Congrès de l’Association Canadienne de Philo

Du 27 au 30 mai 2012

Congrès annuel 2012
Université Wilfrid Laurier / Université de Waterloo

Informations générales

• » CPA Programme de l’ACP (mis à jour : 16 mai)
• » Liste des symposiums (mis à jour : 18 mai)
• » Abstracts – Résumés

Programmes of other societies

• » Association canadienne Jacques Maritain (mis à jour : 17 mai)
• » Canadian Society of Christian Philosophers (mis à jour : 17 mai)Le co

Le congrès se tiendra avec le congrès de la Fédération des Sciences Humaines : http://congress2012.ca/?lang=fr

Ma présentation se tiendra le mardi 29 mai à 15:00.

Bailey, Christiane (Montréal) – La genèse des existentiaux dans la vie animale chez Heidegger

Les cours du jeune Heidegger (1919-1926) révèlent que, s’il affirme dans Être et temps que le Dasein est le mode d’être de l’homme et que les animaux sont simplement vivants, cela constitue un revirement dans sa pensée. Nous nous appuierons sur ses interprétations phénoménologiques d’Aristote pour retracer la genèse des structures existentiales à partir des capacités propres à la vie animale que sont la perception, la discrimination, la mobilité et le désir.

Voici la liste complète des résumés :

Abstracts – Résumés

University of Waterloo — May 27 to May 30, 2012
Université de Waterloo — 27 mai au 30 mai 2012

Abdool, Rosalind (Waterloo) – Obligations to Future Selves on Parfit’s Account: Basic Human Needs
I argue that if Parfit is correct that future selves can be like different selves from current selves, then there exist moral obligations to preserve the primary interests of future selves. One ought to respect the basic human needs of future selves, taking into consideration the aging process and occasions when making someone worse-off is justifiable. It is also argued that this approach allows for special concern for psychologically connected selves and limited paternalistic intervention.

Barber, Alex (Open University – UK) – Science’s Immunity to Moral Refutation
Few would allow a moral conviction to count in evidence against a scientific claim with which it conflicts. Why is this? Moral anti-realists of whatever stripe have a ready answer: moral discourse is defective as a trustworthy source of true and objective judgements. I argue that the only decent realist explanation of science’s immunity to moral refutation places constraints on the structure of evidence for moral judgements, constraints that many realists will refuse to accept.

*Bailey, Christiane (Montréal) – La genèse des existentiaux dans la vie animale chez Heidegger
Les cours du jeune Heidegger (1919-1926) révèlent que, s’il affirme dans Être et temps que le Dasein est le mode d’être de l’homme et que les animaux sont simplement vivants, cela constitue un revirement dans sa pensée. Nous nous appuierons sur ses interprétations phénoménologiques d’Aristote pour retracer la genèse des structures existentiales à partir des capacités propres à la vie animale que sont la perception, la discrimination, la mobilité et le désir.

Bialystok, Lauren (Toronto) – Authenticity and Trans Identity: Toward a New Feminist Essentialism
Authenticity is a concept that presumes essentialism, which is unpopular among academics and feminists alike. I argue that authenticity in fact applies compellingly to trans people, suggesting that there is something essential about sex/gender identity. I describe five components of authenticity and show how they seem to apply to the narratives of trans people’s experiences. I then argue that that this essentialism can be applied to non-trans people as well, without undermining feminist commitments.

Boyd, Kenneth (Toronto) – Assertion, Practical Reasoning, and Excuses
Here I argue that whether we take intuitive judgments of propriety to be indicative of the content of a norm of assertion or practical reasoning entails an implicit commitment to a certain kind of normative structure. Furthermore, I argue that the only plausible structure of norms of assertion or practical reasoning is one that permits appeal to “excuses” in order to explain certain classes of judgments of propriety.

Bradford, Gwen (Rice) – The Value of Achievements
I give an account of the value of achievements. I reject that the folk view that the value of achievements is a matter of the value of their goal. Rather, I argue that achievements are valuable in virtue of their difficulty. I develop a new perfectionist theory of value that acknowledges the will as a characteristic human capacity, and thus holds that the exercise of the will, and therefore difficulty, is intrinsically valuable.

*Bromhall, Kyle (Guelph) – The Role of the Imagination in the Work of William James
This paper is an investigation into the roles that the faculty of the imagination plays within James’s pragmatism. The imagination is shown to be the unsung hero of James’s system, as it is only through it that the process of hypothesis testing, a concept central to Jamesean pragmatism, is possible. The imagination is a bridge between thought and action, in that it draws content from both sources yet suffers from the constraints of neither.

*Bruder, Michael (McMaster) – A Sensible Account of Time
In Physics IV Aristotle describes time as an object of perception. However, it is not immediately clear what kind of perceptual object time is. Time does not have a colour, shape, smell, taste, or sound. After careful analysis of De Anima and the Parva Naturalia I propose that time is an incidental sensible perceived incidentally by the common sense.

Burke, Victoria (Guelph) – Hegel and the Normativity of the Concept
Hegel’s Science of Logic shows the concept to be structured by two reciprocally dependent moments, the cause and the effect. I offer a reading of this concept that shows it to exhibit the normativity of meaning. The two reciprocally dependent moments are the rule and the following of a rule. These moments, and their reciprocity, are mirrored in the two shapes of consciousness that Hegel calls the master and slave in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

*Byrne, Christopher (StFX) – Aristotle on Levels of Explanation in Natural Science
Aristotle argues that individual perceptible objects are composed of distinct, mutually irreducible formal and material principles, each of which is responsible for some aspects of their behaviour. Given this composite nature, several different sciences are required to explain the behaviour of perceptible objects, and part of the difficulty in knowing which science to apply lies in determining at what level the behaviour in question is to be explained.

*Campbell, Neil (WLU) – MacDonald and MacDonald on the Metaphysics of Mental Causation
Cynthia MacDonald and Graham MacDonald argue that the solution to the nonreductivist’s troubles with mental causation lies in an appropriately formulated property exemplification account of events. I argue that while this approach might get us the causal efficacy of mental events, it does not provide the sought-after causal relevance of mental properties. I show that the reason MacDonald and MacDonald stumble on the problem of causal relevance is—ironically—due to features of their view of events, and propose that their general strategy would be more successful if they abandoned the property exemplification account.

Cankovic, Dario (Western) – Against Religious Toleration and Liberal Neutrality
The debate between John Locke and Jonas Proast on toleration has contemporary relevance in light of recent resurgence of religion in public life, and the accompanying reaction to this resurgence via a growing restrains upon the exercise of religion in the name of secularism and liberalism. This backlash has reopened debate about the role of religion in public life in the liberal and secular state. I wish to rehabilitate some of Proast’s arguments against toleration and liberal neutrality, but—contra Proast—wield the arguments against religion and superstition in the spirit of the Enlightenment.

*Champagne, Marc (York) – Stuck Between Two Soup Cans: Limits of Rational Decision
It is a staple assumption that decision theory captures a core algorithm of human thinking. While I do not challenge this claim, I argue that there are cases – notably those involving equally attractive options – where those rational resources are genuinely powerless to adjudicate choices. Although my underlying aim is to promote some form of voluntarism, my approach is negative: I challenge bad attempts to immunize decision theory against its limitations.

Charles, Sébastien (Sherbrooke) – La fiction face à la nécessité : Leibniz versus Spinoza
Si la conception du possible chez Leibniz est relativement connue, il n’en va pas de même du lien explicite tracé par Leibniz entre fiction et possible qui lui permet de s’en prendre au nécessitarisme spinoziste. En s’attachant à préciser le lien existant entre analyse du possible, du contingent et du nécessaire et fiction littéraire, cette communication vise à montrer l’importance du roman à titre d’artifice rhétorique pour dénoncer les conséquences ontologiques du monisme spinoziste.

*Charles, Syliane (UQTR) – Individuation et conatus chez Spinoza
Comment Spinoza parvient-il à concilier le dynamisme de son conatus avec le mécanisme cartésien qu’il reprend par ailleurs ? L’analyse de la définition des « individus » révèle une alternative entre être constitué de l’extérieur, et de l’intérieur – par un conatus. Sur cette base, nous formulons l’hypothèse que n’ont un conatus que les « individus » qui sont des « choses », et donc ni les corps simples, ni les simples agrégats.

Clipsham, Patrick (Western) – In Defence of Anti-Archimedean Moral Realism
Ronald Dworkin argued that many metaethical theories can only be understood as internal to moral discourse. This thesis, which I will refer to as anti-archimedeanism, has profound implications for skeptical metaethical theories. Kenneth Ehrenberg has recently attempted to refute Dworkin’s argument by demonstrating that certain metaethical theories can be understood in a morally neutral manner. I conclude that Ehrenberg assumes an impoverished conception of the nature of moral content and that this undermines his argument.

Davis, Gordon (Carleton) – Analyzing the Buddhist Concept of the Highest Good
Philosophers and scholars have offered various theories as to how the putative ineffability of nirvana is related to its status as highest good and ultimate reality. Most are unsatisfactory by both Buddhist and Western philosophical standards. I explore alternatives that rely on claims about the normativity of nirvana to explain a certain kind of ineffability. Though novel in contemporary debate, anticipations of these ideas can be found in the Yogacara works of Asanga and Vasubandhu. Some long-standing disagreements about nirvana turn out to be meta-ethical disagreements, and the Yogacara position more distinctive and defensible than previously thought.

*Desmeules, Marie-Hélène (Laval) – Husserl et l’unité temporelle des vécus de l’ego personnel
Même si sa temporalité implique une diversité d’expériences, le sujet admet aussi une unité temporelle de ses vécus. Comment se donne en propre cette unité temporelle? Edmund Husserl est surtout connu pour avoir décrit la constitution unitaire du cours des vécus par le simple écoulement continu du flux de la conscience absolue. L’ego personnel et certaines de ses motivations permettent néanmoins de décrire de nouvelles unités temporelles traversant la dispersion temporelle de ses vécus.

Dieleman, Susan (Ryerson) – Negotiating Democracy and Expertise
In this paper, I recommend greater investigation into the “deliberative-analytic approach” forwarded by Frank Fischer in Democracy and Expertise (2009) as a new model of the relationship between opinion and policy. I recommend this approach on the basis of its ability to resolve the tension between democracy and expertise which has (re)emerged as a result of decreasing confidence in the word of experts, alongside increasing interest in participatory forms of governance, in contemporary liberal democracies.

Dixon, Nicholas (Alma College) – Rage against the Cage: A Moral Critique of Mixed Martial Arts
While mixed martial arts (MMA) does not share boxing’s large risk of brain damage, it is still morally problematic because of the explicit goal of hurting and injuring opponents. MMA shows that the consent of autonomous adults is not a moral trump card. When, as in the case of MMA, consent does not alter the inherently objectifying, demeaning nature of an action, it does not rebut the Kantian charge of treating others merely as means.

Doan, Michael (Dalhousie) & Fenton, Andrew (CSU at Fresno) – Embodying Autistic Cognition
Researchers and autistic activists have recently suggested that certain “autism-related” behavioural atypicalities have a function and may not be appropriate targets for behavioural intervention. Yet a common view, expressed in the DSM IV-TR, is that these behaviours interfere with learning. We suggest two theories of embodied cognition as lenses through which to re-imagine the functionality of these behaviours. These theories open up novel explanatory possibilities while also cohering with how some autistics describe their lived experience. Our position navigates a middle way between an understanding of autism in terms of deficit and impairment, and one that seeks to de-pathologize autism.

Dryden, Jane (Mount Allison) – Hegel, ‘Derangement’ and the Role of Reason
This paper considers the role of intellectual disabilities in Hegel’s philosophy, both in terms of his explicit comments on ‘derangement’ and ‘imbecility’ and the implications of his philosophy more broadly, including his treatment of recognition and criticisms of the tyranny of reason. While Hegel’s comments on ‘imbecility’ are problematic, his philosophy as a whole offers up possibilities for rethinking the one-sided valorization of reason that lies beneath the denigration of those with intellectual disabilities.

Duchalski, Richard (Guelph) – A Smile and A Wink: On the Gendered Nature of Charm
This paper examines some of the ways in which charm can be seen (a) as a gendered phenomenon and (b) as a kind of social gift. Considering cases in which the charming person is someone of greater social privilege and position, I suggest ways in which charm can be used to perniciously co-opt its recipients into entrenching and enabling the social power of the charmer.

*Ducharme, Alain (Western) – Aristotle and the Dominion of Nature
I raise the question, against the widely held assumption, whether Aristotle indeed holds the dominion thesis. By examining different ways to understand Aristotle’s attitudes towards nature, I show that Aristotle’s account of nature–or what we can say of it–is value laden, and thus it is wrong to implicate Aristotle with the dominion thesis.

Ellefson, Olaf (York) – Why We Can Trust Our Referential Intuitions
In this paper I will argue that by adopting Davidson’s interpretivist account of reference—which holds that reference is in the service of truth and a theoretical concept deployed to generate acceptable (i.e., meaningful) utterances—I can offer a reason as to why we can prefer the judgements (or intuitions) of philosophers to those of the folk, at least when it comes to matters pertaining to reference.

*Fedock, Rachel (CUNY) – Care: A Case for Concern and Sympathy, but Against Empathy
I argue that care as a sentiment is of critical moral importance, serving as a precondition for experiencing other motivating moral emotions. This analysis reveals that the emotions of concern and sympathy are necessary when caring about, and that caring about is necessary to feel these emotions. Contrastingly, I argue that the sentiment of empathy is not necessary when caring about and that caring about is not necessary in order to empathize with another.

Fenton, Andrew (CSU at Fresno) & Doan, Michael (Dalhousie) – Embodying Autistic Cognition
Researchers and autistic activists have recently suggested that certain “autism-related” behavioural atypicalities have a function and may not be appropriate targets for behavioural intervention. Yet a common view, expressed in the DSM IV-TR, is that these behaviours interfere with learning. We suggest two theories of embodied cognition as lenses through which to re-imagine the functionality of these behaviours. These theories open up novel explanatory possibilities while also cohering with how some autistics describe their lived experience. Our position navigates a middle way between an understanding of autism in terms of deficit and impairment, and one that seeks to de-pathologize autism.

Frankel, Melissa (Carleton) – Sin in an Idealist World
As a metaphysician, Berkeley is an idealist, holding that the physical world is constituted of ideas that are caused by God. As a moral philosopher, Berkeley typically characterises moral action in terms of the bringing about of pleasure / avoidance of pain. But there is a tension here: in so far as God causes the ideas that constitute human behaviour, one might wonder whether humans can be morally responsible for their actions. In this paper I sketch out a textually based account of Berkeley’s view on moral action that resolves this seeming tension between his metaphysics and his moral philosophy.

Gardiner, Mark (Mount Royal) – Interpreting Religious Language: Methodology and Holism
Semantic holism, especially as developed by Donald Davidson, has recently been utilized by a growing number of empirical scholars of religion with respect theorizing about the meaning of religious language and practices as embodied in particular communities. This paper continues that exploration with especial reference to methodological constraints imposed by holism on the study of religion(s), as well as epistemological constraints on radical interpretation imposed by such empirical studies.

Guertin-Armstrong, Simon (Montréal) – Interdépendance épistémique et expertise
Cet article propose une défense et un prolongement de la théorie de l’interdépendance épistémique de John Hardwig (1985). Il s’agit d’une théorie normative de la connaissance au sens où elle tente de fonder en raison la structure « idéale » du savoir tout en prenant acte de la division du travail scientifique. L’objectif de l’investigation consiste à montrer qu’il est possible d’articuler un critère clair, plausible et cohérent de démarcation entre expert et profane.

*Habib, Allen (Calgary) – Sharing the Earth, by Parts and by Turns
The idea of distributive justice has its purchase in largely unexamined notion of ‘fair sharing’. We need a theory of sharing is needed to explain how it is we share, fairly or otherwise, complex goods. Towards that end I introduce here a distinction between sharing something by parts and sharing it by turns. I apply the distinction to the discussion of the currency of inter-generational environmental justice at the heart of the sustainability debate.

Harvey, Jean (Guelph) – Consumerism, Privilege and Oppression
I distinguish the “first order” realization of a consumerist way of living—the more visible aspects of the affluent consumer’s lifestyle, including purchased products and services and associated conveniences—from the “second order” realization—the less visible impact of consumerism on desires, self-valuing, and some important attributes relevant to character and moral agency. Examining the latter in the light of some major insights from feminist philosophy suggests that we should re-think the stereotype of the affluent consumer as privileged, self-centred and irresponsible.

*Hebert, Michel (Western) – Retrospective Assessments of Well-Being
What is the relationship between my personal values and the judgment that I am faring well? In this essay, I focus on retrospective assessments of well-being and the fluctuation of personal values over time. I think we are right to emphasize the importance of personal values in judgements of well-being. However, it is my view that the fluctuation of personal values over time undermines the determinacy of answers that purely subjective theories of well-being generate.

Heiti, Warren (Dalhousie) – Attention (Some Further Remarks)
This essay sets Simone Weil’s account of attention beside John McDowell’s account of virtue as sensitivity. The accounts are tested in some particular aesthetic and ethical contexts. In these contexts, it seems that attention is appropriate even when there is no opportunity for action. Furthermore, to render one’s own gesture of attention understandable, or to direct someone else’s attention, one may offer reasons which resist analysis into “beliefs” and “desires.”

Hejazi, Omid (Queen’s) – A Prioritarian Defence of Liberal Perfectionism
In this paper, I would like to show that the most defendable form of neutrality in liberalism is what I call “conditional neutrality”. I will argue that conditional neutrality could be compatible with “liberal perfectionism” in two important ways: (1) when the promoted good is derivable and could be defended by appealing to the fundamental liberal values such as equality and autonomy. Or (2) in the case that the promoted good is a universally acceptable value among everyone in the society.

Hochstein, Eric (Waterloo) – Statistical Models and Intentional Models: A Family Resemblance
In this paper, I argue that describing complex systems in terms of intentional states (e.g., beliefs, goals, states of information, etc) bears a striking similarity to the way in which statistical descriptions are used in scientific contexts. To demonstrate this, I compare and contrast the application of intentional language with the application of statistical models. I then argue that key similarities between the two give us compelling reasons to consider both as a type of phenomenological model. Following this, I highlight how intentional descriptions play an important role in scientific methodology as a phenomenal model.

Hoffmann, Glen (York) – Infallibility about the Self
On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified, i.e., justified in a way that is truth-entailing. Though rationalist infallibilism is undoubtedly running its course, adherence to at least one of the two species of infallible a priori justification refuses to disappear from mainstream epistemology. Exploring the second component thesis of rationalist infallibilism, I reject the infallible justification of propositions about the self.

Howard, Scott (Toronto) – Nostalgia
In this paper, I argue against two dominant accounts of the nature of nostalgia, put forward by philosophers, literary critics, historians, and sociologists. These views assume that nostalgia requires making an evaluative comparison between a present situation and a past one. I attempt to show that neither view does justice to the range of recognizably nostalgic experiences available to us — in particular, ‘Proustian’ nostalgia directed at involuntary autobiographical memories.

Hundleby, Catherine (Windsor) – Androcentric Bias, Fallacies, Heuristics and Norms
Androcentric bias in argumentation counts as a fallacy by the most demanding current standard of what counts as a fallacy of argumentation, that is Douglas Walton’s (1995). Walton (2010) argues that the attractiveness of fallacious arguments is caused by attenuated versions, “paraschemes” operating as psychological heuristics. Recent work in psychology (the “implicit association test”) suggests that androcentric bias runs much deeper, however, than other fallacies, and has a more complicated normative foundation than paraschemes provide.

Igneski, Violetta (McMaster) – Reconciling Orthodox and Political Conceptions of Human Rights
Are human rights moral rights persons have simply in virtue of being human or are they merely rights grounded in our current political and legal practices? While orthodox and political accounts have recently made a great deal of this distinction, I argue that the best account of human rights will both have a moral foundation and will recognize that human rights are constituted and implemented by political and legal institutions.

Jenkins, Maricarmen (USask) – The Internal Morality of Law as the Starting Point in General Jurisprudence
In this paper, I will argue that Fuller’s account of the internal morality of law should be the starting point in general jurisprudence, since, unlike both the starting points of legal positivism and natural law theory, Fuller’s approach can adequately orient an understanding of law specifically around its limitations. A clear understanding of the limitations of law is needed to understand the general nature of law and provide a proper basis for evaluating law.

Johannsen, Kyle (Queen’s) – Scope and Status in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls
G.A. Cohen is well known within contemporary political philosophy for claiming that distributive justice is personal. More recently, however, he’s also received attention for claiming that it’s a normative ideal. The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between these claims as they’re applied in criticism of John Rawls. It argues that the former, depending on how it’s interpreted, is either vindicated or undermined by the latter.

Johnstone, Mark (McMaster) – Universal Flux in Heraclitus
Since antiquity, Heraclitus has been widely associated with the view that everything in the world is in a constant state of change. However, in recent times attributing this view to Heraclitus has become highly controversial. In this paper, I advance a way of understanding Heraclitus that does justice both to the insights of critics of the traditional “universal flux” interpretation of his thought, and also to Heraclitus’s apparently high opinion of his own originality.

Kapusta, Stephanie (Western) – Critique of Haslanger’s Concept of Woman
I critique Haslanger’s definition of the concept woman as a subordinated social class. After having presented Haslanger’s methodology and aims in developing her definition of woman, I will point out its inherent ambiguities, particularly in relation to transgendered individuals. The succeeding investigation will show how the definition already assumes a concept of woman. Finally, by considering objections to my critique and their rebuttal, I show how my analysis is potentially fatal to Haslanger’s project.

*Kasaki, Masashi (UBC) – Virtue Epistemology and Environmental Luck
Virtue epistemology explains the value of knowledge as a general value attached to success through ability or competence. Duncan Pritchard contends, by appeal to a pair of examples, that (a) success through ability is compatible with environmental luck while (b) knowledge is not. In this paper, I argue against Pritchard that he fails to establish (a) or (b) because he misses the important differences between his examples that involve different means-end structures of performance.

Katz, Emily (Michigan State) – A Not Untidy Unity: Aristotle’s Metaphysics M-N
In contrast to others who have found Aristotle’s Metaphysics Books M and N to contain two quite separate works or to be an “untidy” unity, I argue that Books M and N are in fact a well-ordered unity. I defend this view by explaining how and where the three-part program announced in M.1 is carried out in the rest of M-N.

*Koo, Jo-Jo (Concordia) – How is Rule-Following Fundamentally Social?
Michael Luntley has recently mounted a devastating critique of the social or communitarian interpretation of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following, arguing that this interpretation is either question-begging or redundant. I argue that his critique overlooks an alternative understanding of the social basis of normativity in later Wittgenstein’s philosophy, according to which it is the learning of bedrock practices through training that fundamentally connects the individual to the community, not the continual policing of an individual’s rule-following by other members of the community.

*Kuhle, Lana (Toronto) – Interoception and the Bodily Self
There’s been a growing interest of late in the less commonly explored sensory modalities. There’s also been a growing interest in the relationship between the physical body and the body as it’s experienced first-personally. In this paper, I first show which of these less commonly explored sensory modalities are relevant to explaining this relationship; I then show how they explain the relationship between the physical body and the lived, subjective body.

*Kumar, Victor (Arizona) – Moral Judgment as a Natural Kind
I argue that moral judgment is a natural kind and present an empirical hypothesis about the content of moral judgments. Experimental research suggests that moral judgments are distinct from other normative judgments in that moral norms, unlike other norms, are (1) social, (2) serious, (3) generalizable, (4) authority-independent, and (5) objectively correct. I develop this view by suggesting that these features comprise a homeostatic property cluster. Finally, I respond to recent criticisms from Stephen Stich.

Laderoute, Karl (McMaster) – Nietzsche as Nominalist
Friedrich Nietzsche’s seemingly contradictory views on truth and knowledge have long been a source of debate for commentators. One prominent reading of Nietzsche’s thought is provided by Maudemarie Clark, who argues that he undergoes a substantial epistemological recalibration in his later philosophy. My interpretation contests this, arguing that by understanding Nietzsche as a nominalist we can appreciate what he says on truth and knowledge for a much more substantial portion of his work.

Lapointe, Sandra (McMaster) – Bolzano, Leibniz and Kant
According to the standard narrative, Bolzano’s place in the history of philosophy is determined by his proximity to Leibniz and his distance from Kant. I argue that this view is misleading. Bolzano’s contribution to philosophy should be understood on the background of the (largely ignored) “Kantian logical movement” that arose following the publication of the first Critique and more generally within the context of the reception of Kant’s critical philosophy.

Lavers, Gregory (Concordia) – Frege, Carnap and Explication
This paper argues that Carnap both did not, and should not have, viewed Frege’s project in the foundations of mathematics as misguided metaphysics. The reason for this is that Frege’s project was to give an explication of number in a very Carnapian sense — something that was not lost on Carnap. Furthermore, Frege gives pragmatic justification for the basic features of his system, especially where there are ontological considerations. Despite this, Frege does not accept the principle of tolerance. In the final section I explain why this is, given the interpretation presented in the preceding sections.

Lavery, Jonathan (WLU) – Searching for Impartial, Common Standards in Plato’s Protagoras
Plato’s “Protagoras” casts the leading sophist of the 5th century, Protagoras, against the author’s paradigmatic philosopher, Socrates. Fittingly, the guiding methodological issue of the dialogue is the search for agreement upon impartial, common standards for resolving disagreements over abstract questions. “Protagoras” dramatizes a search for common ground between figures who disagree fundamentally. I focus on the middle interlude, in which a series of speakers address the source of an impasse between the principal interlocutors.

*Lehan, Vanessa (York) – A Defence of Psychologism
In this paper I discuss different versions of psychologism outlined by Pelletier, Elio, and Hanson in “Is Logic all in Our Heads?” I argue that social psychologism, a position similar to the psychological descriptivism outlined by Pelletier et al, is an appealing form of psychologism. Firstly, because this form of psychologism allows philosophers to justify normative claims about human reasoning. Secondly, because psychological descriptivism is not subject to the historical criticisms against psychologism in general.

Luczak, Joshua (Western) – Fatalism, Bivalence, and You
It’s tempting to reject the principle of bivalence when threatened by fatalism. In this article I discuss some ways to ground this response. Ned Markosian (1995) contends that the only plausible grounding involves endorsing indeterministic laws of nature and a certain claim about truth. In contrast, I offer some other sets of commitments and explain that if these sets are at least as plausible, then we needn’t be committed to any part of Markosian’s view.

Lukits, Stefan (UBC) – The Principle of Maximum Entropy and a Problem in Probability Kinematics
Given a special type of evidence, the Principle of Maximum Entropy (PME) provides a solution for the posterior probability assignment based on the intuition that the information gain consistent with assumptions and evidence should be minimal. For one example (Judy Benjamin) the results provided by the PME are supported by an intuitive approach that prima facie should support the case of opponents of PME; and independence assumptions rendering results counter-intuitive are improperly applied by opponents.

*Macintosh, Rebecca (Western) – Explanation and Animal Kinds in Aristotle
Using the account of scientific explanation found in the Prior and Posterior Analytic, I argue that Aristotle’s use of natural kind essentialism and teleological development in his biological works offer a plurality of species definitions that agree with numerous modern species concepts. The combination of form, function, and inheritance with which Aristotle generates his definitions of animal kinds leads us to functional definitions of species that focus on explaining animal traits rather than taxonomical order.

Marsh, Jason (Western) – Procreative Ethics after Eden
The two most troubling conclusions that have been argued for in population ethics are (1) Derik Parfit’s repugnant conclusion and (2) David Benatar’s anti-natalist conclusion. Although more philosophers accept (1) than (2), this paper argues for something nearly as troubling as (2). In particular, I argue that up to billions of people – namely most theists – shouldn’t procreate. My goal is not to express animosity toward religious culture, but to identify a tension in the belief structure of most theists, one that concerns afterlife, procreative ethics and the problem of soteriological evil.

*Mason, Sheila (Concordia) – Virtue Theory and Postmodernism
In answer to the question whether virtue theory can be enlarged so as to incorporate the complex methods of thought of postmodernism rather than being limited by its very structure to elitism and conservatism incapable of radical destabilizing critique of established positions, I conclude that it can, but that both theories would benefit from the kind of enchanting visions one finds in good art, such as Ann Patchett’s novel Bel Canto, which succeeds, where philosophical theory fails, to elicit in readers vital intimations of moral possibilities by enticing them into a world in which delicate caring attachments emerge in unexpected ways.

Matheson, David (Carleton) – Epistemic Generativity and Testimony
In this paper I consider a question of relevance to recent epistemological claims about the importance and fundamentality of testimony as a knowledge-yielding process, viz., whether testimony is generative with respect to the knowledge it yields. After articulating three conceptions of epistemic generativity, I present a novel argument for the view that testimony—unlike other commonly countenanced processes—fails to count as generative under the strongest of these conceptions.

*Monast, Brian (Laval) – Panpsychisme et théorie du double aspect
L’article principal d’une nouvelle version du panpsychisme, soit la théorie du double aspect, n’est pas panpsychiste. Or, cet article rend superflues plusieurs des idées importantes du panpsychisme. Il ne s’agira pas cependant de défendre le panpsychisme, ni même la théorie du double aspect, mais plutôt d’interroger l’économie interne de l’argumentaire panpsychiste. La thèse de Galen Strawson servira d’exemple. L’enjeu serait une solution viable et très fructueuse concernant le problème que semble poser l’écart psychophysique.

Mugg, Joshua (York) – What Are the Cognitive Costs of Racism? A Reply to Gendler
Tamar Gendler argues that living in a racially structured society makes it impossible to be fully rational: one must either fail to encode racial information, or suffer three epistemic costs (cross-race deficit, stereotyping threat, and cognitive depletion). I argue that Gendler has failed to demonstrate the second horn of this dilemma, and as such, the dilemma we face is grimmer than Gendler realizes: we may either be rational or we may be moral, Kant notwithstanding.

Murphy, Jessica (McMaster) – Legal Obligation and Human Action
I argue that Hart, and, more recently, Stephen Perry and Scott Shapiro, misconstrue the nature and depth of the disagreement between sanction-based and rule-based theories of law. What is ultimately at stake, I suggest, are two competing conceptions of human nature and of human action which support different methodologies for the explanation of human behaviour, erecting different criteria of success between the two accounts. With the possibilities for comparative evaluation limited by competing and incommensurable methodologies, justificatory arguments must take place at the deeper level of a theory’s ontology.

Murray, Malcolm (UPEI) – Desire and Compliance
Contractarians have a compliance issue to solve. Although we can see that it is worth our while to agree to peace among ourselves, it seems worth our while to break that agreement whenever the circumstances allow. Such allowances seem frequent. The desire adjustment solution to the compliance problem involves shifting one’s desires. It is this solution I wish to explore.

Murray, Robert (Ryerson) – Liberalism and Recognition
I argue that Kymlicka’s conception of the national minority rights of aboriginal peoples in Canada illustrates a Kantian-Rawlsian conception of group-differentiated recognition which shares the basic reasoning and moral concerns of Fraser and Taylor. If sound, this would have important implications for how the political morality of Kantian-Rawlsian liberalism is to be understood, evaluated, addressed, and confronted. It would also indicate that some of its critics have not always tracked their subject matter.

*Overton, James (Western) – “Explanation” in Scientific Discourse
The philosophical literature on scientific explanation contains a striking diversity of accounts. I address this fragmentation by applying novel empirical methods. Starting with a set of 781 articles from the journal Science, I use text mining techniques and random sampling to develop a large set of small case studies. The results support a new general account, “layered explanation”, that acts as a frame for several existing philosophical accounts of scientific explanation.

Payette, Gilman (Calgary) – Normative Inconsistency: A Stit Account
In this paper we discuss possible accounts of normative inconsistency in a framework of a stit logic. We show that in this account we can introduce some subtle and intuitive ways which normative systems can be inconsistent. However, in the end we demonstrate that avoiding all of these kinds of normative inconsistency can be reduced to just avoiding one of the kinds.

Payton, Jonathan (Dalhousie) – Taking the Amoralist Seriously
Motivational internalism seems vulnerable to the apparent imaginability of an amoralist: someone who makes moral judgments without being motivated to act on them. In this paper I assess Michael Smith’s claim that this amoralist challenge is question-begging because it must rely on an antecedent commitment to externalism, and I construct an amoralist case which relies only on anti-individualism to motivate it. This shows that the amoralist challenge is a genuine one that internalism must face.
Peacock, Kent (Lethbridge) – Dynamic Entanglement: A New Challenge to Peaceful Coexistence?
This paper explores the ways in entanglement challenges the orthodox view that there is “peaceful coexistence” between quantum mechanics and special relativity.

*Perrin, Christophe (Paris-Sorbonne) – « Cogito me cogitare ». Sens et contresens
« Cogito me cogitare ». On croit la formule cartésienne : elle est leibnizienne. On sait qu’elle autorise une lecture du cogito selon la représentation : on ignore qu’il l’interdit. Heidegger met seize ans avant de l’expliquer : Jean-Luc Marion en met trente-six pour la critiquer. Saisir son sens étant saisir son contresens pour que le reproche fait à Descartes sur le sum du cogito se commue en un compliment, il faut l’expliciter.

Picard, Renaud (Paris 8 Vincennes Saint-Denis) – Hobbes et la loi naturelle
Contre le commentaire traditionnel, notre conférence souhaite montrer que la loi naturelle chez Hobbes n’est ni conseil de la raison égoïste, ni commandement divin : qu’elle est plutôt une loi morale qui tire sa force d’obligation dans le droit naturel. En son sens le plus strict, la loi naturelle serait alors une obligation morale de la conscience.

Piercy, Belinda (Toronto) – Peer Disagreement and Aesthetic Claims
In this paper I argue that those working in aesthetics need to take up the problem of peer disagreement currently discussed in epistemology. The popular conciliatory position offered in that debate points out an important problem with the way many aesthetic theorists deal with the issue of responding rationally to disagreement. However, applying the conciliatory approach to aesthetic disagreement produces a devastating result for our lives as aesthetic judges, and should prompt us to keep looking for new solutions to the problem of peer disagreement.

Pikkert, Owen (McMaster) – Two Deflationary Approaches to Ontology
Ontologists generally view themselves as engaged in substantive debates over what really exists. In this paper I examine two alternative, deflationary approaches to ontology. These include Matti Eklund’s maximalism and Eli Hirsch’s quantifier variance. I argue that both maximalism and quantifier variance are problematic.

Porter, Lindsey (Sheffield) – You’re Nobody ’til Somebody Loves You, Baby
According to MA Warren’s account of the moral significance of birth—that is, whether and how birth can change the moral status of the foetus/neonate—being a party to social relationships makes one morally considerable. Social community membership then confers full moral community membership on minimally sentient beings. I argue that an explicitly contextual account of the moral quality of acts can better explain our intuitions about the moral difference between abortion and infanticide.

Rochefort, Pierre-Yves (Montréal) – Putnam et le platonisme en philosophie des mathématiques
On associe habituellement l’indispensabilité des mathématiques au platonisme. Puisque Putnam défend depuis longtemps l’indispensabilité des mathématiques, plusieurs lui ont attribué la défense d’une telle posture en philosophie des mathématiques. C’était le cas d’Yvon Gauthier dans une critique du réalisme quasi empiriste de Putnam. Je voudrais répondre à l’argument de Gauthier afin de mettre en évidence le fait que Putnam n’a jamais défendu quelque forme de platonisme que ce soit en philosophie des mathématiques.

*Rodier, Dany (Freiburg) – Gadamer et la philosophie : des sciences humaines à la métaphysique
Le propos de cette étude est de montrer le rapport étroit qui existe entre la stratégie de légitimation des sciences humaines élaborée dans Vérité et méthode (1960) et la conviction de Gadamer selon laquelle la philosophie est essentiellement métaphysique. Je soutiens que l’apologie de la métaphysique dans les écrits extérieurs à Vérité et méthode participe du même projet de renouvellement de la compréhension de soi de la philosophie que celui qui anime l’oeuvre de 1960.

*Rosner, Mark (Queen’s) – Against Volitional Necessities
In this paper I argue against Harry Frankfurt’s claim that volitional necessities ground all of our reasons for action. I canvass various arguments Frankfurt forwards for his claim and rebut them. In the process, I sketch an alternative account of our moral psychology that does not entail that authoritative reasons for action are grounded in any particular attitude of the agent, by way of some remarks on the first-personal nature of deliberation.

Ross, Andrew P. (Queen’s) – The Authority of Moderate Deontology
I argue that Moderate deontologists are committed to the view that deontic constraints are always balanced against consequentialist moral standards. Following this, I argue that there are certain cases where agents may tip the balance of reasons in favour of consequentialism. In light of these arguments, I argue that if we wish to maintain the intuitive authority of constraints then we must be Absolutists.

Rossiter, Elliot (Western) – Ross and the Spirit of the Promise
Susan Brennan thinks that W.D. Ross’s appeal to the spirit of the promise, in his response to W.D. Pickard-Cambridge, commits him to some form of ideal utilitarianism, as an implicit condition of promise-keeping seems to be that good is maximized. I argue this appeal does not commit Ross to ideal utilitarianism but that this appeal is vitiated by divergence in the moral opinions of educated people, the data of ethics.

*Roy, Mathieu (Western) – Aristotle’s So-Called Moral Monism
In Rethinking Multiculturalism, Bhikhu Parekh labels Aristotle a moral monist on account of his failure to make room for cultural factors in his moral philosophy, and promoting the way of life of the philosopher as superior to all others. In this paper, I offer an interpretation of Aristotle’s accounts of the mean and of contemplation in the Nicomachean Ethics that show that Parekh’s charge of moral monism rests on a misreading of Aristotle’s ethics.

*Sangster, Lee-Anna (Western) – The Empty Threat of the Empty HOT Objection to HOT Theory
Block (2011a) argues that the Higher Order Thought Theory of Consciousness is incoherent and that this can be shown via cases where the higher order thoughts represent lower order states that do not exist (i.e, cases of Empty HOTs). After outlining Block’s concerns I argue that the alleged incoherence dissipates once we recognize that the HOT Theory actually explains two separate yet conflated aspects of consciousness: State Consciousness and Phenomenal Consciousness.

Schranz, Mark (Toronto) – Third-Party Beneficiaries, Directed-Duty Bearers, and the Interest Theory of Rights
Herein I argue that properly attending to the duty-bearer’s position in third-party beneficiary scenarios shows that the Interest Theory of rights is in serious trouble. First, I outline the debate between the Interest Theory and the Will Theory. Second, I show why the third-party beneficiary problem might be fatal for Interest Theory. Third, I show how a focus on the duty-bearer demonstrates that this problem is fatal for the Interest Theory.

Shirreff, Patrick (Michigan) – Forging a Credal form of Reliabilism
Reliabilism is a theory of justification which states that a belief if justified iff it was formed by a reliable process. While Reliabilism does appear to be a comprehensive theory of justification, a closer inspection reveals that it does not appear to have the resources to accommodate more fine-grained epistemology dealing in credences. This paper will attempt to forge a version of reliabilism dealing in credences by allowing evidence to play a role along with reworking the notion of reliability.

Siebert, Matthew (Toronto) – Augustine on Testimony
Augustine is the first to argue that we can have knowledge by means of testimony. I explain four necessary conditions he places on testimony, and argue that Augustine holds a second-personal view of testimony. I criticize both a default-entitlement and a reductionist interpretation of Augustine. And I show how Augustine has distinctive contributions to make to the current debate on the nature, scope and epistemic justification of testimony.

Stegenga, Jacob (Toronto) – Probabilizing the End
If one has a reason to attain some end, then one has a reason to effect means for that end: reasons are transmitted from end to means. I argue that the likelihood ratio is a compelling measure of reason transmission from ends to means. The likelihood ratio measure is superior to other measures, and satisfies intuitions regarding end-means reason transmission in a broad array of cases.

Strohminger, Margot (St Andrews) – Is Objectual Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?
The standard interpretation of the claim that conceivability is a guide to possibility, or Hume’s maxim, is the following: if A imagines that p, then A is thereby justified in believing that it is possible that p. There are also variants of Hume’s maxim framed in terms of objectual imagining (as in Yablo 1993). I argue that neither kind of imagining suffices for justification of the ‘corresponding’ possibility belief.

Sullivan, Arthur (MUN) – Semantically-Driven Interpretive Processes
The aim of this paper is to work toward rebutting the prevalent notion that there is no tenable middle ground between semantic minimalism and semantic contextualism. I will argue that it rests on a false dilemma, which results from unhelpfully broad senses of, respectively, ‘semantics’ (within the minimalists’ camp) and ‘pragmatics’ (on the part of contextualists).

Szende, Jennifer (Queen’s) – Is Global Justice Bad for Women?
Within a liberal domestic theory of justice, the public/private distinction has been repeatedly shown to be bad for women because it creates a domain for injustice that becomes invisible to public policy and the law. I argue that state-centered theories of global justice, especially those that draw on a robust account of sovereignty create an analogous space that is cut off from questions of global justice, and for this reason, I suggest that this way of framing questions of global justice is bad for women in particular.

*Taylor, Chloë (Alberta) – A Feminist Reading of Foucault’s Pierre Rivière
This essay is a critical feminist reading of Michel Foucault’s 1973 publication of “I, Pierre Rivière, Having Slaughtered My Mother, My Sister, and My Brother…”, a collection of archival documents and essays concerning a nineteenth-century matricide.

Thorp, John (Western) – Aristotle and Code
This paper explores the primitive notion of “encoding” that is at work in some of Aristotle’s scientific work. Semantic theory is a relatively straightforward case. More difficult is the case of cognition: perceptions are encoded as kinêseis, and this allows them to continue to exist subconsciously, appearing later in memory or dreams. And most difficult is the case of genetic theory: traits are encoded in male and female semen and so passed on to offspring.

Tonkens, Ryan (York) – Virtuous Parenting
In this paper I articulate a character-based account of the ethics of parenthood, one that overcomes the problems of rights-based and deontological views that currently monopolize this area of philosophy. Attending to the character of parents adds a rich element to our theories of good parenting and our understanding of (un)acceptable parenting practices. Being a virtuous parent extends beyond acting within one’s rights and meeting one’s parental obligations; it is something that a parent does, and is not accomplished by default. After discussing the major tenets of my theory, I examine the parental virtues of creativity and love.

Turri, John (Waterloo) – Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion
I accomplish two things in this paper. First I expose some important limitations of the contemporary literature on the norms of assertion, and in the process illuminate a host of new directions and forms that an account of assertional norms might take. Second I leverage those insights to suggest a new account of the relationship between knowledge and assertion, which arguably outperforms the standard knowledge account

Viger, Chris (Western) – A Model of Concept Acquisition
I present a model of concept acquisition supported by recent findings in cognitive science. I present a challenge to the possibility of increasing the expressive power of our conceptual system from an extreme nativist LOT perspective. As an alternative, I offer my acquired language of thought hypothesis (ALOT) with converging evidence from neuroscience and psychology to support that view. From thisframework, I explain how concept acquisition is possible as a “bootstrapping” process using placeholders.

Walschots, Michael (Western) – Scanlon and the Virtuous Circle of Promissory Obligations
In What We Owe to Each Other Thomas Scanlon responds to the objection that his conception of promising is subject to a charge of circularity. In this paper I suggest that Scanlon’s response itself is question-begging and, as a result, he cannot adequately explain how promissory obligations are created.

Wayne, Katherine (Queen’s) – Recognizing Moral Loss in Reproduction
The principle of procreative beneficence (PPB) represents a particular strategy for resolving the Non-Identity Problem (NIP). Appealing to the doctrine of impersonal harm, PPB advocates may condemn particular reproductive acts, even when those acts harm no identifiable individual. I argue that adherence to the PPB entails condemning not only some but (almost) all reproductive acts. Moreover, this antinatalist entailment is also not avoided with alternative NIP resolution strategies, rendering the antinatalist conclusion difficult to reject.

Winsby, Meghan (Western) – Promises to Children
As one of our strongest and most persistent moral intuitions, the principle that one ought to keep one’s promises has been considered by many philosophers to be self-evident. In this paper I present a challenge to an expectational account of our duty to fulfill promises– namely, that the view has trouble accounting for our promissory obligations to children and other moral patients.

Wright, Ian (York) – The Problem of Perverseness
The possibility of amoralists—agents capable of making moral judgements without being moved by them—is a controversial issue in the metaethical debate between motivational internalists, who argue against it, and motivational externalists, who endorse it. I discuss a similar phenomenon: one that is overlooked despite being more common. Poe called it “the perverse” and using his work, some anecdotes, and research from behavioural psychology, I argue that perverseness presents a novel challenge to internalism.

Wunder, Tyler (WLU) – Plantinga’s Recent Treatment of Draper
In Where the Conflict Really Lies, Alvin Plantinga criticises Paul Draper’s evolutionary argument against theism by focussing upon the claim that evolution is much more probable on naturalism than on theism. I argue two things: first, Plantinga’s critique contains a serious probabilistic error; second, with the error corrected, some of Plantinga’s natural theology requires theism to be contingent just as much as does Draper’s evolutionary argument against theism.

Yaqub, Aladdin (Lehigh) – Ibn Sina’s Causal Necessity and Al-Ghazali’s Occasionalism
An important doctrine of Ibn Sina’s theory of causality is that an effect is contingent in virtue of its own essence and necessary in virtue of its efficient cause. This notion of causal necessity troubled al-Ghazali, who advocated a version of occasionalism. I will discuss some of the central points of Ibn Sina’s theory of causality. Then I will discuss al-Ghazali’s attack on Ibn Sina’s theory and his alternative account of causality.

Yates, Arthur (Western) – Fooles and the Righteous in Hobbes’s Leviathan
This paper addresses two views Hobbes scholars commonly hold: first, that most citizens require the threat of punishment to motivate justice; second, that Hobbes’s refutation of the Foole, who argues that justice is discordant with reason, fails. This paper argues that Hobbes’s reply to the Foole should not be read as an attempted refutation but, rather, an attempted silencing. Hobbes’s reply supports the thesis that just persons in civil society are not the rare exception.

Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani (Oxford – Wolfson College) – Propositions and Compositionality
There is no such thing as a compositional assignment of propositions (relative to contexts) to the sentences of a natural language.

Zaslow, Joanna (McMaster) – Relational Autonomy and Submissive BDSM Sexual Relationships
This paper argues that while feminist accounts of autonomy ought to recognize a woman’s right to choose to enter into a submissive sexual relationship (in particular BDSM relationships), strong substantive autonomy is unable to consistently do so based on its rigid structure and reliance on the feminist intuition. In response, I argue that proceduralist account of autonomy provides a more suitable approach while still remaining concerned with the external influence of patriarchy.

Zettel, David (Cornell) – Albert the Great and the Matter of Virtue
This paper argues that Albert the Great in his early Summa de bono espoused a view of the virtues as essentially remedial. It further claims that Albert held that only sensual pleasures and pains could provide the sort of difficulty for which ethical virtues would be necessary. It argues for this claim through an examination of the “matter of virtue”, an important concept in Albert’s ethics which has not been well understood.