrict myself to what is intuitively given and choose to restrict myself to it alone. If it is cancelled, it nevertheless appears. But what does that mean? It is as if it were existing. The appearance is the appearance of being, positional only insofar as it is believed in. As soon as the appearance — its belief in being — is cancelled, it carries within itself an “as-if” that genuinely emerges when I specifically put out of action every motivation for belief and have no positional interest. It is, however, an appearance-of; it claims its motivational connections, it has its horizons, and so on. But now these are only the horizons of the as-if, etc. In a certain sense, I can view anything as an “image.” I inhibit all actual belief; I have no interest in the thing’s reality and take it as an image, as “mountain” — specifically, in this mode of appearance, as valuable to me in this way.

The Ego as phantasying subject of a reproductive phantasy. Here too I have conflict; I exclude reality. In mixed phantasy not everything turns into the as-if, but the as-if character does infect what is actually
given, since it is to a certain extent existing and to a certain extent merely a semblance effected in reproduction, although not, of course, a present semblance.

Is there not conflict in all phantasy, even in pure phantasy? With perceptions, with memories, with anticipations? I inhibit all world positing. But does not every phantasy have some place or other, something or other, that contests it?
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